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 ﻣـﻠﺨــﺺ
 
ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺒﺎدئ أﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺗﻤﺜﻠﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺢ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺮﻋﻴﻦ واﻟﻤﺒѧﺪﻋﻴﻦ ﻓѧﻲ 
ﻨﻴѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻗﺘﺼѧﺎدﻳﺔ وأدﺑﻴѧﺔ ﻣﺤѧﺪدة وﻟﻤѧﺪد ﻣﺤѧﺪودة ﺧﺎﺿѧﻌﺔ ﻟѧﺒﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺠﺎﻻت اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ واﻷدﺑﻴﺔ واﻟﻔ 
إﻟﻰ أﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻔﻜﺮ اﻹﺑﺪاﻋﻴѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ ﻣﺠѧﺎل " اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ "وﻳﺸﻴﺮ ﻣﺼﻄﻠﺢ . اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎءات واﻹﻋﻔﺎءات 
اﻻﺧﺘﺮاﻋѧѧѧﺎت واﻟﻤﺼѧѧѧﻨﻔﺎت اﻷدﺑﻴѧѧѧﺔ واﻟﻔﻨﻴѧѧѧﺔ واﻟﺮﻣѧѧѧﻮز واﻷﺳѧѧѧﻤﺎء واﻟﺼѧѧѧﻮر واﻟﻨﻤѧѧѧﺎذج واﻟﺮﺳѧѧѧﻮم 
ﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ أهﻤﻴﺔ آﺒﺮى ﺑﻌﺪ أن أﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﻣﺼѧﺪرًا ﻣﻬﻤѧًﺎ ﻟﻠﺜѧﺮوة، وﻗﺪ اآﺘﺴﺒﺖ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ ا . اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ
ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻤﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺸѧﻬﺪ اﻗﺘﺼѧﺎدﻳﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﺗﺤѧﻮﻻت آﺒﻴѧﺮة ﻇﻬѧﺮت ﺟﻠﻴѧًﺎ اﻋﺘﺒѧﺎرًا ﻣѧﻦ اﻟﺮﺑѧﻊ 
اﻷﺧﻴѧﺮ ﻣѧﻦ اﻟﻘѧﺮن اﻟﻌﺸѧﺮﻳﻦ، ﺣﻴѧﺚ ﺗﺤﻮﻟѧﺖ ﻣѧﻦ اﻗﺘﺼѧﺎدﻳﺎت ﺗﻌﺘﻤѧﺪ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﺼѧﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳѧﺔ إﻟѧﻰ 
ﻜﺴѧﺖ هѧﺬﻩ اﻟﺘﺤѧѧﻮﻻت اﻻﻗﺘﺼѧﺎدﻳﺔ، إﺿѧѧﺎﻓﺔ إﻟѧﻰ اﻟﺘﻄѧѧﻮر وﻗѧѧﺪ اﻧﻌ. اﻗﺘﺼѧﺎدﻳﺎت ﺗﻌﺘﻤѧﺪ ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ اﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓѧﺔ 
اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻲ اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ واﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ، اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺷѧﻬﺪت 
ﺑѧﺪورهﺎ ﺗﺤѧﻮﻻت آﺒﻴѧﺮة ﺷѧﻤﻠﺖ ﺗﺴѧﻬﻴﻞ اﺳﺘﻨﺴѧﺎخ اﻟﻤѧﻮاد اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧﺔ ﺑﺘﻠѧﻚ اﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق ﺑﺪرﺟѧﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﻴѧﺔ ﻣѧﻦ 
اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ ﺗﺼﻠﻪ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، ﻣﻤﺎ ﺧﻠѧﻖ ﺗﻬﺪﻳѧﺪًا ﻣﺒﺎﺷѧﺮًا ﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق اﻟﺠﻮدة وﻧﻘﻠﻬﺎ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻷﺛﻴﺮ إﻟﻰ أي ﻣﻜﺎن ﻓﻲ 
وﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴٍﺔ أﺧﺮى ﺳѧﺎﻋﺪت ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴѧﺎ اﻟﺘﺸѧﻔﻴﺮ، وﻣѧﺎ ﺷѧﺎﺑﻬﻬﺎ ﻣѧﻦ . اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻄﺎق اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ 
وﺳﺎﺋﻞ، ﺣﺎﻣﻠﻲ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻷﺣﻴﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻨﺘﺠﺎﺗﻬﻢ، ﺑﻞ ﻣﻨѧﻊ ﺣﺘѧﻰ 
 .ﺎﻧﻮناﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺸﺮوﻋﺔ ﺑﻤﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻘ
ﻧѧѧﺎﻗﺶ هѧѧﺬا اﻟﺒﺤѧѧﺚ ﻣﺴѧѧﺄﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳѧѧﺔ اﻟﺪوﻟﻴѧѧﺔ ﻟﺤﻘѧѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧѧﺔ ﻓѧѧﻲ ﺿѧѧﻮء ﺗﻮﺳѧѧﻊ اﻟﺘﺠѧѧѧﺎرة 
وﻗﺪ ﺷﻤﻞ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﺸﺮة أﺑﻮاب ﺗﻨﺎوﻟﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﻮاﻟﻲ اﻟﺘﻄﻮر اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺨﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ، . اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ
 وﻃﺒﻴﻌѧѧﺔ وﺣѧѧﺪود ﺣﻘѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧѧﺔ، واﻟﺘﺤѧѧﺪي اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜѧѧﻞ ﻓѧѧﻲ ﻇѧѧﺎهﺮة اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ وآﻴﻔﻴѧѧﺔ ﺗﻨﻈѧѧﻴﻢ 
اﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ وآﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺣﻞ ﻣﻌﻀѧﻠﺔ ﺗﻨѧﺎزع اﻟﻘѧﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﻮاﺟѧﻪ اﻟﺘﺠѧﺎرة اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ واﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ 
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اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ، وآﻴﻔﻴѧﺔ ﺣﻤﺎﻳѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻠѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧﻒ واﻟﻌﻼﻣѧﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧﺔ 
ﻟﺘﻮاﻓѧﻖ وﺑѧﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘѧﺮاع ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ، وأﺛѧﺮ ﺗѧﺪوﻳﻞ ﺣﻤﺎﻳѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ وا 
 . اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﺑﺸﺄن ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺤﻘﻮق ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ، إﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺨﺎﺗﻤﺔ واﻟﺘﻮﺻﻴﺎت
ﺷѧﻤﻞ هѧﺬا اﻟﺒѧﺎب ﺛﻼﺛѧﺔ ﻓﺼѧﻮل رﺋﻴﺴѧﻴﺔ، . ﺗﻀﻤﻦ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻷول ﺳﺮدًا ﺗﺄرﻳﺨﻴًﺎ ﻟﺘﻄﻮر اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ 
واﻟﻌﺼѧѧﺮ ﺗﺘﺒѧѧﻊ اﻟﻔﺼѧѧﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻨﻬѧѧﺎ ﺗﻄѧѧﻮر اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧѧﺔ اﻋﺘﺒѧѧﺎرًا ﻣѧѧﻦ ﻋﺼѧѧﺮ ﻣѧѧﺎ ﻗﺒѧѧﻞ اﻟﺘѧѧﺎرﻳﺦ 
وﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜѧﺎﻧﻲ . اﻹﻏﺮﻳﻘﻲ اﻟﺮوﻣﺎﻧﻲ واﻟﻌﺼﻮر اﻟﻮﺳﻄﻰ وﻋﺼﺮ اﻟﻨﻬﻀﺔ واﻟﻌﺼѧﺮ اﻟﺤѧﺪﻳﺚ 
اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪي اﻟﺬي آﺎن ﻳﻨﻈﻢ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ، واﻟﺬي اﺳﺘﻨﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺒѧﺪأ اﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ 
م، واﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴѧﺔ ﺑﻴѧﺮن 3881ﺗﻮﻓﻴﺮ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ وﻓﻘًﺎ ﻟﻤﺎ ﻗﺮرﺗﻪ اﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺑﺎرﻳﺲ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﺼѧﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ 
ورآﺰ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟѧﺚ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟѧﺪﻋﻮة ﻟﺘѧﺪوﻳﻞ ﺣﻤﺎﻳѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧﻮق . 6881ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﻨﻔﺎت اﻷدﺑﻴﺔ واﻟﻔﻨﻴﺔ 
 ﻓѧﻲ هѧﺬا 4991( ﺗﺮﻳﺒﺲ)اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ ودور اﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮاﺣﻲ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ 
ﻴѧﺎت اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﻴѧﺔ واﻟﺜﻨﺎﺋﻴѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ هѧﺬا اﻟﻤﺠѧﺎل، وﻣѧﺎ ﺗﺒﻌﻬѧﺎ ﻣѧﻦ ﺗﻄѧﻮرات ﺷѧﻤﻠﺖ إﺑѧﺮام اﻟﻌﺪﻳѧﺪ ﻣѧﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗ 
واﺳﺘﺤﺪاث وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻟﻠﻔﺼﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﺎزﻋﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺤﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﻮﺣѧﺪ 
ﻟﺤѧѧﻞ اﻟﻨﺰاﻋѧѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧѧﺔ ﺑﺄﺳѧѧﻤﺎء اﻟﻨﻄѧѧﺎق اﻟѧѧﺬي أﺻѧѧﺪرﺗﻪ ﻣﺆﺳﺴѧѧﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ ﻟﻸﺳѧѧﻤﺎء واﻷرﻗѧѧﺎم 
ت اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﺰاﻋѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼﺔ، إﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ دور اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺿﻲ، ﺑﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻤﺤﺎآﻢ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ وهﻴﺌﺎ 
 .   اﻟﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ واﻟﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻠﺔ
وﻗѧﺪ . ﺑّﻴﻦ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ وﺷѧﺮوط ﻣﻨﺤﻬѧﺎ وﺣﻤﺎﻳﺘﻬѧﺎ واﻟﻐѧﺮض ﻣѧﻦ ذﻟѧﻚ 
ﺗﻀﻤﻦ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب ﺛﻼﺛѧﺔ ﻓﺼѧﻮل رﺋﻴﺴѧﻴﺔ، ﺗﻄѧﺮق اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ إﻟѧﻰ ﺗﻌﺮﻳѧﻒ ﻣﺼѧﻄﻠﺢ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ 
أﻧﻮاع اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺷѧﻤﻠﺖ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧﻒ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﻀѧﻢ اﻟﻤﺼѧﻨﻔﺎت اﻷدﺑﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ وﻋّﺪد أهﻢ 
واﻟﻔﻨﻴѧѧﺔ آﺎﻟﺮواﻳѧѧﺎت واﻟﻘﺼѧѧﺎﺋﺪ واﻟﻤﺴѧѧﺮﺣﻴﺎت واﻷﻓѧѧﻼم واﻷﻟﺤѧѧﺎن اﻟﻤﻮﺳѧѧﻴﻘﻴﺔ واﻟﺮﺳѧѧﻮم واﻟﻠﻮﺣѧѧﺎت 
واﻟﺼѧѧﻮر اﻟﺸﻤﺴѧѧﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻤﺎﺛﻴѧѧﻞ واﻟﺘﺼѧѧﻤﻴﻤﺎت اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳѧѧﻴﺔ واﻟﺤﻘѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﺠѧѧﺎورة ﻟﺤﻘѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧѧﻒ واﻟﺘѧѧﻲ 
 اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧѧѧﺔ ﺑѧѧѧﺄداﺋﻬﻢ وﺣﻘѧѧѧﻮق ﻣﻨﺘﺠѧѧѧﻲ اﻟﺘﺴѧѧѧﺠﻴﻼت اﻟﺼѧѧѧﻮﺗﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺒﻄѧѧѧﺔ ﺗﺸѧѧѧﻤﻞ ﺣﻘѧѧѧﻮق ﻓﻨѧѧѧﺎﻧﻲ اﻷداء 
ﺑﺘﺴﺠﻴﻼﺗﻬﻢ وﺣﻘѧﻮق هﻴﺌѧﺎت اﻹذاﻋѧﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺼѧﻠﺔ ﺑﺒѧﺮاﻣﺞ اﻟﺮادﻳѧﻮ واﻟﺘﻠﻔﺰﻳѧﻮن ﻣѧﻦ ﺟﻬѧﺔ،  وﻣѧﻦ اﻟﺠﻬѧﺔ 
63 
اﻷﺧﺮى ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﻔѧﺮع ﺑѧﺪورهﺎ إﻟѧﻰ ﺑѧﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘѧﺮاع واﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﻤѧﻨﺢ 
رﺟﺔ اﻻﺧﺘﺮاع،  واﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ واﻟﺨﺪﻣﻴﺔ، واﻷﺳѧﻤﺎء اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧﺔ، ﻷﻧﻮاع اﻻﺑﺘﺪاع اﻟﺘﻲ ﻻ ﺗﺒﻠﻎ د 
واﻟﺮﺳﻮم واﻟﻨﻤﺎذج اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ واﻟﺪواﺋﺮ اﻟﻤﺘﻜﺎﻣﻠﺔ، وﺑﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺪر اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﻴﺔ، إﺿﺎﻓًﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻷﺳѧﺮار 
وﺗﻀﻤﻦ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ واﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﺷѧﺮﺣًﺎ ﻣѧﻮﺟﺰًا ﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ . اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ واﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔ ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوﻋﺔ 
وﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑѧﻊ اﻟﺘﺒﺮﻳѧﺮات . ﻨﺤﻬѧﺎ وﻣѧﺎ ﻳѧﺮد ﻋﻠﻴﻬѧﺎ ﻣѧﻦ ﻗﻴѧﻮد واﺳѧﺘﺜﻨﺎءاتاﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ وﺷѧﺮوط ﻣ
 .اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ
ﺗﻀѧﻤﻦ . أﻣﺎ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﻄﺮق إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﺤﺪي اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻇﺎهﺮة اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وآﻴﻔﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣѧﻞ ﻣﻌﻬѧﺎ 
ﻳѧﻒ ﻣﺼѧﻄﻠﺢ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ وآﻴﻔﻴѧﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻬѧﺎ، هﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب ﺛﻼﺛѧﺔ ﻓﺼѧﻮل رﺋﻴﺴѧﻴﺔ، ﺗﻨѧﺎول اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻷول ﺗﻌﺮ 
ﺣﻴﺚ ﺷﻤﻞ هﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺷﺮﺣًﺎ ﻣﻔﺼﻞ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﺎﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴѧﺔ، وﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ آѧﺬﻟﻚ 
ﺗﻄѧѧﻮر اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ وإﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴѧѧﺔ ﺗﻮﺳѧѧﻌﻬﺎ ﻓѧѧﻲ اﻟﻤﺴѧѧﺘﻘﺒﻞ، ﺣﻴѧѧﺚ ﺗﺘﺒѧѧﻊ هѧѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧѧﻞ ﻇѧѧﺎهﺮة اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ ﻣﻨѧѧﺬ 
ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮات اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤѧﻊ أﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻘﺪ ﻓﺤﺺ . ﻇﻬﻮرهﺎ وﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ﺗﻄﻮرهﺎ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ 
ودرس اﻟﻔﺼѧѧﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟѧѧﺚ آﻴﻔﻴѧѧﺔ اﻟﺴѧѧﻴﻄﺮة ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ . اﻟѧѧﺪوﻟﻲ، ﺣﻴѧѧﺚ ﻧѧѧﺎﻗﺶ ﻣﺤﺎﺳѧѧﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ وﺳѧѧﻠﺒﻴﺎﺗﻬﺎ 
اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ وﻋѧѧﺮض ﻣﺨﺘﻠѧѧﻒ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳѧѧﺎت اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﺗѧѧﻢ ﻃﺮﺣﻬѧѧﺎ، وﻣﻨﻬѧѧﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳѧѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﺗѧѧﺪﻋﻮ إﻟѧѧﻰ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠѧѧﺔ 
اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗѧﺪﻋﻮ ﻟﻠﺘﻘﻴѧﺪ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ آﻌѧﺎﻟﻢ ﻣﻨﻔﺼѧﻞ ﻋѧﻦ ﻋѧﺎﻟﻢ اﻟﻮاﻗѧﻊ ﻟѧﻪ ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻨѧﻪ وﻧﻈﻤѧﻪ اﻟﺨﺎﺻѧﺔ ﺑѧﻪ، وﺗﻠѧﻚ 
ﺑѧﺎﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗѧﺮى أﻧﻬѧﺎ ﻗѧﺎدرة ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﺳѧﺘﻴﻌﺎب ﻇѧﺎهﺮة اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ واﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣѧﻞ ﻣﻌﻬѧﺎ، وﺛﺎﻟﺜѧﺔ 
ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﻰ اﻻﺳﺘﻔﺎدة ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘѧﺪرات اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴѧﺔ ﻟﻠﺴѧﻴﻄﺮة ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ ﻣѧﻦ ﺧѧﻼل ﺗﺼѧﻤﻴﻤﻬﺎ ﺑﺸѧﻜﻞ 
ﺘѧѧﺪاﺑﻴﺮ اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴѧѧﺔ ﻳﺘﻮاﻓѧﻖ ﻣѧѧﻊ ﻣѧﺎ ﻳﺮﻳѧѧﺪﻩ اﻟﻘѧﺎﻧﻮن، وﻧﻈﺮﻳѧѧﺔ راﺑﻌѧѧﺔ ﺗѧﺪﻋﻮ إﻟѧѧﻰ ﺗﻄﺒﻴѧﻖ ﺧﻠѧѧﻴﻂ ﻣѧﻦ اﻟ 
 .واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ
ﺗﻢ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ هѧﺬا اﻟﺒѧﺎب إﻟѧﻰ ﺳѧﺘﺔ ﻓﺼѧﻮل رﺋﻴﺴѧﻴﺔ، . ﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ آﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ 
ﻋѧѧѧﺮض اﻟﻔﺼѧѧѧﻞ اﻷول ﻓѧѧѧﺮص وﺗﺤѧѧѧﺪﻳﺎت اﻟﺘﺠѧѧѧﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧѧѧﺔ، ﺣﻴѧѧѧﺚ ﺗﻀѧѧѧﻤﻦ ﺗﻌﺮﻳѧѧѧﻒ اﻟﺘﺠѧѧѧﺎرة 
 ﻓѧѧﻲ ذﻟѧѧﻚ ﺗﻠѧѧﻚ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧѧﺔ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧѧﺔ وﺗﻄﻮرهѧѧﺎ واﻧﺘﺸѧѧﺎرهﺎ واﻟﻤﻌﻮﻗѧѧﺎت اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﺗﻌﺘѧѧﺮض ﺳѧѧﺒﻴﻠﻬﺎ، ﺑﻤѧѧﺎ 
أﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜѧﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻘѧﺪ ﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ . ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻮاﺣﻲ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ واﻟﺪﺧﻮل إﻟﻰ اﻟﺴﻮق، إﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻌﻮﻗﺎت اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ 
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اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ، وﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟѧﻰ إﻳﺠѧﺎد ﻗѧﺎﻧﻮن دوﻟѧﻲ ﻣﻮﺣѧﺪ 
ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻟﻘѧﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﻨﻤﻮذﺟﻴѧﺔ، وﺛﺎﻟﺜѧﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺎت، وأﺧﺮى ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﻰ ﺗﺒﻨﻲ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻣﻮﺣﺪ ﻋﻦ 
ﺗѧѧﺪﻋﻮ إﻟѧѧﻰ ﺗﻄѧѧﻮﻳﺮ ﻗѧѧﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﺷѧѧﺒﻴﻬﺔ ﺑѧѧﺎﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ آﻮﻧﻬѧѧﺎ اﻟﺘﺠѧѧﺎر ﺧѧѧﻼل اﻟﻌﺼѧѧﻮر اﻟﻮﺳѧѧﻄﻰ ﻟﺘѧѧﻨﻈﻢ 
. ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻼﺗﻬﻢ، وﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ راﺑﻌﺔ ﺗﻨﺎدي ﺑﺘﻄﻮﻳﺮ ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻋѧﻦ ﻃﺮﻳѧﻖ ﻣѧﺰج اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳѧﺎت اﻟѧﺜﻼث ﺳѧﺎﻟﻔﺔ اﻟѧﺬآﺮ 
ﻧѧﺖ، ﺣﻴѧﺚ ﺗﻀѧﻤﻦ هѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ أﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻘﺪ درس آﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺻﻴﺎﻏﺔ اﻟﻌﻘѧﻮد ﻋѧﻦ ﻃﺮﻳѧﻖ اﻻﻧﺘﺮ 
. ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﻤﺼﻄﻠﺤﺎت ذات اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﻌﻘﺪ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ واﻟﺴﺠﻞ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ واﻟﻮآﻴﻞ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧѧﻲ 
آﺬﻟﻚ ﻧﺎﻗﺶ هﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮ اﻟﻌﻘﺪ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ، وهﻲ اﻹﻳﺠﺎب واﻟﻘﺒﻮل واﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻞ وﻧﻴﺔ ﺧﻠѧﻖ ﻋﻼﻗѧﺎت 
 اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ، ﺧﺎﺻѧًﺔ ﻣѧﺎ ﻳﻌѧﺮف ﺗﻌﺎﻗﺪﻳѧﺔ، وآﻴﻔﻴѧﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﻴѧﻖ ﺗﻠѧﻚ اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻѧﺮ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﻌﻘѧﻮد اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﺒѧﺮم ﻋﺒѧﺮ 
وﻓﺤﺺ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑѧﻊ ﻣѧﺪى ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻌﻘѧﻮد اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ ﺿѧﻮء اﻟﺸѧﻜﻠﻴﺎت . ﺑﺎﻟﻮآﻴﻞ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ 
اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻮد اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﻜﺘﺎﺑﺔ وآﻮن اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻨﺪ أﺻﻠﻲ وﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒѧﻞ اﻟﺸѧﺨﺺ 
ﺘﻨﺪات اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ، ﺣﻴѧﺚ ﻋѧﺮف أﻣѧﺎ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺨѧﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻘѧﺪ ﺗﻨѧﺎول ﻣﺴѧﺄﻟﺔ ﺗﻮﺛﻴѧﻖ اﻟﻤﺴѧ . اﻟﻤﺨﻮل ﺑﺬﻟﻚ 
ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﺼﻄﻠﺤﺎت ذات اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﺘﻮﺛﻴﻖ واﻟﺘﻮﻗﻴѧﻊ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧѧﻲ واﻟﺘﻮﻗﻴѧﻊ اﻟﺮﻗﻤѧﻲ، آﻤѧﺎ ﻋѧﺮض 
اﻟﻮﺳѧﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﻤﺘﺒﻌѧﺔ ﺣﺎﻟﻴѧًﺎ ﻓѧﻲ اﻟﺘﻮﻗﻴﻌѧﺎت اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ وﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ اﻟﺘﻮﻗﻴѧﻊ اﻟﺮﻗﻤѧﻲ، و ﻣѧﺎ ﻳﻌѧﺮف ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻜѧﺎﻓﺊ 
 وﻣѧﺪى ﺗﺤﻘѧﻖ ذﻟѧﻚ ﺑﻮﺳѧﻴﻠﺔ اﻟﻮﻇﻴﻔﻲ وذﻟﻚ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻟﺒﺤѧﺚ وراء اﻟﺤﻜﻤѧﺔ ﻣѧﻦ اﻹﺟѧﺮاء اﻟﻤﻄﻠѧﻮب 
. إﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧѧﺔ، وآѧѧﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘѧѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﺗﻌѧѧﺮف ﺑѧѧﺬات اﻟﺸѧѧﻌﺒﺘﻴﻦ وهѧѧﻲ ﻣѧѧﺰﻳﺞ ﻣѧѧﻦ اﻟﻄѧѧﺮﻳﻘﺘﻴﻦ اﻟﺴѧѧﺎﺑﻘﺘﻴﻦ 
 . وﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻗﺒﻮل اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻨﺪ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻹﺛﺒﺎت وﻗﻴﻤﺘﻪ اﻹﺛﺒﺎﺗﻴﺔ
اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ أﻣﺎ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﺪث ﻋﻦ ﻣﻀﺎﻣﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ اﻟﺨﺎص ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺠѧﺎرة 
وﻗѧﺪ ﻗﺴѧﻢ هѧﺬا اﻟﺒѧﺎب إﻟѧﻰ ﺛﻼﺛѧﺔ ﻓﺼѧﻮل رﺋﻴﺴѧﻴﺔ، ﺷѧﺮح اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ . واﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ
ﻗﻮاﻋѧѧﺪ اﻻﺧﺘﺼѧѧﺎص وﺑѧѧﻴﻦ أهﻤﻴѧѧﺔ اﻻﺧﺘﺼѧѧﺎص ﻹﺻѧѧﺪار أﺣﻜѧѧﺎم ﻗﺎﺑﻠѧѧﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻔﻴѧѧﺬ، آﻤѧѧﺎ ﺑѧѧﻴﻦ ﻧѧѧﻮﻋﻲ 
اﻻﺧﺘﺼﺎص وهﻤﺎ اﻻﺧﺘﺼﺎص اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﺬي ﻳﺴﺘﻨﺪ إﻟѧﻰ ﻣﺤѧﻞ إﻗﺎﻣѧﺔ اﻟﻤѧﺪﻋﻰ ﻋﻠﻴѧﻪ واﻻﺧﺘﺼѧﺎص 
ﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧѧﻮع اﻟﻨѧﺰاع، ﻣﺜѧﻞ ﻗﻀѧﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﻤﺴѧﺆوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﺼѧﻴﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺜﻠѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ اﻟﺘﻌѧﺪي اﻟﺨﺎص اﻟﺬي ﻳ 
ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ واﻟﻌﻘﻮد اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ رﺟﺎل اﻷﻋﻤﺎل، ﺳﻮاء ﺗﻢ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺗﺤﺪﻳѧﺪ 
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وﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ . اﻟﻤﺤﻜﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼﺔ أو ﻟﻢ ﻳﺘﻢ، وآﺬا اﻟﻌﻘﻮد اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺒѧﺮم ﺑѧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﺠѧﺎر واﻟﻤﺴѧﺘﻬﻠﻜﻴﻦ 
اﻟﻮاﺟѧﺐ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴѧﻖ ﻓѧﻲ ﺣѧﺎل اﻻﺗﻔѧﺎق ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﻗѧﺎﻧﻮن ﺑﻌﻴﻨѧﻪ واﻟﻘﻴѧﻮد اﻟѧﻮارد ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺣѧﻖ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ اﻟﻘѧﺎﻧﻮن 
اﻷﻃﺮاف ﻓﻲ اﻻﺧﺘﻴѧﺎر، وآﻴﻔﻴѧﺔ ﺗﺤﺪﻳѧﺪ اﻟﻘѧﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻮاﺟѧﺐ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴѧﻖ ﻓѧﻲ ﺣѧﺎل ﻋѧﺪم اﻻﺗﻔѧﺎق أو ﻓѧﻲ 
وﺗﻨﺎول اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ اﻷﺣﻜﺎم وإﻟѧﺰام اﻟﻤﺨѧﺎﻟﻔﻴﻦ . ﺣﺎل اﻟﺘﻌﺪي ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻵﺧﺮﻳﻦ 
وﺑѧﻴﻦ هѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﻌﻮاﺋѧﻖ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﺤѧﻮل دون . ى اﻟﺤﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺁﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻘﻴﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن وﻣﺪ 
اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬ ﻓﻌﺎل ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺨﺘﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻼت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﻢ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ واﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﺘﻤﺜѧﻞ ﻓѧﻲ ﺻѧﻌﻮﺑﺔ 
. اآﺘﺸѧﺎف اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻟﻔѧﺎت وﻣѧﺪى ﺗﻌѧﺎرض اﻟﻜﺸѧﻒ ﻋѧﻦ هﻮﻳѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺨѧﺎﻟﻔﻴﻦ ﻣѧﻊ ﻗѧﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺨﺼﻮﺻѧﻴﺔ 
آﻔﺎﻳѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧﺪاﺑﻴﺮ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴѧﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳѧﺔ، ﺧﺎﺻѧﺔ ﻓﻴﻤѧﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠѧﻖ وﺗﻄﺮق هﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ آﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮع ﻋﺪم 
ﺑﺤﻘѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﻗﺎﻣѧѧﺖ ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ ﻣﺒѧѧﺪأ اﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴѧѧﺔ، واﺳѧѧﺘﻌﺮض اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳѧѧﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣѧѧﺔ 
ﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ هﺬا اﻟﻘﺼﻮر وﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﻰ اﻻﻋﺘﻤѧﺎد ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴѧﺎ آﻮﺳѧﻴﻠﺔ ﻹدارة 
ﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ، وﺗﻠѧﻚ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗﻘﺘѧﺮح اﻟﻠﺠѧﻮء ﻟﻠﻄѧﺮق اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻠѧﺔ اﻟﺤﻘﻮق واﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻻﻟﻜﺘ 
ﻟﺤﻞ اﻟﻤﻨﺎزﻋﺎت وﺛﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬ اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳѧﻖ اﻷﺷѧﺨﺎص اﻟѧﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﺴѧﻴﻄﺮون ﻋﻠѧﻰ 
 . أﻧﺸﻄﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﻲ اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ وﻣﺴﺠﻠﻲ أﺳﻤﺎء اﻟﻨﻄﺎق
رآѧѧﺰ اﻟﺒѧѧﺎب اﻟﺴѧѧﺎدس ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ أﺛѧѧﺮ اﻟﺘﺠѧѧﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧѧﺔ ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ ﺣﻤﺎﻳѧѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧѧﻒ واﻟﺤﻘѧѧﻮق 
ﻗﺴﻢ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب إﻟﻰ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻓﺼﻮل رﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ، ﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ ﻣѧﺪى ﺣﻘѧﻮق . ﺠﺎورة ﻟﻬﺎ اﻟﻤ
ﺗﻨѧѧﺎول هѧѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧѧﻞ اﻟﺤﻘѧѧﻮق اﻻﻗﺘﺼѧѧﺎدﻳﺔ . اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧѧﻒ ﻓѧѧﻲ اﻷﻋﻤѧѧﺎل اﻟﻤﻨﺸѧѧﻮرة ﺑﺎﻟﺸѧѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧѧﺔ 
اﻟﺤﺼѧﺮﻳﺔ، ﺑﻤѧﺎ ﻓѧﻲ ذﻟѧﻚ ﺣѧﻖ اﻻﺳﺘﻨﺴѧﺎخ وﺣѧﻖ اﻟﻌѧﺮض ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﺠﻤﻬѧﻮر، وﻣѧﺎ إذا آѧﺎن ﻣﻘﺒѧﻮًﻻ 
ﻘﻴﻦ ﺑﺸﺄن اﻷﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻤﻨﺸﻮرة ﻋﺒﺮ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﺑﻌﺪ أن أﻟﻐﺖ اﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ اﻻآﺘﻔﺎء ﺑﺄﺣﺪ هﺬﻳﻦ اﻟﺤ 
آѧﺬﻟﻚ ﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ هѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ . ﻋﻤﻠﻴًﺎ اﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ، وهﻞ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ إﻳﺠﺎد ﻣﺨﺮج ﻣﻘﺒѧﻮل ﻟﺘﻌѧﺎﻳﺶ اﻟﺤﻘѧﻴﻦ 
وﺗﻄѧﺮق . اﻟﺤﻘﻮق اﻷدﺑﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺆﻟѧﻒ وأهﻤﻴѧﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﻬѧﺎ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻷﻋﻤѧﺎل اﻟﻤﻨﺸѧﻮرة ﺑﺎﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ 
ﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ هѧﺬا . اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧﻒ واﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﺠѧﺎورة ﻟﻬѧﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜѧﺎﻧﻲ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧﻮق 
اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﻌﺪي ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟﻒ واﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﻲ ﺧѧﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت 
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آѧﺬﻟﻚ ﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ هѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﻤﺴѧﺆوﻟﻴﺔ ﻋѧﻦ اﻟﺘﻌѧﺪي اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷѧﺮ واﻟﺘﻌѧﺪي ﻏﻴѧﺮ . اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ ﺣﻴѧﺎل ذﻟѧﻚ
ﺔ ﺑﺤﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧﻒ، ﺑﻤѧﺎ ﻓѧﻲ ذﻟѧﻚ اﻻﺧﺘﺼѧﺎص اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮ، وﺟﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ اﻟﺨﺎص اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘ 
أﻳﻀѧًﺎ ﺷѧﻤﻞ هѧﺬا اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ ﻣﻮﺿѧﻮع اﺳѧﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻮﺳѧﺎﺋﻞ . وﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ اﻷﺣﻜﺎم واﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ 
اﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﺆﻟﻒ، ﺣﻴﺚ أﺷﺎر إﻟѧﻰ ﺑﻌѧﺾ أﻧѧﻮاع اﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺴѧﺘﺨﺪﻣﺔ واﻟѧﺪور اﻟѧﺬي 
ﺪﺧﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻮاﻗﻊ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ ﻟﻜﻨﻬѧﺎ ﻳﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ آٌﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ، وﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ اﺑﺘﺪاًء ﺑﺎﻟ 
ﻻ ﺗﺴѧﻤﺢ ﺑﺎﻻﺳѧﺘﻐﻼل ﻏﻴѧﺮ اﻟﻤﺸѧﺮوع ﻣﺜѧﻞ اﻻﺳﺘﻨﺴѧﺎخ أو اﻟﺘﻌѧﺪﻳﻞ، واﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺴѧﺘﺨﺪﻣﺔ ﻟﻤﻨѧﻊ 
اﻟﺪﺧﻮل إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻮاﻗﻊ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ اﺑﺘﺪاًء، واﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻤﻜѧﻦ ﻣѧﻦ وﺿѧﻊ ﻋﻼﻣѧﺎت ﻣﺎﺋﻴѧﺔ ووﺷѧﻢ 
أﻣѧﺎ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ . ﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ ﻹدارة اﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺮﺋﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻤﻨﺸﻮرة ﺑﺎﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، واﻷﻧﻈﻤѧﺔ اﻟﺮ 
اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻘﺪ ﻧﺎﻗﺶ وﺿﻊ اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎءات واﻟﻘﻴﻮد اﻟﻤﻔﺮوﺿѧﺔ ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺣѧﻖ اﻟﻤﺆﻟѧﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ، 
ﺣﻴѧѧﺚ ﺗﻨѧѧﺎول ﻣѧѧﺪى اﻟﺤﺎﺟѧѧﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴѧѧﻖ اﻻﺳѧѧﺘﺜﻨﺎءات واﻟﻘﻴѧѧﻮد اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳѧѧﺔ ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ اﻷﻋﻤѧѧﺎل اﻟﻤﻨﺸѧѧﻮرة 
ﻮر ﻣѧѧѧﻦ ﺗﻠѧѧѧﻚ ﺑﺎﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧѧﺖ وأﺛѧѧѧﺮ اﻷﻧﻈﻤѧѧѧﺔ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧѧѧﺔ ﻹدارة اﻟﺤﻘѧѧѧﻮق ﻋﻠѧѧѧﻰ اﺳѧѧѧﺘﻔﺎدة اﻟﺠﻤﻬѧѧѧ 
 .   اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻨﺎءات واﻟﻘﻴﻮد
اﺷѧﺘﻤﻞ هѧﺬا اﻟﺒѧﺎب ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺛﻼﺛѧﺔ . ﺗﻨﺎول اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ 
ﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺗﺴﺠﻴﻞ اﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ آﺄﺳѧﻤﺎء ﻧﻄѧﺎق، ﺣﻴѧﺚ . ﻓﺼﻮل رﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ 
ﻼﻣѧѧﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧѧﺔ ﺷѧѧﺮح ﻣﺼѧѧﻄﻠﺢ أﺳѧѧﻤﺎء اﻟﻨﻄѧѧﺎق وﺑѧѧﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺸѧѧﺎآﻞ اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﻧﺘﺠѧѧﺖ ﻋѧѧﻦ ﺗﺴѧѧﺠﻴﻞ اﻟﻌ 
آﺄﺳѧѧﻤﺎء ﻧﻄѧѧﺎق ﻣѧѧﻦ ﻗﺒѧѧﻞ أﺷѧѧﺨﺎص ﻻ ﻳﻤﻠﻜﻮﻧﻬѧѧﺎ، ودور ﻣﺆﺳﺴѧѧﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ ﻟﻸﺳѧѧﻤﺎء واﻷرﻗѧѧﺎم 
اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼѧѧﺔ ﻓѧѧﻲ ﺣѧѧﻞ ﺗﻠѧѧﻚ اﻟﻤﺸѧѧﺎآﻞ، واﺳѧѧﺘﻌﺮض ﺁﺧѧѧﺮ اﻟﺘﻄѧѧﻮرات اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧѧﺔ ﺑﺄﺳѧѧﻤﺎء اﻟﻨﻄѧѧﺎق، 
آﺬﻟﻚ ﻧﺎﻗﺶ هﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺳѧﺒﻞ ﺣѧﻞ اﻟﻨﺰاﻋѧﺎت ﺑѧﻴﻦ ﻣѧﺎﻟﻜﻲ اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧﺎت . وﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ 
 أﺳѧѧﻤﺎء اﻟﻨﻄѧѧﺎق، ﺣﻴѧѧﺚ اﺳѧѧﺘﻌﺮض اﻟﺘﺠѧѧﺎرب اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴѧѧﺔ ودور ﺳﻴﺎﺳѧѧﺔ ﺣѧѧﻞ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧѧﺔ وﻣﺴѧѧﺠﻠﻲ
واﺳѧﺘﻌﺮض اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜѧﺎﻧﻲ اﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺳѧﺎت . اﻟﻨﺰاﻋﺎت اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻃﺒﻘﺘﻬѧﺎ ﻣﺆﺳﺴѧﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ ﺑﻬѧﺬا اﻟﺸѧﺄن 
اﻷﺧѧѧﺮى ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ اﻟﺘѧѧﻲ ﺗﺨѧѧﺺ اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧѧﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧѧﺔ، وﻣﻨﻬѧѧﺎ اﺳѧѧﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧѧﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧѧﺔ 
ن اﻟﻤﻮﻗѧﻊ اﻟﻤѧﺮاد ﺟѧﺬب اﻟﺠﻤﻬѧﻮر إﻟﻴѧﻪ، آﺮﻣﺰ أو ﻣﻔﺘѧﺎح ﻳﻀѧﻤﻦ ﺑﺼѧﻮرة ﻏﻴѧﺮ ﻣﺮﺋﻴѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ ﻋﻨѧﻮا 
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ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﻤﺎآﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﺒﺤﺚ رﺻﺪ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻊ ﻣﺘﻰ ﻣѧﺎ ﻳﻄﻠѧﺐ ﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ اﻟﺒﺤѧﺚ ﻋѧﻦ ﻣﻮاﻗѧﻊ ﺗﺨѧﺺ 
وآѧѧﺬﻟﻚ وﺿѧѧﻊ ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻳѧѧﺎت ﺑﻌѧѧﺾ اﻟﻤﻮاﻗѧѧﻊ اﻟﻤﺴѧѧﺘﻬﺪﻓﺔ، ﻋѧѧﺪا اﻟﺼѧѧﻔﺤﺔ . ﺗﻠѧѧﻚ اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧѧﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧѧﺔ 
ﻟﻤﻮﻗѧﻊ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ، داﺧﻞ إﻃﺎر ﻣﻮﻗѧﻊ ﺁﺧѧﺮ ﻟﺠѧﺬب ﻋﻤѧﻼء اﻟﻤﻮﻗѧﻊ اﻟﻤﺴѧﺘﻬﺪف واﺳѧﺘﻔﺎدة أﺻѧﺤﺎب ا 
وآѧﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﺠѧﻮء ﺑﻌѧﺾ . اﻵﺧﺮ ﻣѧﻦ ذﻟѧﻚ ﺑﺠѧﺬب ﻣﺰﻳѧٍﺪ ﻣѧﻦ اﻹﻋﻼﻧѧﺎت اﺳѧﺘﻨﺎدًا إﻟѧﻰ ﻋѧﺪد اﻟﺰاﺋѧﺮﻳﻦ 
وهѧﻲ إﻋﻼﻧѧﺎت ﺗﻈﻬѧﺮ ﻓﺠѧﺄة " ﺑѧﻮب أب ﺁدس"اﻟﻤﺘﻌѧﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ ﻓѧﻲ ﻋѧﺎﻟﻢ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ إﻟѧﻰ ﻣѧﺎ ﻳﻌѧﺮف ب
ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﺎﺷﺎت اﻟﺤﺎﺳﺐ اﻵﻟﻲ دون اﺳﺘﺌﺬان وأﻳﻀًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻌﺮف ﺑﺸﺮاك اﻟﻔﺄر، وهﻮ أن ﻳﺘﻢ اﺳﺘﺪراج 
ﻮﻗﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺛﻢ ﺗﻌﻄﻞ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ اﻟﺮﺟﻮع واﻟﺨﺮوج ﻟﺪﻳѧﻪ وﻻ ﻳﺴѧﺘﻄﻴﻊ اﻟﺨѧﺮوج ﻣѧﻦ ذﻟѧﻚ اﻟﻤﺘﺼﻔﺢ إﻟﻰ ﻣ 
أﻣѧﺎ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟѧﺚ ﻓﻘѧﺪ ﻧѧﺎﻗﺶ ﺻѧﻌﻮﺑﺎت ﺗѧﺄﻗﻠﻢ اﻟﻘѧﺎﻧﻮن . اﻟﻤﻮﻗѧﻊ إﻻ ﺑﻐﻠѧﻖ ﺟﻬѧﺎز اﻟﺤﺎﺳѧﺐ اﻵﻟѧﻲ
. اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴѧﺪي ﻟﻠﻌﻼﻣѧﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧﺔ ﻣѧﻊ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ ﻟﺘﻮﻓﻴﺮاﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳѧﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻼﻣѧﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧﺔ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ 
ﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟѧﺚ اﻟﺠѧﺪل اﻟѧﺬي ﻳѧﺪور ﺣѧﻮل ﻣѧﺪى اﺳѧﺘﻴﻔﺎء اﺳѧﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧﺔ وﻓﻲ هѧﺬا اﻟﺼѧﺪد أﺑѧﺎن اﻟﻔﺼѧ 
اﻟﺬي ﻳﻄﻠﺐ ﻓﻲ آﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻟﺘﺴѧﺠﻴﻞ اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧﺔ " اﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪام"اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻟﺸﺮط 
أو اﻻﺣﺘﻔﺎظ ﺑﻬѧﺎ، وآѧﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﺴѧﺄﻟﺔ ﺗﻌѧﺎﻳﺶ اﻟﻌﻼﻣѧﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧﺔ اﻟѧﺬي آѧﺎن ﻣﻘﺒѧﻮًﻻ ﻓѧﻲ ﻇѧﻞ إﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴѧﺔ 
ﻧﺎﻗﺶ هﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ اﻻﺧﺘﺼﺎص وﻣﺪى ﻓﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠѧﺎت أﻳﻀًﺎ . ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ 
 .اﻟﻤﺘﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺸﺄن اﻻﻋﺘﺪاء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﻮق أﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴﺔ
ﺗﻀѧﻤﻦ هѧﺬا اﻟﺒѧﺎب . أﻣﺎ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻘﺪ درس ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﺑﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘﺮاع ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﺸѧﺒﻜﺎت اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻴѧﺔ 
ﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧѧѧﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠѧѧѧﺎرة ﺳѧѧѧﺘﺔ ﻓﺼѧѧѧﻮل، ﻧѧѧѧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼѧѧѧﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻨﻬѧѧѧﺎ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴѧѧѧﺔ ﺗﺼѧѧѧﻨﻴﻒ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺮﻋѧѧѧﺎت ا 
اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﺐ اﻵﻟﻲ ووﺳﺎﺋﻞ أداء اﻷﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﺿﻤﻦ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺮﻋѧﺎت اﻟﺘѧﻲ 
آﻤѧﺎ . ﺗﻤﻨﺢ ﺑﺮاءات اﺧﺘﺮاع، ﺣﻴﺚ اﺳﺘﻌﺮض اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻵراء اﻟﺪاﻋﻤﺔ واﻟﻤﻌﺘﺮﺿﺔ 
ﺎرة ﻓﺤﺺ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺎﻣѧﻞ ﻣѧﻊ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺮﻋѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠѧ 
اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ، ﺣﻴѧﺚ اﻗﺘѧﺮح اﻟѧﺒﻌﺾ ﺗѧﻮﻓﻴﺮ ﻧѧﻮع ﻣѧﻦ اﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳѧﺔ ﻳﺮاﻋѧﻲ ﻃﺒﻴﻌѧﺔ ﺗﻠѧﻚ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺮﻋѧﺎت، 
ﺳﻮاء آﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ ﺣﺎﺳﺐ ﺁﻟﻲ ﺑﺤﺘﺔ أو وﺳﺎﺋﻞ أداء أﻋﻤﺎل ﺗﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﺗﻌﺘﻤѧﺪ ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺑѧﺮاﻣﺞ اﻟﺤﺎﺳѧﺐ 
اﻵﻟѧѧﻲ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤѧѧﺎ اﻗﺘѧѧﺮح ﺁﺧѧѧﺮون اﻟﺘﻤﺴѧѧﻚ اﻟﺼѧѧﺎرم ﺑﺸѧѧﺮوط ﻣѧѧﻨﺢ ﺑѧѧﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘѧѧﺮاع، ﻋﻨѧѧﺪ ﻓﺤѧѧﺺ 
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ة اﺧﺘѧﺮاع ﻋѧﻦ وﺳѧﺎﺋﻞ أداء اﻷﻋﻤѧﺎل اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳѧﺔ ، ﺧﺎﺻѧﺔ ﺷѧﺮط ﻋѧﺪم ﻃﻠﺒﺎت اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑѧﺮاء 
وﺿﻮح اﻻﺧﺘﺮاع ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺘﺼﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل ﻗﺒﻞ اآﺘﺸﺎﻓﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺮع، وذﻟѧﻚ ﺑﻐѧﺮض اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴѧﻞ 
ﻣﻦ أﻋﺪاد هﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣѧﻦ ﺑѧﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘѧﺮاع ﺑﺎﺳѧﺘﺒﻌﺎد اﻻﺧﺘﺮاﻋѧﺎت اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻻ ﺗﻤﺜѧﻞ ﻓﺘﺤѧًﺎ ﻓѧﻲ هѧﺬا 
. اﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﻘﻠﻴٍﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﻬﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒѧﻞ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼѧﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل واﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻋﺎدة ﻣﻌﺮوﻓﺔ أو ﻳﻤﻜﻦ 
درس اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﺠﻴﻢ ﺑﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘﺮاع اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳѧﻖ 
اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ اﻟﻀﻴﻖ ﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻜﺎﻓﺆ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻄﺒﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺤﺎآﻢ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴѧﺔ ﻋﻨѧﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺠѧﺪ أن ﻣﻨѧﺎﻓﺲ ﺻѧﺎﺣﺐ 
ﻴﺔ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﺧﺘѧﺮاع ﻣﻨﺎﻓﺴѧﻪ ﻟﻴﺤﺼѧﻞ ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺑѧﺮاءة ﺑﺮاءة اﻻﺧﺘﺮاع ﻗﺪ أدﺧﻞ ﺑﻌѧﺾ اﻟﺘﻌѧﺪﻳﻼت اﻟﺸѧﻜﻠ 
أﻣѧﺎ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺨѧﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻘѧﺪ ﻓﺤѧﺺ ﺣﺠѧﻢ اﻟﺨﺒѧﺮات اﻟﻤﺘѧﻮﻓﺮة ﻓѧﻲ ﻣﺠѧﺎل . اﺧﺘѧﺮاع ﻟѧﻨﻔﺲ اﻻﺧﺘѧﺮاع 
اﻻﺧﺘﺮاﻋѧѧﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘѧѧﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠѧѧﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧѧﺔ، وﻧѧѧﺎﻗﺶ ﻣѧѧﺪى أهﻤﻴѧѧﺔ اﻟﺘﻮﺳѧѧﻊ ﻓѧѧﻲ ﺗﻄﺒﻴѧѧﻖ ﻧﻈﺮﻳѧѧﺔ 
 وذﻟѧﻚ ﺑѧﺄن ﻳﻨﻈѧﺮ ﻣѧﺜًﻼ اﻟﻘﻴﺎس ﻟﻠﺘﻘﻠﻴﻞ ﻣﻦ أﻋﺪاد ﺑѧﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘѧﺮاع اﻟﻤﻤﻨﻮﺣѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ هѧﺬا اﻟﺠﺎﻧѧﺐ، 
ﻟﻠﺨﺒﺮات اﻟﻤﻤﺎﺛﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻓﺮة ﺧﺎرج ﻧﻄѧﺎق اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ واﻟﺘﺠѧﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ، واﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻳﻌﻤѧﺪ اﻟѧﺒﻌﺾ 
وﻧѧѧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻔﺼѧѧﻞ اﻟﺴѧѧﺎدس . ﻟﻨﻘﻠﻬѧѧﺎ إﻟѧѧﻰ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧѧﺖ وﻳﺴѧѧﻌﻰ ﻟﻠﺤﺼѧѧﻮل ﻋﻠѧѧﻰ ﺑѧѧﺮاءة اﺧﺘѧѧﺮاع ﻋﻠﻴﻬѧѧﺎ 
اﻟﻘѧﺎﻧﻮن ﺟﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ اﻟﺨﺎص اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺒﺮاءات اﻻﺧﺘﺮاع، ﺑﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ اﻻﺧﺘﺼﺎص و 
 .  اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ واﻻﻋﺘﺮاف ﺑﺎﻷﺣﻜﺎم وﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬهﺎ
 وﻧﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ اﻟﺪﻋﻮة إﻟѧﻰ ﻗѧﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻣﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ ﻓﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ ﻣﺘﻮاﻓﻘѧﺔ ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﻣﺴѧﺘﻮى اﻟﻌѧﺎﻟﻢ وأﺛѧﺮ ذﻟѧﻚ 
اﺷﺘﻤﻞ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب ﻋﻠﻰ أرﺑﻌﺔ ﻓﺼﻮل رﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ، اﺳﺘﻌﺮض اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻣﻨﻬﺎ . ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ 
ﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴѧﺔ اﻻﺳѧﺘﻔﺎدة ﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ واﻟﺘﺤѧﺪﻳﺎت اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻳﻨﺒﻐѧﻲ ﻓѧﺮص اﻟﺘﺠѧﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻳﻤﻜѧﻦ ﻟﻠѧ 
وﻋѧﺮض اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜѧﺎﻧﻲ اﻵراء اﻟﻤﺆﻳѧﺪة واﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿѧﺔ ﻟﺘѧﺪوﻳﻞ . ﻋﻠﻴﻬѧﺎ ﺗﺨﻄﻴﻬѧﺎ ﻟﺒﻠѧﻮغ ﺗﻠѧﻚ اﻟﻐﺎﻳѧﺔ
أﻣѧﺎ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟѧﺚ ﻓﻘѧﺪ درس ﺁﺛѧﺎر ﺗﻘﻮﻳѧﺔ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ اﻟﺘѧﻲ . ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ
اﻟﺤﻘѧﻮق ﻋﻠѧﻰ ﺣﺴѧﺎب اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤѧﻊ، ﺣﻴѧﺚ أﺑѧﺎن ﺗﻬﺪف إﻟﻰ ﺗﻮﻓﻴﺮ ﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ أآﺜﺮ ﺻѧﺮاﻣﺔ ﻟﺤѧﺎﻣﻠﻲ ﺗﻠѧﻚ 
وﻓﺤѧﺺ اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑѧﻊ . هﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺁﺛﺎر ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟѧﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴѧﺔ ﻣѧﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴѧﺔ اﻟﺘﻜѧﺎﻟﻴﻒ واﻟﻔﻮاﺋѧﺪ 
اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ ﺗﺒﻨﻴﻬﺎ ﻟﺠﻨѧﻲ ﺛﻤѧﺎر ﺗѧﺪوﻳﻞ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ 
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ا اﻟﻔﺼѧﻞ أرﺑѧﻊ ﺛﻐѧﺮات ﻻ ﺑѧﺪ ﻟﻠѧﺪول وﻗﺪ رﺻﺪ هﺬ . اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ أو ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻗﻞ اﻟﺨﺮوج ﺑﺄﻗﻞ اﻟﺨﺴﺎﺋﺮ 
اﺳѧѧﺘﻴﻌﺎب ﻣﻔѧѧﺎهﻴﻢ وﻣﻮاﺿѧѧﻴﻊ وﻓﻮاﺋѧѧﺪ وﻣﺨѧѧﺎﻃﺮ ﺣﻘѧѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧѧﺔ : اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴѧѧﺔ ﻣѧѧﻦ ﺳѧѧﺪهﺎ، وهѧѧﻲ أوﻻ ً
: ﺛﺎﻟﺜѧﺎ ً. آﻴﻔﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ واﻻﻟﺘﺰام ﺑﺎﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴѧﺎت اﻟﺪوﻟﻴѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ هѧﺬا اﻟﻤﺠѧﺎل : ﺛﺎﻧﻴًﺎ. اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ أﻋﻤﻖ 
ﺘﻮاﻓѧﻖ اﻟѧﺪوﻟﻲ ﺑﺸѧﺄن ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ إدارة واﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻔﺎوﺿﺎت اﻟﺠﺎرﻳﺔ ﺑﺸѧﺄن ﻣﺰﻳѧٍﺪ ﻣѧﻦ اﻟ 
 .ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ اﻻﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺎت واﻟﺘﺤﻀﻴﺮ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ: راﺑﻌًﺎ. اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ
اﻟﺒﺎب اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻋﺒﺎرة ﻋﻦ ﺧﺎﺗﻤﺔ وﺗﻮﺻﻴﺎت، ﺣﻴﺚ ﺗﻀﻤﻨﺖ اﻟﺨﺎﺗﻤѧﺔ ﺗﻠﺨﻴﺼѧًﺎ ﻟﻤѧﺎ ورد ﺑѧﺎﻷﺑﻮاب 
اﻟﺘﺴﻌﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ، ﻓﻴﻤﺎ رآﺰت اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻴﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﻄﻮات اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ اﺗﺨﺎذهﺎ ﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖ أآﺒﺮ اﻟﻔﻮاﺋﺪ 
. ﻤﻜﻨѧﺔ ﻣѧﻦ ﺣﻘѧﻮق اﻟﻤﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ واﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ واﻟﺘﺠѧﺎرة اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴѧﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻤѧﻊ اﻟѧﺪوﻟﻲ آﻜѧﻞ اﻟﻤ
وأوﺻﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﺑﻀﺮورة اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﻟﻰ اﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴﺔ دوﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﺤﻞ ﻣﺸﻜﻠﺔ ﺗﻨﺎزع اﻟﻘѧﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻓﺎﻗﻤѧﺖ 
اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪﺗﻬﺎ، وأن ذﻟﻚ ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة اﺗﻔﺎق ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وإرﺳﺎء ﺣﻘѧﻮق 
وﺧﻠﺼﺖ إﻟѧﻰ أن ﺗﻨﻈѧﻴﻢ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧѧﺖ ﻳﺘﻄﻠѧﺐ إﻳﺠѧﺎد إدارة ﺟﻤﺎﻋﻴѧﺔ ﺗﺤѧﺖ . ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻴﺔﻣﻠﻜﻴﺔ ﻓﻜﺮﻳﺔ 
رﻗﺎﺑѧѧﺔ اﻷﻣѧѧﻢ اﻟﻤﺘﺤѧѧﺪة، وأن اﻟﻮﺻѧѧﻮل إﻟѧѧﻰ اﺗﻔﺎﻗﻴѧѧﺔ دوﻟﻴѧѧﺔ ﻧﺎﺟﺤѧѧﺔ ﺑﺸѧѧﺄن ﺣﻘѧѧﻮق ﻣﻠﻜﻴѧѧﺔ ﻓﻜﺮﻳѧѧﺔ 
ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺐ إزاﻟѧﺔ أو اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴѧﻞ ﻣѧﻦ ﺗﻌѧﺎرض اﻟﻤﺼѧﺎﻟﺢ اﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴѧﺔ، وهѧﺬا ﺑѧﺪورﻩ ﻳﺤѧﺘﻢ زﻳѧﺎدة 
وﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴѧﻖ هѧﺬﻩ اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴѧﺔ ﺑﻌѧﺪة ﻃѧﺮق ﻣﻨﻬѧﺎ اﻟѧﺪﻋﻢ . اﻷﻗﻞ ﻧﻤﻮا ًﻣﻌﺪﻻت اﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ و 
ﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮ وﻧﻘﻞ اﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﺟﻴﺎ وﺗﺸﺠﻴﻊ اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻷﺟﻨﺒﻲ اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮ وﺗﺒﻨﻲ ﺣﻘѧﻮق ﻣﻠﻜﻴѧﺔ ﻓﻜﺮﻳѧﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ اﻟ 
وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻤﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ أن ﺗﻜﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻀѧﻐﻂ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟѧﺪول اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴѧﺔ . ﺗﻔﻀﻲ إﻟﻰ اﻻﺑﺘﺪاع واﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔ 
وﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﺤﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺼﺎﻋﺪة ﻟﻔﺮض ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻣﻠﻜﻴﺔ ﻓﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺪول ﻷن ذﻟﻚ ﻟﻦ ﻳﺄﺗﻲ ﺑﻨﺘѧﺎﺋﺞ 
ﺎ ﺑѧﺪًﻻ ﻣѧﻦ ذﻟѧﻚ أن ﺗﻘѧﺪم اﻟѧﺪﻋﻢ اﻟﻤѧﺎﻟﻲ واﻟﻔﻨѧﻲ ﻟﻠﺪوﻟѧﺔ اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴѧﺔ وﺗﺒﻨѧﻲ ﻣﻌﻬѧﺎ ﺷѧﺮاآﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ، وﻋﻠﻴﻬ 
 . ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺗﺮاﻋﻲ ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ 
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Abstract 
 
 The modern intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been premised on 
basic principles represented in granting the creators and other 
producers of intellectual goods and services certain time-limited rights 
to control the use made of their products, subject to certain exceptions 
and limitations. The term 'intellectual property' denotes copyright and 
rights relating to it and industrial property. Generally, copyright 
includes the rights of authors in their scientific and artistic works and 
the rights relating to them, such as the rights of producers, 
performance, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations in their performances, phonograms and broadcasts 
respectively. Industrial property includes patents, utility models, 
trademarks and service marks, trade names, industrial designs and 
integrated circuits, geographic indications, trade secrets, and the 
protection against unfair competition. IPRs have acquired increasing 
importance because they have become a major source of wealth, 
especially for developed countries, which are experiencing great 
economic transformations. The economies of developed countries 
have become knowledge-based economies, instead of the traditional 
industries. Moreover, the emergence of technologies such as the 
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Internet and electronic commerce, have brought further 
transformations in the field of IPRs. The Internet has facilitated the 
easy and perfect copying and transfer of intellectual property products 
worldwide, hence posing direct threat for their protection. On the 
other hand, the use of technical measures for the protection of IPRs 
threatens the lawful exploitation of these rights by the society 
members. 
  This thesis discusses the international protection of intellectual 
property rights in the light of the expansion of electronic commerce. It 
contains ten chapters deal respectively with the historical development 
of the intellectual property law, the nature, purpose and scope of 
modern intellectual property rights, the challenge of the Internet, the 
regulation of electronic commerce, the conflict of laws implications 
for electronic commerce and intellectual property, the protection of 
copyright, trademarks and patens on digital networks and the impact 
of internationally harmonized IPRs on developing countries, in 
addition to a conclusion and proposals for reform.        
Chapter 1 discusses the historical development of the intellectual 
property law. It is divided into four parts. Part 1 traces the earliest 
stages of development of intellectual property rights, including 
prehistory forms of intellectual property rights, forms of intellectual 
property in the Greco-Roman Era, the Middle Ages and the 
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Mercantilist Period. Part 2 discusses the emergence of modern 
intellectual property law. Part 3 reviews the traditional legal system 
governing intellectual property rights. Part 4 examines the 
internationalization of intellectual property rights. It is divided into 
four subtitles including a background, the role of TRIPS in the 
international protection of intellectual property rights and beyond 
TRIPS developments. Beyond TRIPS developments include 
multilateral and bilateral treaties, regional instruments, and other 
developments. Also this Part discusses the role of litigation in the 
creation of new international intellectual property norms, whereby it 
reviews the views supporting national courts, WTO Panels, and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism. 
  Chapter 2 studies the nature, purpose and scope of modern 
intellectual property rights. It is divided into four parts. Part 1 defines 
the term 'intellectual property' and enumerates the main categories of 
intellectual property rights and how new rights are created. Part 2 
studies in brief copyright and neighboring rights. It is divided into four 
subtitles which examine copyright and neighboring rights, scope of 
protection, and exceptions and limitations. Part 3 reviews the 
industrial property rights. It is divided into seven subtitles which 
discuss the different aspects of the industrial property rights including 
patents, utility models, trademarks and service marks, trade names, 
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industrial designs and integrated circuits, and geographical 
indications, in addition to protection against unfair competition and 
trade secrets. Part 4 examines the justifications for, and, against 
intellectual property.  
  Chapter 3 studies the phenomenon of the Internet, its potential 
evolution and expansion, its impact on the international society and 
the approaches for its regulation. It is divided into three parts. Part 1 
studies the emergence of the Internet, and its evolution and potential 
expansion. It includes the definition of the term Internet and other 
related terms, how it works and its potential evolution and expansion. 
Part 2 discusses the positive and negative aspects of the Internet.Part 3 
examines the approaches advanced for the regulation of the Internet. It 
discusses four approaches relating to the governance of the Internet 
viz., self-governace approach, regulation by means of the traditional 
legal system, governance through the control of the architecture of the 
Internet and a hybrid regulation approach. 
 Chapter 4 examines some of the legal aspects relating to the 
regulation of electronic commerce. It is divided into six main parts. 
Part 1 discusses the opportunities and challenges of electronic 
commerce. It is sub-divided into three sub-titles including the 
definition of the term electronic commerce, its potential growth and 
the impediments confronting its future growth and expansion. Part 2 
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studies the theoretical approaches advanced for the regulation of 
electronic commerce. It is sub-divided into four sub-titles which 
discuss the different suggested approaches. Part 3 studies the 
formation of electronic contracts. It is sub-divided into five sub-titles 
involving the definition of the related terms and the discussion of the 
necessary elements for the formation of contracts such as offer, 
acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal relations. Part 4 
examines the validity of electronic contracts in the light of the 
formalities required by law. It is sub-divided into three sub-titles, 
which discuss some of the formalities frequently required by law in 
paper-based environment and whether these formalities can be 
satisfied by a data message. Part 5 discusses the authentication of 
electronic documents. It is sub-divided into two sub-titles including 
the definition of related terms and a review of the approaches 
concerning the methods of authentication of electronic documents. 
Part 6 discusses the admissibility and the evidential value of electronic 
documents. It is sub-divided into two sub-titles discussing the 
admissibility of electronic documents as evidence and the weight 
accorded to such evidence.  
 Chapter 5 studies the conflict of laws implications for electronic 
commerce. It is divided into three main parts. Part 1 deals with issues 
relating to jurisdiction. It is subdivided into two main subtitles which 
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discuss the general jurisdiction of courts, which is based on the 
domicile of the defendant, and the various cases of specific 
jurisdiction including jurisdiction on tortious acts, choice of 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction where there is no choice and jurisdiction on 
disputes involving consumers. Part 2 discusses the governing law. It is 
divided into four subtitles which study the applicable law where there 
is choice of law and where there is no choice and the limitations on 
the choice of law, in addition to the study of the law applicable for 
infringements cases. Part 3 discusses the enforcement of rights. It is 
divided into four subtitles which study the need for effective 
enforcement in the Internet era, the difficulties relating to detection of 
infringements and identification of wrongdoers, the insufficiency of 
the traditional means of enforcement and the attempts made to date in 
relation to enforcement including technical devices, alternative 
disputes resolution and direct enforcement.  
 Chapter 6 discusses the impacts of electronic commerce on the 
international protection of copyright and related rights and whether the 
existing legal system can be adjusted to respond to this technological 
challenge effectively and efficiently, so as to safeguard the furtherance 
of the guiding principles of copyright and related rights. It is divided 
into three main parts. Part 1 studies the scope of the rights of authors 
on digital networks. It is divided into two subtitles discussing the 
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exclusive economic rights and moral rights of authors. Part 2 studies 
the protection of copyright and related rights works disseminated over 
digital networks. It is divided into four subtitles which discuss the 
infringement of copyright and the related rights and the legal status of 
the Internet Service Providers, the private international law aspects of 
copyright and related rights, the protection of copyright and related 
rights through technical measures and the legal protection of such 
technical measures. Part 3 examines the future of the traditional 
copyright exceptions and limitations on digital networks. It is divided 
into two subtitles which study the scope of the traditional exceptions 
and limitations and the impacts of the electronic rights management 
systems on those exceptions and limitations. 
  Chapter 7 discusses the current problems facing the protection of 
trademarks rights on digital networks. It is divided into three main 
parts. Part 1 studies the registration of trademarks as domain names. 
This part is sub-divided into six titles comprising the definition of 
domain names, the problems generated by the registration of 
trademarks as domain names, the role of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the recent developments 
relating to domain names, the future of ICANN, and the settlement of 
disputes between domain names holders and trademarks owners. Part 
2 discusses other forms of practices on the Internet that proved to be 
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detrimental to trademarks rights. This part is sub-divided into five 
titles dealing with the use of trademarks as meta tags or keywords or 
in framing and linking, pop-up advertisements, and mouse-trapping. 
Part 3 clarifies the clash between the principle of territoriality, upon 
which the traditional trademark law has been based and the global 
nature of the Internet. It is divided into four subtitles which discuss the 
requirement of ‘use’ for the acquisition and maintenance of 
trademarks rights on the Internet, the co-existence of trademarks on 
digital networks, jurisdiction over infringements online and the extent 
of remedies in infringement actions. 
          Chapter 8 discusses the protection of patent rights on the digital 
networks. It is divided into six parts. Part 1 discusses the patentability 
of electronic commerce-related inventions. It is divided into two 
subtitles, which study the patentability of software and business 
methods. Part 2 discusses the different views in favor of, and, against 
patenting business methods and software. Part 3 studies some views 
advanced for dealing with electronic commerce-related inventions. It 
is sub-divided into two titles discussing the various suggestions. Part 4 
discusses the impact of the narrow application of the doctrine of 
equivalents on the scope of business methods patents. Part 5 examines 
the scope of prior art for electronic commerce-related inventions. Part 
6 studies some private international law issues relating to patents law. 
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It is divided into three subtitles discussing jurisdiction, applicable law, 
and recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
  Chapter 9 discusses the potential of electronic commerce for 
developing countries and the ongoing move towards internationally 
harmonized intellectual property rights, their implications for 
developing countries and the strategic policies that should be adopted 
by developing countries to face any accompanying challenges. The 
chapter is divided into four main parts. Part 1 reviews the potential of 
electronic commerce for developing countries. It is divided into two 
subtitles discussing the opportunities and challenges in this respect. 
Part 2 reviews the different arguments for, and, against the move 
towards internationally harmonized intellectual property rights. It 
includes two subtitles which discuss the arguments of the supporters 
and opponents of internationalization. Part 3 examines the 
implications of strengthened IPRs for developing countries. It is 
divided into two subtitles discussing the costs and benefits of strong 
IPRs in relation to development generally and access to the Internet 
and electronic commerce in particular. Part 4 discusses strategic policy 
issues for developing countries. It is divided into four subtitles 
examining the technical and capacity gaps in developing countries and 
the necessary safeguards for developing countries in order to fill these 
gaps. It identifies gaps in four areas need to be filled by developing 
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countries viz., understanding the concepts, issues, benefits and risks of 
intellectual property protection; implementing and complying with 
existing commitments; managing and influencing on-going 
negotiations on further commitments; and making and developing 
strategies and setting the agenda for the future. 
  Chapter 10 is a conclusion and proposals for reform. The conclusion 
summarizes the previous chapters. The proposals for reform 
recommend for the conclusion of an international agreement in order 
to solve the problems relating to conflict of laws, which have been 
exacerbated by the emergence of the Internet. However, as far as 
intellectual property is concerned, the success in concluding such an 
agreement depends on international agreement on related issues such 
as the regulation of the Internet and the adoption of acceptable 
substantive intellectual property rights. In this respect this Study 
recommends for collective administration of the Internet under the 
auspices of the United Nations. Moreover, a successful international 
agreement on substantive intellectual property rights necessitates the 
removal or lessening of the conflict of interests of the stakeholders. 
This, in turn, requires the increase of development rates for 
developing countries, through different means including direct 
financial support, transfer of technology, encouragement of direct 
foreign investment, and adoption of intellectual property laws 
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conducive to innovation and competition. Developed countries should 
not exercise pressures on developing countries and should stop the on-
going campaign for imposing on developing countries intellectual 
property laws not acceptable by them. They should, instead, provide 
developing countries with the financial and technical support they 
need and work with them to achieve the common interests of all 
parties.  
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Chapter 1 
Historical Development of  Intellectual Property Law 
 
 
     Introduction 
 The digital revolution and the emergence of the Internet with 
its borderless dimensions have created a series of new legal 
problems facing intellectual property law. In order to find out 
solutions for these problems and as the past and the present 
are intimately linked, a flashback for the history of 
intellectual property may offer a better understanding of the 
intellectual property system and help in finding solutions for 
the present problems. This chapter makes a brief study of the 
historical development of intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
the traditional legal system governing them and the latest 
developments concerning IPRs as well as the legal system 
governing them. It includes four parts. Part 1traces the 
emergence of intellectual property rights and its earliest 
stages of development including prehistory forms of 
intellectual property rights, forms of intellectual property in 
the Greco-Roman Era, the Middle Ages and the Mercantilist 
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Period. Part 2 discusses the emergence of modern intellectual 
property law. Part 3 reviews the traditional legal system 
governing intellectual property rights. Part 4 examines the 
internationalization of intellectual property rights. It is 
divided into four subtitles including a background, the role of 
TRIPS in the international protection of intellectual property 
rights and beyond TRIPS developments. Beyond TRIPS 
developments include multilateral and bilateral treaties, 
regional instruments, and other developments. Also this Part 
discusses the role of litigation in the creation of new 
international intellectual property norms, whereby it reviews 
the views supporting national courts, WTO Panels, and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism. 
      
1. Earliest Stages of Development of Intellectual Property Rights 
   i) Prehistory Forms of IPRs 
 The supporters of property rights in intellectual products contend that 
the essence of intellectual property rights could be traced back to 
prehistory times. According to one writer, “intellectual property 
notions have evolved from the dawn of history, although identity-
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related symbols are also of early origins”.1In this respect pottery is 
considered as a valuable source of knowledge. Excavations showed 
that some elements of intellectual property may be identified in 
ancient civilizations which predated Greco-Roman times. For 
example, marks on jars and tools found in tombs of ancient Egyptian 
kings dated back to 3200 BC. Also stones seals bearing marks were 
found in Greece and Near East from about that time onward.2 Similar 
examples were found in China where the name of the maker or of the 
place of origin of clay or porcelain pots was imprinted together with 
the name of the emperor.3 These marks are considered as a precursor 
of trademarks.4A distinctive feature of prehistory forms of intellectual 
property was that trade-related advantages were of less importance in 
comparison with other kinds of gains such as the acquiring and 
preservation of power, particularly in political, military and religious 
matters.5 It has been stated that there were indications of “exclusive 
rights in bricks and papyrus (Egypt), and wheat and purple 
(Phoenicians) predated Greco-Roman times”.6 
                                                 
1  Granstrand, Ove ‘The Economics and Management of Intellectual Property – Towards Intellectual 
Capitalism’. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Cheltenham, UK, Northampton MA, USA, 1999, at 27. 
2 Ibid., at 28.   
3  See Azmi, Ida Madieh and Maniatis, Spyros M. and Sodipo, Bankde ‘Distinctive Signs and Early 
Marks: Europe, Africa and Islam’ (in) Alison Firth, (ed.), 'The Prehistory and Development of 
Intellectual Property Systems', London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1997, at 133.  
4  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 28. 
5  Ibid., at 27. 
6  See Endeshaw, Assafa ‘Intellectual Property Policy for Non-Industrial Countries’ Dartmouth Publishing Co. 
Ltd. 1996, at 54. 
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[ii) Forms of Intellectual Property in the Greco-Roman Era 
  New forms of intellectual property emerged during the Greco-Roman 
era. It has been stated that the Greeks were the first to repudiate 
slavish copying of existing works and to punish literary piracy. 
Moreover, during the Roman era, authors often sought to get not only 
glory but also pecuniary profits from their manuscripts. However, this 
pecuniary gain is said to be “far from the recognition of exclusive 
reproduction right because the Romans did not yet appreciate the 
distinction between the ownership of a manuscript and the exclusive 
right to reproduce it”.7 In these ancient cultures patent-like institutions 
for technical inventions were not known but there are indications of 
other forms of intellectual property such as trademarks and a patent-
like system for ‘food chemistry’ in Sybaris, the Greek colony in the 
southern part of the Italian Peninsula.8 
 
iii) Protection of Intellectual Property in the Middle Ages 
  The Middle Ages witnessed significant development in notions of 
intellectual property as a result of the development of trade and 
technology. The traditional means of protection, based on secrecy, 
was considered as inconvenient. This may be due to the fact that “a 
ruler could feel overly dependent on the secret-based ‘natural’ 
                                                 
7  Ibid. 
8  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 27. 
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monopolistic power of professional guilds and societies, as well as on 
that of an individual artisan such as a clever weaponsmith”. Moreover, 
secrecy-based protection would compel the owner of that secret to 
keep it for himself or within a narrow circle, a matter threatening its 
loss if such owner was missed for whatever reason.9 Different 
incentives were created for encouraging disclosure of secrets including 
prizes, grants, patent privileges and the like. A patent-like system 
emerged during that period in relation to ore mining. During this 
period the priority rule ‘first to invent’ had appeared. The meaning of 
the term ‘invention’ at that time was close to the meaning of 
‘discovery’ in the present day language.10The presence of patent 
privileges, among other alternatives, may be due to the fact that a ruler 
who granted these privileges would not pay any direct remuneration 
and moreover, remuneration of the privilege holder would be 
connected with the practical exploitation of the patented invention and 
the demand for it, whereby he could charge higher prices for his 
products.11  
  The republic of Venice is considered as a pacesetter of intellectual 
property rights in the Middle Ages because it had developed the 
essential elements of the intellectual property system in the period 
                                                 
9  Ibid. at 31. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
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between 1450 and 1550.12 At that time there were two types of 
privileges known in Venice; one was known as invention privilege, 
which protected against unauthorized imitation and the other was 
known as trade privilege, which protected against competition.13 The 
republics of Venice and Florence were described as “the most brilliant 
countries of civilization in the Western World in 14th and 15th 
centuries”.14 In 1474 the republic of Venice issued a formal patent 
code, which is considered as the first patent code in history. In this 
code any invention was capable of receiving protection provided that 
it was found workable, useful and subject to compulsory licensing 
provisions.15 A distinctive feature of that code was that “it provided 
for patents as a matter of right and general principle, not merely of 
royal favor”.16 Likewise, copyright protection found its way in the 
republic of Venice. In 1469 the Senate of Venice granted the first 
privilege in the field of copyright. It preceded all the privileges 
granted at that time by other European countries including Germany, 
France and England. At first copyright privileges were granted to new 
as well as old books, but since 1517 a new statute was issued whereby 
it confined protection to new books only. In 1544 an act was 
                                                 
12  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 55. 
13  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 32. 
14  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 55. 
15  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 32. 
16  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 55. 
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promulgated, which provid ed expressly for the right of an author to 
keep his work unpublished. This right has been described as a form of 
recognition of the author’s personality.17  
  Remarkably, Venice had not given similar attention to the protection 
of trademarks. This is attributed to the fact that at those times the 
commercial value of trademarks, to an extent worthy of protection, 
had not generally emerged.18 However, due to the decline of Venice, 
most of its discoveries and practices, especially the patent system, 
were largely transferred and adopted by the other Italian city-states 
and Europe. It has been stated that the Venetian patent system was 
adopted by the other Italian city-states and Europe exactly as 
developed in Venice.19  
 
iv) Protection of Intellectual Property during the Mercantilist 
Period 
      As the development of intellectual property is connected with 
economic progress, England and France, the leading powers in this 
respect in the mercantilist period, were considered as the pacesetters 
of intellectual property. The other countries, which entered in the field 
of industrialization thereafter such as Germany, USA, Japan and old 
                                                 
17  Ibid., at 56. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. 
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Russia had adopted an adaptive course.20 Therefore, the study of the 
development of intellectual property in the mercantilist period will 
concentrate mainly on England and France. 
      During the mercantilist period patents were seen as a convenient tool 
for implementing policies concerning the promotion of industry and 
commerce, which were considered as key instruments in economic 
progress and regulated by the state.21 An important event in this period 
was the promulgation of the Statute of Monopolies by the English 
Parliament in 1624, which provided under section 6 for monopoly 
privileges of 14 years for the true and first inventor, provided that the 
invention was new in England i.e., the monopoly privilege was 
granted not only for the deviser of the invention, but also to one who 
imported it from abroad.22 This Statute was used as a model by the 
British colonies in North America, which started to adopt similar 
patent laws in the 17th century.23 The significance of the Statute of 
Monopolies lay not only in its recognition of a specific form of a 
patent system, but also in the shift it made in the way of granting 
patent privilege whereby patent privileges became a concern of a 
government or its bureaucracy and governed by specific rules and 
                                                 
20  Ibid., at 58. 
21  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 32. See also Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 57. 
22  See Cornish, W. R., ‘Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights’. 2nd 
ed., London. Sweet & Maxwell 1989, at 67. 
23  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 33. 
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conditions instead of being a grant of a royal ruler or sovereign 
depending on his own will or temper.24 However, in France the 
practice of dealing with patent as a privilege granted by the monarch 
continued until the French Revolution in 1787, whereby the National 
Assembly issued in 1791 a patent law treating inventions as personal 
rights of the inventors who had complete and unlimited rights to use 
them.25 Another important event within that period was the 
promulgation of a federal patent law in the United States of America 
in 1790.26 Generally, “the period from the late 18th century to the late 
19th century is characterized by continued but locally disrupted 
diffusion of the patent system internationally”.27  
      However, an anti-patent movement was generated in Europe in 1860s 
to an extent that the patent laws were abolished in some countries such 
as Holland and weakened in other countries as in England. Yet, in the 
1870s the anti-patent current almost faded down. This anti-patent 
movement resulted from the dominion of free-trade and anti-
monopoly notions in that period, but the pressure of pro-patent interest 
groups in emerging industry, supported by the worldwide depression 
                                                 
24  Ibid. 
25 See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 60. 
26  See Granstrand, supra note 1, at 34. 
27  Ibid., at 35. 
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in the 1870s, led to the revival of protectionism notions and the 
weakening of anti-patent movements.28  
  The development of copyright in Europe, generally, was affected by 
the progress in printing after the discovery of the printer, whereby the 
relative ease of making copies paved the way for fraudulent re-print. 
Both in England and France the publishers (stationers) had succeeded 
in getting privileges for the exclusive rights of printing. The granting 
authorities found a way to control publishing through granting 
privileges to the stationers who were obliged to publish only 
authorized materials, so that the state could prevent the dissemination 
of ideas considered as detrimental to its interest or against public 
morality. Thus privileges of printing acquired a political function as 
they provided the authorities with effective means for censorship.29 
Typically, the publisher became the sole owner of the published book 
once he agreed with the author for publishing that book. The author 
had no more than the amount specified in the agreement between him 
and the publisher.30 This state of affairs continued in England till the 
promulgation of a copyright Act in 1709, which was known as the 
Statute of Anne. Under this Statute the authors and their assigns were 
granted the “sole right and liberty of printing books”, on condition that 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29  Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 61-5. 
30  Ibid., at 62. 
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the book had to be registered with the Stationers Company before 
publication. The right was valid for 14 years capable of being renewed 
for another 14 years if the author survived after the expiry of the first 
period.31 No significant change happened thereafter except the 
extension of copyright protection to artistic works such as sculpture, 
painting, drawings, photographing etc., until the enactment of the 
1911 Copyright Act, which is considered as the first British legislation 
unifying the various copyright Acts in a single text.32  
 Likewise, in France the exclusive control of publishing by Stationers 
continued until the enactment of copyright legislation by the decrees 
of Louis XVI (1777) whereby authors’ right to publish and sell their 
works was explicitly recognized as well as the separate rights of 
publishers. The rights of other categories of copyright owners, such as 
painters and sculptors in their creations were also recognized. Authors 
were granted perpetual property rights in contrast with the temporary 
monopoly granted to publishers.33 However, after the Revolution this 
legislation was replaced by the Decree of 1791, which considered the 
authors’ right as natural rights that need not require concessions from 
public authorities. This decree was followed by the 1793 Decree, 
which provided for the exclusive right of reproduction for authors, and 
                                                 
31  See Cornish, supra note 22, at 246. 
32 Ibid., at 248-50. 
33  Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 62. 
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the 1810 Decree, which extended the term of protection from 10 to 20 
years and the 1852 decree, which considered the infringement of 
copyright an offence. No significant changes were made thereafter in 
copyright law until the promulgation of the law of 1957, which was 
replaced by the law of 1985.34 
  Trademarks have been used and recognized in France since the 13th 
century. But their use at that time was compulsory. Their function was 
to distinguish the owner of the products, not the products carrying 
them. Artisans were compelled to put marks on their products so as to 
enable the concerned authorities to trace the origin of the products 
carrying these marks. As per a royal edict issued in 1564, imitators of 
marks were considered as counterfeiters liable to capital punishment. 
However, “the mandatory requirement of placing marks was not 
evenly applied to every activity so that an anomaly resulted in making 
infringement a felony in one trade and a civil wrong in another”. A 
law of trademarks issued in 1857 and amended in 1890 and 1891 
provided for the protection of trademarks for a period of 15 years 
capable of being renewed. “Registration did not bestow any title but 
served as a declaration of proprietorship, which depended ultimately 
on prior use of the mark”. The French judiciary is said to be the first in 
                                                 
34  Ibid. 
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developing the concept of unfair competition in the early 19th century 
in order to “combat the abuse of freedom of trade” 35  
  In England, as in France, the marks were used as means of 
identifying the owners of the goods in the earlier stages. Their use was 
motivated by the desire to prove property in goods missed as a result 
of piracy or shipwreck. A statute passed in 1353 provided for the 
restitution of goods depending on the marks they carried without any 
need to resort to common law. Also, as in France, the artisans in 
England were compelled to put marks on their products. However, 
these marks, which were first considered as ‘police’ or ‘liability’ 
marks were later on developed into ‘asset’ marks i.e., they acquired 
value as symbols of individual good-will.36 This transformation of the 
function of marks from a regulatory method to a valuable asset 
indicating the good-will of a business was considered as “a significant 
step towards legal recognition of proprietorship in trademarks”.37 The 
protection of trademarks in England was mainly developed by case 
law. Only in the second half of the 19th century did the English 
Parliament start to deal with the regulation and protection of 
                                                 
35  Ibid., at 62, 63. 
36  Ibid. at 67. 
37  Ibid. 
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trademarks. The first British trademarks registration Act was passed in 
1875.38 
 
2. The Emergence of Modern Intellectual Property Law 
  In their analysis of the history of modern intellectual property law, 
Sherman and Bently disagree with the view considering the 1624 
Statute of Monopolies and the 1710 Statute of Anne as the origin of 
patent and copyright law in England respectively. They argue that 
copyright, as understood today, emerged only after 1850s or 
thereabout and that the Statute of Monopolies played minimal role, if 
any, as it had been mainly declaratory of what had been held to be the 
law by judges. They contend that “while gradual, haphazard and in 
some ways still incomplete, by the 1850s or thereabout modern 
intellectual property law had emerged as a separate and distinct area of 
law replete with its own logic and grammar”.39 To explain their views, 
the said two writers make an artificial distinction between what they 
called pre-modern and modern intellectual property law, depending 
largely on the British law over the period from 1760 through to 1911. 
They state that 1760 witnessed the height of literary property debate 
and 1911 witnessed the enactment of the British copyright law. They 
base their distinction on what they consider as the distinctive features 
                                                 
38  See Cornish, supra note 22, at 393-94. 
39  See Sherman, Brad and Bently, Lionel ‘The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law’. 
Cambridge University Press 1999, at 205-12. 
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of the law before and after the 1850s. According to them, modern and 
pre-modern intellectual property law differ in the way in which the 
law is organized. In other words, while modern intellectual property 
law with its subsidiary categories of patents, designs, trademarks, 
copyright and neighboring rights is considered universally as given, 
under pre-modern law there was no consensus on the form in which 
the law should be organized. The current shape of intellectual property 
law was not known before 1850s and although there was agreement on 
granting property rights in mental labor, the nature of this legal 
category itself was uncertain. Another difference between modern and 
pre-modern intellectual property law lies in the particular form each of 
them took. Pre-modern law is described as subject-specific and 
reactive i.e., it dealt only with particular problems presented to it, 
whereas modern law is described as abstract and forward looking 
because it deals not only with the objects it regulates, but also it is 
concerned with the shape that the law itself is going to take when 
performing these tasks as reflected in modern legislation. A third 
difference between modern and pre-modern intellectual property law 
relates to the protected subject matter and the approach adopted by the 
law towards that subject matter. Under pre-modern law the 
concentration was on the creativity or mental labor embodied in the 
protected subject matter, which played a pivotal role in determining 
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the final shape, duration and scope of the concerned legal rights. 
Modern intellectual property law on the other hand emphasizes more 
on the object in its own right. In other words, it has shifted its focus 
from the mental labor, which was considered as the essence of the 
intangible property embodied in a book, for example, and 
concentrated more on “the object as a closed and unitary entity; with 
the impact that the book had on the reading public, the economy and 
so on”.40  
 This closure of intangible property was reflected in the approach 
adopted by the law when dealing with the protected subject matter. 
Thus, while pre-modern law used the traditional jurisprudence when 
treating the issues relating to intangible property such as the 
identification of the essence of the protected subject matter, with the 
closure of intangible property the modern intellectual property law has 
utilized the resources of political economy and utilitarianism in 
dealing with the protected subject matter.41 Moreover, the role played 
by registration in pre-modern intellectual property law was different 
from its counterpart in modern intellectual property law. Under pre-
modern law registration was used as a means of identifying the 
intangible property whereas under the modern law it has been used not 
only for identifying the intangible property, but also for performing 
                                                 
40  Ibid., at 173. 
41  Ibid., at 174. 
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other jobs such as placing the intangible property in a standardized 
format. In so doing, registration has helped in the closure of intangible 
property and the related move away from creativity and mental labor 
in modern law. Furthermore, registration has played a positive role in 
modern intellectual property law in managing and demarcating the 
shape of the intangible property embodied in the protected subject 
matter, especially with regard to patent, designs and trademarks in 
addition to its role as a means of proof of ownership.42  
  However, Sherman and Bently at the end of their analysis of the 
history of making modern intellectual property law conclude that in 
spite of the fact that the second half of the nineteenth century 
witnessed “the closure of intangible property and the consequential 
exclusion of creativity and mental labor from the law’s immediate 
horizon” nevertheless, this does not mean complete disappearance of 
creativity from intellectual property law. This is because, despite its 
efforts, “modern intellectual property law has been unable to confine 
intangible property to the document as registered or, and this is 
particularly the case with copyright, the immediate physical form in 
which it is expressed”. Intangible property still plays a central role in 
organizing the categories of modern intellectual property law, which 
were differentiated according to their relative value. But, unlike pre-
                                                 
42  Ibid., at 180-93. 
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modern law where the value of the protected subject matter was 
measured in terms of the mental labor embodied in the concerned 
property, under modern intellectual property law “the ‘value’ tended 
to mean the macro-economic value of the property”. Within this 
perception what is important is not the labor or creativity embodied in 
the work but its contribution, which is judged in economic or quazi-
economic terms. Moreover, under modern intellectual property law 
creativity has appeared in new forms, for example, the requirements of 
originality and non-obviousness.43  
 
3. The Traditional Legal System Governing Intellectual Property 
Rights 
  As stated above, by 1850s or thereabout modern intellectual property 
law emerged as a discrete area of law. Intellectual property laws at 
that time were identified by their pure national character. Different 
internal factors interfered in determining the scope of protection for 
the various types of intellectual property rights in each country. Each 
country was making a balance between “the interests of the society as 
a whole in its economic and cultural development and the interest of 
the individual to secure a ‘fair’ value for his intellectual efforts or 
investment of capital or labor”.44 The scope of protection was 
                                                 
43  Ibid., at 194-202. 
44  See Cornish, supra note 22, at 5& 6. 
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determined mainly by political decisions expressed primarily in forms 
of national legislation. The economic and cultural differences among 
nations have been reflected in differences in the approaches toward 
intellectual property rights and their specific features.45 Moreover, as 
intellectual property laws have been connected with the economic 
objectives of each country, there has been some tendency not to 
extend protection to nationals of other countries unless the receiving 
country is in need for the work of the foreigner for furthering its 
interest or the interests of its nationals, for example, an invention 
needed for the economic and industrial progress of the receiving 
country. The tendency of excluding nationals of other countries from 
acquiring or retaining intellectual property rights is very clear in 
relation to copyright protection where the recipient countries are 
typically reluctant in paying out royalties to foreign owners.46 
  However, the expansion in trade and the progress of industries in the 
last quarter of the 19th century have made the activities of exporting 
and importing of technology and know-how major concerns for 
industrial and non-industrial countries respectively. This development 
had rendered the interaction between the different countries and their 
nationals inevitable. Therefore, a need for transborder protection of 
intellectual property rights has become a necessity. The response of 
                                                 
45  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 58. 
46  See Cornish, W. R., The International Relations of Intellectual Property, 52,Camb. L.J. 48 (1993).   
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the different countries to the demands of providing protection to 
foreigners’ intellectual property rights depends on the need of the 
concerned country for protection of the rights of its nationals abroad. 
Thus, few countries were ready to grant unilaterally protection for the 
foreigners’ rights similar to that granted to its citizens, and this was 
mainly confined to copyright protection and moreover, this was said to 
be motivated by the desire to be followed by other countries e.g., it 
was said that when France unilaterally extended copyright protection 
to foreigners in 1810, it had been suffering from piracy of the rights of 
its nationals in other European countries and made this step to 
encourage other countries to do the same. France was followed by 
other countries such as Denmark in 1828, Prussia in 1836 and England 
in 1837. Therefore, protection of intellectual property rights of 
foreigners, especially industrial property rights, was secured at first 
through bilateral arrangements, which required strict reciprocity. It has 
been stated that by 1883 there were 69 bilateral treaties in this 
respect.47  
  During the second half of the 19th century the industrializing 
countries of Europe and America had enacted intellectual property 
laws, more or less, similar in nature and scope. The Western European 
countries, which were “similar in outlook and stage of culture and 
                                                 
47  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 69-73. 
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industrial development”, adopted the call for multilateral protection of 
intellectual property rights. By the end of the 19th century the most 
basic conventions in the field of intellectual property, namely, the 
Paris Convention on Industrial Property 1883 and the Berne 
Convention on Literary and Artistic Works 1886 were concluded.48 A 
criticism for the two conventions is that they could only be amended 
by unanimous agreement of member states. Regardless of this 
unanimity rule the two conventions had been amended many times 
mainly to elaborate their scope in favor of the industrializing 
countries.49 Another criticism is that member countries have confined 
their “obligations in the main, without any too scrupulous regard for 
precise compliance”. In addition, there are no specific provisions, in 
both conventions, for the settlement of disputes.50 
  However, later on developed as well as developing countries have 
shown dissatisfaction with both conventions. On the one hand 
industrial countries are complaining of the increasing scale of piracy 
for their products while, on the other hand non-industrial countries 
have expressed their dissatisfaction with the contribution of the two 
conventions in the dissemination of technology, learning and 
entertainment. They claim for adapting both conventions “so as to 
                                                 
48  Ibid., See also Cornish, supra note 46, at 48. 
49  See Cornish, supra note 46, at 48. 
50  Ibid. 
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foster their ability to attract foreign technology, and also the stuff of 
learning, entertainment and sophisticated marketing so as to found and 
foster their domestic industry”. Therefore, direct amendment of either 
convention at present is considered difficult, if not impossible.51   
  Furthermore, “intellectual property rights, which help to sustain the 
lead of those with technical know-how, with successful marketing 
schemes, with new fetishes for pop culture, have come to foster 
immense commercial returns”, coupled with the growth and expansion 
of international trade, the globalization of production and the massive 
increase in exports52, have led the dominating powers to call for new 
means of protection for intellectual property rights to combat the 
ascending scale of piracy of their products worldwide. The existing 
legal techniques for the protection of intellectual property rights are 
seen as insufficient. Different views have emerged, some call for new 
rules and others call for improvement of the existing rules.53  
 
 
4. Internationalization of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 
i) Background 
  The call for a universally uniform legislation could be traced back to 
the discussions preceding the conclusion of the Paris Convention since 
                                                 
51  Ibid. 
52  See Cornish, supra note 22, at 11. 
53  Ibid. 
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1878. However, the controversy about the suitability and expediency 
of a universal system has not been settled yet. For some, the 
unification of intellectual property laws, especially patent system, is 
seen as utopian because the differences in legal systems are due to 
differences in the economic and legal foundations in each country. 
Others consider such unification as possible and necessitated by the 
mounting economic demands, and that only political obstacles have 
stood in its way.54 Since 1965, the US has started its campaign for the 
establishment of a universal patent system. Later on this campaign has 
been extended to cover other areas of intellectual property rights. The 
cause of this campaign is said to be the desire of the US to maintain 
technological superiority over other industrial countries. The US 
contends that the existing multilateral conventions are unable to 
protect its economy from piracy and counterfeiting. So it calls for a 
new regime that can respond to its needs, instead of accommodating 
within the current conventions.55 
  It has been stated that the US used its allegations of piracy as a 
pretext for objecting to other legitimate demands of developing 
countries relating to issues such as the denial of protection for certain 
categories of inventions e.g., pharmaceutical and chemical substances, 
strict standards of patentability, a shorter period of protection, the 
                                                 
54  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 79. 
55  Ibid., at 80. 
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issuance of compulsory licenses and stiffer regulation of technology 
transfer agreements.56 Moreover, the US has resorted to apply 
unilateral measures in form of economic sanctions against the 
countries, which are considered by the US as not maintaining adequate 
and effective protection of intellectual property rights or not providing 
fair and equitable market access to its citizens in connection with 
intellectual property protection. In doing so, the US is depending on 
its own internal laws, especially the famous section 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act and its subsequent amendments.57 
 Furthermore, the US had started a new move aimed at reducing 
intellectual property issues into trade issues and hence, bringing them 
under the umbrella of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
(GATT) and its effective enforcement mechanism. This new trend has 
been described as an attempt by the US to emulate the rule of section 
301 of its Trade Act for international trade as a whole. In 1987 the US 
formulated a proposed intellectual property code to be adopted by the 
GATT. The proposed code addressed debatable issues in intellectual 
property such as the extension of patent protection to cover all fields 
of technology including controversial areas like pharmaceutical and 
chemical substances. The aim of the US is to replace “national 
treatment and minimum intellectual property standards of existing 
                                                 
56  Ibid., at 80-1. 
57  Ibid., at 81-2. 
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conventions by material reciprocity where countries would be forced 
to provide protection similar to that of their trading partners”.58 The 
US efforts in this respect have resulted in the conclusion of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).  
 
 
ii) The Role of TRIPS in the International Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
  The final Uruguay Round of the GATT adopted on April 15, 1994 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
effective on January 1, 1995. An annex to this Agreement is the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). Under TRIPS the term ‘intellectual property’ refers to all 
categories mentioned in sections 1 to 7 of Part II of that agreement, 
namely; copyright and neighboring rights, trademarks, geographical 
indications, industrial designs, patents, lay-out designs (topographies) 
of integrated circuits and undisclosed information.59 Most of the 
provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
                                                 
58  Ibid., at 82-3. 
59  See WIPO Publication No. 476 (E), 2nd ed., (1998) at 333-5. 
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Artistic Works are incorporated by reference in TRIPS Agreement and 
some provisions are either changed or extended.60  
  The rules provided for under TRIPS Agreement are considered as 
minimum standards for the availability, scope and use of intellectual 
property rights. Therefore, controversial issues relating to the 
protection of intellectual property such as the term and area of 
protection for patent, copyright and trademarks are considered as 
settled. In this respect, TRIPS Agreement provides for the 
patentability of all fields of technology for a term of twenty years and 
for copyrightability of computer programs and databases and the 
protection of well-known trademarks without need for registration. 
The term for copyright protection is the life of the creator plus fifty 
years thereafter and the term of protection of trademarks should not be 
less than seven years capable of indefinite renewal. Also TRIPS 
provides for the protection of industrial designs and integrated circuits 
for a term of ten years, in addition to the provision that trade secrets 
and know-how should benefit from the protection that member states 
are expecting to provide. Moreover, previous practices relating to 
“compulsory licenses for inventions, marks or literary and artistic 
works are restricted. Exclusions of protection are strictly limited to the 
need to maintain public order or morality, to protect public health and 
                                                 
60  Ibid. 
 80
nutrition”, provided that such exclusion be compatible with the 
provisions of TRIPS Agreement.61 Furthermore, TRIPS requires 
member countries to provide for enforcement procedures in order to 
enable aggrieved parties to take effective actions against infringements 
of their intellectual property rights, including expeditious remedies to 
prevent infringements and remedies deterring further infringements. 
The required procedures should be transparent, effective and 
expeditious. The WTO settlement of dispute mechanism will be 
applied for the implementation of TRIPS provisions.62 
 TRIPS Agreement is considered as a transformation from the 
traditional multilateralism characterizing the other previous 
conventions relating to the protection of intellectual property rights, 
which is based on territoriality, sovereignty and national treatment to a 
new universalism based on trade principles and implemented by 
WTO.63 TRIPS is considered as “a major milestone, laying out for the 
first time a minimum level of adequate intellectual property protection 
and enforcement on an international scale”.64    
                                                 
61  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 87. See also WIPO Publication, supra note 59, at 337-44. 
62  See WIPO Publication, supra note 59, at 344-6. 
63 Doern, G. Bruce, ‘Global Change and Intellectual Property Agencies’. Pinter, London and New   
York, 1st ed. 1999, at 94. 
64  Ley, Charles S., ‘Implementing TRIPS – A Test of Political Will’. L. & Policy in Int. Business, vol. 
31 no. 2 at 789. 
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 The main features distinguishing TRIPS from other previous 
multilateral conventions for the protection of intellectual property 
rights may be summarized as follows: 
- Unlike the other conventions, TRIPS provides for a comprehensive 
uniform code of intellectual property covering all categories of 
intellectual property rights known at the time of its conclusion. 
This uniform code has left few, if any, options or alternatives for 
member states to include in their internal laws.65 
-  Also, unlike the other conventions, TRIPS is concentrating on the 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property and disregard any 
cultural or social implications thereof.66 
-  TRIPS is supported by an enforcement mechanism represented in 
the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism, “backed by US tenacity 
and a further residual use of US aggressive unilateralism”. Such 
enforcement mechanism is not available in the other conventions.67 
  The negotiations which preceded the conclusion of TRIPS show that 
many developing countries had resisted the inclusion of the issue of 
intellectual property in the agenda of the General Agreement on Tariff 
and Trade (GATT) in 1986, arguing that the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) was the appropriate forum, but 
                                                 
65 See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 84-6. 
66 See Doern, supra note 63, at 92- 101. 
67 Ibid., at 101.  
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ultimately they accepted it as part of a package covering other 
agreements facilitating the access of developing countries products 
such as agricultural and textile to developed countries markets, on the 
belief that “the benefits of the other Uruguay Round Agreements 
would outweigh the economic and social costs of TRIPS”.68 
 TRIPS has been much criticized for different reasons.  In this respect 
it has been argued that TRIPS was not based on a carefully 
coordinated economic analysis and that “it was the manifestation of 
rent-seeking desires of those multinationals that saw opportunities for 
themselves in redefining and globalizing intellectual property rights”. 
Also it was seen as a result of US coercive strategy to force other 
countries to respond to its own economic interests.69 One commentator 
sees TRIPS as an attempt to “remake international copyright law in 
the image of Western copyright law” and that if it succeeds, “it will be 
one of the most effective vehicles of Western imperialism in 
history”.70 He adds that as TRIPS, which was concluded in the 
Internet era, did not take account of this new phenomenon and 
                                                 
68  See UNCTAD-ICTSD Capacity Building Project on IPRs (2002), Part 2, 'The Global Intellectual 
Property Rights System', at 43-4. Available at: 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/pp/pp_3ch_02.pdf  
69  Ibid. at 95. 
70  Hamilton, Marci A. ‘The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective’  (in) 
Adam D. Moore (ed.), Intellectual Property – Moral, Legal and International Dilemmas, Rowman and 
littlefield Publishers 1997, at 243-4. 
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disregard its impact on the protection and dissemination of intellectual 
property; it is therefore, outdated and may be overprotective.71 
  From developing countries perspective, it has been argued that 
TRIPS was imposed on developing countries. To prove this allegation, 
Professor Drahos traced the negotiations preceding the conclusion of 
TRIPS since 1986 and concluded that there were no negotiations in 
the true sense because developed countries, especially the United 
States, used different forms of pressure including unilateral trade 
sanctions, bilateral arrangements and other forms of pressure in 
addition to the exploitation of the ill-informed and ill-resourced  
developing countries’ negotiators so as to coerce developing countries 
to sign TRIPS.72  
  It is believed that TRIPS has tilted the balance on which intellectual 
property has been basically built, in favor of right holders at the 
expense of public interests, and as such, it deprived developing 
countries from striking a proper balance between their developmental 
needs and the protection of private IPRs. “Pre-TRIPS countries were 
able to set their own IPR policies and legislation. Most developing 
countries exempted essential consumer items, especially 
pharmaceutical drugs, food products and biological materials 
                                                 
71  Ibid. 
72  See Drahos, Peter, ‘Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue’. [in] 
Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne [ed.] ‘Global Intellectual Property Rights- Knowledge, Access and 
Development’. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, New York (2002), at 161-174.  
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(including seeds and plant varieties) from patentability”. Most of these 
privileges are no longer allowed under TRIPS. The approach of ‘one-
size-fits-all’ adopted by TRIPS is believed to be a great disservice to 
developing countries. “Many of the present-day developed countries 
did not adopt IPR legislation or strict IPR standards when they were 
going through the stages of development that the developing countries 
of today are attempting to go through”. The history showed that many 
of the developed countries of today adopted highly deficient IPRs 
regimes compared to the present standards. Most of them did not 
allow patents on chemical and pharmaceutical substances until 
recently. For example, “pharmaceutical products became patentable 
only in 1967 in West Germany and France, 1979 in Italy and 1992 in 
Spain”. Similarly, chemical substances became patentable in 1967 in 
West Germany, 1968 in Nordic countries, 1976 in Japan, 1978 in 
Switzerland and 1992 in Spain. The disenchantment of developing 
countries has been further exacerbated as the implementation of 
TRIPS showed that while the IPRs on which developed countries 
acquired a dominant position have been well protected under TRIPS, 
other forms of IPRs emanating mainly from developing countries, 
such as traditional knowledge, have not been adequately protected. By 
allowing the patenting of life forms such as microorganism, in 
addition to the non-biological and microbiological processes, TRIPS 
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has facilitated the “exploitative appropriation by transnational 
companies of the biological resources and traditional knowledge of 
local communities based mainly in developing countries”. This form 
of exploitation has been described as ‘biopiracy’. Moreover, 
developing countries found that some of the claims and promises, 
relating to the promotion of innovation and transfer of technology 
respectively, have not been fulfilled. Furthermore, it has become 
apparent for developing countries that “developed countries regard 
TRIPS, not as the final word on intellectual property protection, but 
rather as a solid foundation from where to extort greater degrees of 
protection from developing countries”.73  
  It is believed that although all countries may enact intellectual 
property laws compatible with TRIPS requirements under the threat of 
economic sanctions of section 301 of the US Trade Act and WTO, yet 
as most of those countries, especially non-industrial countries, are in 
imperative need for laws conforming to their necessities, they will find 
ways to circumvent those uniform laws and apply alternative measures 
and standards. Forcing non-industrial countries to adopt laws against 
their economic interests will put the economies of those countries 
under further strain and may curtail any expansion in their markets, a 
                                                 
73  See Pretorius, Willem, ‘TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?’, [in] 
Drahos and Mayne [ed.], supra note 72, at 185. See also Khor, Martin ‘Rethinking Intellectual Property 
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matter which may in turn be against the benefit of industrial countries 
as well, which are always in need of those markets. It is believed that 
non-industrial countries have been “pushed to the precipice: to 
abandon any economic development and perish or scrape through with 
whatever they can, including forming international economic zones as 
seems to be the trend of these days”.74 
  It is worthy to mention that the disenchantment over TRIPS is not 
confined to developing countries, but extend to some of the 
transnational companies. This is because, although TRIPS came into 
being as a result of the pressure of transnational corporations, 
especially those of the US, EU and Japan, which started their efforts to 
frame IPRs as a trade-related issue since the 1973-1979 GATT Tokyo 
Round, nevertheless some of these transnational corporations, 
particularly pharmaceutical and life science businesses, are dissatisfied 
with TRIPS. Likewise, many developed countries would like TRIPS 
to be amended so as to accommodate new technological advances, 
including the Internet and electronic commerce that have taken place 
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.75 Moreover, the  
supporters of TRIPS are complaining of non-compliance of some of 
the developing countries with their obligations under TRIPS after 
January 1, 2000, the day on which TRIPS has become effective for 
                                                 
74  See Endeshaw, supra note 6, at 85. 
75 See UNCTAD-ICTSD Capacity Building Project on IPRs, supra note 68, at 45. 
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developing countries.76 According to one writer, this non-compliance 
is attributed to the fact that the US negotiators may have placed so 
much faith on their “belief that developing countries would make 
honest efforts to voluntarily comply with both the letter and spirit of 
the agreement”, and that litigation would be enough deterrent for those 
not complying.77 He describes this as overreliance on the rule of law 
and litigation. The overreliance on the rule of law, as he believes, 
emanated from the underestimation of the power of internal political 
and economic forces that work against the compliance of a developing 
country with TRIPS and also the underestimation of the fact that 
member states may reinterpret their commitments in TRIPS in ways 
that respond to domestic political and economic pressures. This 
overreliance on litigation, he added; “stem in part from the affinity for 
litigation as a problem-solving tool, both within the United States and 
among lawyers in particular”. He thinks that litigation is an imperfect 
tool for TRIPS as the expected volume of litigation would overwhelm 
the litigation system of WTO and, moreover, the cases are considered 
as complicated because “in addition to their factual backdrop, they 
have substantial political dimension, which are more acute because 
TRIPS imposes positive obligations that require affirmative steps by 
countries to comply”. He believes that the successful and expeditious 
                                                 
76  See Ley, supra note 64, at 789. 
77  Ibid., at 791-2. 
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implementation of TRIPS requires a political will and strategy. 
Developing countries should possess a political will to implement 
their responsibilities under TRIPS and the developed countries as well 
should have political will to comply with the agreement themselves 
and hold developing countries accountable. Moreover, there should be 
a selective and strategic litigation concentrating on simple and 
straightforward cases that constitute clear violation of the TRIPS, so 
as to build a body of precedents, and hence to leverage these decisions 
to obtain greater compliance on other countries. In addition, 
diplomacy may work as another tool for securing increasing 
compliance with TRIPS.78 
 
iii) Beyond TRIPS 
  The international intellectual property lawmaking process is 
increasingly becoming more complicated. Different forums, including a 
diversity of multilateral agreements, international organizations, bilateral 
and regional arrangements and even private entities, are participating in 
this process. Almost all these institutions overlap in driving towards 
globally harmonized and strengthened IPRs. 
 
    (a) Multilateral Treaties 
                                                 
78  Ibid., at 793-4. 
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  Many developments in the field of the international intellectual 
property law have taken place since the conclusion of TRIPS. In the 
field of copyright and neighboring rights two agreements were 
concluded in 1996, namely, WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), which came 
into force in March 2002.79 These two agreements have been 
formulated to accommodate new technological advances, such as the 
Internet. It has been commented that these treaties provide “advanced 
copyright protection which, in realty, probably represent the 
substantive ‘floor’ of copyright-protected levels under TRIPS Round 
2”.80 The new issues introduced by WCT in comparison to the Berne 
Convention are that: first, the WCT increases the range of protected 
subject matter such as the protection of software. Second, it expands 
the range of modes of dissemination of works, which are considered 
as infringing acts e.g., it considers digitization as a form of 
reproduction. Third, it requires Signatory States to take civil and 
criminal measures to prevent any interference with technical devices 
used to restrict access to copyright content. It has been observed that 
some of the provisions of the WCT such as the “creation of a 
freestanding right of distribution (Article 6) and a uniform right to 
                                                 
79 See WIPO Survey of Issues relating to Intellectual Property on the Internet: Issue III. December 
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80  See Lea, Gary, ‘Digital Millennium or Digital Dominion? The Effect of IPRs in Software on 
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control communication to the public (Article 8) go well beyond 
TRIPS, let alone Berne”. Moreover, the provisions of the WCT which 
are expected to cause far-reaching effects on copyright exceptions and 
limitations are those of Articles 11 and 12 relating to control of 
copyright content by right holders through technical measures and 
rights management information (RMI). This is because there are no 
express requirements or even permissions for exceptions or limitations 
on these control measures. This fact is reflected in the first 
implementation attempts of WCT by Signatory Countries such as the 
1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of the US and the 
2001 Directive on Copyright in the Information Society of the EU, 
which contain fewer exceptions or limitations than what is provided 
for under copyright law. The WPPT contains similar provisions.81   
  The international developments in the field of patents include the 
Patent Law Treaty (PLT) 2000, the reform process of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the ongoing negotiations of the 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT).82 The PLT deals with 
procedural requirements relating to the application, obtaining and 
maintaining patents worldwide. It aims at harmonizing the procedures 
in this respect. The main criticism directed to this treaty is that it 
relaxes “the conditions for admission of a patent application and the 
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determination of the application date”. The importance of the 
determination of the application date is that it is crucial for the 
assessment of novelty and inventive step and for establishing the right 
to a patent grant in case of rival claims by different inventors. It has 
also been observed that although the rules under Article 5 of the PLT 
appear to benefit patents applicants, they may in fact increase the 
uncertainty and litigation and, as such increase the load on national 
patent offices instead of reducing it.83  
  On the other hand, the PCT was concluded in 1970 with the aim of 
creating a single international system regulating the filing procedures 
for patent applications that would be valid in all Contracting 
Countries. One of the main characteristics of that system was that it 
respected the substantive differences in the patent laws of the 
Contracting Countries. The process of reforming the PCT started in 
2000. It aims at introducing amendments that would simplify and 
streamline the procedures and align the PCT with new PLT standards. 
It has been commented that although the reform of PCT found support 
both from developed and developing countries, yet there are fears that 
the objectives of the United States, which is the main proponent of this 
reform, may not be limited to the making of the system more cost-
effective in comparison to the cost of direct national filing, and may 
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transcend the grant of substantive rights for PCT applicants. “Thus the 
system could move away from its current, non-binding patentability 
opinions and adopt procedures where substantive rights could 
eventually be granted via the PCT”.84  
  However, the most controversial development in the field of patents 
may be the draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, which is currently, 
(2004), under discussion at WIPO. This treaty concentrates on 
substantive standards aiming initially at “creating uniform substantive 
patent law standards relating to issues of prior art, novelty, utility and 
inventiveness, requirements relating sufficient disclosure, drafting and 
interpretation of claims, ground for refusal of an application, and for 
revocation and invalidation of a patent”. Further, this first phase may 
witness harmonization in areas such as who is entitled to a patent: the 
first to invent or the first to file, and the post-grant opposition 
proceedings, if the differences between the US and EU in this respect 
would be settled. The provisions of this draft treaty go well beyond 
TRIPS by giving specific definitions to the requirements of 
patentability and what an invention is. It is feared that if the SPLT is 
adopted in its current form, it will not be in the benefit of developing 
and least developed countries, as it would set binding international 
standards in critical areas of patent law so far left to be determined by 
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each country according to its own public interest. “Strong pressures to 
adopt such standards both bilaterally and multilaterally (through, for 
example, the review and amendment procedures of article 71 of 
TRIPS) can be anticipated”. To date, the participation in negotiations 
by developing and least developed countries is weak in comparison to 
the participation of developed countries and many non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) representing the interests of transnational 
corporations and patent lawyers. It has been recommended that: “it is 
necessary to improve the quality of participation by developing 
countries whose representatives often lack expertise and experience in 
international intellectual property standard setting and in the 
examination of the relationship between intellectual property and 
national interests, and who may be unfamiliar with some of the 
technical subjects being discussed in WIPO”.85     
 
    (b) Bilateral Treaties and Regional Instruments  
  Away from the ongoing negotiations at forums such as WIPO and 
WTO, developed countries are pursuing their intellectual property 
agenda through bilateral and regional arrangements. Developed 
countries, especially the United States, use these alternative forums to 
conclude agreements that “aim to raise national IPRs standards to the 
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level of TRIPS, or even beyond. Some of the resulting agreements 
have required developing countries to introduce TRIPS standards 
before the expiry of the transitional period, and introduce standards of 
protection even higher than those required by TRIPS. Many such 
commitments are embedded in free trade agreements”.86 An example 
of such bilateral treaties is the 2000 agreement between the United 
Sates and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area. Under 
this Agreement Jordan is obliged to give patent in all fields of 
technology to the same extent as applied in the US. The Agreement 
made no mention of exceptions from patentability provided for under 
Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS. Moreover, Jordan must join the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. 
Furthermore, a supplementary memorandum of understanding requires 
Jordan to allow the patenting of business methods and computer-
related inventions.87 An example of regional instruments is the Draft 
Agreement (Free Trade Area of the Americas) July 2001. This Draft 
Agreement includes a chapter on the protection of IPRs, “which in 
addition to requiring compliance with now standard international 
intellectual property principles, also requires parties to enact laws 
substantially equivalent to 17 U.S.C. section 1201(a)(1)(A), which 
creates a distinct tort for circumventing technological measures”. It 
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has been argued that the standards provided for under DMCA go well 
beyond what is required by WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996.88 
 
   (c) Other Developments 
  It has been observed that the “sudden emergence of the WTO as part 
of the international intellectual property lawmaking process seemed to 
energize WIPO”. In addition to several treaties in different fields of 
intellectual property that have been concluded since the conclusion of 
TRIPS, WIPO has formed ‘Standing Committees’ so as to respond 
quickly to social and technological developments relating to 
intellectual property and make proposals to the WIPO Assemblies for 
“adoption in form of non-binding recommendations rather than pursue 
the same substantive goals through the mechanism of formal treaties 
adopted after a long negotiation process”. The notable examples in 
this process are the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on 
the Protection of Well-Known Marks adopted by the WIPO General 
Assembly and the Paris Union Assembly in September 1999 and 
WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, 
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and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet in 
September 2001.89  
  These non-binding recommendations are considered to be ‘soft law’, 
i.e., each nation may choose whether or not to act in compliance with 
them. Another example of the so-called ‘soft law’ is the Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), adopted by the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 
1999. ICANN requires each of its approved registrars to include in the 
agreements for the registration of domain names a clause obliging the 
registrant to submit to the application of UDRP, in case of dispute 
between domain names registrants and trademarks owners. In case of 
such disputes, ICANN-authorized dispute settlement providers appoint 
quasi-arbitral panels that apply “substantive rules that were developed 
in an unconventional process of international intellectual property 
lawmaking”. The decisions of these panels are not binding on national 
courts, and as such can be overcome by contrary determination in 
national courts. The importance of these forms of lawmaking 
processes is that the resulting soft law may turn into hard law, i.e., 
binding law through different mechanisms, including incorporation in 
bilateral or multilateral treaties. For example, the draft agreement on 
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Free Trade Area of the Americas requires Signatory States to ensure 
that their trademark laws comply with the WIPO Joint 
Recommendations on Well-known Marks. Even WIPO is seeking to 
incorporate its non-binding recommendation on trademarks in a treaty 
harmonizing international trademarks law. Therefore, it is 
recommended that care and attention should be made when 
formulating rules through these new lawmaking processes.90   
  In the field of copyright, the WIPO Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) is currently (2004) discussing a 
treaty on broadcasting/cablecasting/webcasting. The aim of this 
proposed treaty is to expand the exclusive copyright protection on 
transmitted content to 50 years. It has been observed that the 
protection would cover all contents “(not only the signal) even when 
the content was not owned or created by the ‘casting’ entity”. 
Moreover, “the loosely defined new webcasting right as promoted by 
USA (where it is not recognized, however) could apply to almost any 
listserve of web page”.91  
  A notable development in the field of copyright is the emergence of 
the concept of ‘open access’. The aim of this concept is to provide 
alternative to the restricted access model based on the exercise of 
                                                 
90  See Dinwoodie, supra note 89, at 1002-3 
91  See Correa, M. Carlos, ‘Recent International Development in the Area of Intellectual Property 
Rights’. ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd Belliagio Series on Development and Intellectual Property, 
18-21 Sept. 03, at 7. Available at: http://www.iprsonline.org.unctadictsd/pdf  
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IPRs. There are several initiatives in this respect including the 
initiative for freely accessible software under a legal mechanism 
known as ‘copyleft’. Under this mechanism third parties are not 
allowed to modify free software and protect it under IPRs. Many 
governments including US, EU and several developing countries are 
encouraging the public procurement of open-source software. The 
concept of open access operates within the current legal framework of 
copyright law. The right holder who allows the free access to his work 
retains some or all of the exclusive property rights that are granted 
under statutory intellectual property law. “Despite that open access is 
based on a restricted use of IPRs, WIPO has refused to deal with this 
kind of initiatives”.92   
                                                 
92  Ibid. 
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iv) The Role of Litigation in the Creation of New International  
 
Intellectual Property Norms 
 
 
 (a) National Courts 
  By now, the traditional reluctance of national courts to adjudicate 
intellectual property disputes involving foreign intellectual property 
laws seems almost to vanish, particularly within copyright context. In 
addition to domain names disputes, national courts are beginning to 
tackle cases in other contexts with broader international ramifications 
and thus contribute to the effective creation of international 
intellectual property rules. U.S. as well as EU courts have begun to 
assume jurisdiction on disputes involving claims under several foreign 
copyright laws.93 Typically, U.S. courts differentiate between 
jurisdiction and applicable law. However, recently, U.S. courts have 
developed a device, particularly for infringements that take place on 
the Internet, to the effect that where an infringing act took place in the 
United States and enables further reproduction abroad U.S. courts 
apply the U.S. law for both domestic and abroad acts of infringement, 
i.e., they apply choice of law rules that allow localization of 
                                                 
93 See for example Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236, 257-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [cited in] 
Dinwoodie, supra note 89, at 1007, (where a US court accepted jurisdiction notwithstanding the failure 
of the plaintiff to specify in his claims specific countries under whose laws the claims were made).See 
Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership Ltd. (1997) Ch. 293, (whereby an English court decided that the 1968 
Brussels Convention requires an English court to assume jurisdiction over the infringement of foreign 
intellectual property rights if the defendant is domiciled in England), [cited in ] Stuart Duston, ‘The 
Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights- a Restatement of the Terms of Engagement’. I & 
Comp. L. Q. Vol. 47, Part 3, (1998), at 659. 
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infringements via the Internet in the United States.94 It is believed that 
“as a practical matter, these new private law developments occurring 
in national courts increasingly may come to compromise and generate 
the content of international intellectual property law”. Professor 
Dinwoodie argues that substantive international rules developed by 
national courts jurisprudence may possess advantages over public 
lawmaking processes (whether classic or new). This is because, 
according to him, the development of international law through 
national courts is more responsive to the competing values of national 
autonomy and universal rules and subject to refinement by a range of 
national institutions, which may modify or even reverse the decisions 
of those courts. He thinks that as agreement on substantive 
harmonized rules “(especially forward-looking rules)” may not 
progress due to competing interests of the different parties, national 
courts lawmaking processes may offer a greater prospect of progress. 
He concedes that the jurisprudence that may result from the 
involvement of national courts in international lawmaking process 
may be uncertain but, according to him, this common uncertainty is a 
value in itself. 95 
                                                 
94 See Los Angeles News Serv. V. Reuters T.V. Int'l, Ltd., 149 F. 3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998), [cited in] 
Dinwoodie, supra note 89, at 1007.  
95  See Dinwoodie, supra note 89, at 1009, 1011. 
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  Professor Austin argues that if national courts were to develop a 
substantive law approach to choice of law in transnational intellectual 
property disputes, such as the notion of localization adopted by the 
U.S. courts, “there would be considerable scope for courts to engage 
with scrutiny of underlying values and policies of the different 
domestic rules that may be in conflict”. He adds that: “identifying 
‘core’ intellectual property values might be quite difficult, however, 
particularly in cases of doctrinal uncertainty”.96 Professor Dinwoodie 
acknowledges the possibility of such difficulty. Thus, he recommends 
that the interpretation and application of foreign law by national courts 
needs comparative analysis covering not only the supply of 
information about the foreign law, but also translating that information 
into knowledge and understanding so that such information be 
properly understood and applied. However, national courts are 
considered by one commentator as institutionally incompetent to 
address jurisdictional ambiguity created by digital networks in a way 
that would take into account the implications for international trade, 
particularly in relation to developing and least developed countries97    
 
                                                 
96 See Austin, supra note 88, at 1190-91. 
97 See Dinwoodie, Graeme B., ‘International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent 
Comparativist Thought?’ A. J. Comp. L. Vol. 49(2001) at 441. See also Adams, Wendy A., 
‘Intellectual Property Infringement in Global Networks: The Implications of Protection Ahead of the 
Curve’. Int’l. J. L. & Info. Tech., Vol. 10 No.1. Oxford University Press (2002), at 129. Available at: 
http://www.1.oup.co.uk/inttec/hdb/volume_10/Issue_01 
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  (b) WTO Panels 
  It has been argued that the conventional wisdom at the time of the 
promulgation of TRIPS was that although Member Countries were 
allowed to grant higher forms of protection within their territories, 
practically the international protection of IPRs would be harmonized 
within the minimum baselines prescribed by TRIPS because while 
foreigners and national innovators of a country adopting heightened 
protection could benefit from that heightened protection, the nationals 
of that country could not rely on their local higher levels of protection 
to establish comparative advantage internationally due to the 
territoriality of IPRs.98 However, the implications of heightened 
protection may differ within the context of electronic commerce 
involving the widespread dissemination of digital goods and services. 
Jurisdictional ambiguity over infringing acts occurring on digital 
networks has destabilized the territorial notions of protection. National 
courts respond to such jurisdictional ambiguity by “developing the 
necessary doctrines to localize online activity for the purposes of 
asserting jurisdiction and applying local law. Lacking universal 
standards, these ad hoc unilateral efforts at localization reach 
inconsistent results, with domestic innovators either over- or 
under-compensated in relation to foreign imitators”. It is believed that 
                                                 
98  See Adams, supra note 97, at 129. 
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even if the currently negotiated draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters99 
or any other alternative multilateral treaty100 is eventually promulgated 
and succeed in removing such inconsistency, this would not solve the 
problem of heightened protection in a manner consistent with trade 
and non-trade values observed in TRIPS Agreement. This is because 
national courts are institutionally incompetent to “address the 
complexities introduced by the integration of intellectual property 
within international trade law. Accordingly, private enforcement runs 
the risk of disrupting the negotiated balance of benefit and burden 
between developed and developing/least developed states”.101   
  It has been argued that the interests of developing/least developed 
countries may be best served within a public institutional framework 
“where the potential for cross-sectoral advantage exists, and where 
express accommodations have been made to lessen any adverse 
impact of increasing trade liberalization and heightened standards of 
intellectual property standards”. In this respect, it is believed that 
WTO institutions are competent to strike a balance between the 
competing interests involved in a manner that both protects the 
                                                 
99  See http://www.hcch.org/en/conventions/draft36e.htm  
100 See in this respect a proposed convention devoted totally for intellectual property, authored by 
professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane Ginsburg. Available at: 
 http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/ipp/intl-courts  
101  See Adams, supra note 97, at 130-31. 
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proprietary entitlements of private actors and addresses the concerns 
of states located on the less privileged side of the digital divide. 
Therefore, efforts of reform should be directed to TRIPS Agreement 
in order to rectify the shortcomings which appeared as a result of the 
emergence of digital networks.102   
  Some commentators, however, have criticized the dispute resolution 
process adopted by the WTO Panels arguing that “the methodology of 
the panels has been quite strict in tying decisions to the literal 
language of TRIPS Agreement; Webster’s Dictionary has become an 
essential research tool in WTO TRIPS litigation”.  It has been argued 
that, “there is evidence that, at least in some respects, WTO panels 
will not try to alter radically the mix of national autonomy and 
universal standards embodied in the international intellectual property 
agreements”.103 The supporters of the competency of WTO Panels 
argue that the latter arguments should be advanced in favor of the 
competency of WTO panels in order to address the widening gap 
between minimum prescribed standards and heightened protection 
accorded new technologies, because private international law 
institutions are incompetent and “are not particularly well-suited to the 
task of designing WTO-neutral rules of enforcement in accordance 
                                                 
102  Ibid. at 131. 
103  See Dinwoodie, supra note 89, at 1005-6. 
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with the full range of values already integrated within the global trade 
regime”.104   
    (c) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
  Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is used here in its widest sense 
to include different ways of private settlement of disputes ranging 
from more informal means such as negotiation and mediation, passing 
through quazi-arbitral means as in cases of settlement under the 
UDRP to more formal means of arbitration. Traditionally, ADR 
mechanisms were uncommon in intellectual property disputes because 
intellectual property rights have been perceived as territorial rights 
based on public policy considerations. The emergence of e-commerce 
has contributed in pushing intellectual property rights to the center of 
economic activity. As a result intellectual property materials are 
increasingly marketed on an international scale and ADR is “gaining 
importance in intellectual property disputes. This is evidenced by the 
growing number of intellectual property disputes filed with 
institutional ADR providers such as the WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center”.105 
  It has been argued that ADR systems are contributing in the creation 
of new international intellectual property norms. Commenting on the 
                                                 
104  See Adams, supra note 97, at 121-22. 
105 See WIPO E-commerce Primer: Intellectual Property on the Internet: A Survey of Issues. Issue IV: 
'The Role of Private International Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution', (December 2002), at 20-7. 
Available at: http://ecommerce.wipo.int/survey/html/4.html.   
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panel decisions issued under UDRP by ICANN-authorized dispute 
settlement providers, Professor Dinwoodie believes that the mere 
adoption of UDRP by ICANN in late 1999 is “another example of 
speedy (and novel) international intellectual property lawmaking”. He 
points out that although the UDRP is intended to produce only soft 
law, in the sense that the decisions under UDRP are not binding on 
national courts, this soft law might be hardened through different 
mechanisms such as the traditional public law mechanisms or through 
wide acceptance. He refers in this respect to the recent submission of 
the Australian government to the TRIPS Council in December 2000, 
in which it recognized that: “the UDRP has indeed become the 
international standard for resolution of cybersquatting disputes”. 
Moreover, “the practical structure of the soft law mechanism might 
cause it to possess more enduring force than would first appear”. The 
relatively few cases of UDRP panel decisions that were challenged 
before national courts in comparison to the total volume of the settled 
cases prove the worldwide acceptance of the UDRP settlement 
mechanism.106  
Conclusion 
  In conclusion one may say that in its earlier stages 
intellectual property may be described as mainly an 
                                                 
106  See Dinwoodie, supra note 89, at 1000-3. 
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individual concern. The pre-history forms of intellectual 
property were mainly identity related symbols or marks and 
secrets. At that time, trade-related advantages were of less 
importance in comparison with other kinds of gains such as 
the acquiring and preservation of power, especially in 
political, military and religious settings. The protection of 
intellectual property rights was probably depending on 
customs and the self-imposed rules that governed each sector 
of commerce. The interference of the ruler or sovereign could 
be traced back to the Roman era, which knew a kind of public 
prosecution against anyone who took the name of another for 
profit and that the purchaser of falsely marked goods had a 
right to bring an action based on injury or deceit. 
  The commercial value of intellectual property became clear 
in the Middle Ages especially the patents, which were 
considered as an important tool for the industrial and 
economic progress of each country. To secure more 
inventions and thus more industrial and economic progress, 
different incentives were offered to inventors to encourage 
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them to exert more efforts. These include gifts, prizes and 
patent privileges. The protection was confined mainly to the 
nationals of each country. Foreigners were only awarded 
protection if there was need for their works in the receiving 
country. Copyright protection was affected by the discovery 
of the printer, which facilitated making of copies and paved 
the way for fraudulent re-print. Privileges of printing were 
given to publishers. The authors were given only the amount 
of reward they agreed upon with the publishers. The 
authorities found a means of control of publishing in granting 
privileges of printing to publishers. The granting of 
privileges, therefore, acquired a political function, as it 
became the most efficient means of censorship. 
  In the 1850s or thereabout the modern intellectual property law 
emerged as a discrete area of law. The expansion of trade between 
states necessitated the protection of foreigners’ intellectual property 
rights. This was first secured by bilateral treaties and later on evolved 
into multilateral system of protection. The main multilateral 
conventions in this respect are the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property in 1883 and the Berne Convention for the 
 109
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1886. However, due to 
the massive increase in exports, especially in the field of technology in 
the last quarter of the 20th century, the traditional multilateral system 
of protection was considered by the major industrial countries, 
especially the US, as insufficient means of protection due to the 
increase of piracy of their products. This new trend has resulted in the 
conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). This agreement is considered as a major 
milestone codifying for the first time minimum standards of adequate 
intellectual property protection and enforcement mechanism on 
international scale. It is seen as a transformation from the traditional 
multilateralism to a new universalism.  
  The emergence of electronic commerce has rendered TRIPS 
outdated. It has driven for further globalization of trade and triggered 
the move towards more strengthening and internationalization of IPRs 
under the name of international harmonization of IPRs. The 
international intellectual property lawmaking process is becoming 
increasingly complicated. Different forums are participating in this 
lawmaking process, including multilateral and bilateral treaties, 
regional arrangements, international governmental and non-
governmental organizations, and public and private litigation 
institutions. The final form of this international intellectual property 
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lawmaking has not yet been articulated. Nevertheless, it has raised 
much controversy, especially from the part of developing countries, as 
to where the on-going 'race to the top' international harmonization is 
going to rest and what are its impacts on developing countries.    
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Chapter 2 
The Nature, Purpose and Scope 
 of Modern Intellectual Property Rights 
 
     Introduction 
  There is no standard definition for the term ‘intellectual property’. 
Traditionally, it was used to describe and distinguish copyright from 
industrial property. Later on it has been used as a general term to 
describe copyright and rights relating to it as well as industrial 
property.107 Generally, copyright includes the rights of authors in their 
scientific and artistic works and the rights relating to them, such as the 
rights of producers, performance, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organizations in their performances, phonograms and 
broadcasts respectively. Industrial property includes patents, utility 
models, trademarks and service marks, trade names, industrial designs 
and integrated circuits, geographic indications, trade secrets and the 
protection against unfair competition.  
  This chapter studies in brief the nature, purpose and scope of 
intellectual property. It is divided into four parts. Part 1 defines and 
                                                 
107  Cornish, W. R., ‘Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights’. 2nd ed., , 
London: Sweet & Maxwell (1989) at 46. 
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explains the meaning, purpose and scope of intellectual property in 
general. Part 2 studies copyright and the rights relating to it. Part 3 
examines industrial property. Part 4 discusses the justifications of 
granting intellectual property rights. 
 
1. Definition 
   In the Collins Dictionary of Law, ‘intellectual property’ is defined as 
“a convenient term to describe various parts of the law that have the 
effect of protecting the product of the imagination and intellect”.108 
Broadly speaking, intellectual property can be defined as “the legal 
rights that result from an activity of the mind in the fields of industry, 
science, literary and artistic works”.109 One writer defines intellectual 
property as a “product of the human intellect that has commercial 
value”.110 Another writer describes intellectual property law as “a 
complex mix of law dealing with rights associated with ideas, 
information, innovation and commercial reputation and goodwill”.111 
                                                 
108  Stewart, W. J. & Burgess, Robert, ‘Collins Dictionary of Law’, Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers 
1996. 
109  WIPO Publication No. 476 (E), 2nd ed., (1998), at 3 
110  Elias, Attorney Steven ‘Patent, Copyright & Trademarks’, 3rd ed. Edited by Lisa Goldoftas. 
Berkeley: non.com, Inc. (1999), at 2. See Also, Cornish, supra note 1, at. 5. 
111  Bainbridge, David I., ‘Intellectual Property – How to Identify, Protect, and Exploit your 
Company’s Assets’. Pitman Publishing  (1993), at1. See also Elias, supra note 4, at 2. 
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 The purpose of intellectual property law is to safeguard the rights of 
creators and other producers of intellectual goods and services, by 
granting them certain time-limited rights to control the use made of 
their products.112 According to one writer, although the concept of 
intellectual property may be derived from recognition that it is 
desirable to prevent unfairness in business, putting such basic idea into 
effect is complex. This complexity, according to that writer, emanates 
from the fact that: 
           The law must provide a balance between granting too much 
protection to the extent that fair competition is stifled, and 
providing insufficient protection so as to discourage 
investment in new technologies or high quality branded 
products and the like. Because of the diverse nature of 
intellectual property, ranging from technology-related 
rights to purely artistic rights, from marketing tools such 
as trademarks and trade names to plant breeders’ rights, 
there is no common theme running through all, other than 
the basic recognition that unfair competition or unfair 
exploitation should not be tolerated.113  
                                                 
112  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 3. 
113  Halstead, Richard ‘Protecting Intellectual Property – Understanding and using trade marks, 
patents, design and copyright business’, London: ICSA Publishing (1993), at 1. 
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  One of the features of intellectual property is that it is a form of 
property, albeit intangible, and as such it can be owned, disposed of by 
way of license or assignment, used as a security for a loan or a subject 
matter of investment.114 Moreover, the existence of the intellectual 
property rights is distinct from the physical objects that contain them, 
i.e.; those rights are applicable to the intellectual creation as such.115  
  A central element of protection common to all kinds of intellectual 
property rights is the concept of an exclusive right of protection. This 
central element is affected by other common elements relating to the 
mechanism of its creation, scope, duration and enforcement subject to 
the supervening public interest.116 This exclusive right of protection 
has driven some writers to describe protection of intellectual property 
as a monopoly. For instance, Cornish states that “exclusive rights to 
prevent other people from doing things are at least monopolistic in a 
legal sense, if not necessarily in an economic one”.117He goes on to 
say that such exclusivity is necessitated by the desire to prevent the 
competitive imitators from taking the fruit of the inventors and 
creators. He added that the only way to get out of this dilemma is to 
                                                 
114  Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1 
115 WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at3. See also Bainbridge, David I. “ Cases and Materials in 
Intellectual Property Law”. Pitman Publishing (1995), at 1. 
116 Sherwood, Robert M., ‘Intellectual Property and Economic Development’ Westview Press: 
Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford (1990), at 28 –37. 
117 See Cornish; W. R. ‘ The International Relations of Intellectual Property’, 52,Camb. L.J., 48 
(1993), at 47. 
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make a balance between the dangers that unjustified monopoly may 
generate and the degree of dissipation of investment to produce ideas 
or convey information if such exclusive right is not granted. 
According to him, the negative impacts of monopoly, such as the 
reduction of output or rising of prices may be mitigated by measures 
such as direct price control or compulsory licensing.118 Other writers 
argue that the exclusive right granted to intellectual property 
proprietors should not be described as a monopoly because this right is 
subject to exceptions and limitations determining its scope and 
duration and restricted by the supervening public interest.119  
  Article 2(viii) of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) 1967 provides that intellectual 
property shall include rights relating to:120 
-  Literary, artistic and scientific works. 
- Performances of performing artists, phonograms, and broadcasts. 
-  Inventions in all fields of human endeavor. 
-   Scientific discoveries. 
-   Industrial designs. 
-  Trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and 
designations. 
                                                 
118  See Cornish; ‘Intellectual Property’, supra note 1, at 17-8. 
119 See Sherwood, supra note 10, at 28-37. 
120  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 3. 
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-  Protection against unfair competition. 
  Intellectual property law is growing and developing continuously so 
as to accommodate new technologies and other forms of innovations 
and human creativity. The creation of new intellectual property rights 
can be achieved either by way of accretion or emulation. Accretion 
involves re-defining an existing right so as to accommodate the new 
subject matter, whereas emulation requires the creation of a new and 
distinct right based on eclectic analogy from the existing rights. 
Different factors affect the choice between accretion and emulation, 
such as the suitability of the existing rights to the emerging material 
and the acceptability of a sui generis form of right.121 Traditionally, 
intellectual property is divided into two main categories, namely, 
copyright and industrial property. 
 
2. Copyright and Neighboring Rights 
i) Copyright: 
   The term copyright is interpreted under section 3 of the Sudanese 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996 as “all or any 
of the rights mentioned in section 8, and includes other similar rights”. 
By reference to sections 5(1) and section 8 of the same Act, copyright 
                                                 
121 See Cornish, ‘ The International Relations of Intellectual Property’, supra note 11, at 54, 55. 
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may be defined as the moral and financial rights of an author in his 
original literary and artistic works. The term ‘author’ is interpreted 
under section 3 of the 1996 Act as “any natural person who devises 
the work”. For copyright purposes, this definition may be described as 
narrow since it confines authorship to creators only, whereas an author 
may be the creator of the work or any other entity that pays for its 
creation in an employment or hire contract.122 
  The definition of the term ‘author’, adopted by section 3 of the 1996 
Act, may be acceptable when dealing with the moral rights of an 
author in his work because in this case, only the natural person who 
devises the work is allowed, not only to claim authorship but also to 
object to any distortion, mutilation, modification of, or any other 
derogatory action in relation to the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.123 The economic rights of an 
author include rights of reproduction, translation, public recitation, 
public display, distribution and other forms of commercial 
utilization.124 
  
 ii) Neighboring Rights: 
                                                 
122  See Elias, supra note 4, at 82 
123  See Article 6bis of “the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works” 
(1886).  Available at: http://wipo.org./treaties/ip/index, html. 
124  See section 8(b), of 1996 Act. 
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  Neighboring rights are referred to as the rights of producers, 
performers, and producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations in their performances, phonograms and broadcasts 
respectively.125 
 
  iii) Scope of Protection: 
  Copyright protection does not need formalities such as registration or 
deposit.126 Broadly speaking, any type of original non-functional 
expression fixed in a tangible medium and having some degree of 
creativity, is eligible for copyright protection. The ideas underlying a 
copyrightable work need not be new but the form, be it literary or 
artistic, in which they are expressed must be an original creation of the 
author. Typically, copyrightable works include literary works, 
audiovisual works, computer software, graphic works, musical 
arrangements and sound recordings.127 However, copyright protection 
is confined to the way or form in which the work is expressed, and 
does not extend to the facts, ideas or concepts underlying that 
                                                 
125  See “Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
Broadcasting Organizations” (1961). Available at: http://wipo.org./treaties/ip/ index.html. 
126  See Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. 
127  See Elias; supra note 4, at 95. See also, WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at38. 
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work.128Therefore, if the idea is inseparable from the expression, 
copyright on such expression will be denied, according to what is 
known as the 'merger’ doctrine.129  
  It is worthy to point out here to a controversial area of copyright 
protection, viz., copyrightability of computer software, which has 
raised a great controversy that has not been finally settled. This may 
be due to the fact that a computer program, from a programmer 
perspective, is a kind of writing expressed in a language that 
resembles in some respects the ordinary human languages. It involves 
the personal style of the author associated with other forms of writing. 
As such, copyright rather than patent, would seem to be proper for its 
protection. But on the other hand, a program is similar to a machine 
part as soon as it is executed by a computer. The program controls the 
operation of the computer. From this perspective it is a functional 
object. Thus patent protection seems to be more suitable.130  
   Internationally, the matter seems to be settled in favor of 
copyrightability of computer software, as reflected in Article 10(1) of 
                                                 
128  In a case between Apple Computer – V- Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp.1006, 1025, 24 U.S. P.Q. 
2nd 1081(N.D. Cal. 1992), an American court ruled that the desktop metaphor employed by the 
Macintosh user interface, was not a protectable idea. [in] Goldstein, Paul ‘Cases and Materials on the 
Law of Intellectual Property’, revised 4th ed. Foundation Press – New York (1999), at 859. 
129   See Helbert Rosenthal Lewelry Corp. v. Kalpkian , 446 F. 2nd 738, 170 U. S. P. Q. 557 (9th Cir. 
1971), where an American court held that “when an idea and its expression were inseparable, copying 
of the expression would not be barred, since protecting expression in such circumstances would confer 
monopoly of the idea”. [in] Goldstein; supra note 22, at 600. 
130  See Durham, Alan A., “Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide” Quorum Books, 88 Post Road 
West 1999, at 10, 11. 
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the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 1994 (TRIPS Agreement), and Article 4 of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty 1996 (WCT) which provide for the protection of 
computer programs as literary works, and that such protection should 
be the same as that granted to such works under the Berne 
Convention, provided that other requirements for copyrightability be 
satisfied.131 
  However, at present, the trend in industrial countries, especially the 
United States of America, is towards the patenting of software-related 
inventions. This trend started in the United States since the decision of 
the US Supreme Court in Diamond –v- Diehr132, There are many 
factors behind this transformation, including the pressure of interest 
groups. Moreover, the move towards the patentability of software-
related inventions has been enhanced by the reluctance of the US 
courts to extend copyright protection to the functional aspects of 
computer programs. Since the decision in Computer Associate Int’l. v. 
Altai133 in 1992, the American courts started to adopt what is known 
as the filtration approach, whereby the court separates the code’s idea 
and other public domain elements from its expression and then 
                                                 
131  See WIPO Publication , supra note 3, at 
132  450 U. S. 175, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2nd 155, 209 U. S. P. Q. 1. [in] Goldstein, supra note 22, 
at 894 
133  982 F. 2nd 693, 23U. S. P. Q. 2nd 1241 [in] ibid. at 825 
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extends protection only to the expression.134 This position has been 
further enhanced by a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
supporting the exclusion of the functional aspects of a computer 
program from copyright protection.135 However, even if the 
requirements for copyright protection are satisfied, copyright 
protection is not absolute because it is usually subject to some 
exceptions and limitations relating to its duration and scope of 
protection, which may be determined by the national law of each 
country according to the Berne Convention.136 
 
  iv) Exceptions and Limitations: 
 Generally speaking, under the 1996 Act, copyright protection of the 
moral rights of an author extends to the lifetime of the author, whereas 
copyright protection of the economic rights of an author continues 
throughout the lifetime of the author and for a period of fifty years 
after his death. But there are certain exceptions to this general rule. 
For instance, the copyright protection of audiovisual works, works 
                                                 
134  See Elias, supra note 4, at 93. See also de laat, Paul B., ‘Patenting Mathematical Algorithms: 
What’s harm?’ Int. Rev. of Law and Economics’ 20 (2000), at 88. .  
135  See the case of Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F. 3d 807 (1995) [in] 
Goldstein, supra note 22, at 846. Professor Weinreb argues, in his comment on the decision in this case, 
that the current uncertainty about copyright for computer programs and the user interface of programs 
brings the issue of copyright for functional expression into sharp focus and raises fundamental 
questions about copyright generally’. See Weinreb, Lloyd L. ‘Copyright for Functional Expression’ 
Harvard L.Rev. Vol. 111 March 1998, at 1150. 
136 See Article 2bis of the Berne Convention. 
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published for the first time after the death of the author, or those 
published under a pseudonym, anonymous or without a name, is 
twenty five years from the time of publication.137 
  Moreover, there are certain works excepted from copyright 
protection, such as works that are vested in public ownership, official 
documents, daily news and events having the nature of news published 
in newspapers, magazines, periodical publications, broadcasting and 
television services or ideas, syllabi, and emblems and symbols of 
states.138 Furthermore, the national folklore is considered as public 
property, and as such is not copyrightable in favor of private 
entities.139 In addition to what has been mentioned above, national 
laws typically impose certain exceptions under what is known as ‘fair 
use’ principle, whereby a copyrighted work can be freely used for 
purposes, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship and research.140 
 
 
                                                 
137  See section 13 of the 1996 Act. 
138  See section 6 of the 1996 Act. 
139  See section 7 of the 1996 Act. 
140  Moore, Adam D. ‘Introduction’, [in] Adam D. Moore (ed.), Intellectual Property – Moral, Legal 
and International Dilemmas’. Rowman and littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Boulder, New York 
and Oxford (1997), at 4. See also section 14 of the 1996 Act. 
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3.  Industrial Property:  
  Article 1(2) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property provides that the protection of industrial property has as its 
object patent, utility model, industrial design, trademarks, service 
marks, trade names, indication of source and appellation of origin and 
the suppression of unfair competition.141  
   
i) Patents 
     (a) Definition: 
  Broadly, a patent is a certificate describing an invention, granted by 
the concerned authority (usually a patent office of a single country or a 
regional patent office representing a group of countries), to an 
inventor enabling him to prevent others, for a limited period of time, 
from making, using, importing, selling or offering for sale his 
invention without his authorization.142An invention is defined as a 
“solution to a specific problem in the field of technology”.143 As such, 
a patent may be defined as an exclusive right of exploitation of an 
invention, granted to the inventor for a limited period of time, by the 
concerned government authority. Unlike copyright, a patent protects 
                                                 
141  See the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883). Available at: 
http://wipo.org./treaties/ip/index.html  
142  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 13.  See also Moore; supra note 34, at 4. 
143  Ibid.  
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not only the expression, but also the idea underlying that expression 
and its implementation.144 
     
 
(b) Conditions of Patentability: 
 To qualify for a patent, an invention must satisfy certain 
requirements: Firstly, it must be a statutory patentable subject matter. 
A patentable invention is that which is recognized by law to be within 
the scope of patentable subject matters. Patentable subject matters, in 
turn, are defined by reference to the exceptions to patentability, i.e., 
subject matters not expressly excepted from patentability are 
patentable subject matters because the general rule is that protection 
shall be available for inventions in all fields of technology.145 Things 
often considered as exceeding the statutory boundaries of patentable 
subject matter or sufficiently close to those boundaries to an extent 
generating controversy, includes abstract ideas, principles of nature, 
living organisms, literary or artistic creations, printed matters, 
methods of doing business, computer programs and inventions the 
publication or exploitation of which would generally be expected to 
                                                 
144  Ibid. 
145  See WIPO Publication; supra note 3, at 14. Under section 3 of the Patents Act 1971, any invention, 
which is new, results from inventive activity and capable of industrial application is patentable. 
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encourage offensive, immoral or anti-social behavior.146 In this 
respect, patentability of computer software has generated great 
controversy. This is due to the fact that software inventions consist of 
mathematical algorithm, which is considered as an unpatentable 
abstract law of nature.147 For example, in the case of Gottschalk v. 
Benson148, which was decided in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that phenomena of nature, mental processes and abstract intellectual 
concepts were not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.149 However, since the decision of the U.S 
Supreme Court in the case of Diamond v. Diehr,150 in 1981, it has 
become possible in the United States of America to patent software-
related inventions, provided that the patent application describes the 
software in relation to computer hardware and related devices, and 
limits the software to specific uses.151 This position has been further 
enhanced by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) in State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group 
                                                 
146  See Cornish; ‘Intellectual Property’, supra note 1, at 138-150. See also Durham, supra note 24, at 
23, 24. 
147  See Elias, supra note 4, at 289. 
148   409 U.S. 63, 93 S. Ct. 253, 34 L. Ed. 2nd 237 [in] Goldstein, supra note 22, at 823. 
149  450 U. S. 175, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2nd 155, 209 U. S. P. Q. 1 [in] Goldstein, supra note 22, 
at 894. 
150  Ibid.  at 894.  
151 More than 20,000 software patents have been issued in U.S.A., as of mid-1995. See Elias; supra 
note 4, at 289. 
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(1998)152, which further expanded the definition of patentable software 
and allowed patenting of business methods.153 
  Secondly, the invention must be industrially applicable. An invention 
is said to be industrially applicable if it can be applied for practical 
purposes and not purely theoretical, that is, if the invention is intended 
to be a product it should be capable of being made, and if it is 
intended to be a process or part of a process, it must be possible to be 
used.154 Thirdly, the invention must be novel. An invention is 
considered new if it does not form part of the state of the art.155The 
term ‘state of the art’, also known as ‘prior art’, is defined under 
section 4 (2) of the 1971 Act as all knowledge made available publicly 
anywhere, at any time whatsoever, by means of written or oral 
description, by use or any other way, before the date of the filing of 
the patent application, or the priority date validly claimed 
thereof.156The question whether the determination of what constitutes 
prior art, should be made by reference to the knowledge made public 
in the protecting country or worldwide, has generated some 
controversy.157 However, as provided under section 4(2) of the 1971 
                                                 
152  149 F. 3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1596 [in] Goldstein, supra note 22, at 920. 
153  For more details see Chapter 8 infra.  
154  See section 6 of the Patents Act 1971. See also WIPO Publication; supra note 3, at 14. 
155  See section 4 (1) of the Patents Act 1971. 
156  See  Elias; supra note 4, at 278. 
157  See WIPO Publication; supra note 3, at 15. 
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Act, the Sudanese law seems to adopt the broad definition of prior art 
to the effect that prior art includes all knowledge made public 
anywhere and at any time. To qualify for prior art that may destroy the 
novelty of an invention, a publication must anticipate the subject 
matter of the claimed invention, i.e., the subject matter contained in a 
claim of an application under examination, should be compared 
element by element with the contents of each individual publication, 
and that such publication explicitly contains the subject matter of the 
claimed invention. In other words, it is not permissible to combine 
separate items of prior art in order to prove lack of novelty.158 
   Fourthly, the invention must contain an inventive step. The 
inventive step, also known as non-obviousness, in an invention is 
satisfied, according to Section 5 of the Patents Act, if the invention 
does not obviously follow from the state of the art, either as to the 
method, the application, the combination of methods, or the product 
which it concerns or as to the industrial result it produces. The wisdom 
behind this requirement is that, protection should not be extended to 
what is already known as part of the prior art or can be deduced as an 
obvious consequence of that prior art, by a person with ordinary skills 
in the concerned field.159 The term ‘inventive step’ as its expression 
                                                 
158  Ibid. at 16. 
159  See Elias; supra note 4, at 257.  
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indicates, requires that there must be an invention, that is, something 
resulting from a creative activity, and that such invention must 
constitute a step forward, i.e., adding something new to the prior art. 
In some countries, the invention must be of progress or advance over 
the prior art.160 
  When examining the nature of the differences which are relied on by 
the inventor as forming the inventive step, regards have to be given to 
the prior art as a whole, i.e., the subject matter of the claim under 
examination should not be compared with each publication 
individually or other disclosure separately, but with the combinations 
thereof. It is the sum of the differences that have been discovered, 
which must be compared with the prior art and judged as to 
obviousness, and not each of the new elements taken individually, 
unless there is no technical connection between them.161 The 
assessment of the differences constituting the inventive step should be 
made in the light of the circumstances normally preceding any 
invention, namely, a problem to be solved, a solution to that problem 
and a result guaranteed by the application of that solution. If a person 
with ordinary skills in the art concerned could pose the problem and 
                                                 
160  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 16. 
161  Ibid. 
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solve it in the manner claimed and foresee the result, the inventive 
step is lacking.162  
  In addition to the above substantial requirements for patentability, 
there are certain formalities, which must be complied with when 
submitting an application to acquire a patent. Typically, there are three 
formal requirements, which must be complied with when drafting a 
patent application. These requirements are: First, the application for a 
patent must relate to only one invention, or to a group of inventions 
connected to each other in a way that makes them form a single 
general inventive concept.163 Under section 17(3) of the 1971 Act, if 
the applicant does not respond to the invitation of the Patent Office to 
restrict the original application to one invention, no patent shall be 
granted. Second, the application shall contain a description of the 
invention, which discloses the invention in a manner sufficiently clear 
and complete, to an extent that enables a person skilled in the relevant 
field to make and use the invention. Third, the application must 
contain claims that define the protection sought.164 These claims are 
important for determining the scope of the exclusive rights to be 
granted by the patent; hence, they must be concise and must not 
                                                 
162  Ibid. at 16, 17. 
163  Ibid. at 18. 
164  See sections 12 & 13 of the Patents Act 1971. 
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exceed the contents of the description.165 However, even if an 
invention satisfies the substantial and procedural requirements of 
patentability and, even though patent protection is often described as a 
monopoly, nevertheless such protection is not absolute and subject to 
some exceptions and limitations. 
 
 
    (c) Exceptions to Patentability: 
  Some countries specify certain areas within which a patentable 
invention must fall. For instance, under the American Patent Law, a 
patentable invention must fall within one of five categories, namely, 
process, machine, manufacture, a combination of matter or any 
improvement thereof.166 Broadly, exceptions to patentability include 
the following:167 
- Discoveries of materials or substances already existing 
in nature. 
        -  Scientific theories or mathematical methods. 
                                                 
165  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 19, 20. See also section 13 of the Patents Act 1971. 
166  See Durham; supra note 24, at 23. 
167  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 16. 
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        - Plant or animal varieties or essentially biological           
processes for the production of such plant or animal 
varieties, other than microbiological processes. 
        - Schemes, rules or methods, such as those for doing 
business, performing purely mental acts or playing games. 
         -  Methods of treatment for humans or animals, or diagnostic 
methods practiced on humans or animals (but not products 
for use in such methods). 
  In some jurisdictions, in addition to the above exceptions, inventions 
in areas such as agricultural chemicals, pharmaceuticals and nuclear 
field are temporarily excluded from patentability for reasons of public 
interest.168 However, under the 1971 Act, only principles and 
discoveries of a scientific nature are excluded from patentability, as 
they are not considered to be inventions.169  
  Generally, the grant of a patent confers on the registered owner an 
exclusive right, frequently referred to as a monopoly, to preclude 
others from making, importing, offering for sale, selling or stocking 
the patented product for the purpose of selling, using or applying the 
patented process or doing any of the above acts, with regard to a 
                                                 
168  Ibid. 
169  See section 3(3) of the Patents Act 1971. 
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product directly obtained by means of that patented process.170 But 
this right is subject to some limitations, including the following: 
     - The patent protection extends for a limited period of time and against 
acts done for industrial or commercial purposes.171 
     - A patent is granted at the risk of the patentee, i.e., a subsequent 
applicant successfully claiming the right of priority can invalidate it. 
Moreover, in a suit for infringement the defendant may raise, as a 
defense, the non-compliance with the requirements of patentability, 
such as novelty or non-obviousness.172  
     - A patent may be subject to compulsory license, for reasons of non-
working or insufficient working of the invention or for any other 
reasons based on public interest.173 
 
  ii) Utility Models 
 In some countries there are certain types of inventions, such as the 
inventions in the mechanical field, which are called ‘utility models’ 
and protected as such. The aim of this kind of protection is to 
encourage innovative developments. There are two main differences 
                                                 
170  See section 21 of the Patents Act. See also WIPO Publication; supra note 3, at 26. 
171  Under section 25(1) of the Patents Act 1971 ‘a patent shall expire at the end of the twentieth year 
from the date of the filling of the application, subject to the payment of the annual fees prescribed by 
the regulations’. See also section 23(1) of the same Act. 
172  WIPO publication, supra note 3, at 21. See also Elias; supra note 4, at 244. 
173  See sections 34 – 44 of the Patents Act 1971. 
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between utility models and inventions for which patents for invention 
are available: First, the technological progress required in the case of 
utility models is less than the technological progress (inventive step) 
required in the case of inventions for which a patent may be granted. 
Second, the maximum term of protection granted in the case of utility 
models is shorter than the maximum period granted in case of an 
invention for which a patent is available. However, the same 
certificates of utility models are called, in many countries, a patent. In 
such a case, it is recommended that these certificates should be 
referred to as ‘patent for utility model’ so as to distinguish it from 
patents for invention.174 
 
   iii) Trademarks and Service Marks 
 
     (a) Definition: 
  A trademark is defined as “any sign that individualizes the goods of a 
given enterprise and distinguishes them from the goods of its 
competitors”. The same definition is extended to a service mark, 
except that a service mark distinguishes services.175 Some countries 
allow the registration of what are known as collective marks and 
                                                 
174  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 35. 
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certification marks. A collective mark indicates the affiliation of an 
enterprise. It is usually owned by an association whose members are 
permitted to use the collective mark to show their affiliation to that 
association. Typically, such association is based on compliance of its 
members with certain quality standards. On the other hand, a 
certification mark refers to identifiable standards met by the product 
for which the mark is used. Accordingly, any entity that complies with 
the standards of a certification mark may use it. However, the status is 
not as such in all countries recognizing certification marks. For 
example, in the United States of America, only enterprises authorized 
by the owner of the certification mark may use it.176 
National laws vary as to the kinds of signs that may be used as a 
trademark. Generally, signs that may serve as a trademark include the 
following:177  
     - Words: Such as company names, surnames, forenames, geographical names and any other names or sets of words, whether 
invented or not, and slogans. 
     - Letters and Numerals: Examples are one or more letters, one or more numerals or any combination thereof. 
     - Devices: This category includes fancy devices, drawings and symbols and also two-dimensional representations of goods or 
containers. 
     - Combinations of any of those listed above, including logotypes and labels. 
     - Colored Marks: This category includes words, devices and any combinations thereof in color, as well as color combinations 
and color as such. 
                                                 
176  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 60, 61. 
177  Ibid. at 63. 
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     - Three-Dimensional Signs: A typical category of three-dimensional signs is the shape of the goods or their packaging. 
However, other three-dimensional signs such as the three-pointed Mercedes star can serve as a trademark.   
     - Audible Signs (Sound Marks): Two typical categories of sound marks can be distinguished, namely those that can be 
transcribed in musical notes or other symbols and others (e.g. the cry of an animal). 
     - Olfactory Marks (Smell Marks): This is possible when, for instance a company sells its goods (say, writing paper), with 
certain fragrance and the consumer becomes accustomed to recognizing the goods by their smell. 
     - Other (invisible) Signs: Examples of these are goods recognized by touch. 
  However, for practical reasons, signs that are allowed for registration 
are only those which can be registered and published in a trademark 
journal to inform the public of the registration of the trademark.178 
Under the Sudanese Trademarks Act 1969, only visible signs are 
recognized to serve as trademarks or service marks.179  
 
    (b) Requirements of Registration: 
  To be eligible for registration as a trademark or service mark, a sign 
must satisfy two main requirements, namely, it must be of a 
distinguishable character and must not be contrary to public 
interest.180A sign is said to be distinctive for the given goods, when it 
is recognized as such by those to whom it is addressed.181The 
distinctiveness of a sign is capable of being acquired, increased or 
decreased, depending on the steps taken by the user of the sign or third 
                                                 
178  Doern, G. Bruce, ‘Global Change and Intellectual Property Agencies’. Pinter, London and New   
York, 1st ed. (1999), at 70. See also WIPO Publication; supra note 3, at 63. 
179  See section 3 of the Trade Marks Act 1969. 
180  See Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention. 
181  See WIPO Publication; supra note 3, at 64. 
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parties.182 Generally, fanciful and coined trademarks are usually 
distinctive. Likewise, the arbitrary use of common words and other 
corresponding devices as trademarks is considered as distinctive.183 
  A sign is said to lack distinctiveness when it is a generic term 
defining the category or type, to which the goods belong or if it is a 
descriptive sign serving in trade to designate the kind, quality, 
purpose, value, place of origin, time of production or any other 
characteristics of the goods. However, a descriptive sign may be 
registerable if it has acquired a secondary meaning, to an extent that it 
has become recognized by the consumers as indicating the source of 
the goods for which it is used.184 Other examples of signs, which are 
considered as unregisterable for lack of distinctiveness include those 
which consist of shapes or forms imposed by the inherent nature or the 
industrial function of the goods for which they are intended to be used, 
or those referring to the geographical origin of such goods. 185  
  Also a sign may be denied eligibility for registration as a trademark, 
if it infringes rights of third parties or is contrary to the rules for the 
prevention of unfair competition or is contrary to public interest. 
These include signs resembling already filed or registered marks or 
                                                 
182  Ibid. at 65. 
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184  See section 8 of the Trade Marks Act 1969. See also WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 65, 66. 
185  See section 8 of the Trade Marks Act 1969. 
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those which constitute a reproduction in whole or in part, an imitation 
or translation or transcription of marks well known in the country 
belongs to third parties, or those which are of deceptive nature or 
contrary to public morality, e.g., consisting of obscene pictures or 
reserved for use by the state or public or international organizations.186  
 
 
    (c) Scope of Protection: 
  The protection of trademarks may be based on use or registration or 
both. However, full protection can be secured only through 
registration.187Under the 1969 Act, registration of a trademark is a 
prima facie evidence of ownership and all other subsequent 
assignments and transfer of that trademark.188 The registered owner of 
a trademark is granted an exclusive right to exploit his trademark. This 
includes the right to use it by himself and the right to exclude others 
from using it. The right of use includes the right of the owner of a 
trademark to affix it on goods, containers, labels, packaging, etc. or to 
use it in any other way in relation to the goods for which it is 
registered, and the right to introduce the goods to the market under the 
                                                 
186  Doern, supra note 72, at 70. See also section 8 of the Trade Marks Act 1969. 
187 WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 70. See also section 27 (6) (e) of the Trade Marks Act 1969. 
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trademark.189  Moreover, it includes his right to assign or transfer his 
trademark independently, or with all or part of his business and in 
relation to all or part of the goods for which it is registered, provided 
that such transfer or assignment be recorded at the Register of 
trademarks within six months of its occurrence and that the assignee 
would not use the trademark in a way that may deceive or confuse the 
consumers.190 Also the owner of a trademark may license the use of 
his trademark by others, provided that such license be recorded at the 
Register within six months of its date and that the use of the trademark 
by the licensee be under the effective control of the owner, as 
concerns the nature and quality of the goods and that such licensing 
would not involve any deception of the public.191 
  On the other hand, the right to exclude others includes the right of 
the owner of a trademark to preclude third parties from using his mark 
or other confusingly similar marks for goods in respect of which the 
mark is registered or for other goods in connection with which, the use 
of the mark or sign is likely to mislead the public. Moreover, the 
trademark owner has a right to prevent any other use of the mark or a 
                                                 
189  WIPO Publication, supra note 60, at 77. See also section 20 of the Trade Marks Act 1969. 
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sign or trade name resembling it, without just cause and in a way 
likely to be prejudicial to him. 192 
However, the protection of a trademark owner is subject to some 
limitations imposed by national laws, which include the following: 
     - The registration of a trademark shall not prevent third parties from 
bona fide use of their names, addresses, pseudonyms, a geographical 
name or exact indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, 
destination, value, place of origin or time of production or of supply 
of their goods and services, provided that such use is merely for the 
identification or information in a way that would not mislead the 
public as to the source of the goods or services.193 
     - The protection of a trademark does not extend to fair use by non-
competitors for purposes such as the listing of the mark in a 
compendium of trademarks or in dictionaries or use of the trademark 
in newspaper articles or in books or any publication.194  
     - Once a trademark owner sells the goods carrying his trademark, he 
cannot prevent the further sales of such goods in the course of 
trade.195 
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     - A registered trademark may be removed from the Register, if the 
owner fails to renew its registration within the prescribed period or if 
it has become a generic term for the goods in respect of which it is 
registered.196 
     - The registration of a trademark may be cancelled by order of the 
court, on the request of the Registrar or any interested party, on the 
ground that the trademark has been obtained by fraud or has not been 
used within the five years preceding the allegation of non-use or that 
the trademark should not have been registered according to the 
applicable law, provided that grounds no longer existing at the time 
of the decision shall not be taken into account.197 
 
   iv) Trade Names 
  The function of a trade name is to distinguish an enterprise from 
other enterprises, but not the source of the goods or services marketed 
or rendered by that enterprise, unless it is registered as a trademark or 
service mark.198 Distinctiveness is not a pre-requisite for the 
registration or subsequent use of a trade name. A distinctive trade 
name is protected even if it is not registered. But if it is not distinctive, 
                                                 
196  Under section 19 of the Trade Marks Act, ‘the registration of the trademark must be renewed after 
ten years of the original registration or last renewal, with a period of grace of six months’. See also 
WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 77. 
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protection can be afforded to it only if it has become distinctive by 
use. Distinctiveness in this context means that the trade name has 
become well known by the public as a reference to a certain trade 
source.199 A trade name or a business name may be registered as a 
trademark or a service mark. In such a case, it will be subject to the 
rules and regulations applicable to trademarks and service marks.200 
 
 
  v) Industrial Designs and Integrated Circuits 
 
      (a) Industrial Designs: 
  Industrial design refers to the right of protection granted to the 
creator of the original and non-functional features of an industrial 
article or product.201The subject matter of protection of industrial 
design is the abstract conception or idea that is applied or embodied as 
a design in an industrial article or product.202 The conception or idea 
that constitutes the design may be something which can be expressed 
either two-dimensionally, i.e., refers to something embossed, engraved 
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or placed upon an article for the purpose of its decoration, or three-
dimensionally, i.e., signifies the form in which an article is made.203 
The requirements which qualify an industrial design for protection, 
include the following:204 
     - It must be possible to be applied to utilitarian articles, i.e., it must be capable of being used in industry or in respect of 
articles produced on a large scale. 
     - It should have a visual appearance capable of being realized. 
     - It must not be necessitated by the very nature of the article, in which 
it is applied, i.e., it must be non-functional. 
     - It must be novel. 
  Generally, the right of protection in respect of industrial design is 
granted to the person who created that design, whether independently 
or with the assistance of a computer. But, if the creator is an employee 
or a commissioned contractor, the protection will be conferred on the 
employer or the person that commissioned the design. The proprietor 
of a design is granted exclusive right to make, import, sell, hire or 
offer for sale, for industrial or commercial purposes, any of the articles 
in which the design is applied.205 Usually the protection for industrial 
design is provided pursuant to a procedure for the registration of the 
design. The term of protection varies from country to country. 
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Typically, the maximum period of protection ranges from 10 to 25 
years.206 
  However, in some countries; rights in designs may be acquired by 
the act of creation and fixation of the design in a document or by 
embodying the design in an article, without need for formal 
registration procedure.207In such a case, the right in the industrial 
design may be protected under the law of copyright, provided that it 
satisfies the requirements of copyrightability viz., original, non-
functional creative work, fixed in a tangible medium.208But the 
question which arises here is whether the protection of the right in the 
industrial design can be claimed cumulatively, i.e., both the law of 
industrial property and the law of copyright to be applied cumulatively 
and simultaneously, or whether such protection can only be available 
in a co-existence form, i.e., the choice of either branch of the law 
excludes the other? The majority of countries choose the co-existence 
form of protection, but some countries such as France and Germany 
apply the cumulative form of protection.209 
  The difference between protection under copyright law and 
protection under industrial design law is that industrial design law 
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protects the expression as well as the idea underlying it and prevents 
even an independent creation of a similar design. But it is difficult to 
be obtained, as it must be registered and its term is proportionately 
short, whereas copyright protection lasts for a long period extending to 
the life of the creator and fifty years after his death and, moreover, it is 
easy to obtain as it does not require formalities such as registration. 
But, it protects only the literal expression of the design and does not 
extend to the idea underlying that design nor prevent independent 
creation of a similar design.210  
 
   (b) Integrated Circuits: 
 Recently, the lay-out design, (topographies), of integrated circuits has 
become a subject matter of intellectual property protection. In 1989, a 
Diplomatic Conference was held in Washington D.C., which adopted 
a ‘Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits 
(Washington Treaty), which has been incorporated in the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO)1994.211  
  Under Article 2 of the Washington Treaty 1989, the term integrated 
circuits is defined as a product in its final form or intermediate form, 
                                                 
210  Elias, supra note 4, at 97, 98. See also WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 113. 
211  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 113, 114. 
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in which the elements, at least one of which is active element, and 
some or all of the inter-connections are integrally formed in and/or on 
a piece of material, and which is intended to perform an electronic 
function. Also the same Article defines lay-out design (topography), 
as the three-dimensional disposition, however expressed, of the 
elements, at least one of which is an active element, and some or all of 
the interconnections of an integrated circuits, or such a three-
dimensional disposition prepared for an integrated circuits intended 
for manufacture.212  
The Contracting Parties to the Washington Treaty are obliged to 
provide protection against unauthorized reproduction of the lay-out 
design and the importation, sale or other distribution for commercial 
purposes, of a lay-out design or an integrated circuit in which the lay-
out design is incorporated. However, acts performed for private 
purposes or for the sole purpose of evaluation, analysis, research or 
teaching may be freely permitted.213Moreover, the Contracting Parties 
are allowed to make the protection of lay-out designs dependent on 
their commercial exploitation or on the filing of an application for 
their registration or on their actual registration. Furthermore, each 
Contracting Party may grant, for public interest, non-voluntary 
                                                 
212  Ibid., at 114. 
213 Ibid. 
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licenses for the commercial exploitation of the lay-out design or the 
integrated circuits in which such lay-out designs are incorporated.214 
 
  vi) Geographical indications: 
  The term ‘geographical indications’ is relatively new in the field of 
intellectual property. In the Paris Convention there is no reference to 
geographical indications as such; instead, the Paris Convention Article 
1(2) considers indications of source or appellations of origin as objects 
of protection of industrial property law.215 The difference between 
indications of source and appellations of origin is that indications of 
source refer to any expression or sign used to indicate the place of 
origin of a product, whereas appellations of origin mean that the 
products originating from a certain place, carry specific characteristics 
imposed by natural or human factors relating to that place.216 
 The term ‘geographical indications’ has been chosen by WIPO so as 
to be used in its widest possible meaning, which includes all existing 
means of protection of names and symbols, including the geographical 
origin of a product, regardless of whether they indicate that the 
qualities of a certain product are attributable to its geographical origin 
(appellation of origin) or they merely indicate the place of origin of a 
                                                 
214  Ibid., at 114, 116. 
215  See Article 1 (2) of the Paris Convention. 
216  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 115. 
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product (indications of source).217 The protection of geographical 
indications may be achieved by preventing the use of the geographical 
indications for goods not originating from the place indicated or not 
complying with the quality standards of that place, and by preventing 
the use of the geographical indications as a generic term for the goods 
originating from them. Such protection may be carried out by the 
public authorities as well as private entities. In this regard, collective 
marks and certification marks may provide an effective means of 
protection of geographical indications, independent of statutory or 
judicial measures.218 Therefore, protection of geographical indications 
may be based on general legislative provisions or principles of 
jurisprudence, such as the law of unfair competition or through a 
special action to be taken by the competent government authority or 
by a private initiative through registration of collective marks or 
certification marks.219 
  At the international level, there are three multilateral treaties 
administered by WIPO, which contain provisions for the protection of 
geographical indications, namely the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 1883,220the Madrid Agreement for 
                                                 
217 Ibid., at 116. 
218  Ibid., at 117, 118. 
219  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 118, 119. 
220  See Articles 1, 9, 10 and 10ter of the Paris Convention. 
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the Repression of False and Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods 
(Madrid Agreement) 1891 and the Lisbon Agreement for the 
Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International 
Registration (Lisbon Agreement) 1958.221  
 
 
 
  vii) Protection against Unfair Competition: 
  The free competition in the marketplace between industrial and 
commercial enterprises, which is adopted in the market economy 
systems, is considered by its supporters as the best means of satisfying 
supply and demand in the economy and serving the interests of 
consumers and the economy as a whole. But the smooth performance 
of such free competition requires that all participants act in accordance 
with specific basic rules. Violation of these basic rules is considered 
as against honest practices and thus, prejudices the consumers as well 
as law-abiding competitors.222 
  The specific laws on the protection of industrial property, such as the 
patent law, provide protection for the rights therein, but there are wide 
varieties of unfair practices in the marketplace, such as misleading 
                                                 
221  Both Madrid Agreement and Lisbon Agreement are available at:       
http://wipo.org./treaties/ip/index.html. 
222  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 124, 125. 
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advertising and violations of trade secrets that are not dealt with by 
such laws. Therefore, the repression of unfair competition is 
considered by Article 1(2) of the Paris Convention as one of the 
objects of industrial property protection. Unfair competition is defined 
under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, as any act of competition 
contrary to honest practices in industrial and commercial matters. In 
addition to this broad definition, Article 10bis(3) of the same 
Convention, specifies three types of acts to be prohibited in particular. 
These acts are: 
        - All acts of such nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or 
the industrial or commercial activities of a competitor. 
        - False allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the establishment, the goods, or the 
industrial or commercial activities of a competitor. 
        - Indications or allegations the use of which in the course of 
trade is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the 
manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability 
for their purpose, or the quantity of the goods. 
  Generally, unfair competition law is considered as the legal umbrella 
that governs any commercial activity that tends to confuse, mislead or 
deceive the public about the sale of products or services.223 Moreover, 
even within the field of industrial property rights, there are some 
rights, which are not covered by the laws for the protection of 
                                                 
223  See, Elias, supra note 4, at  415. 
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industrial property, such as the protection against unauthorized use of 
a trademark that has not been registered, or the unauthorized 
exploitation of a patent disclosed to the public but has not been 
patented or in respect of which the patent has expired. Thus, unfair 
competition law is necessary not only as a means for the protection 
against unfair practices in the marketplace, but also as a supplement to 
the laws for the protection of industrial property rights. Therefore, in 
order to respond to the various challenges, unfair competition law 
must be flexible and adapting to all new forms of market behavior and 
moreover, protection thereunder must not be subject to formalities, 
such as registration.224 
  
  viii) Trade Secrets: 
   There is no standard definition of a trade secret. It may be defined 
shortly as information of a commercial value that has been kept 
confidential.225 Broadly, it may be defined as “any information that 
can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise, and that 
is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential 
economic advantage over others”.226 Section 53 of the Patents Act 
1971 provides that manufacturing processes or knowledge concerning 
                                                 
224  For more details see WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 124 – 155. 
225  See Elias, supra note 4, at 16. 
226  Moore, supra note 34, at 6. 
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the use and application of industrial techniques may be freely used by 
any person. But if such processes or knowledge have not been 
published or made available to the public, they shall be protected 
against unlawful use, disclosure or communication by third parties, 
provided that the person who has developed them has taken the 
necessary steps to preserve their secret character.  
  Generally, any information that provides its owner with a 
competitive advantage and has been kept secret by that owner may be 
considered as a trade secret. This may be information of a 
technological character such as any formula, process of 
manufacturing, a method of treating or preserving materials, a pattern 
for a machine, a pile or other devices, or it may be commercial secrets 
such as sales methods, distribution methods, list of customers, 
advertising strategies, business schedules, details of price agreements 
or consumer profiles.227 However, when determining whether a 
particular information qualifies as a trade secret, regard has to be 
given to the extent to which the said information is known publicly or 
within a particular trade or industry, the amount of money and effort 
expended by the owner to develop such information, the value of the 
information to the business, the measures taken by the trader for 
                                                 
227  See WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 145. See also Moore, supra note 34, at 6. See also Elias, 
supra note 4, at 16. 
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preserving the secrecy of the said information and the difficulty of 
getting such information by others.228 Any information, which satisfies 
the requirements of being considered as a trade secret is eligible for 
protection against misappropriation or disclosure by third parties. But, 
such protection does not extend to cases where the said information is 
legitimately acquired or independently invented, discovered or 
developed by third parties.229 Owners of trade secrets have exclusive 
rights to make use of them either by using them by themselves, 
licensing or even selling them to others.230  
 
4. Justifications of Intellectual Property: 
  The need for private property rights in information goods, as 
intangible objects, is considered as more pressing when 
compared with the need for protection for tangible objects. This 
is because, absent property rights, the producer of information 
will not be able to appropriate the value of information once it is 
exposed in the marketplace since it can easily be freely 
replicated and sold by his competitors at prices lower than the 
prices which should have been charged by the first producer in 
                                                 
228  WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 145 
229  See section 55 of the Patents Act. See also WIPO Publication, supra note 3, at 145. 
230  See section 56 of the Patents Act. 
 153
order to recoup his investment in producing it.231 But, on the 
other hand, the fact that information is intangible means it is 
indivisible, i.e., an unlimited number of users can consume it 
without depleting it. Take, as an example, a motion picture: if 
one person or one million sees it, it will remain as it is. This 
means that ‘once information has been produced, it can benefit 
an indeterminate number of users without adding any additional 
cost on the producer’.232 Since the intellectual property law 
enables information producers to charge users for accessing to 
their information, this will necessarily result in depriving those 
who could not pay or do not want to pay for the use of such 
information, even though giving them free access will harm 
nobody else.233 
  These unique characteristics of intellectual goods have led to 
much controversy, mostly of philosophical nature, about the 
moral foundations for granting private property rights in 
intellectual goods. Many writers base their justifications for 
defending the private property rights in intellectual goods on 
the traditional principle of natural rights; especially the labor 
theory, which was principally defended by John Locke, as a 
justification for the acquisition of unclaimed land to the effect 
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that each person has a natural right in the fruit of his labor, 
provided that enough and as good is left to others.234  
  One writer criticizes the utilitarian justifications of intellectual 
property adopted by the Anglo-American systems on the 
ground that justifying the grant of intellectual property rights to 
authors and inventors merely on the desire to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts means that what is 
granted is in fact not a right but something less; something 
dependent solely on considerations of the overall social good. 
He calls for robust rights to property, be it tangible or intangible 
property. He sees that this can be achieved by reference to the 
natural law theory. He states that as far as the intellectual 
goods are inexhaustible in amount, this satisfies the Lockean 
proviso ‘enough and as good for others’, more than in the case 
of real property.235 Another writer justifies his defense for 
granting private property rights in intellectual goods on 
principles, such as privacy and sovereignty of individuals, 
especially with regard to the private property rights in trade 
secrets. According to this writer, “if a person has any right with 
respect to her ideas, surely it is the right to control their initial 
                                                 
234  See Child, James W.,’The Moral foundations of Intangible Property’. [in] Moore (ed.), supra note 
34, at 57. See also Moore, Adam D., ‘Toward a Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property’. [in]  Moore 
(ed.), supra note 34, at 81.    
235  Ibid. at 81 -103 
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disclosure”.236 A third writer grounds his defense for private 
property rights in intellectual goods on a combination of both, 
the labor theory of John Locke and the personality theory of 
Hegel. After analyzing both theories, he concludes: 
           Earlier, I suggested that the personality theory might 
justify the right to protect one’s private property 
without justifying rights to alienate that property. I 
must add, as a possible corollary, that the labor 
justification, with its emphasis on value 
maximization, might legitimate alienation and value 
exchange, without safeguarding rights to keep 
particular objects merely as “possession”. In this 
way, the two theories may compensate for each 
other’s weakness.237  
  However, these traditional justifications of private property rights in 
intellectual goods have been criticized by another group of writers on 
different grounds. One writer states that inventions, writings and 
thought, generally do not come from vacuum, but are built on the 
previous human endeavor. Thus, considering the final producer of an 
intellectual product as having the exclusive natural property right in 
                                                 
236  See, Paine, Lynn Sharp, ‘Trade Secrets and the Justification of intellectual Property’, [in] Moore 
(ed.), supra note 34, at 41 
237  For more details see, Hughes, Justin, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’, [in] Moore (ed.), 
supra note 34, at 165. 
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the market value of the resulting product ignores the contribution of 
others.238 Another writer criticizes the utilitarian thesis adopted by the 
Anglo-American systems, as well as the natural law theory adopted by 
the Civil Law countries. He bases his criticism on the ground that the 
assessment of intellectual property had not been considered before it 
was entrenched as an institution and only when questions about its 
efficacy surfaced (from mid-19th century), as a result of academic 
curiosity rather than pressing practical concern. He says that the 
history of intellectual property showed that protection had not been 
based on the fact that it was a right, but as a privilege granted by the 
sovereign or the concerned municipal authority in exchange for 
payments.239 He criticizes the natural law thesis on the ground that it 
did not explain why the state should be needed to intervene in granting 
a natural right or imposing restriction on its term or non-use. 
Moreover, he criticizes the incentive thesis on the basis that originally, 
state measures at their earliest periods were aimed at generating 
revenue for the state not for promoting the industrial activity, less to 
say intellectual creativity. He adds that even at the present time, it is 
doubtful whether the incentive thesis can operate in the industrial 
countries as an instrument for individual stimulation. This is due, as he 
                                                 
238  Hettinger, Edwin C., ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’, [in] Moore (ed.), supra note 34, at 22. 
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sees it, to the fact that inventions in industrial countries are often 
owned by large corporations, especially multinational corporations 
(MNC). These large corporations have their own considerations as 
concerns the decision whether or not to innovate, and whether to get a 
patent for their inventions or to keep them as trade secrets. He states 
that, on the contrary, these large corporations are often accused of 
suppressing inventions by practices, such as the shelving of an 
invention which others would like to manufacture or use, or getting 
patents just for postponing the application of inventions that might 
lead to scraping of their equipment before becoming physically 
obsolete, or just to protect themselves from the potential threat of their 
competitors. One of effects of these practices, he says, is a delay in the 
development of new inventions.240 He concludes that “the view of 
intellectual property as something other than a legal arm of the 
economic-technical structure in the industrial countries, has no basis 
in history nor is it supportable in theory”.241 
 
Conclusion 
  Although the intellectual creativity in trade and service marks, trade 
names, geographical indications and the various forms of unfair 
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competition may not be as prominent as in the case of inventions, 
literary and artistic works, industrial designs and integrated circuits, 
the term intellectual property has acquired international acceptance as 
a term describing the rights relating to all of these activities. The fields 
of intellectual property protection are widening in number and scope 
so as to respond to new technologies, and other forms of inventions 
and human creativity. The protection of a new subject matter may be 
achieved either by re-defining an existing right so as to be adaptable to 
accommodate the new subject matter or through the creation of a new 
and distinct right by way of analogy from the existing rights. 
 A common element of all forms of intellectual property protection is 
the right of exclusivity. This right enables the owners of intellectual 
products to prevent others from exploiting their products for 
commercial purposes. But this exclusive right is subject to public 
interest, which determines its creation, scope, duration and 
enforcement. Moreover, this public interest seems to be the main 
factor behind granting intellectual property rights in essence, 
especially with regard to patents system.  
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Chapter 3 
The Challenge of the Internet 
 
      Introduction: 
          The emergence of the Internet as a means of 
communication surpassing all other means of 
communications has created a great challenge for the 
international community. This challenge lies in the ability of 
the international community to get use of the benefits of the 
Internet and avoid its negative effects. The unique features of 
the Internet have complicated the resolution of the 
conundrum of its governance. Under the traditional legal 
system, jurisdiction is defined by reference to a physical 
territory. Moreover, although the traditional private 
international law rules witnessed important transformations 
relating to the stringent territorial requirements embodied in 
the rules lex locus contractu and lex locus delicti, in favour of 
a more flexible system based on what is described as “interest 
analysis”, due to the fact that transborder events and 
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transactions became commonplace in the twentieth century, 
nevertheless, the essential requirement of some nexus 
between the concerned jurisdiction and the persons or 
transactions intended to be subject to it, has not been 
abandoned. 
       However, it is thought that the Internet has not only 
weakened the significance of physical locations, but also 
destroyed them all together in three senses: first, the Internet 
ignores the existence of physical borders to an extent that 
events happening on the Internet may be described as taking 
place “everywhere if anywhere”. Second, even though the 
presence of a server in one location may give special interest 
to that locality in regulating the content of that server, 
nonetheless, there are many events and transactions that may 
be described as having no physical locality in particular but 
taking place only on the network itself, which by its very 
nature is not a “localizable phenomenon”. For example, 
Usenet discussion groups, which consist of continuing 
changing collection of messages that are routed from one 
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network to another across the global net, with no centralized 
location at all, may be considered as occurring everywhere, 
nowhere in particular. Third, locations on the Internet can be 
conceived of only in a virtual sense by reference to the 
addresses of machines between which information and 
messages are routed. These addresses are independent of the 
physical locations in which those machines are located. These 
unique features of the Internet have generated controversial 
legal issues.  
 Different approaches have been advanced in relation to the 
governance of the Internet. Broadly, there are four 
approaches in this respect. One approach argues that no 
territorial state is capable of regulating the Internet and that 
the Internet should be left to regulate itself in a separate 
jurisdiction, independent of real space jurisdiction. The 
second approach contends that the existing legal system is 
competent to resolve the problems generated by the Internet. 
The third approach sees the solution in a form of interplay 
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between law and technology. The fourth view suggests a 
hybrid form of regulation. 
 This chapter studies the phenomenon of the Internet, its 
potential evolution and expansion, its impact on the 
international society and the approaches for its regulation. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 studies the 
emergence of the Internet, its evolution and potential 
expansion. It includes the definition of the term Internet and 
other related terms, how it works and its potential evolution 
and expansion. Part 2 discusses the positive and negative 
aspects of the Internet.Part 3 examines the approaches 
advanced for the regulation of the Internet. It discusses four 
approaches relating to the governance of the Internet viz., 
self-governace approach, regulation by means of the 
traditional legal system, governance through the control of 
the architecture of the Internet and hybrid regulation 
approach. 
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1.What is the Internet? How does it Work? 
 
i) Definition of the Term Internet and Other Related 
Terms: 
  The emergence of the Internet has generated many new 
terms and abbreviations connected with its work and uses. 
These terms are so numerous that some commentators 
descibe it as a second language and label it as 
cyberlanguage.242 The knowledge of these terms and their 
abbreviations is a precondition for better understanding of the 
nature of the Internet and how it functions. Hereunder are 
definitions and explanations of the term Internet and some 
other related terms: 
     (a) Internet: Generally, the term Internet refers to a network 
of computers all over the world speaking the same language. 
                                                 
242  See Dachelet, Jaime ‘Cyberlanguage and How it is Affected by Trademarks, Domain Names and 
Generic Words’, Available at:  www.ukans.edu/cybermom/clj/dachelet/dachelet.html , visited February 
2002, at 1.    
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It is often described as the network of networks.243 Some 
commentators see this short definition as incomplete. They 
state that a comprehensive definition should include the 
physical parts of the Internet as well as its various 
applications.244 Kahn and Cerf prefer the definition adopted 
by the American Federal Networking Council in its 
Resolution of October 24, 1995, which defines Internet as 
follows: 
           Internet refers to the global information system that: 
         - Is logically linked together by a globally unique 
address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) 
or its subsequent extensions/follow-on; 
         - Is able to support communications using the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/ 
follow-ons, and/or other IP- compatible protocols, 
and 
                                                 
243  See Gringras, Clive ‘The laws of the Internet’ Butterworth, London (1997) at 1 
244  See Smith, Graham J.H. ‘Internet law and Regulation’ 2nd - FT Law and Tax, London (1997) at 1  
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        - Provides uses or makes accessible, either publicly 
or privately, high level services layered on the 
communications and related infrastructure 
described herein.245 
       According to Kahn and Cerf the above definition is the best 
definition currently in existence because “it defines the 
Internet as a global information system and include in the 
definition, not only the underlying communications 
technology, but also higher level protocols and end users 
applications, the associated data structures and the means by 
which the information may be processed”. It is worthy of 
note to mention that the term ‘cyberspace’ is used, especially 
in the US, to describe the Internet and other computer 
networks. The term cyberspace was first used by the 
American science fiction writer William Gibson in his novel 
‘Neuromancer’ to refer to a “near computer network where 
users mentally travel through matrices of data”. It has been 
also described as “the conceptual space where words, human 
                                                 
245  See Kahn, Robert E. and Cerf, Viton G. ‘What is the Internet? And What Makes it Works? 
Available at: www.internetpolicy.org, visited January 2002, at 12.  
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relationships, data, wealth and power are manifested by 
people using CMC (computer mediated communications) 
technology”.246 However, in contrast to the publicly 
accessible Internet, there are other forms of private Internets 
commonly known as intranets. 
      (b) Intranets: these are internal company networks connected 
to the Internet but are not accessible or should not be 
accessed from the public Internet due to the use of a 
protective devise known as ‘firewall’. These private intranets 
use the tools of the Internet Protocols and other Internet-
compliant software. There are five categories or levels of 
intranets tailored according to the needs of each organization. 
The choice of a specific level is determined by the needs and 
scope of the concerned organization. These five levels are 
known as: Basic, Publishing Library, Collaboration, 
Transaction and Extranet. The last level “Extranet” is the 
largest evolutionary version of intranets. It is a big internal 
                                                 
246  Ibid. See also Dachelet, supra note 1, at. See also Loader, Brian D. ‘The Governance of 
Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring’, [in] Loader, Brian B. (ed.) ‘The 
Governance of Cyberspace’, Routledge, London (1997), at 2. 
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network designed to “manage and coordinate the operations 
and information of large organizations on a global scale”.247   
           (c) E-mail: It is short for the phrase “electronic mail”. It is a 
means of communications through the Internet. It is the oldest 
application of the Internet. An e-mail message can be sent 
from computer to another using an e-mail address. The basic 
structure of e-mail addresses is username@domain. The word 
mail should be understood at its widest meaning. Actually, 
any material that can be created and stored in a computer may 
be sent as e-mail. This includes messages, picture, sound, 
software, etc. Unlike its physical counterpart, what is sent in 
case of the e-mail is a copy of the material created by the 
sender. The original material remains in the computer of the 
sender.248  
      (d) Pseudo-Anonymity: This is a special computer program 
enabling Internet users to remain anonymous by sending their 
e-mails through an “anonymous re-mailer’. This program 
                                                 
247  See Scott, S. Kokka ‘Property Rights on an Intranet’, 3.2 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 3. Available at: 
http://journal.law.ufl.edu./~techlaw/3-2/kokka.html (1998), visited January 2002, at 2-4. 
248  See Gringras, supra note 2, at 4,5. 
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strips any incoming e-mail from its header and re-sends it to 
the intended recipient.249   
      (e)  Bulletin Boards: Like a physical bulletin board, a digital 
bulletin board produces the e-mails sent to it in a readable 
format accessible to any user of the bulletin board. The reader 
has the option to reply privately to the sender or send a reply 
to be stored in the bulletin board accessible to any user of the 
board. Also, like its physical counterpart, digital bulletin 
boards are often moderated by someone who stores the 
messages in equipment under his control.250   
(f) Forum: These are kinds of bulletin boards provided by 
some of the Internet Service Providers (ISP) for their 
members. Each forum carries a distinguishable title indicating 
the nature of conversation threads and files that can be found 
on the board. These boards are usually moderated by the 
Service Providers who provide them.251  
(g) Usenet: This is a collection of bulletin boards known as 
newsgroups, which can be accessed by anyone connected to 
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the Internet. Unlike forums, members of different Service 
Providers participate in newsgroups. Each Service Provider is 
responsible for messages posted by its members on the 
relevant newsgroups, but has no control over messages 
posted by other members of the newsgroups other than 
denying access by its members to a specific newsgroup.252 
(h) Telnet: This is a means through which a user connected to 
the Internet can gain access to a remote computer. Once that 
user logs on into such remote computer he or she can easily 
run programs and view data stored on that computer and, 
moreover, from that remote computer the said user can log on 
to another computer and so on.253  
(i) Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP): 
These are set of standards that govern how computers 
communicate with each other via Internet.254 
(j) World Wide Web (www): This is a system of joining 
documents to each other via Internet using hybertext links or 
the address of a web site. By using programs that browse the 
                                                 
252  Ibid., at 6-7. See also Smith, supra note 3, at 293. 
253  See Gringras, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
254  Ibid., at 7. See also Smith, supra note 3, at 293. 
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web, such as Hybertext Transmission Protocol, a user can 
retrieve information stored in remote computers.255 
     (k) Uniform Resource Locator (URL): This is a system that 
tells the computer what type of protocol is being used, where 
the site is located and what type of site it is.256 
(l) Hybertext Markup Language (HTML): This is a system of 
additions to plain text, which acts as instructions to web 
browsers or other HTML-compliant programs. Acting on the 
instructions, the browser converts a marked up text into 
formated pages including hybertext links.257 
(m) Hybertext Transmission Protocol (HTTP): This is the 
Internet protocol that is used to link and transfer hybertext 
documents.258  
(n) Hybertext: A hybertext document includes embeded 
hyberlinks to other sites. A hyberlink is easily distinguishable 
from the other parts of a text on the page as it appears in a 
different color or format e.g., blue underlined text. Once a 
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hyberlink is clicked by a mouse, the computer is instructed to 
go to the address embeded within that link and retrieve the 
material stored there.259 
(o) File Transfer Protocol (ftp): This is the protocol used to 
transfer or download a software program or file from an 
Internet site (ftp server) to the user’s computer (the client).260 
(p) Browsers: These are programs which facilitate navigation 
of the World Wide Web and interpret the data found in other 
web sites into a collection of text, picture and sound. They 
enable users to visit other web sites by typing the intended 
web site’s address. Moreover, they provide navigation 
buttons enabling a user to return back to where he came from, 
in addition to their ability to store favorite pages or sites.261 
(q) Domain Name: This is a name assigned for an entity with 
an address on a network.262 
(r) Top Level Domain (TLD): This refers to the suffixes 
found at the end of web addresses. There are several types of 
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TLD. For example, “.com or .co” for commercial 
organizations, “.edu or .ac” for educational institutions, “.int” 
for international organizations, “.mil or .ml” for military 
(especially US military organizations), “.net” for networks, 
“.org” for nonprofit organizations, “.gov” for governments 
(especially US government). Other governments use certain 
codes to distinguish themselves e.g., “.uk” for United 
Kingdom, “.fr” for France, etc.263  
(s) Server: Strictly, a server is software that delivers data 
from the computer on which it resides or is stored across the 
network (the host), in response to instructions from 
elsewhere. For example, a web server delivers web pages, a 
domain name server (DNS) delivers IP address in response to 
domain name requests, and so on. The term server may refer 
to the computer hosting the required data as well as the 
software facilitating the delivery of that data.264 
 
    ii) How does the Internet Work? 
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  (a) The Infrastructure for the Internet Work: 
        Different communication standards, procedures and 
computational facilities have been used to make possible the 
global interconnection of millions of otherwise independent 
computers, communication entities and information systems. 
The basic infrastructure that facilitates the communication of 
computers with each other is a set of standards or procedures 
called “Protocols”. These protocols are supported by “a set 
of architectural concepts and data structures for 
heterogeneous information systems that render the Internet a 
truly global information system”.265 Interconnection of 
computers is a digital matter. Computers understand only the 
numbers one and zero. Thus, computers use a mathematical 
binary of ones and zeros to communicate with each other i.e., 
they process and exchange digital information. For 
communication purposes, “such information is mapped into 
continuous electrical or optical waveforms”. The term 
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computer referred to herein includes not only the traditional 
computers but also other “devices that can be controlled 
digitally over a network, information resources such as 
mobile programs and other computational capabilities”.266  
  Typically, computers “send out brief but intensive bursts of 
data then remain silent for a while before sending out the next 
burst”. These bursts are communicated in forms of packets. 
The packet switching style is found more suitable for digital 
communication than the circuit-switched voice network used 
in telephone system, which “makes limited use of the 
communication facilities and takes too long to set up 
connections”.267The way in which the Information is 
transmitted through the Internet is similar to the international 
postal system. The packets in which information is 
transferred are much like electronic postcards. The packets 
are relayed from computer to another till they reach their 
destination. There are special computers known as packet-
switches or routers, configured to carry out this work. Just 
                                                 
266  See, Gringras, supra note 2, at 1. See also Kahn and Cerf, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
267  See Kahn and Cerf, supra note 4, at 4. 
 175
like postcards, Internet packets can get lost, delivered out of 
order or delayed and even may be duplicated. Internet 
Protocols are responsible for putting these packets in order 
and resend them to their destination.268  
 
  (b) Applications of the Internet: 
       The materials accessible by the end-users are generally 
divided into real- time and downloadable contents. Real-time 
contents include materials that can be viewed or heard when 
accessed by the user. The amount of data that can be 
accessed by the user and the speed at which such data can be 
accessed is affected by the capacity or bandwidth pipes 
carrying the Internet traffic. Examples of real-time materials 
are audio (speech or music), video, animation, video-
conferencing and voice telephony. Downloadable materials 
are typically files capable of being copied from an Internet 
site to the users’ computers. Examples of downloadable 
materials range from simple text files, graphics and video to 
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computer programs.269 The content providers may be the 
same owners of the hosts or servers in which the content is 
stored or may be other parties using these hosts for free or 
for reward as commercial services. The owner of the host 
may take part in placing the materials stored in his server, 
such as providing web design and HTML coding, or may just 
provide storage area, bandwidth and URL for others without 
participating in the selection or design of the materials.270 
  The access to the Internet may be through computers 
connected directly into high bandwidth elements of the 
Internet, such as those used by academic institutions, or may 
be by means of high capacity leased lines or ISDN 
(Integrated Service Digital Network) connections often used 
by business, or simply via a modem and an ordinary 
telephone line through Internet Service Providers, as used by 
individual home users.271 The first access providers were 
academic institutions or government bodies with high 
capacity Internet-compliant links, who provided access to 
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their students and staff. However, the main access providers 
at present are commercial organizations selling Internet 
access to home and commercial users. Network providers 
often have contractual arrangements between them known as 
(peering agreements), regulating the exchange of traffic 
between the concerned networks. If there is no direct physical 
connection and peering agreement in place between the two 
networks, the traffic has to find another route. Routers may 
contain instructions not to pass traffic to or from certain 
networks. In such cases messages use the Internet Protocols 
to route around gaps and blockage. This may not only diffuse 
the responsibilities of safe delivery of messages among 
different networks, but also make the identities of those 
networks unpredictable in advance.272  
  The Internet access providers, commonly known as Internet 
Service Providers, frequently assume roles more than the 
mere connection to the Internet. Some of them store web 
pages for their customers or host Usenet newsgroups etc. This 
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means that an Internet Service Provider may be content 
provider and host as well as access provider. So the term 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) may sometimes be 
misleading, as it does not distinguish the underlying roles of 
content providers, access providers and hosts. Therefore, it 
has to be interpreted within the context in which it comes.273 
Moreover, due to the expansion of the Internet and the huge 
quantity of data available on-line, it may not be easy to find 
out quality content or to know where it is. So, a new 
category, known as navigation providers, has emerged in 
order to facilitate for the Internet users the access to on-line 
quality content. Navigation providers may take many forms. 
For example, umbrella sites for specializing activities such as 
shopping malls, law, medicine etc., where customers are 
attracted to such sites as they expect to find collection of 
content providers. At present, search engines and directories 
are considered as the most important navigation providers. 
These sites may produce their own content or agree with 
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other content providers. The content sifted by navigation 
providers may be stored in hosts owned by third parties.274  
 
iii) The Evolution and Potential Expansion of the Internet: 
     (a) The Emergence of the Internet: 
  The Internet has passed through different stages before 
reaching its present status. The first stage was launched in 
1969 when the US Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency (ARPA) commissioned a wide area computer 
network called ARPANET. This network applied the packet-
switching methods for connecting computers together. The 
computers linked at the beginning were those of universities 
and other research institutions in the United States and other 
selected NATO countries. In the late 1970s the Internet 
addressing system TCP/IP was developed. In 1980 TCP/IP 
system was formally adopted as a standard by the US 
Department of State. In 1983 it was applied in ARPANET as 
its standard host protocol. The application of the TCP/IP 
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protocols on the ARPANET and other networks led to the 
rapid growth of the Internet to an extent that the addressing 
system applied at that time, which associated the names of 
host computers to Internet addresses was found 
impracticable. Efforts for finding a more practical addressing 
system resulted in the development of what is known as the 
Domain Name System (DNS). The system of Domain Names 
allow hundred of thousands of “name server” to maintain 
small portions of a global database of information associating 
IP addresses with the names of computers on the Internet. 
However, only after the application of the World Wide Web 
in 1994 did Internet become publicly accessible.275   
 
  (b) The Evolution and Potential Expansion of the Internet: 
       Since its invention and up to now the evolution and 
expansion of the Internet is beyond the expectation of its 
designers. Kahn and Cerf, who participated in designing the 
architecture of the Internet, state that:          “As we struggle 
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to envision what may be commonplace on the Internet in a 
decade, we are confronted with the challenge of imagining 
new ways of doing old things, as well as trying to think of 
new things that will be enabled by the Internet, and by the 
technologies of the future”.276      The use of small and cheap 
computer chips as web servers is expected to revolutionize 
the spread of the Internet at rates more than its present rates. 
In addition to the traditional laptop and desktop computers, 
devices such as cell phones, fax machines, household 
appliances, hand-held organizers, digital cameras and all 
other “devices connected to the Internet will be Internet 
enabled appliances”.277 Information may be accessed through 
digital objects of all kinds. The networking speed has been 
developed from 50,000 bit-per-second ARPANET to 2.4 
billion bit-per-second of today’s commercial networks. 
Experiments are going on to raise the networking speed to 
trillions of bits-per-second. Some of these ultra-high speed 
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systems may be used in the future to carry data from other 
planets.278  
      The exponential growth of the Internet has resulted in the 
vast expansion of the users of the Internet from the forty or so 
computers of ARPANET in the seventies of the twentieth 
century to more than 60 million host computers by 1999 
serving more the 200 million users in over 200 countries.279 
The rate of the growth of the Internet is estimated at 33% 
every six months since 1988. By the end of the year 2001, the 
population of the Internet jumped to 529 million.280 
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2. The Impacts of the Internet on the International 
Community: 
  i) The Importance of the Internet: 
      The great role of the Internet is manifested in its ability to 
integrate the communications technologies with the 
computing capabilities of computers to provide an efficient 
system of instant connectivity and global information 
services to all its users at very low cost.281 In the words of 
one writer: 
              The Internet, the precursor of the Information 
Superhighway, heralds the beginning of a new age 
in communications, commerce and entertainment 
and is a tremendous vehicle of economic growth. It 
is probably not an exaggeration to say that the 
Internet has had, in one way or the other, an impact 
on all stratums of society and radically altered the 
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way communications may be made and business 
may be conducted worldwide.282  
      As a communication means, the Internet has provided its 
users with various means of communications. Once 
connected to the Internet, a user has various options of 
communications, including real-time communications, one-
to-one messaging and retrieval of information from remote 
computers. The first and most popular means of one-to-one 
communications is the act of sending messages via the 
Internet, commonly known as electronic mail or e-mail, for 
short. The e-mail function is not confined in simple sending 
of text messages. Anything that can be created and stored in a 
computer can be sent as e-mail. This includes pictures, sound, 
software etc.283 Among other forms of communications are 
those called digital bulletin boards. Bulletin boards may be 
closed for a certain group of members, often specializing in 
particular activities, or may be open for access by any person 
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linked to the Internet. The closed forms of bulletin boards are 
known as “forums”. These forums are run by Internet Service 
Providers for their members and often moderated by them. 
The open forms of bulletin boards are called Usenet. These 
are described as collection of over 15000 boards known as 
newsgroups. Unlike forums, all the subscribing Service 
Providers maintain and store the conversation threads of the 
newsgroups. Each Service Provider participating in a Usenet 
is able to display the content of messages sent by all other 
members but responsible only for messages posted by its own 
members. A third form of communication is called Tenet. 
This is a method by which a computer linked to the Internet is 
enabled to access another remote computer and runs 
programs and data stored in that remote computer.284 Yet, the 
most important applications of the Internet up to this moment 
is the World Wide Web (the Web) and its supporting 
browsers, which facilitate the access, retrieval, downloading 
and uploading of information by the computers linked to the 
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Internet. The Web is described as a powerful tool for the 
acquisition and dissemination of information that epitomizes 
the Information Age more than any comparable 
communication innovation. The growth of on-line commerce 
is premised on the Web.285However, the other side of the coin 
is something different. 
 
ii) The Negative Aspects of the Internet: 
      The positive aspects of the Internet are confronted with 
negative ones threatening the smooth use of the Internet. 
These negative aspects are represented in the different kinds 
of problems generated by the Internet. The problems created 
by the Internet vary from criminal activities to civil wrongs, 
harmful content and further complications for the rules of 
conflict of laws. The Internet has been exploited by some in 
the commission of different kinds of crimes, either directly or 
indirectly. Direct crimes are those fully committed in 
cyberspace e.g., pornography, theft of copyrighted materials, 
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gambling, intrusion and damage of computer systems and 
programs etc. In indirect crimes the Internet is used as a 
facilitating factor for the commission of the crime e.g., 
killing, kidnapping, hate crimes, forgery, illegal drugs sale 
etc.286Also the Internet is exploited for the commission of 
other wrongful acts such as the violation of privacy rights, 
infringement of intellectual property rights, defamation etc. 
Moreover, the use of the Internet in commercial transaction 
has resulted in civil disputes relating to the interpretation and 
performance of contractual obligations.287 However, although 
most of the problems generated by the Internet are not new, 
the multiple jurisdiction nature of the Internet has rendered 
the existing legal measures inappropriate for settling them in 
the views of many commentators. The fluid nature of the 
Internet has added new dimension of complexity and 
confusion to the conflict of law rules.288 Like any other tool, 
the Internet can be exploited for good or for evil. Therefore, 
efforts have been exerted to obtain the optimal benefits of the 
                                                 
286  See, anonymous author, supra note 42, at 1591. 
287  See, Anil, supra note 41, at 3. 
288  Ibid. 
 188
Internet and avoiding or at least mitigating its negative 
aspects. In this respect different approaches have been 
advanced for the control and governance of the Internet. 
 189
3. The Governance of the Internet      
i) Separate Virtual Space: 
   The proponents of separate jurisdiction for cyberspace 
believe that the global computer-mediated communications 
have created a virtual status undermining the feasibility and 
legitimacy of applying laws based on geographical 
boundaries. They believe that “while these electronic 
communications play havoc with geographic boundaries, a 
new boundary made up of screens and passwords that 
separate the virtual world from the ‘real world’ of atoms, 
emerge”.289This separate virtual world refers to a distinct 
cyberspace, which should be governed by new legal 
institutions applying new sets of laws. They expect the 
emergence of new rules in the various online spaces, 
separated from doctrines built by reference to territorial 
jurisdictions, to govern the new phenomenon. “These new 
rules will play the role of law by defining legal personhood 
and property, providing a mechanism for resolving disputes, 
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and crystallizing a collective conversation about core values”. 
Territorially based law-making and law-enforcing authorities 
may have no choice other than deferring to the self-regulatory 
bodies of cyberspace who are deeply concerned with this new 
digital dealing in ideas, information and services.290 
      Johnson and Post argue that cyberspace is a distinct place 
and should be treated as such. It is not a homogenous place. It 
consists of different groups and activities with unique 
characteristics, but the boundaries between these groups are 
as clear as the borders in real space, if not more.291 Each of 
these Net groups form a distinct community composed of 
users and Service Providers. These communities are capable 
of developing their own effective legal institutions. In the 
view of those writers the process of the formation of law 
merchant (lex mercatoria), which regulated border-crossing 
trade of the Middle Ages, may be taken, by analogy, as an 
example for the possibility of making separate law for 
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cyberspace.292Moreover, the doctrine of comity along with 
the principles applicable when territorial sovereigns delegate 
authority to self-regulatory organizations such as church, 
clubs and social organizations may be applied by analogy as 
bases for non-interference of territorial sovereigns in the 
affairs of cyberspace communities. In other words, a 
territorial sovereign should not interfere unless there is a vital 
threat to its interests.293The two authors summarized their 
argument as follows: 
              Global electronic communications have created 
new spaces in which distinct rule sets will evolve. 
We reconcile the new law created in this space with 
current territorially based legal systems by treating 
it as a distinct doctrine, applicable to a clearly 
demarcated sphere, created primarily by legitimate 
self-regulatory process, and entitled to appropriate 
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deference- but also subject to limitations when it 
oversteps its appropriate sphere.294  
       Moreover, some supporters of virtuality even go further by 
viewing the Internet as the “last frontier”, i.e., the Internet is 
viewed as a big limitless space with much uncharted territory 
and that who claims first will have the right to control. This 
approach is similar to virtuality approach in excluding the 
public role in regulation, but it differs from it as concerns the 
issue of regulation. The virtual separate space approach 
anticipates a form of self-regulation depending on normative 
structures, whereas, the “last frontier” approach sees no role 
for normative structures. In the same line there is another 
approach, which views the Internet as a “commons” or “green 
space”. This approach calls for the preservation of the public 
nature of the Internet at all costs. It ignores the roles of the 
private sector in constructing the technical information 
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infrastructure, and the rules of law relating to private 
rights.295  
       However, the “last frontier” and “commons” approaches 
have not found much support and are described as myths and 
unrealistic.296But the issue of separate virtual communities 
having their own laws and mechanism of enforcement has 
raised much debate. Some writers have elaborated the 
concept of virtual communities. For example, one writer 
believes that the mere availability of a common interest is 
enough for the formation of a virtual community around the 
globe. According to this writer, the real world of today has 
been shattered in the Networld into thousands of overlapping, 
fragmented and specialized communities in almost every 
field of interest. These communities include fantasy 
communities, ethnic communities, topical discussion 
communities, professional groups, game playing 
communities etc. Each community is defined by reference to 
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its boundaries and its respective netizens intend to stay within 
it. He argues that the contents of the rules applicable in 
cyberspace are based on pragmatism and reasonableness. He 
considers customary law as the origin of the norms governing 
cyberspace communities.297The approach of self-normative 
regulation of the Internet envisions a series of dominant 
private rights vis-à-vis information access and control based 
on freedom of contracting.298  
      The Internet groups that have found wide acceptance as 
virtual communities so far include: bulletin boards systems 
(BBS), conferencing systems, Internet Relay Chat, Usenet, e-
mail lists and Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs).299Moreover, 
the governance of these communities in the views of many 
writers “varies so far, from unwritten norms, to moderation of 
discussion and regulation of conduct by system operators 
(sysops) to formally enforced rules”.300However, some 
commentators have cautioned against hasty assumptions of a 
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fixed nature for the Internet or its communities. The argument 
underlying this caution is that cyberspace is still at its first 
steps and as such, it is better to see first the impact of forces 
such as technology, markets and other extra-legal forces in 
shaping the evolving cyberspace before discussing the law’s 
role in shaping these communities. In this respect there are 
three factors expected to affect the future classification of 
cyberspace communities: first, the way in which the debate 
about public and private spaces will be settled in the future; 
second, to what extent the Internet will be tailored, through 
filtering for example, to meet individual preferences; third, 
for how long the mystery of cyberspace will continue in the 
light of other technologies such as web televisions and 
Internet videophones i.e., when the Internet becomes more 
integrated into familiar technologies it will no longer be 
convincing to classify “this” as cyberspace and “that” as real 
space.301 
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      The opponents of separatism describe the call for separate 
jurisdiction governed by different rules as puzzling, since it 
ignores the fact that cyberspace interactions ultimately refer 
to humans and, moreover, disregards previous international 
solutions of trans-border problems generated by earlier 
communication technologies such as the telephone and 
telegraph which, by analogy, may be applied to trans-border 
problems resulting from the use of the Internet.302Reviewing 
a book written by Curtis E.A. Karnow, under the title: Future 
Codes: Essays in Advanced Computer Technology and the 
Law, Kelly described the call for separate jurisdiction as 
“separatism fallacy”. He believes that “the separatism fallacy 
must be rooted from cyberspace writings because it posits 
(and often assumes) a situation that does not exist- a parallel 
world where current understandings have no legitimate 
claim”.303 
       Moreover, the virtuality approach is described by one writer 
as a myth because, the paradigm of the Internet regulation 
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that is going on to this moment, for better or worse, is based 
on existing legal maxims.304 Also the self-normative 
regulation through dominant private rights based on freedom 
of contracting has been criticized on different grounds. First, 
this approach is considered as an attempt to exclude the 
public law from regulation of contracts in the way that serves 
the public interests. Secondly, this approach assumes parity 
of contracting parties, which is not the case on the Internet. 
The mechanism of private contracting in the sense viewed by 
self-regulation proponents may result in what are known as 
contracts of adhesion because of the uneven distribution of 
bargaining power between information owners and end users. 
As a result, a new term ‘information adhesion’ is “used to 
describe the process of market-based information alignment 
and control, that, in the present discussion is expressed 
through the mechanism of private contracting, favors those 
with a dominant bargaining position, and results in 
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information inequity”.305 This information adhesion may 
occur in dealings between private parties in different 
countries or between private parties within a particular 
country. It is believed that without a system of public laws 
that reserve and protect public interests, new communications 
technologies may be exploited by powerful private interests 
for more subjugation of the weaker parties instead of 
liberating media.306  
      Furthermore, one commentator even goes further by 
objecting even to the use of the term “cyberspace” or “the 
law of the Internet”. He premises his objection on the 
argument that very few bodies of law are defined by their 
characteristic technologies and that modern informatics 
technology should not be an exception. He believes that no 
cyberlaw exists and that it is dangerous to pretend that it 
does. According to this commentator, a tendency to define 
the future may be very dangerous when there is no agreement 
even on the present. Moreover, a tendency to define the law 
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of the future is worse because the law normally evolves 
through “an inductive accretion of experience”. He believes 
that “it is much safer to extract first principles from a mature 
body of law than to extract a dynamic body of law from 
timeless first principles”. According to him, “an overly 
technological focus can create bad taxonomy and bad legal 
analysis, at least, and at worst, it can lock us into bad law, 
crystallizing someone’s idea of a future that will never be”.307 
The opponents of separatism argue that most of the legal 
issues posed by the Internet are not new and even with regard 
to the few issues, which may be considered as new, most of 
the existing legal doctrines are flexible enough and can be 
adapted to accommodate new social practices.308  
 
ii) Adaptation of the Traditional Legal System: 
      The exponents of governance of the Internet through 
traditional legal principles argue that the exiting law is 
competent for the resolution of the problems generated by the 
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Internet either directly or through the adaptation of its rules to 
accommodate new issues. In his attempt to refute the 
arguments of the supporters of self-governance of Internet 
communities and prove the adequacy of the traditional legal 
system to accommodate the legal issues generated by the 
Internet, Sommer numerated most of the problems posed by 
the Internet at present, and concludes that few of these 
problems may be considered as novel. Moreover, although he 
concedes that the new informatics technologies are, by 
definition, new and may generate novel social practices, 
which may, in turn, result in novel law nevertheless, he 
argues that much novel law should not be expected. 
According to him there are, at least, two reasons for this: first, 
new technologies often facilitate existing social practices 
rather than making new ones and, second, even new social 
practices can often be accommodated in the traditional legal 
devices. He points, as an example, to the statute of frauds, 
which has been available since the days of Hammurabi ready 
for being applied whenever needed. However, he 
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acknowledges that sometimes, substantial changes in law 
may occur and this may be as a result of new technologies 
but, he argues, this process is likely to be slow as law is often 
a conservative practice, drawing heavily on analogy and 
history. He states that the first “cyber-statute” might have 
been Article 4A of the American Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) 1989, codifying the practice of bank wire transfers, 
which has been practically applied for more than a century. 
According to him, the value of the Internet may be that it 
illuminates old controversial legal issues and may help in 
forming better understanding. It is described as no more than 
another battleground for old wars.309 
       Sommer discusses many issues considered as new 
challenges for the existing legal system, especially those 
relating to electronic commerce, sovereignty, intellectual 
property and privacy. He believes that the traditional legal 
system has already dealt effectively with most of these issues 
and has enough space to accommodate even the remaining 
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issues, which may be considered as novel. For example, as 
concerns electronic commerce, he discusses issues such as 
electronic authentication and data integrity, embodied-rights 
versus account-based system, contracting with machines 
through what are known as electronic agents and licensing of 
information. He argues that only the notion of electronic 
agency may be described as a new development.310With 
regard to sovereignty, he believes that some of the issues 
posed by borderless media and borderless communities in a 
world of multiple territorial sovereigns are old and insoluble, 
and others are old and have been successfully solved.311As 
concerns intellectual property, he states that the concept of 
commodification of culture may be considered as “very 
significant technology mediated transformation affecting the 
core, salience and meaning of intellectual property law driven 
by very old information technology before the emergence of 
the Internet”. However, he concedes that the process of 
digital rights management may be considered as a novel 
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development connected with the emergence of the 
Internet.312He concludes his argument by stating that there 
are no unique characteristics of cyberspace more than any 
other social practice or set of social practices. He sees no 
structural difference between cyberspace and any other social 
practice of transnational nature. For example, he argues that 
there is no difference between sovereignty and cyberspace or 
sovereignty and the international banking system or 
sovereignty and globalization. All are based on the same 
political theory and many of the same legal sources. He 
believes that the significance of informatics revolution is that 
it stimulates the re-examination of many legal practices.313  
      One commentator states that although human beings are 
experiencing radical transformations in the conceptions of 
how they interact due to the increasing power of digital 
communications, it is not clear that the legal problems posed 
by cyberspace are truly new. This is because, he adds, other 
previous communication technologies, such as the air travel, 
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telephony, telegraphy, radio, motion pictures and television 
“have posed the same types of challenges to relatively 
moribund legal regimes built on assumptions that the 
technologies obviated”. He argues that the attempts to 
distinguish those previous technologies from computers, 
depending on the great malleability of computers, are 
unavailing as they concentrate on the machines rather than on 
humans who operate them or the purposes for which they are 
used. He believes that the response of law to any technology 
should be based on careful analysis of the most likely uses of 
that technology, not on automatic assumptions that 
“transformational technologies will become the dominant 
ones around which law, as regulator of human behavior 
should orient itself”. According to him, it would be more 
fruitful to find out the most likely applications of those 
technologies and their expected transformations and how the 
law will respond to the resulting changes. In this respect, 
returning to history and studying the previous responses to 
transformative technologies may offer good bases for 
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analogy. He argues that the history of transformative 
technologies showed that societies repeatedly adapted to 
changing notions of time, distance and interconnectedness 
over the world. In the view of this commentator, the 
protection of issues such as privacy, access and liability 
concerns may be achieved by means of a careful study of the 
constraints imposed by dominating factors like social norms 
and market forces so as to come out with an intelligent 
structuring of direct regulation that takes into account 
privacy-protecting incentives, rather than attempting to create 
an entirely new legal entity, as suggested by the supporters of 
separatism approach.314  
      In the view of one writer, although the problems posed by 
the Internet may be described as unique, the settlement of 
these problems does not necessarily require separate law for 
the Internet. But he believes that there is a vital need for 
uniform substantive and procedural rules on a global level. 
He argues that although political reality may require 
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compromises that may be far from the best scholarly or 
practical solution, nonetheless, scholarly thoughts are 
indispensable in determining the means of creating uniform 
rules that can tame the Internet “beast”.315 Typically, the 
proponents of the application of the traditional legal 
principles often cite the present efforts for the settlement of 
the Internet controversies, exerted by local and international 
entities including courts, legislatures, regional and 
International bodies, such as the European Directives, 
UNCITRAL Model Law and OECD Guidelines, as rebuttal 
of the separatism approach. However, they acknowledge that 
the law of the Internet is still at its first stages and in a state of 
flux and uncertainty at times, but cyberspace is still 
developing under the umbrella of the existing legal 
information infrastructure.316  
      However, in the view of Professor Lipinski the attempts to 
extend traditional property rights and other information 
controls and regulations to the Internet have been 
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accompanied by calls for harmonization, globalization and 
amelioration. Moreover, the legal development concerning 
information ownership and control has passed through 
different themes such as iteration, redaction, reaction and 
marginalization. The first term ‘harmonization’ refers to the 
process of the conformity of national laws to some basic 
international standards. For example, the recent treaties of 
WIPO, such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 and the 
WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty 1996, are 
considered as guidance for the member countries for the 
protection of copyrighted materials in digital 
environments.317 Harmonization of the rules governing the 
Internet internationally may be a good mechanism of fairness 
and efficiency in a sense that it will result in uniform rules all 
over the world and as such, facilitate the agreements between 
information sellers and information buyers, which may result, 
in turn, in the growth and expansion of the Internet. But in 
another sense it may be detrimental if it means forcing a 
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particular country to harmonize its information infrastructure 
to external standards not fitting to its internal circumstances. 
This is the case especially when the decision-makers or those 
who set the external standards are the First World countries 
“information rich” and those who have to harmonize their 
laws are the developing countries “information poor”.318  
Harmonization in this sense ignores individual uniqueness of 
each country for the sake of inter-operability. This, in turn 
may “result in debasement of the cultural information 
heritage of a country in the name of economic progress”.319 
      The second term ‘globalization’, “refers to the natural trend 
in information access and control that is developing through 
market factors”. The trend in recent years is directed towards 
what is known as commodification of information. This trend 
has result in the globalization of information products, 
whereby the market factors are playing the main role in the 
access and control of information. For example, the decision 
of a multinational company to invest in information products 
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in a certain country will not be based on the information 
needs or equity of that country’s citizens, but on the demands 
for its products or services in the said country. Thus, 
globalization is viewed as a means for the domination of 
external economic forces upon weaker parties. Therefore, the 
dilemma facing policy-makers, especially in developing 
countries is how to strike a balance between establishing a 
climate that will attract investment in information 
infrastructure and at the same time preserving the public 
interest.320  
      The third term, ‘amelioration’, is considered by professor 
Lipinski an alternative for globalization and harmonization. 
Amelioration is described as a positive concept that 
recognizes the connected and interrelated nature of post-
national era and envisions international agreement in the 
fields of international intellectual property or international 
commercial development, for example, which preserve the 
uniqueness of each sovereign country, instead of dismissing 
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such peculiarities on grounds that they are primitive or 
unworthy. In order to achieve the economic justice, the 
concept of amelioration favors the application of what is 
known as Rawlsian distributive justice in any international 
agreement or law, otherwise, it dictates the application of 
what is known as Pareto optimization. Pareto optimum 
concept to harmonization or globalization stipulates that no 
law, international treaty or agreement should be adopted 
unless all of the parties are not worse off by the activity and 
at least the position of one party improves. Rawlsian 
distributive justice suggests that no international agreement 
or treaty would be adopted or implemented unless the least 
advantaged party (namely, the developing country) is placed 
in a better position as a result of such agreement or treaty.321   
      Moreover, the development of legal responses to 
information ownership and control has passed through 
themes such as iteration, redaction, reaction and 
marginalization, which characterize the recent information 
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warfare disputes. The emergence of new information 
technologies, such as the Internet, drives the traditional rules 
governing information to adapt to these new environments. 
“Iteration occurs when existing legal concepts are applied 
with less convincing results to web environments”. There are 
many examples of iteration in the decisions of the US courts. 
For example, in the case of Reno-v-ACLU322, the US 
Supreme Court assimilated the web to a vast library 
containing millions of readily available and indexed 
publications and sprawling mall offering goods and services. 
It is said that although this decision is considered by free 
speech advocates as a victory, the analogy used by the court 
“does not seem to comport with how library collections are 
actually built and constructed by library professionals”.  
      Furthermore, the US courts have “struggled to apply 
traditional ‘photocopying’ scenarios to Internet copying and 
browsing with less than convincing articulation”. For 
example, in one case the court decided that an Internet 
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Service Provider was not responsible for posting of others on 
its system. The court reasoned its decision by analogy to the 
responsibility of the owner of a copying machine. In another 
case the court ruled that browsing was equivalent to reading 
in a library, which did not implicate copyright infringement 
and need no permission from the copyright owner. These 
decisions led some to say that if courts cannot adequately 
characterize new information disputes with consistency, the 
digital environment may threaten existing legal mechanisms 
of information altogether. As a result, some resort to legal 
doctrines, such as misappropriation, which have not been 
traditionally applied in case of copyright infringement. It is 
argued that misappropriation is ill-suited for situations 
involving public rights, such as fair use right. Likewise, the 
US courts have reached disparate conclusions with regard to 
the issue of jurisdiction over Internet transactions.323  
      Furthermore, trademark law is unable to adapt to the web 
environment, especially with regard to the disputes between 
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trademarks proprietors and domain names owners. The 
stretch of the traditional information boundaries to adapt to 
the resolution of the problems generated by the Internet has 
resulted in breakdown in traditional information boundaries. 
Information owners and users are not sure of their rights and 
obligations. This leads, in turn, to what is known as redaction. 
The term ‘redaction’ is often referred to as the legal response 
to the ‘newness’ of Internet as a medium. That is, “current 
legal ‘solutions’ to the so-called information harms or wrongs 
are edited or redacted, to commit principles that, in the analog 
world, would simply not apply or extend”.324 For example, 47 
U.S.C. s.230(c) was originally drafted to protect Internet 
Service Providers from tortious liability when their attempts 
to prevent defamatory materials posted on their servers are 
unsuccessful. Before the enactment of this law the courts 
used to hold the Internet Service Providers responsible when 
they asserted to the users of their systems that they protect 
them from defamatory postings. However, after the 
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enactment of this law the courts extended the protection not 
only to defamatory cases, but also to litigations involving 
other negligent postings of harmful or injurious materials. 
The state of flux that resulted from the inadequate application 
of traditional legal norms to cyberspace ‘iteration’ and the 
expansion of legal norms to cover situations not originally 
intended ‘redaction’, has paved the way for a third trend 
known as ‘reaction’. As a response to the uncertainty of the 
law’s ability to “preserve the information status quo, policy-
makers with support from information owners have reacted 
by seeking alternative measures to protect their interests”. 
This reaction has resulted in self-protection information 
environments that aim at filling the gaps left by iteration and 
redaction movements. An example of official reaction in the 
EU is the sui generis database protection legislation. An 
example of private measures is the digital rights 
management.325 The implementation of digital rights 
management means that the users of copyright materials have 
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to pay for every use, even if such use falls within fair use 
exception. This will result in loss or decrease in the available 
information public space and, hence, lead to the so-called 
marginalization of information. Marginalization happens 
when the “commercial interests supercede cultural or 
educational information interests”.326 Professor Lipinski 
concludes his analysis of the legal response to the Internet 
challenges as follows: 
           Sovereign states or multi-states entities will 
continue to respond through law to the challenges of 
the digital environment. While the application of law 
to cyberspace is under development, there is the 
potential that a loss of information access and equity 
will occur. This loss may result as when traditional 
information boundaries breakdown (i.e., iteration) 
and new meta-information boundaries arise (i.e., 
redaction). There is no longer a check vis-à-vis the 
legal infrastructure on the private stakeholders 
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whose interests may be in opposition to the public 
good. Furthermore, sovereign states or multi-states 
entities should resist the tendency to adopt self-
protection measures under a reaction approach that 
may restrict the flow and access of information, and 
should also be weary of the marginalization of the 
public interest or of particular stakeholders whose 
interests may not otherwise be protected.327     
 
iii)   Governance through Architectural Modifications:    
        A third group of writers sees the solution of the Internet 
problems in controlling the architecture of Internet 
infrastructure. The supporters of this approach argue that the 
problems generated by the Internet such as children access to 
harmful materials, invasion of privacy, unauthorized 
exploitation of intellectual property etc., could not be 
resolved by legal measures alone, which may not be able to 
adapt to the rapid and continuously changing medium. 
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Moreover, they contend that the Internet in essence refers to 
interconnection of computers all over the world. Computers 
in turn, are no more than machines that read and execute 
instructions or “code”328 Some kinds of codes carry out basic 
functions, some enable the processing of words, music or 
visual images, and some facilitate the interconnection of 
computers together. In short, “code defines the architecture of 
cyberspace”. The architecture of cyberspace is described as 
open and malleable because anyone who understands how to 
read and write code is capable of rewriting the instructions 
that define the possible. This malleability of code may be 
manipulated to eliminate the problems of cyberspace by 
altering its architectural code to achieve that end.329  
      The supporters of code architecture state that code 
architecture is intended to enhance regulation by law. That is, 
the law may regulate directly where this is possible and 
effective, otherwise, it may enforce its values indirectly by 
tailoring the architecture of cyberspace to meet that 
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purpose.330 Professor Lessig argues that cyberspace is not 
inherently unregulable because “its regulability is a function 
of its design”. Governments have the ability to influence the 
design of cyberspace in a way that serves their goals. But, 
there are limits on the power of regulation by governments. 
He thinks that the power of governments to regulate depends 
on their control on those who own the code. As far as code is 
owned by private entities capable of being tracked or owned 
by the government itself, the power of the government to 
regulate is enhanced. But, if it is owned in “commons” the 
government’s power of control is reduced. By “private” he 
means that the code is designed and sold as a complete 
package, as most commercial code is presently designed, 
without giving the licensee the source code or allowing him 
to modify it. The product is sold as is and has to be used as is. 
It is the property of the seller who maintains an exclusive 
right over its design and development. Therefore, Professor 
Lessig encourages private ownership of code because he 
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believes that it enables the government to influence the 
owners of the code to write or modify it in the form preferred 
by the government. He disfavors the call for the design of 
“open source” where software is distributed with its source 
code and the end users are entitled to modify it. He argues 
that this form of “open source” produces commons code i.e., 
no single person exercises an exclusive right over the code. 
This may reduce the ability of the government to regulate. 
However, he cautions that the issue of cyberspace 
architecture should be dealt with carefully for, at least two 
reasons: first to avoid the side effects of what he calls over-
inclusiveness, because sometimes a code solution which 
targets one issue may transcend to other unintended issues 
and produce unintended results. For example, the device 
enabling digital rights management, which is known as 
“trusted systems” for the protection of copyright, may result 
in absolute or unlimited protection for the targeted 
copyrightable material, thus removing the balance made by 
copyright law such as fair use and limited period of 
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protection. This form of over-inclusiveness protection often 
results from what he calls “bottom-up” control. This form of 
control frequently stems from bottom-up structures, such as 
contract-like or property-like systems. This may be labeled as 
the political economy of the Internet’s self-regulation. “As 
with any political economy, some interests gain more 
individually from a particular structure than do others”. In the 
view of Professor Lessig, this form of bottom-up behavior 
“highlights a weakness in the potential for Internet self-
regulation”. Secondly, he calls for careful dealing with the 
issue of cyberspace architecture because of the lack of 
transparency in case of regulation through code design. He 
attributes this to the fact that ‘it is a feature of people’s 
experience of cyberspace that they are unlikely to associate 
any particular constraints with a choice made by a coder”. He 
argues that in real space transparency is a value that 
constraints the promulgation of statutes and regulations. So, 
he asks these questions: “should our belief in the value of 
transparency steer us away from regulations through code 
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that hide their policy? Should we demand that the state 
announces its purpose or makes plain its hand?” He answers 
by saying that although at present there are no constitutional 
principles obliging the US government to do so, the 
government should adhere to transparency.331He concludes 
by recommending that when the law uses code to achieve its 
ends, that code should be narrowly tailored to serve only 
legitimate state ends and that the structure of code should not 
be allowed to displace values implicit in the law. Moreover, 
he believes that if “bottom-up aggregation of preference 
won’t produce the ideal mix of regulation, we should check 
the aggregation made through bottom-up design of code”.332  
One writer states that the assumption that legal decisions 
about the Internet be based on property rights look sound but, 
according him, a regime of an absolute property rights may 
result in assigning liability to all uses of the Internet. This, in 
turn, may result in chilling the effective use of the Internet, 
whose efficiency is derived from its open nature. Therefore, 
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the law must make balance between property rights on one 
hand and open access to the Internet on the other, premising 
on the assumption that connection to the Internet “implies 
some willingness to permit others to interact with one’s 
computer”. According to this writer, in order to determine 
which interactions are permissible and which constitute bases 
for liability, the law must resort to metaphor i.e., treats the 
Internet as if it were a physical place and hence, get use of the 
function of fences in real space.333The role of fences in real 
space is that they indicate an assertion of property rights. He 
believes that exclusionary technical measures in cyberspace 
should play the same role. In other words, liability should be 
confined to those who circumvent these exclusionary 
technical measures.334 He believes that the consequences of 
applying cyberspace fences metaphor are that; first, it will 
allow the law to adapt current rules of privacy and computer 
security in real space to be applicable to the problems of 
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cyberspace in a way that ensures the function of property 
rules in cyberspace and second, “the metaphor permits the 
law to posit fences in cyberspace that then permit the law to 
define property rights in cyberspace much more precisely. 
Third, as in real space, property rights in cyberspace must be 
based on property-like interests such as privacy or actual 
ownership of the concerned computers or the information 
stored therein. Fourth, the final aspect of the metaphor is that 
whenever there is no property assertion in the way mentioned 
above, the presumption is that access is permissible.335 
However, a fourth group of writers argue that each of the 
proponents of separate jurisdiction and independent law for 
cyberspace and the supporters of regulation under the rules of 
the traditional legal system as well as the supporters of 
regulation through architectural modifications, say part of the 
truth. The full truth in the view of those writers may be found 
in a hybrid form of regulation.  
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iv) Governance through Hybrid Measures: 
    The exponents of a hybrid form of regulation share with 
self-governance proponents the view that the Internet has 
unique characteristics that defy the conventional regulatory 
theories and policy-making practices. But they disagree with 
them as concerns the proper way of regulation of the Internet. 
Professor Perritt describes the calls for self-governance and 
separate jurisdiction as well as the calls for regulation solely 
through traditional territorial sovereign countries as 
implausible. He believes that the impossibility of self-
regulation stems from the fact that democratic political 
systems are not expected to allow a place like the Internet 
engaging explosively in commerce and political matters, to 
be entirely out of the reach of these political systems. At the 
same time, he argues that allowing almost 200 countries and 
thousands of other subordinate entities all over the world to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities carried out on 
the Internet “risks turning the regulators into latter day King 
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Canutes who demonstrated the limitations of law by 
commanding the tide not to come in”.336 
  The supporters of hybrid governance see the solution of the 
problems generated by the Internet in a form of hybrid 
international measures. However, they differ in the details of 
this form of regulations. For example, Reidenberg argues that 
the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) has undermined 
the geographical as well as substantive legal sovereignty. It 
undermines the geographical sovereignty in the sense that it 
ignores the existence of geographical borders all together. It 
undermines substantive legal sovereignty in the sense that it 
obscures the traditional boundaries of substantive law. For 
example, the boundaries of the conventional 
telecommunication law are distinct from those of financial 
services law and the borders of intellectual property law are 
separate from the borders of privacy law. The Global 
Information Infrastructure has blurred these substantive 
boundaries. For instance, a packet of information may contain 
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electronic cash or payment instructions embedded in images 
of an individual. In this case the transfer of that packet of 
information transcends many sectoral lines, including 
telecommunications, financial services, intellectual property 
and privacy. He believes that “digitalization and the 
information infrastructure enable the objectives of one 
distinct body of law, such as privacy law, to be achieved by 
application of the rules of another field such as intellectual 
property law”. Therefore, he argues, territorial borders and 
substantive borders are no longer suitable as key paradigms 
for the regulation of GII.337 
Reidenberg is of the opinion that Network communities have 
formed what he calls Network sovereignty. These Network 
communities are controlled mainly by Network Service 
Providers and infrastructure architecture. Moreover, 
governments have direct interest in governing these 
communities to protect public interest. He criticizes both US 
and European approaches for governance of Network 
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communities because they stick to the traditional paradigms 
of distinct legal fields and territorial borders and disregard the 
global nature of these Network communities. Reidenberg 
argues that the overlap of interests between real space and 
cyberspace necessitates a form of governance that sets rules 
leading to a form of separation of powers. This may be 
achieved by recognizing a kind of semi-sovereignty status for 
Network communities and apply a form of federalism for the 
relationship between territorial governments and cyberspace. 
He acknowledges that governments can and should be 
involved in creating norms for cyberspace, but according to 
him, this cannot and should not reach a stage in which a 
territorial government attempts to expropriate all regulatory 
power from Network communities. He believes that 
governments have many tools to induce Network 
communities to adopt desirable public policies. This includes 
architecture of Internet infrastructure, provision of incentives 
and allocation of liability. But these policy instruments, he 
adds, need to be dealt with carefully; otherwise it may turn 
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into a form of censorship that may result in restricting the 
advantages of a powerful Network.338 
Professor Perritt believes that the main legal barriers that 
impede full realization of Internet potentials are the 
uncertainty of legal remedies. One of the solutions suggested 
for solving the problem of uncertainty is the application of 
targeting. Targeting means that a market participant directs 
its sales or purchasing activity to particular jurisdictions. 
However, targeting has its disadvantages as excessive de-
targeting excludes consumers in de-targeted states from the 
benefits of the global e-commerce.339 In the view of Professor 
Perritt, the uncertainty relating to the forum and applicable 
law can be reduced by contractual choice of forum and law. 
He thinks that the power of contract is reflected in its support 
for the emergence of new legal institutions of hybrid 
characters, such as the International Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), credit cards chargeback 
mechanism, eBay’s escrow and insurance arrangements and 
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various cyber tribunals. He argues that the geographic 
limitations facing public institutions exercising sovereign 
powers for settling jurisdictional uncertainty may be 
surmounted when rules are made and enforced by private 
rather than public institutions. But there is a possibility that 
private arrangements may not express the political consensus 
of democratic societies as concerns the values to be enforced 
or setting of competition balance between market 
participants. Therefore, according to Professor Perritt, a 
combination of public regulation with its great political 
legitimacy and the private regulation with its jurisdictional 
strength may be achieved by developing new hybrid 
frameworks. The role of public law is to set minimum and 
general standards of conduct and to provide enforcement 
support, whereas, the role of a private regulatory regime is to 
make detailed rules and first-level dispute settlement and 
enforcement machinery within this public framework. In this 
respect, he points to three endeavors as promising examples 
of hybrid approaches. The first endeavor is ICANN, which 
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regulates assignment of Internet domain and resolves related 
disputes. The second endeavor is the safe harbor mechanism 
for privacy protection, which allows forming of basic norms 
for privacy protection to be enforced by private regulatory 
institutions. This privacy protection mechanism has found 
acceptance both in US and European Union. The third 
endeavor is that known as credit card chargeback mechanism, 
which provides effective settlement for virtually all disputes 
relating to credit card-based Internet commerce.340  
However, Professor Perritt adds that the hybrid regulation, as 
well as other contractual arrangements for the solution of 
jurisdictional uncertainty, needs intermediaries that can 
develop and enforce the related rules. For example, ICANN, 
the new intermediary for the domain name regulatory regime, 
issues rules regulating assignment of domain names and 
solution of controversies between trademark owners and 
domain name holders. New dispute resolution intermediaries, 
such as the administrative panels under the WIPO disputes 
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resolution rules adjudicating these controversies under the 
ICANN rules. Credit cards issuers work as intermediaries 
adjusting disputes between merchants and consumers. Mail 
Abuse Prevention System (MAPS) works as an intermediary 
enabling the Internet Service Providers to exclude spam. The 
roles played by these volunteer intermediaries are different 
from those imposed on unwilling intermediaries, such as 
Internet Service Providers or telecommunication bodies, who 
are compelled to assume regulatory roles under the threat of 
liability for the conduct of users of their services. However, 
the rules made by those intermediaries or their application 
“may raise concerns about lack of accountability, arbitrary 
enforcement and anticompetitive effects”. Therefore, he 
recommends that the new initiatives for private self-
regulation must be based on widely accepted rules connected 
with broadly accepted norms for privacy protection, 
consumer protection and respect for intellectual property and, 
moreover, in order to ensure effective enforcement and 
compliance with these rules, the works of these private bodies 
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must be subject to a form of audit by independent mechanism 
so as to assure that these private self-regulatory regimes are 
working in compliance with the rules of their formation.341     
 
Conclusion 
   The invention of the Internet by all means is a revolution in 
the field of communications in the twentieth century. Its vast 
abilities in performing different kinds of communication 
activities including real-time communications, one-to-one 
messaging and retrieval of information efficiently and 
effectively at low cost have revolutionized the interactions of 
humans all over the world and truly rendered the world a 
small village. The exponential growth of the users of the 
Internet proves that it is a popular medium. Its various 
applications facilitate almost all aspects of life. It has 
surpassed all previous communications means in facilitating 
the communications and dissemination of information. As a 
result, it has generated transformative social practices, which 
                                                 
341  Ibid., at 7-11. 
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need legal response. Moreover, as a tool, the Internet can be 
exploited for good and for evil. Some are using the Internet 
for illegal practices including criminal activities, civil wrongs 
and infringement of rights. The transborder nature of the 
Internet has added further complications for the problems 
resulting from its use. Actions taking place on the Internet are 
taking place instantaneously everywhere, if anywhere. Efforts 
have been exerted within individual sovereign countries as 
well as at the international level to find solutions for these 
legal controversies.  
  Different approaches have been advanced for the 
governance of the Internet. Some take extreme sides and 
some are in between. Four approaches have been discussed 
herein. The first approach calls for separate virtual space to 
be governed by independent rules. The supporters of this 
view argue that the Internet Service Providers and users have 
formed separate virtual communities capable of creating their 
own normative rules. Individual countries cannot and should 
not control cyberspace, because actions on the Internet take 
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place everywhere instantaneously, not in any place in 
particular. The trend adopted by this approach has been 
described as illogical and unrealistic, simply because it 
ignores salient facts such as the presence of the dealers in 
Internet activities in the physical world and the direct positive 
and negatives impacts of the Internet on various aspects of 
life in real space. The second approach calls for the 
application of the existing legal system. The supporters of 
this approach contend that most of the problems generated by 
the Internet are not new and that the traditional rules of the 
existing law are flexible enough and can be adapted to 
accommodate even the problems, which may be considered 
as new. The critique directed at this approach is that it ignores 
the peculiarities of the Internet. The third approach adopts 
what is known as code solution. The exponents of this 
approach argue that the resolution of the Internet 
controversies lies in interplay of law and technology. They 
believe that the governance of cyberspace can be achieved 
through modifications in the architecture of the Internet 
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infrastructure supported by the power of law, i.e., the law can 
enforce its values through imposing the designing or 
modification of the architecture of the Internet infrastructure 
in a way that serves its values. The criticism directed at this 
approach is that code solution may not be perfect and it may 
be circumvented. Moreover, even if it is perfect, it may 
transcend to other activities not intended and bring negative 
results. The fourth approach suggests a hybrid form of 
regulation taking into account the Internet peculiarities as 
well as the direct concerns of the real world with its activities. 
The hybrid form of regulation approach may offer a good 
solution if it considers not only the peculiarities of the 
Internet, but also its connections with the physical world and 
moreover, within the physical world it must take account of 
the economic, social and political peculiarities of each 
sovereign country, especially the developing countries.  
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     Chapter 4 
Regulation of Electronic Commerce 
 
    Introduction: 
  In spite of the fact that the Internet innovation has been 
accompanied by a perception that it is a tool for scientific and 
academic exchange, nevertheless the capabilities of the 
Internet have proven to be beyond the expectation of its 
designers as it has become involved almost in all everyday 
life activities. Among these everyday life activities the 
economic activities have taken the lion’s share. The main 
vessel for these economic activities is trading via the Internet, 
namely electronic commerce. The application of the World 
Wide Web has facilitated the interaction between businesses 
as well as businesses and consumers. Moreover, international 
trade is no longer confined exclusively to big businesses. The 
international nature of the Internet and the easy and low cost 
of access to it have enabled small and medium sized 
enterprises to participate in the international trade. The genius 
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of the Internet is said to lie not only in facilitating transaction 
for tangible goods, but also in revolutionizing commerce in 
the field of intangible goods and services. This is because, in 
addition to promoting electronic contracting for intangible 
goods and services, the Internet has enabled online delivery 
of these goods and services. Therefore, the Internet is 
expected to be the main medium for contracting and delivery 
of goods and services such as computer software, 
entertainment products, information services, technical 
information, products licenses, financial services and 
professional services. It has been stated that the emergence of 
electronic commerce has generated dramatic developments 
for the digital economy reflected in financial markets and 
trade flows, innovative models for business and new 
opportunities for consumers. The size of these developments 
is so big that electronic commerce has become a subject of 
economic, policy and social importance. 
  However, the growth and expansion of electronic commerce 
are facing impediments of different kinds. In the legal field 
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electronic commerce is confronting lack of predictable legal 
environment due to legal uncertainty as concerns the 
formation and security of electronic transactions, jurisdiction, 
the applicable law and enforcement, in addition to other 
related legal issues such as the protection of consumers, 
intellectual property and privacy. Moreover, there are fears 
from intensive government intervention through imposing of 
extensive regulation on the Internet and electronic commerce, 
especially in fields such as taxes, customs duties, restriction 
on types of information to be transmitted, licensing 
requirements and the extent of responsibility of Service 
Providers. 
  Different theoretical approaches have been advanced for the 
regulation of electronic commerce including calls for an 
international uniform law via treaties, model laws, law 
merchant (lex mercatoria) and a hybrid form of regulation. 
However, currently there are many legislative attempts 
nationally and at the international level addressing issues 
pertaining to the regulation of electronic commerce. The aim 
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of these legislative endeavors is to secure trustworthy digital 
transactions based on legal principles and technical 
capabilities so as to promote reliable digital authentication 
and specify the rights and obligations of the parties involved. 
Amongst these attempts are the works of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
including UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
1996 and UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signature 
2001, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Guidec 
I (1997) and Guidec II (2001) on General Usage of 
International Digitally Ensured Commerce, the European 
Union Directive on Electronic Signature 1999, the works of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), in addition to national legislation such 
as the US Uniform Computer Information Traction Act 
(UCITA). 
  This chapter examines some of the legal aspects relating to 
the regulation of electronic commerce. It is divided into six 
main parts. Part 1 discusses the opportunities and challenges 
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of electronic commerce. It is divided into three subtitles 
including the definition of the term electronic commerce, its 
potential growth and the impediments confronting its future 
growth and expansion. Part 2 studies the theoretical 
approaches advanced for the regulation of electronic 
commerce. It is divided into four subtitles discussing the 
different approaches suggested in this respect. Part 3 studies 
the formation of electronic contracts. It is divided into four 
subtitles involving definition of related terms and examining 
the necessary elements for the formation of contracts such as 
offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal 
relation. Part 4 examines the validity of electronic contracts 
in the light of the formalities required by law. It is divided 
into three subtitles discussing some formalities frequently 
required by law in paper-based environment and whether 
these formalities can be satisfied in a data message. Part 5 
discusses the authentication of electronic documents. It is 
divided into two subtitles including definition of related terms 
and a study of the approaches concerning the methods of 
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authentication of electronic documents. Part 6 discusses the 
admissibility and the evidential value of electronic 
documents. It is divided into two subtitles discussing the 
admissibility of electronic documents as evidence and the 
weight accorded to such evidence.  
 
 
1.  Opportunities and Challenges of Electronic Commerce 
 
 i) The Emergence and Growth of Electronic Commerce 
 (a) Definition: 
  To date, there is no internationally accepted definition for 
the term ‘electronic commerce’ (e-commerce). Generally, 
electronic commerce refers to transactions by means of 
communications that can be labeled ‘electronic’.342 The use 
of electronic means for the conclusion of transactions is not 
new. It could be traced back to the time of the invention of 
the telegraph in mid-nineteenth century. Other electronic 
                                                 
342  See Basu, S. ‘Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ JILT 2001 (2), at 2. Available at: 
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-2/basu.html  
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means include telex, facsimile, telephone, Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) and the Internet.343 For the purpose of this 
thesis, the term electronic commerce refers to trading by 
means of the Internet. In this context the definition of 
electronic commerce proposed to OECD by the British 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) may be described as 
comprehensive. DTI proposed the following definition: 
         Using an electronic network to simplify and speed 
up all stages of the business process, from design 
and making to buying, selling and delivery e-
commerce is the exchange of information across 
electronic network, at any stage in the supply 
chain, whether within an organization, between 
businesses and between businesses and consumers 
or between the public and the private sectors, 
whether paid or unpaid.344 
  The subject matter of electronic transactions may be 
intangibles data products or tangible goods. In either case the 
                                                 
343  See Mitrakas, Andreas ‘Open EDI and Law in Europe, A Regulatory Framework’, Kluwer Law 
International – The Hague (1997) at 22. 
344  See Basu, supra note 1, at 2. 
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physical presence of the parties is not required and where the 
goods or services are processed in digital form, even delivery 
can be carried out online.345 The WIPO Primer on Electronic 
Commerce and Intellectual Property defines the phrase 
‘electronic commerce’ through dividing it into two words 
‘electronic’ and ‘commerce’ and defines each word 
separately. The term ‘electronic’ refers to “the global 
infrastructure of computer and telecommunication 
technologies and networks upon which the processing and 
transmission of digitalized data takes place”. The word 
‘commerce’ in this context “refers to an expanding array of 
activities taking place on the open networks – buying, selling, 
trading, advertising and transactions of all kinds – that lead to 
an exchange of value between two parties”. The WIPO 
Primer has pointed to two important features of commerce 
taking place over the digital networks. First, the international 
dimensions of the electronic means referred to above reflect 
the transnational nature of electronic commerce. In other 
                                                 
345  Ibid. 
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words, the mere establishment of a web site enables small 
and medium sized enterprises to offer their goods or services 
worldwide. Secondly, the interdisciplinary nature of 
electronic commerce has rendered the traditional lines 
between business sectors, which have been premised on the 
different physical forms of the goods or services offered and 
the different physical means of their distribution, less clear. 
This transformation has resulted in new competitive pressures 
for business necessitating processes of restructuring within 
and across industries, so as to respond to the opportunities 
and challenges posed by this transformation.346 
 
(b) Growth and Expansion of Electronic Commerce: 
  The speed at which e-commerce is growing has proved to be 
more than that predicted by market forecasts. For instance, 
markets forecasts made in 1996-97 turned out to be less than 
the actual performance.347According to M/s Forrester 
                                                 
346  See Primer on Electronic Commerce and Intellectual Property Issues, prepared by WIPO. Available 
at:  http://ecommerce.wipo.int/primer/index.html , visited June 2002, at 2. 
347  See Basu, supra note 1, at 3. 
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Research Inc., a leading US consulting firm in e-commerce, 
the Internet commerce will jump from $55-$80 billion in 
1998 to $1.4- $3.2 trillion in 2003.348 The vast majority of 
this growth comes from business-to-business commerce. 
Even business-to-consumers transactions are growing 
exponentially regardless of consumers’ precautions relating 
to security of payment, potential for fraud and intrusion of 
privacy.349 For example, business-to-consumers online 
shopping of the European web sites is expected to grow from 
111 million Euros in 1997 to nearly 5 billion Euros in 2002. 
However, there are great disparities between countries 
concerning the growth and expansion of electronic 
commerce. The leading countries in this respect to date are 
the USA, EU, and Australia. Other countries, such as 
Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore and India are striving to lead 
their way in this field by evolving mechanisms and 
technologies enhancing their business environment.350 It is 
believed that the smooth growth of electronic commerce 
                                                 
348  Ibid. 
349  See WIPO Primer, supra note 5, at 4. 
350  See Basu, supra note 1, at 4. 
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requires the removal of the barriers constraining its potential 
growth and expansion.  
 247
 
ii) Barriers Constraining the Growth of Electronic 
Commerce 
  Different factors affect directly or indirectly the potential 
growth of electronic commerce. Broadly, these factors may 
be classified into three categories including financial issues, 
legal problems and market access impediments. 
 
(a) Financial Obstacles: 
  These are mainly related to customs duties, taxation and 
security of electronic payment systems. There are fears that 
countries, in their search for new sources of revenue, may 
resort to levy tariffs on global electronic commerce and 
impose new taxes on it. Moreover, the cautions of consumers 
as concerns security of online payment may drive 
governments to impose inflexible and highly prescriptive 
regulations and rules that may constrain the ongoing 
evolution of online payment systems. On July 1, 1997 the 
USA government issued a ‘Framework for Global Electronic 
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Commerce’ in which it calls for the declaration of Internet as 
free-tariff environment, when used to deliver goods or 
services, and that no new taxes should be imposed on Internet 
transactions.351 
  It has been stated that in the light of the peculiarities of the 
Internet such as the potential anonymity of transacting 
parties, the value of multiple small transactions and the 
difficulty of locating the transacting parties on the physical 
world, there should be an international coordination 
concerning taxation of the Internet transactions, which must 
be consistent with existing established principles of 
international taxation, avoid inconsistent tax jurisdictions and 
double taxation.352With regard to the development of 
electronic payment systems, it is recommended that 
governments should “work closely with the private sector to 
inform policy development and ensure that governmental 
                                                 
351  See A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, issued by the White House  (July 1, 1997), at 
4. Available at: http://www.ecommerce.gov/framework.html at 4. 
352  See Basu, supra note 1, at 21-2. 
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activities flexibly accommodate the needs of the emerging 
marketplace”.353  
 
(b) Barriers to Market Access 
  Barriers to market access include issues relating to 
telecommunication services, such as pricing of access to the 
Internet, service delivery options or technical standards, and 
issues concerning the regulation of Internet content and the 
freedom of access to Internet materials. For example, the US 
government calls for broadest possible free flow of 
information across international borders. Some countries tend 
to restrict content of and access to information on the Internet 
because they fear that the free flow of information may affect 
negatively their cultural, social and political systems. 
According to U.S. government, internationally collective 
efforts should be exerted to regulate issues relating to public 
policy such as hate speech, violence, sedition, pornography 
and other content so as to ensure that “differences in national 
                                                 
353  See ‘Framework for Global Electronic Commerce’; supra note 10, at 5-6. 
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regulation, especially those undertaken to foster cultural 
identity, do not serve as disguised trade barriers”.354 
 
    (c) Legal Obstacles: 
  There are many factors which contribute in the generation of 
challenges for electronic commerce. Among these are the 
peculiar characteristics of the Internet, including the non-
physical existence of digitalized data, the difficulty of 
designating the physical places of the transacting parties, 
especially the place of business, and the instantaneous 
availability of content to users around the globe, in addition 
to formalities required by traditional legal system for the 
conclusion of contracts. These unique features of the Internet 
have created uncertainty in law as regards the legal issues 
they raise. As a result, there is uncertainty in relation to, for 
example, the formation and validity of electronic contracting, 
authentication of electronic messages and admissibility and 
value of electronic evidence, consumer protection and 
                                                 
354  Ibid., at 14-9. 
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intellectual property protection, in addition to conflict of laws 
implications such as the competent jurisdictions to settle 
disputes relating to electronic transactions, the applicable law 
and enforcement of judgments.  
  It is believed that the resolution of these legal problems 
necessitates the creation of uniform global substantive and 
procedural rules that can address the various legal problems 
facing the growth and expansion of electronic commerce. 
Such uniform law must secure the save dealings of the 
contracting parties. For example, it must provide adequate 
protection for the intellectual property rights of the 
transacting parties from fraud, theft and piracy, so that sellers 
or licensors are confident that their intellectual property will 
not be stolen and buyers or licensees are sure that they obtain 
authentic products. Moreover, such uniform rules should 
provide protection for privacy as concerns the misuse of 
personal data and unsolicited advertisements (spam), as well 
as ensuring secure and reliable telecommunications networks 
that can provide effective means for protecting the 
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information systems attached to them, in addition to 
providing effective means, which can authenticate and ensure 
confidentiality of electronic information so that data can be 
protected from unauthorized use.355  
 
2. Theoretical Approaches for the Regulation of Electronic 
Commerce  
  Different approaches have been advanced for the legal 
regulation of electronic commerce. Some of these approaches 
are connected with the regulation of the Internet generally 
and have been discussed above. However, the approaches 
discussed hereunder are focusing on electronic commerce in 
particular. The common aim of these approaches is to create 
legal certainty with regard to the legal problems impeding the 
potential growth of electronic commerce. Despite the wide 
consensus as concerns the need for uniform global law to 
govern the Internet transactions, different approaches have 
been suggested as to the best entrance to this uniform law.  
                                                 
355  Ibid. at 8-14. See also Diedrich F. ‘A Law of the Internet? Attempts to Regulate Electronic 
Commerce’, 2000 (3) JILT http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/003/diedrich.html , visited January 2002, at 3. 
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 i) Global Uniform Law through International Treaties 
  International treaties are described as the classical means for 
creating uniform law applicable to international transactions. 
The supporters of regulation of electronic commerce via an 
international convention point to the Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) 1980, as the “most 
successful convention having regard to the number of 
contracting states and its acceptance in practice”. The 
advantages of an international convention are that such 
convention, as the case in international conventions 
generally, is expected to be based on compromises that take 
into account the political and cultural differences of its 
participants, so that it can find way to be applied in the 
member countries. This could result in “supranational rules in 
different equally authentic languages”. Moreover, usually 
international conventions only allow for minor deviations 
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from the applicable rules so that similar rules exist in all 
member countries.356    
  However, at the same time, international conventions have 
their disadvantages. One of the disadvantages is that the 
conflicting interests of the participating states usually impede 
the quick promulgation of such treaties so that it may take 
many years to come to consensus on a final form of a 
convention. Moreover, with regard to the Internet 
transactions, it is believed that even if an international 
convention succeeds in achieving certainty of law, practically 
this may not provide solution for small value transactions 
concluded by consumers. This is because “the transaction 
costs of adjusting disputes through conventional judicial 
institutions are too high for many of the low-value 
transactions that represent the Internet’s greatest potential”.357    
 
ii) Uniform Rules through Model Laws 
                                                 
356  See Diedrich, supra note 14, at 6. 
357  Ibid. See also Perritt, Henry H., ‘Jurisdiction II: Global Network/ Local Rules’, Internet Law and 
Policy Forum. (2001), at 1. Available at: http://ilpf.org/events/jurisdiction/presentation2/perritt-
pr/perrittpr.html , visited January 2002.. 
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  It has been argued that the objective of uniform global rules 
applicable to electronic transactions may be achieved through 
model laws to be drafted by international bodies such as the 
United Nations Commission for International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and UNIDROIT. Unlike treaties, 
model laws are not binding on states or individuals unless 
they are incorporated in the internal law of the concerned 
country. States have the option to adopt the model law. 
However, there are many reasons that may drive states to 
adopt a certain model law e.g., its convincing legal standard 
or because of the desire to be party to supra-nationally 
uniform rules. A successful example of international model 
law is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.358   
  The distinctive features of model laws are that they are 
flexible and do not require rigid formalities for their drafting. 
                                                 
358  See Perritt, supra note 16, at 7. 
 256
Therefore, unlike treaties, model laws can be drafted in a 
short time in order to respond to emergent problems. Of 
course, draftsmen usually take into account the political, 
economic and legal differences of states when drafting a 
model law so as to secure wide acceptance for it. However, 
model laws also have their disadvantages. One of these 
disadvantages is that model laws usually do not exclude the 
rules of conflict of laws, i.e., a court has to use the conflict of 
laws rules to find out the applicable state version of the 
model law. This may result in differences in the application 
of the model law, due to disparate interpretations given to its 
provisions in different jurisdictions or as a result of the 
deviations made pursuant to the provisions of the model law 
itself.359   
 
iii) The Law Merchant (lex mercatoria)                                                         
                                                 
359  Ibid. 
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Lex mercatoria is defined as “the customary law that is 
binding upon merchants dealing in a specific trade”.360 
Historically, lex mercatoria refers to a body of law developed 
during the medieval ages by merchants of Europe and Middle 
East. The source of this body of law was based on trading 
fairs and the practices of the merchants at that period. This 
body of law had developed into sets of commercial customs 
applicable to merchants wherever they move. “Gradually 
over time, these customs gained the force of law as 
governments recognized that merchants should be able to 
resolve their disputes by their own rules”.361 However, by the 
end of the Middle Ages and due to the emergence of modern 
states, the uniformity of lex mercatoria was diluted as it was 
incorporated into national legal systems.362Lately, the rules 
developed by lex  mercatoria have been collected so as to 
form  a coherent set of rules. For example, INCOTERMS, 
                                                 
360  Ibid. 
361  See Anil, Samtani ‘An Overview of the Law of the Internet Commerce and an Introduction to the 
Law of Software Agents’. EDI L.Rev. Vol. 8 No. 1 (2001), at 5. 
362  Ibid. 
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which have been collected and regularly updated by the ICC, 
are considered as an example of lex mercatoria.363  
  However, lex mercatoria rules have been much contested by 
developing countries on the ground that they are unsuitable 
for them and that they should not be imposed on them 
because they had not participated in their creation. Moreover, 
it is contended that such rules have not reached the stage of 
being considered as constituting an independent legal 
regime.364 Furthermore, it is believed that the disadvantages 
of the application of these rules to the Internet transactions 
surpass their advantages because; first, the emerging rules 
will not be considered as forming customary law unless they 
have found constant common acceptance and this usually 
takes a long time of usage. Secondly, the participants in 
Internet transactions are not only merchants of equal 
bargaining powers, but also include consumers and other 
weak parties. “So it is very likely that one-sided rules in favor 
of the more powerful global players would emerge”. Thirdly, 
                                                 
363  See http://www.iccwbo.org .  See also Diedrich, supra note 14, at 7. 
364  See, Sempasa, Samson L. ‘Obstacles to International Commercial Arbitration in African 
Countries’. I&C.L.Q. 387 (1992) Vol. 41 at 408-11. 
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in some jurisdictions, e.g., Germany, the customary law is 
considered as a matter of fact that needs to be proved before 
the court. This will be “costlier and riskier than relying on 
statute law”.365   
 
iv) Mixed Form of Regulation 
  In the view of some commentators a mixture of the above 
approaches has to be made to form a unified body of law for 
the regulation of electronic commerce. This process is 
considered as possible and there is an existing example for 
such possibility represented in the UNIDROIT Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts.366 The provisions of the 
UNIDROIT, which is an international convention, have been 
based on the rules of lex mercatoria in international 
commercial contracts.367 Therefore, it is believed that the 
same can be applied to the Internet transactions by codifying 
the usages and practices of Internet users in an international 
                                                 
365  See Diedrich, supra note 14, at 7-8. 
366  Ibid., at 8. 
367  For the text of UNIDROIT see http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/unidoit/html. See also Diedrich, 
supra note 14, at 8. 
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convention or putting them in a global model law. However, 
once again all the disadvantages of the above approaches i.e., 
the difficulty of concluding an international convention, the 
non-binding nature of model laws and the long time needed 
for creating customary law converge here. Therefore, even a 
mixture of the above approaches is not ideal for harmonizing 
or unifying essential legal rules.368 However, regardless of 
these theoretical approaches there are many practical 
endeavors, which have dealt with the issue of regulation of 
electronic transactions, especially as concerns the formation 
and validity of electronic contracts, authentication of data 
messages and admissibility and value of electronic 
documents. 
 
3. Formation of Contracts Online 
i) Definition: 
 (a) Electronic Contracting 
                                                 
368  See Diedrich, supra note 14, at 9. 
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The term electronic contracting is defined by Guidec II of the 
ICC, as “the automated process of entering into contracts via 
the parties’ computers, whether networked or through 
electronic messages”.369The Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act (UCITA) of the U.S., refers to this form of 
contracting as the ‘automated transaction’ and is defined 
under s.102(7) thereof as “a transaction in which a contract is 
formed in whole or part by electronic actions of one or both 
parties, which are not previously reviewed by an individual in 
the ordinary course”.370 
 
   (b) Electronic Message  
  This term is defined under s. 102(28) of UCITA as “a record 
or display that is stored, generated or transmitted by 
electronic means for the purpose of communication to 
another person or electronic agent”.371 It is referred to under 
Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
                                                 
369  See ICC Guidec II for General Usage for Internationally Ensured Commerce (October 2001). 
Available at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/guidec/guidec_two/electronic_contracting.asp   
370  See Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (2001). Available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita01.html   
371  Ibid. 
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Commerce as ‘data message’ and it is defined as 
“information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, 
optical or similar means including, but not limited to, 
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, 
telex or telecopy.372 
 
    (c) Electronic Agent  
 This term is defined under s. 120(27) of UCITA as: 
        A computer program or electronic or 
automated means, used independently to initiate 
an action or to respond to electronic messages 
or performances, on the person’s behalf without 
review or actions by an individual at the time of 
the action or response to the message or 
performance.373  
 
ii) Offer 
                                                 
372  See Article of the UNCITRAL Model Law On Electronic Commerce (1996). Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/en.index.html  
373  See s. 102 (27) of UCITA, supra note 29. 
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   Generally, under contract law an effective offer that can turn into 
contract when met by acceptance, must comprise a definite promise to 
be bound if certain specified terms are accepted.374An offer may be 
made to a particular person or to the public at large. In case an offer is 
made to the public at large, the offeree need not communicate his 
acceptance to the offeror. The mere performance of the required action 
is enough as it was held in the famous case of Carlil v. Carbolic 
Smoke Ball Co.375 However, the law distinguishes offer from what is 
known as invitation to treat. In case of invitation to treat a party often 
offers to negotiate or provokes an offer from the other party. For 
example, actions such as advertisements to promote goods or services 
by showing their features or calling for auction or displaying goods in 
a shop-window or on the shelves have been treated as invitation to 
treat.376 Moreover, an offer can be revoked at any time before being 
considered by law as accepted. Also “it may lapse, it may be subject to 
a condition that fails to be satisfied or it may be affected by the death 
of one of the parties”.377   
  Before applying the above mentioned general rules to online 
contracts, it is worthy to point out that formation of contracts via the 
                                                 
374  See Cheshire, G.C and Fifoot, C.H. S. and Furmston, M. P. ‘The Law of Contract’. 8th ed. 
Butterworth – London (1972) at 25. 
375  (1892) 2 Q. B. 484. 
376  For more details see Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, supra note 33, at 24-48. 
377  Ibid., at 46. 
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Internet has been endorsed as valid in legislation dealing with this 
matter nationally and internationally. For example, under Article 11 of 
UNCITRAL Model Law, unless the parties agreed otherwise, “an 
offer and the acceptance of that offer may be expressed by means of 
data messages”.378 However, when applying the general rules of law 
of contract within the context of Internet transactions, a court may 
need to determine whether a web advertisement is like a shop display 
i.e., invitation to treat or to be considered an offer. The difficulty of 
making such classification arises from the fact that the Internet fuses 
advertising and shopping. It is argued that unless the court finds that 
the objective intention of the web site owner is directed towards 
making an offer, web advertisement should be treated as shop display 
i.e., invitation to treat. The justification of this argument is that by 
analogy web advertisement is similar to shop displays. This analogy is 
enhanced by the “presentation of some web pages as virtual shops 
within the Internet version of a shopping mall”. Moreover, the web 
site owner may not like to deal with a certain category of dealers e.g., 
minors or certain jurisdictions or may prefer to receive payment in 
advance. Furthermore, he may not have enough stock of tangible 
goods to meet the demand for them. Of course the latter justifications 
                                                 
378  See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 31. 
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will breakdown if the said goods are infinite intangible goods.379 
However, it is acknowledged that there is uncertainty in this area 
enhanced by lack of precedent and legislation. Therefore, it is 
recommended that in order to remove doubt, the web site owners have 
to “state expressly the procedures to be followed for a binding contract 
to come into existence”. Moreover, they should avoid misleading 
statements and misrepresentation.380  
iii) Acceptance: 
       Broadly speaking, the occurrence of acceptance by one party to an 
offer made to him by another party is a matter of fact. It may be 
proved by the words or documents passed between the parties or may 
be inferred from their conduct. The court must find that the offeree 
unreservedly assents to the exact terms proposed by the offeror. Any 
variations in the terms proposed by the offeror may be considered as a 
counter-offer. Likewise, a conditional assent is not acceptance. 
However, the court has to distinguish counter-offers from other issues 
such as a request for further information. An acceptance is not 
considered effective until it is communicated to the offeror, unless the 
offeror waives expressly or impliedly the requirement of 
communication as in the case of unilateral contracts, for instance. 
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Communication of acceptance may take any form considered by law 
as enough for manifesting the assent of the offeree to the exact terms 
proposed by the offeror, unless the offeror prescribes the mode of 
communication. The mode of communication may be prescribed 
expressly or may be inferred from the circumstances. For example, it 
was held in one case that an offer by telegram was a presumptive 
evidence of a desire of prompt reply.381 It has been argued that 
communication should be considered effective if the mode of 
communication is equally or more expeditious than the mode specified 
by the offeror, unless the offeror insists on a specific mode 
exclusively.382 If no particular method is designated, the mode of 
communication varies according to the nature of the offer and the 
circumstances in which it is communicated to the offeree. For 
example, in case of oral offer the offeree must be sure that his 
acceptance is heard and understood by the offeror. In other words, if 
the method of communication enables the instantaneous contact 
between the parties, the acceptance is not complete until it is received 
by the offeror. This rule applies equally to conversation over 
telephone and to messages sent by telex and fax. However, if 
communication of acceptance by post is found more convenient and 
                                                 
381  See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, supra note 33, at 30-9. See also Kennedy v. Thomassen (1929) 
1 Ch. 426.  
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practicable, communication is considered effective when it is put into 
post according to most common law systems.383 The civil law systems 
apply what is known as information theory, which requires the actual 
receipt by the addressee of the content of the communication in case 
of direct forms of communication such as telephone and in case of 
indirect forms of communications such as telegram and telex they 
apply the so-called reception theory, which requires the physical 
receipt of the communication by the addressee or at least such 
communication is made available to him, even though he has not 
taken notice of the content.384 
  Applying the above general rules to electronic contracts few may be 
added as regards the proof of an unequivocal acceptance by the 
offeree of all the terms of the offer proposed by the offeror.385 
However, as far as the issue of communication is concerned, 
especially the time of communication of offer and acceptance, regard 
has to be given to the specific characteristics of the current methods of 
communication via the Internet. At present communications relating to 
electronic transactions over the Internet are conducted through 
electronic messages, commonly known as electronic mail (e-mail) or 
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via the World Wide Web.386An e-mail is similar in some aspects to an 
ordinary posted letter. For example, like ordinary letters, some e-mails 
are not directly delivered to the recipient’s desk, but delivered instead 
to an electronic pigeon-hole-like, called ‘inbox’, ready for collection. 
Also like a posted letter, an e-mail passes through many different 
carriers before it reaches its destination. Therefore, as sometimes 
happen with regard to letters, e-mails may be misaddressed, delayed 
by any server or router on the way, and even may not be collected 
after delivery. It is worthy to mention that certain e-mails systems 
allow for a ‘read’ and ‘received’ receipt automatically returned to the 
sender of the e-mail. But it is important to point out that ‘receive’ 
receipt indicates that the e-mail has been received by the server 
hosting the addressee account not by the addressee himself. The ‘read’ 
receipt informs the sender that the e-mail is retrieved by the addressee, 
but it does not show whether he reads it or not. Therefore, “it may not 
be proper to depend on this receipt for anything but evidence”.387 So it 
is believed that the best practice may be that the offeror specifies a 
definite date for acceptance. “ Specifying this date in relative terms, 
for instance five days after receipt, poses problems unless the offeror 
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provides a definition of exactly what is receipt”. A simpler and more 
certain method is to specify an objective date and time.388 
  As explained above the main means of communication used in 
relation to Internet transactions are the World Wide Web and the 
electronic mail. As concerns the World Wide Web, the effective time 
of communication of acceptance may be settled by analogy to 
telephone and telex i.e., communication of acceptance is effective 
when actually received by the offeror. This is because, as in the case 
of telephone conversation and telex messages, the communication 
between a server and a client over the World Wide Web is conducted 
instantaneously for most purposes. Either party can realize 
immediately if the other party goes off-line. This is due to the fact that 
a digital data sent by either party is accompanied by a program known 
as checksum allowing the receiving computer to check that the correct 
information has been received. “If the client loses contact with the 
server, the server will ‘know’ of this situation within seconds, its 
checksum and ‘received data’ will not arrive”. If a client sends data to 
a server but for some problem it has not been received by the server, a 
message to the effect that ‘server not responding’ appears on the 
client’s computer. This means that the offeree could know 
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immediately that his acceptance has not been communicated to the 
offeror.389 
  However, a difficulty arises when examining communication of 
acceptance via e-mail. As explained above, although there is some 
similarity between e-mails and ordinary letters, there are also 
substantial differences between them. For example, when an e-mail is 
sent, it is broken into chunks and sent as a collection of packets using 
protocols that “allow one computer to pass on information accurately 
to another”. But sometimes these protocols are used incorrectly and as 
a result, an e-mail may arrive garbled or missing some important parts. 
Moreover, it has been stated that sometimes e-mails may be slower 
than the post and that the arrival of the acceptance depends in most 
cases on the recipient rather than the sender. Also, e-mails are 
different from telephone and fax communications, as there is no direct 
contact between the sender and the recipient and as such, it is not easy 
for the offeree to know instantaneously that his acceptance is 
communicated to the offeror. Moreover, an e-mail must be collected 
and retrieved by the recipient.390 
 Therefore, different opinions have been expressed as to the effective 
time of the communication of acceptance. Some believe that as long 
as e-mails are different from telephone, fax and telex, and dissimilar to 
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postal services in some aspects, it may not be wise to recommend the 
slavish application either of the instantaneous rule or the postal rule. 
Instead, it is suggested that since the rules applicable to the previous 
means of communications are premised on the notion of the allocation 
of risk between the contracting parties, any rule that is proposed to be 
applicable to e-mail communications should achieve that 
end.391Another group of writers proposes that “in case of an e-mail, 
the offer, acceptance, order or notice will be legally effective once it 
has been deposited in the recipient’s electronic post box”, i.e., once it 
is made available for the recipient to retrieve and read, whether he 
does so or not.392A third group believes that the issue should be 
decided case by case as follows: first, the offeror has to determine at 
the time of making his offer, whether acceptance by e-mail is suitable. 
Secondly, if acceptance by e-mail is found reasonable, a subsequently 
sent acceptance should not be given priority over an earlier one, 
provided that the court makes balance of interests between the 
competing offerees. For example, it may not be reasonable to prefer 
the earlier acceptance if it was misaddressed or it was sent even 
though the offeree had been aware that his e-mail server had crashed. 
Thirdly, if the acceptance is not received due to the fault of the 
offeree, there is no acceptance, but if the e-mail is not received due to 
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an external factor without any fault from the side of the offeree, the 
court may decide that there is an acceptance from the time of sending 
of the e-mail, provided that in such a case the court has to strike a 
balance between the interests of the offeree and those of the offeror 
who may have already contracted with another party. Likewise, if the 
e-mail is not received due to the careless conduct of the offeror, e.g., 
not retrieving it or deleting it without reading, then the acceptance is 
considered effective from the moment of sending the e-mail. Fourthly, 
since an e-mail may arrive garbled or missing some of its content and 
as long as the offeree has no means to discover this, the offeror should 
not be allowed to consider the acceptance of the offeree as a counter-
offer, provided that he has not specified an alternative method of 
acceptance.393  
  However, it is believed that the good practice is that the offer should 
contain as many details as possible in relation to the mode of 
acceptance and how it is to be communicated and the time and place 
of its receipt.394 It is worthy of note that under Article 15(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, a data message is considered as dispatched 
when it enters an information system out of the control of the 
originator or that of a person acting on his behalf. Article 15(2) of the 
same Model Law provides that unless otherwise agreed between the 
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originator and the addressee, a data message is considered received 
when it enters the information system of the addressee if he has not 
designated a specific information system for receipt or when it enters 
the information system designated by the addressee for receipt. But if 
the data message is sent to an information system of the addressee that 
is not the designated information system, receipt of that data message 
occurs at the time when it is retrieved by the addressee.395 It has been 
noticed that the Model Law has not dealt with the issue of when a data 
message is considered effective, but focuses instead on the issue of 
when a data message is received. This approach, it is added, “may suit 
the contract regimes in civil jurisdictions but it makes little sense in 
those based upon the common law”, because the common law 
concentrates on when a message is effective not on when it is 
received.396  
  Finally, it is important to point out that the Internet also provides 
telephone services for its users. This service has found wide response 
due to its low cost in comparison with traditional telephone services. 
The question poses itself here is: what is the legal status of an 
acceptance communicated through the telephone services via the 
Internet? It is suggested that “where the service is full duplex (i.e. both 
parties can speak without cutting the other off) and in real-time, the 
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position should not differ from that where a more traditional telephone 
service is used”, i.e., the communication is effective when heard and 
understood by the offeror.397 
 
iv) Consideration 
  Generally, under the common law system in order to be actionable, a 
promise made by the defendant must either be contained in a 
document under seal or supported by consideration. Consideration is 
defined as the price paid by the plaintiff for the defendant’s promise. 
For consideration to be effective, it must be sufficient, adequate and 
pass from the promisee. Consideration may be executory or executed. 
It is executory when the “defendant’s promise is made in return of a 
counter-promise from the plaintiff”. Executed consideration is that 
which is made in return for the performance of an act. In both cases 
the mutual promises of the plaintiff and defendant must constitute one 
single transaction. Subsequent promises for past consideration are not 
effective for lack of consideration, that is, past consideration is not 
effective consideration.398 
       Applying the above general rules to Internet transactions, it is 
generally argued that contracting via Internet does not affect the 
doctrine of consideration. The mere promise by one party to deliver 
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goods or services in exchange of the other party’s promise to pay for 
this is enough consideration.399 However, there are certain practices of 
Internet users which need to be subjected to analysis in the light of the 
doctrine of consideration, for example, whether the so-called web-
wrap contract is supported by consideration or not. This form of 
contract happens when a viewer of a web site is asked to click on a 
link labeled ‘I agree to the terms above’. These terms often aim at 
protecting the intellectual property of the web site owner and 
exempting him from responsibility for any damage caused by the site. 
It is argued that the promise of the viewer to abide by the terms of the 
license in exchange of the promise of the web site owner to allow him 
to view the content of the web site constitutes enough consideration 
for a binding contract.400 
 
v) Intention to Create Legal Relations  
  Intention to create legal relation is considered as an independent 
element in the process of formation of contracts. Typically, the law 
differentiates between social, family or other domestic agreements on 
one hand, and commercial agreements on the other hand. In case of 
social, family or other domestic agreements, “the presence or absence 
of an intention to create legal relations depends upon the inference to 
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be drawn by the court from the language used by the parties and the 
circumstances in which they use it”, whereas in case of commercial 
agreements “the presence of this intention is presumed and must be 
rebutted by the party denying it”.401 
  The elements of intention to create legal relation may be of special 
interest in electronic contracting due to the fact that in electronic 
contracting at least one party is an individual acting for himself or on 
behalf of another and the other party is a programmed software 
(electronic agent) acting on behalf of its owner. This fact raises the 
issue of how a contract can be formed without direct intention. It has 
been stated that contracting with machines is not a new issue. For 
example, in 1971 Lord Denning ruled in one case that the automatic 
reaction of the car park turning a light from red to green and thrusting 
a ticket was enough to create a contract.402It is commented that in the 
above case the court looked objectively to whether a contract can be 
considered as being concluded, that is to say, whether the user has 
been induced to believe that a contract is made or offered. It is argued 
that the same rule should apply to computer programs. However, the 
question is whether the presence of bugs, for example, in these 
programs negatives the owner’s intention. It is believed that in such a 
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case, if as a result of a bug in the contracting program an offer is 
accepted in error, the court should presume the presence of the 
requisite intention and it is on the web site owner to rebut the 
presumption of intention to create legal relation.403  
 
4. Validity of Electronic Contracting and Formality Requirements 
i) Writing:  
  In a paper-based environment, writing plays a pivotal role. The law 
may require, for different legal purposes, that a contract must assume 
a written or printed form so as to acquire validity and be enforceable. 
Likewise, requirement of writing may be imposed by law or stipulated 
by the parties themselves. Examples of contracts required by law to be 
in writing are those relating to real state. Moreover, tax formalities 
often require certain types of contracts to be in a written form. Some 
official documents relating to commerce are required to be in a 
specific paper format so as to meet the legal requirements, for 
example, those relating to customs, accountancy, taxation, transport, 
payment, and public administration documents. Even the contracting 
parties themselves often insert in their contracts a standard clause to 
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the effect that any amendment of the contract will not be valid unless 
it is in writing and signed by both parties.404  
  The question, which poses itself here is: how can a data message pass 
the obstacle of writing formality so as to gain validity? Article 6 (1) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law answers this question by providing that 
“where the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement 
is met by a data message if the information contained therein is 
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference”. Paragraph (2) 
of this Article explains that the requirement of paragraph (1) is 
applicable “whether the requirement therein is in the form of an 
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the 
information not being in writing”.405The remark of UCITRAL on this 
Article showed the difficulty the drafters faced when they drafted it. 
The drafters found that the traditional functions of writing in a paper-
based environment include, amongst others: first, assurance by 
tangible evidence of existence and nature of the parties’ intention to 
bind themselves; secondly, works as warning for parties as regards the 
consequences of their action; thirdly, provides an unalterable 
permanent record of a transaction; fourthly, facilitates reproduction of 
a document; fifthly, allows authentication by means of signature; 
sixthly, ensures that a document is in a form acceptable by public 
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authorities and courts; seventhly, indicates finality of the parties’ 
intent and provides a record of that intent; eighthly, facilitates storage 
of data in a tangible form; ninthly, provides control and subsequent 
audit; tenthly, ensures validity for transactions required to be in 
writing.406  
  The drafters of UNCITRAL Model Law found that “it would be 
inappropriate to adopt an overly comprehensive notion of the 
functions performed by writing”. In order to adopt a functional 
equivalent approach, the drafters prefer to adopt a narrow definition 
for the term ‘writing’ so as to avoid satisfying the long list of 
functions traditionally attributed to writing and often confused with 
more stringent requirements such as “signed writing”, “signed 
original” or “authenticated legal act”. For example, concepts relating 
to ‘evidence’ and ‘the intention of the parties to bind themselves’ 
should be connected with other distinct notions concerning reliability 
and authentication of data rather than being included in the definition 
of ‘writing’. Therefore, Article 6 concentrates on basic requirements 
that the information shall meet in order to fulfill the requirement of 
writing. These basic requirements are that information must be 
reproducible and readable. It has been stated that these requirements 
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are formulated in an objective way providing that the data message 
must be accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.407     
 
ii) Originality 
  Wherever ‘writing’ is required, it is often accompanied by a 
requirement of being ‘original’. This is particularly relevant within 
evidence issues and in relation to documents of title and negotiable 
instruments. Examples of other documents that might be required to 
be in original form include “trade documents such as weight 
certificates, agriculture certificates, quality or quantity certificates, 
inspection reports, insurance certificates etc.” The traditional 
definition of ‘original’ stipulates that information must be preserved in 
the medium in which it was fixed for the first time. If this definition 
were to be adhered to in relation to data messages, it would be 
impossible to speak of ‘original’ data message as far as what will be 
received by the addressee of a data message is always a copy.408 
Therefore, when treating the obstacle of ‘originality’ facing electronic 
commerce, UNCITRAL Model Law refers to the functional equivalent 
of originality. Article 8 (1) (a) and (b) thereof considers information to 
be original if “there exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the 
information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, 
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as a data message or otherwise” and is capable of being presented and 
displayed when required. Paragraph 3(a) of the same Article clarifies 
the criteria for assessing integrity by emphasizing that additions such 
as endorsement or any change happens in the normal course of 
communication, storage and display will not affect the integrity 
requirement as long as the information has remained complete and 
unaltered.409  
 
iii) Signature 
  As in the case of ‘originality’ requirement, wherever ‘writing’ is 
required, it is frequently required to be signed by the authorized 
person. Amongst others, there are essentially two functions for 
signature in a paper-based environment, namely to identify the 
signatory of a document and to attribute the content of the 
document to him. In other words, signature is used in paper-based 
environment as a method of authentication. 
  Therefore, in order to meet the requirements of signature, the method 
used for signing a data message must at least be capable of identifying 
the signatory and indicates his approval of the information contained 
in that data message and is reliable as was appropriate for the purpose 
for which the data message is generated or communicated in the light 
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of all relevant circumstances, including any relevant agreement. A 
data message authenticated in the above way shall not be denied 
validity merely because it was not authenticated in a manner peculiar 
to paper documents.410 As it is clear from the formulation of Article 7 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the reliability of the electronic method 
of authentication is a prerequisite for its acceptability. Therefore, the 
issue of electronic authentication has attracted much attention 
nationally and internationally. 
 
5. Authentication of Electronic Documents 
i) Definition 
 (a) Authentication  
The act of authentication of documents denotes in the American usage 
the process of identifying oneself with a message, whereas in the 
European usage it is associated with the verification of a signature. 
The ICC Guidec II defines the term ‘authenticate’ as the act of 
recording or adopting “a digital seal or symbol associated with a 
message, with the present intention of identifying oneself with the 
message”.411 However, different approaches have been adopted as 
regards the method of authentication of electronic document. So far 
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the main technical method of authentication is the so-called electronic 
signature. 
 
 (b) Electronic Signature  
  The term ‘electronic signature’ is defined under Article 2 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signature as “data in electronic 
form in, affixed to, or logically associated with a data message, which 
may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data message 
and to indicate the signatory’s approval of the information contained 
in the data message”.412 The term ‘electronic signature’ is sometimes 
confused or used interchangeably with another term known as ‘digital 
signature’, although technically the two terms are distinguished. 
Actually, the term ‘electronic signature’ is a wide concept, which 
refers to all technologies for replacing hand-written signature in an 
electronic environment, including ‘digital signature’.413  
 
 (c) Digital Signature  
      This term is defined by paragraph 8 of Part XI of ICC 
Guidec II as to refer to: 
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A transformation of a message using an asymmetric 
cryptosystem such that a person having the authenticated 
message and the signatory’s public key can accurately 
determine: (a) whether the transformation was created 
using the private key that corresponds to the signatory’s 
public key, and (b) whether the signed message has been 
altered since the transformation was made.414 
 
ii) Approaches to the Methods of Electronic Authentication 
   The legislative attempts nationally and internationally have, so far, 
led different ways as concerns the methods of electronic 
authentication. There are at least three approaches in this regard. One 
approach focuses on a certain technology such as ‘digital signature’ 
technology, considers it as adequate for the purposes of authentication 
and adopts it in legislation. Another approach put a general framework 
based on functional equivalent analogy. A third approach consists of a 
hybrid of the other two approaches. 
 
(a) The digital Signature Approach 
    This approach is described as a technology-dependant approach 
because it solely concentrates on one kind of electronic authentication, 
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namely digital signature, and builds its regulation on it. Moreover, it 
focuses on the establishment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) so as 
to ensure the reliability of the digital signature in performing its 
authentication and identification roles.415 The legislation and 
regulations adopting this approach often share the following 
characteristics: adoption of asymmetric cryptography for the creation 
of a digital signature; regulation of the duties of certificate authorities 
(CAs) and key holders; and the limitation of cases under which 
reliance on an electronic signature is justified.416Generally, civil law 
countries are tending to the adoption of this approach e.g., Germany 
and Italy.417 The advantages of this approach are that it gives a kind of 
certainty and trustworthiness as concerns the legal issues relating to 
electronic authentication, but it is criticized as being technology-
dependant and as such, its certainty and trustworthiness may not last 
for long as technology is continuously developing and the “devices 
adopted may become obsolete or adjustable at any given time”, a 
matter that may lead to instability in legislation.418 
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     (b) Functional Equivalent Approach 
       This approach is also referred to as the minimalist approach.419 It 
aims to facilitate the use of electronic signature by prescribing a 
general framework for the process of electronic authentication. It is 
based on observing and analyzing the roles played or functions 
performed by particular existing requirements in paper-based 
environment e.g., signature, for the purpose of seeing whether those 
functions can be performed by any electronic method, whereby the 
same rules applicable to those requirements will be extended by 
analogy to the electronic method.420The role of the legislator in such a 
case is to set in a general way the circumstances under which an 
electronic method of authentication will fulfill any such requirements, 
with the purpose of setting a standard of proof.421  
       In an analysis made by the Internet Law and Policy Forum (ILPF) in 
September 2000, it has been found that the traditional common law 
countries such as United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States have tendency towards the application of the 
functional equivalent approach. For example, in the United States 
although some states adopted initially different approaches, e.g., Utah 
Digital Signature Act of 1995 adopted the digital signature approach, 
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yet the recently adopted Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act 2000, has unified the U.S. law relating to electronic 
signature under the umbrella of the functionalist approach.422This 
approach also has been adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce 1996.423  The advantages of this approach are 
that it is technology-neutral and as such, its application will lead to 
legislation stability. Moreover, it provides quick resolutions for the 
problems confronting electronic commerce as it is based on existing 
principles and does not seek to establish new ones as long as there is a 
functional equivalent in the physical world for the problems facing 
electronic commerce.424 However, the main criticism directed at it  
relates to its national character in contrast to the international character 
of electronic commerce in the light of the uncertainty concerning the 
conflict of law rules relating to Internet transaction.425The opponents 
of the functionalists approach argue that a coherent approach to the 
regulation of electronic commerce should begin “with identification 
and application of first principles rather than the transference of rules 
applied in analogous context”.426 
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    (c) The Two-tier Approach 
   This approach is also referred to as ‘two-prong’ approach or hybrid 
approach.427 It is based on the idea that the two approaches mentioned 
above are not necessarily mutually exclusive and as such, they may be 
combined to form a hybrid approach taking the advantages of both 
approaches and avoiding their disadvantages. “This consolidated 
approach generally takes the form of enacting laws that prescribe 
standards for the operation of PKIs, and concomitantly take a broad 
view of what constitutes a valid electronic signature for legal 
purposes”.428This approach has been adopted in the EU Directive on 
Electronic Signature 1999, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Signature 2001 and Singapore Electronic Transaction Act 1998.429 To 
achieve its goals, the two-tier approach allows two levels of 
authentication: the minimal level, which receives a certain minimum 
legal status and based on the functional equivalent approach, and 
maximum level, which is based on more strict security measures, as in 
the case of digital signature approach. In other words, the maximum 
level of the two-tier approach prescribes in details the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties and liability allocation between them, in 
                                                 
427  See Aalberts and Van Der Hof, supra note 72, at 19. See also Kuner, Barcelo, Baker and 
Greenwald, supra note 75, at 4. 
428  See Kuner, Barcelo, Baker and Greenwald, supra note 75, at 5. 
429  Ibid. See also Aalberts and Van Der Hof, supra note 72, at 20. See also UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Signature, supra note 71. 
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addition to establishing PKI and Certification Authorities. However, it 
differs from the digital signature approach in that it does not specify a 
particular technology as it leaves room for future technologies. The 
maximum level of authentication receives greater legal effect such as a 
presumption of integrity of the authenticated electronic document, a 
presumption of attribution of that document to the person it purports to 
be associated with and a presumption of the intention of the signatory 
for signing the document and approving its content. This maximum 
level referred to in the EU Directive as the ‘advanced electronic 
signature and in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signature 
as ‘reliable electronic signature’ and in Singapore Act as ‘secure 
electronic signatures’.430 The critique for the two-tier approach is that 
although it leaves room for future technology, it “often deals with 
issues and situations (e.g., CAs, liability, qualities that focus mainly on 
certain techniques) which have not yet been determined and thus, may 
well need adjustment once they have”. Moreover, like the digital 
approach, the two-tier approach focuses on signature ‘as such’ and not 
on form requirements as a whole.431 Furthermore, all these regulatory 
efforts are described as premature, especially in the light of the lack of 
enough judicial precedents supporting any of the approaches. In the 
words of one writer: 
                                                 
430  Ibid. 
431  See Aalberts and Van Der Hof, supra note 72, at 30. 
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                Policy proposals are being debated before the nature or full 
potential of the information technologies that may provide 
the foundation for electronic commerce in the future is 
known. While certainly it is appropriate for policy-makers to 
anticipate and encourage economic and technological 
development by establishing legal ‘rules of the road’, the 
danger is that a rush to legislate will impose legal analogies 
and formalistic structures that constrain rather than 
promote the development of the Internet and other 
computer-based communication systems as media for 
commercial transactions.432 
       However, regardless of these critiques, the current trend is directed 
towards the acceptance of the two-tier approach.433 
 
6. Admissibility and Evidential Value of Electronic Documents  
  One of the obstacles facing electronic commerce is the admissibility 
and evidential value of data messages. In a paper-based 
environment, a document must satisfy the formal requirements 
prescribed by law e.g., originality, as a first step, before being 
admitted by the court and hence, as a second step, it must meet the 
                                                 
432  See Murray, supra note 84, at 128. 
433  See Kuner, Barcelo, Baker and Greenwald, supra note 75, at 5. 
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substantial requirements necessary for its credibility to accord it the 
suitable evidential value.  
i) Admissibility of Data Messages 
 Article 9(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce 1996, provides that: 
            In any legal proceeding, nothing in the application of the 
rules of evidence shall apply so as to deny the admissibility 
of a data message in evidence: (a) on the sole ground that it 
is a data message; or (b) if it is the best evidence that the 
person adducing it could reasonably be expected to obtain, 
on the grounds that it is not in its original form.434 
  Paragraph (1) of Article 9 deals with the formal requirements for the 
admissibility of a data message as evidence. However, It has been 
stated that the reference to the term ‘best evidence’ in this Article, 
which is applicable in common law jurisdictions, may result in a great 
deal of uncertainty in legal systems in which this rule is not known. 
Therefore, it is recommended that states, which do not apply such rule 
may disregard it when enacting the Model Law.435 Typically, the 
formal requirements of evidence are provided for in civil procedures 
legislation, which set the means of evidence admissible by law. 
                                                 
434  See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 31. 
435  Ibid. paragraph 70 of the UNCITRAL remarks on the Model Law. 
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However, this should not be confused with the formalities required by 
law for certain documents, because “the admissibility of a document 
as evidence is independent of the format that a document takes and the 
medium that is used”. It is noticed that national legislation in many 
countries have not yet explicitly considered the technological 
development as regards the admissibility of electronic evidence in all 
cases. It is recommended that efforts should be exerted worldwide to 
lift the ambiguity and uncertainty relating to the admissibility of 
electronic documents as evidence.436 
 
 ii) Evidential Value of Data Messages 
  In order to be effective evidence, a data message must not only be 
admissible, but also of evidential value. The evidential value of a data 
message is intimately connected with the reliability of its source. The 
trustworthiness of the security measures applied with regard to the 
generation, transmission and storage of a data message play a pivotal 
role in the evidential weight that will be accorded to it. It is 
recommended that when the required security procedures are used, 
electronic documents should at least be accorded the same evidential 
                                                 
436  See Mitrakas, supra note 2, at 56, 57 and 112. 
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value as paper-based documents.437 Paragraph (2) of Article 9 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce provides that: 
              Information in the form of a data message shall be given due 
evidential weight. In assessing the evidential weight of a 
data message, regard shall be had to the reliability of the 
manner in which the data message was generated, stored or 
communicated, to the reliability of the manner in which the 
integrity of the information was maintained, to the manner 
in which its originator was identified, and to any other 
relevant factor.438 
 
Conclusion 
  The potential opportunities offered by electronic 
commerce are numerous. Every conceivable economic 
activity can be carried out wholly or partially via the 
Internet. The communication facilities provided by the 
Internet at virtually minimal cost have opened great 
opportunities for various kinds of commercial practices. 
Yet the greatest transformation in this respect is 
                                                 
437  Ibid., at 64, 112. See also paragraph 71 of the UNCITRAL remarks on the Model Law, supra note 
31.. 
438  See Article 9 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 31. 
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manifested in the field of intangible goods and services. 
The Internet has not only facilitated the communications 
for conclusions of transactions concerning intangibles but, 
furthermore, worked as a carrier for transferring the 
intangible goods and services, almost instantaneously, to 
their destination at wherever point in the globe reached 
by the Internet.  However, these vast opportunities are 
confronted with obstacles impeding their potential. There 
are different kinds of barriers; financial, legal and in 
relation to market access. The legal barriers vary from 
direct impediments such as legal uncertainty and lack of 
predictability of legal consequences, to indirect barriers 
resulting from fear of negative impacts of unregulated 
commerce on other rights such as intellectual property 
rights and privacy, which may discourage participants in 
electronic commerce to proceed in this activity.  
  Different efforts have been exerted all over the world to 
pave the way for electronic commerce. As far as the legal 
efforts are concerned, there are the contributions of the 
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legal writers represented in legal writings analyzing the 
legal problems and suggesting legal solutions and 
theoretical approaches. Moreover, there are the legislative 
endeavors nationally and internationally. The legal issues 
discussed in this chapter are in relation to the formation 
of electronic contracts and their validity in the light of the 
formalities required by law or the parties to a contract in 
paper-based environment such as writing, originality and 
signature, in addition to issues relating to the 
authentication of electronic documents and their 
admissibility and evidential weight. However, as shown in 
the analyses there are still many controversial areas. For 
example, as regards the formation of electronic contracts, 
issues concerning communication of offer, acceptance and 
related notices have not been settled yet. Rules 
determining the effective time of communication should 
be clearly prescribed. Also, terms such as dispatch, 
delivery and receipt should be clearly defined. Moreover, 
the controversy about contracting by means of 
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programmed software (electronic agents), especially the 
allocation of responsibility of the related parties in case of 
alleged error or mistake resulting from a defect in the 
programmed software, should be definitely specified. As 
concerns formalities, the functional equivalent approach 
applied for lifting formality impediments is still debatable 
and needs much analysis. Likewise the issues relating to 
authentication of electronic documents and their 
admissibility and evidential value are far from being 
settled, especially in the light of lack of judicial precedents 
supporting any of the legislative endeavors made to this 
moment.   
  The growth and flourishing of electronic commerce need more 
collective efforts. These efforts should be of international nature so 
as to cope with the international dimensions of electronic 
commerce. These efforts should not be selective or targeting the 
interests of a particular group on the account of others. Moreover, 
for such efforts to succeed due regard has to be given to the social, 
cultural and political divergences. Scholars from all related 
specializations should participate in these efforts, without of 
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course, ignoring the roles of policy-makers and the public opinion 
at large. Any hasty endeavors may result in negative consequences. 
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Chapter 5 
Conflict of Laws Implications for Electronic Commerce and 
Intellectual Property 
 
     Introduction 
  As explained in the previous Chapter, the Internet has proven its 
potential as a useful medium for commercial activities of different 
kinds. As any other activity involving interaction of different entities, 
the possibility of disputes is unavoidable. Disputes may arise from 
contractual relationships or may result from infringements of rights. 
The unique features of the Internet have added a new dimension of 
complexity and confusion to the traditional rules of private 
international law. For example, traditionally, jurisdiction is defined by 
reference to a physical territory and although the traditional private 
international law rules witnessed along their evolution important 
transformations relating to the stringent physicality requirements 
embodied in the rules lex locus contractu and lex locus delicti, in 
favour of a more flexible system based on what is described as 
“interest analysis”, nevertheless; the essential requirement of some 
nexus between the concerned jurisdiction and the persons or 
transactions intended to be subject to it, has not been abandoned. The 
difficulty facing the traditional conflict of laws in this respect is that 
 299
the Internet has not only weakened the significance of physical 
locations, but destroyed them all together in three senses: first, the 
Internet ignores the existence of physical borders to an extent that 
events happening on the Internet may be described as happening 
simultaneously in every place reached by the Internet. Secondly, there 
are many events and transactions that may be described as having no 
physical locality in particular but taking place only on the network, 
which by its very nature is not a “localizable phenomenon”. For 
example, Usenet discussion groups, which consist of continuing 
changing collection of messages that are routed from one network to 
another across the global net, with no centralized location at all, may 
be considered as occurring everywhere, nowhere in particular. 
Thirdly, locations on the Internet can be conceived of only in a virtual 
sense by reference to the addresses of machines between which 
information and messages are routed. These addresses are independent 
of the physical locations in which those machines are located, that is, 
it is impossible to designate the physical location of users or resources 
merely by reference to the Internet’s addresses. This geographic 
indeterminacy is simply part of the network normal operation, without 
recourse to technological devices such cryptography or anonymous re-
mailers. Moreover, users of the Internet may not always be aware of 
the physical jurisdictions they visited while navigating the World 
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Wide Web through hyperlinks. So, due to the differences in the 
substantive laws of different countries, those users may be oblivious to 
the fact that they may violate laws of different jurisdictions while 
navigating the Internet. 
  However, even if the above difficulties have been 
surmounted, the application of the traditional private 
international law rules to the Internet transactions and 
infringement of rights via the Internet is controversial, 
especially with regard to transactions or infringements 
that take place completely online. For example, where 
there is no clause for choice of forum or the applicable 
law in case of transactions completely performed online, 
determining the place of performance is controversial. 
Likewise, in case of infringement of rights online such as 
downloading of an allegedly infringing copy of a 
copyrighted work from a foreign web site, a question 
arises as to where the alleged tort takes place. Is it in the 
place where the user’s computer is located or in the place 
where the server hosting the downloaded material is 
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situated? Similar difficult questions arise in case of 
infringement of other intellectual property rights. Even 
where there is a contractual choice of forum and 
applicable law, the application of the traditional 
mandatory rules relating to consumer protection to the 
Internet transactions has raised much controversy. Add 
to what is mentioned above, performance of transactions 
is another difficulty, especially in relation to small sized 
transactions. 
  This chapter studies the conflict of laws implications for 
electronic commerce. The focus will be on electronic 
commerce in intellectual-property-based products 
because these products can be transacted for and 
delivered online and much of the difficulties arise from 
the fact that the performance of electronic transactions 
and occurrence of infringing acts often take place 
completely online, a matter that adds further layer of 
complexity and confusion to the conflict of law rules. The 
complexity arises from the fact that protection of 
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intellectual property is traditionally based on 
territoriality whereas electronic commerce has 
international dimensions. The chapter is divided into 
three main parts. Part 1 deals with issues relating to 
jurisdiction. It is divided into two main subtitles 
discussing the general jurisdiction of courts, which is 
based on the domicile of the defendant, and the various 
cases of specific jurisdiction including jurisdiction on 
tortious acts, choice of jurisdiction, jurisdiction where 
there is no choice and jurisdiction on disputes involving 
consumers. Part 1 discusses the governing law. It is 
divided into four subtitles studying the applicable law 
where there is choice of law and where there is no choice 
of law and the limitations on the choice of law, in addition 
the study of the law applicable for infringements cases. 
Part 3 discusses the enforcement of rights. It is divided 
into four subtitles studying the need for effective 
enforcement in the Internet era, the difficulties relating to 
detection of infringements and identification of 
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wrongdoers, the insufficiency of the traditional means of 
enforcement and the attempts made to date in relation to 
enforcement including technical devices, alternative 
disputes resolution and direct enforcement.   
 
1. Jurisdiction 
 
  In a dispute involving foreign elements, the first question a court has 
to answer is whether it has jurisdiction to settle it. The term 
‘jurisdiction’ refers to the competence of courts and other tribunals to 
settle disputes with authority that makes the decisions binding and 
enforceable within their own system and capable of being recognized 
and enforced by courts and tribunals of other jurisdictions.439 
Jurisdiction is classified into two broad categories viz., criminal 
jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction. The focus here will be on civil 
jurisdiction because most of the disputes relating to electronic 
commerce and intellectual property fall within this category. 
Generally, although there are some regional conventions harmonizing 
the conflict of laws of their members, in principle each sovereign state 
determines its own conflict of law rules. However, lately the Hague 
                                                 
439  O’Brien, John ‘Conflict of Laws’. 2nd ed.,  Cavendish Publishing Limited – London, ( 1999), at 
175. 
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Conference on Private International Law issued a Preliminary Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, which was adopted by the Special Commission 
on 30 October 1999. The goals of this draft Convention are to 
harmonize jurisdiction rules among member countries, limit 
competent fora and simplify and expedite the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.440 Due to the lack of an international 
convention in this respect some concentration will be made on the 
provisions of the draft Convention together with the European 
Commission Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments 1999441, which is intended to replace the Brussels 
Convention of 1968, for the discussion of issues of jurisdiction in 
relation to electronic commerce and intellectual property. 
  Broadly, jurisdiction may be divided into general jurisdiction and 
special or specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction involves the cases 
where a court is competent to see all the claims against the defendant 
irrespective of their nature. Special or specific jurisdiction refers to 
cases in which jurisdictional rules are applied to certain areas 
prescribed by law such as contract, tort or exclusive jurisdiction.442 
                                                 
440  For the text of the draft Convention, see http://www.hccp.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html  
441  For the text of the European Regulation, see 
http://www.europa.eu.int/com/justice_home/pdf/com1999-348-en.pdf  
 
442  See WIPO Primer on Electronic Commerce and Intellectual Property Issues, (1999) at 5. Available 
at http://ecommerce.wipo.int/primer/index.html , visited June 2002. 
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i) General Jurisdiction 
  A court is said to have general jurisdiction when such jurisdiction is 
based on the domicile or habitual residence of the defendant not on the 
cause of action. In this respect Article 3(1) of the draft Hague 
Convention provides that “subject to the provisions of the Convention, 
a defendant may be sued in the courts of the State where that 
defendant is habitually resident”. The same rule has been provided for 
under Article 2 of the Regulation proposed by the European 
Commission, but the term used here is ‘domicile’ instead of ‘habitual 
residence’. The draft Hague Convention emphasizes that general 
jurisdiction should be based only on the habitual residence of the 
defendant, therefore, it prohibits under Article 18(1) the exercise of 
general jurisdiction by the courts of a Contracting State where the 
defendant is not habitually resident in that State. Paragraph 2 of this 
Article enumerates the cases in which a Contracting State is prohibited 
from assuming general jurisdiction solely on one or more of them. 
Among these cases is the case provided for under Article 18(2)(e), 
which prohibits general jurisdiction solely on the ground that the 
defendant carries on commercial or other activities. However, in such 
a case the court may assume specific jurisdiction if the dispute is 
directly related to those activities. It has been commented that this 
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provision would alter the longstanding practices of the USA courts, 
which assume general jurisdiction solely on the ground that the 
defendant is doing business in a systematic and continuous way in a 
particular jurisdiction.443 Under the US law the courts are authorized 
to assume general jurisdiction if the defendant is physically present in 
the forum state or if his “contacts with the forum are systematic and 
continuous enough that the defendant might anticipate defending any 
type of claim there”.444 However, in certain cases, general jurisdiction 
may not be exercised e.g., when the jurisdiction to settle a certain 
dispute is exclusively reserved by law for a certain jurisdiction. In this 
respect and as far as intellectual property is concerned, Article 12(4) 
of the draft Hague Convention provides that: 
         In proceedings which have as their object the registration, 
validity, [or] nullity, [, or revocation or infringement,] of 
patents, trademarks, designs or other similar rights required 
to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Contracting 
State in which the deposit or registration has been applied 
for, has taken place or, under the terms of an international 
convention, is deemed to have taken place, have exclusive 
                                                 
443  Ibid. 
444  See Burk, Dan L. ‘Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders’. 1Va. J. L. & Tech. 3 (Spring 1997), at 
7. Available at http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu,  See also Mark C. Dearing, ‘Personal Jurisdiction and 
the Internet: Traditional Principles and Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System into the 21st 
Century?’ 4 J. Tech. L.& Pol’y 4 , at 2. Available at: http://journal.law.ufl.edu/~techlaw/4/dearing.html  
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jurisdiction. This shall not apply to copyright or any 
neighboring rights, even though registration or deposit of 
such rights is possible. 
  It has been observed that in addition to copyright and neighboring 
rights, common law trademarks, which require no prior registration, 
are not covered by paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the draft Convention. 
The provision of Article 12(4) is viewed as broadening the scope of 
exclusive jurisdiction for certain proceedings of industrial property 
rights to include the exclusion of not only the grounds of general 
jurisdiction depending on domicile or habitual residence of the 
defendant, but also the grounds for specific jurisdiction such as the 
place of the occurrence of a tortious act. However, the exclusion by 
paragraph 5 of Article 12 of the proceedings concerning patents 
infringement from the rule under paragraph 4 has been debatable as 
the justification of differentiating between patents and trademarks in 
this respect is seen as inadequate. Therefore, the Special Commission 
of the Hague Conference indicated that a group of experts, including 
intellectual property specialists would be convened to address these 
issues.445  
  As far as jurisdiction over disputes relating to activities via the 
Internet is concerned, general jurisdiction poses no new difficult legal 
                                                 
 
445  See WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
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questions since it is based on the domicile or habitual residence of the 
defendant. The important factor, therefore, is to prove the domicile or 
habitual residence of the defendant. It has been stated that domicile 
has nothing to do with other complicated factors such as the location 
of a server. The ownership, control or access of a web site anywhere 
in the world is wholly irrelevant for determining the domicile of the 
defendant.446 However, difficulties arise in cases of specific 
jurisdiction where a defendant is haled to a jurisdiction other than the 
forum of his domicile or habitual residence. 
 
ii) Specific Jurisdiction  
 
    (a) Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights: Torts or Delicts 
  The easiness with which intellectual property materials 
can be uploaded on and downloaded from Internet web 
sites almost at no cost make them vulnerable to 
unauthorized exploitation all over the world. This 
unauthorized use constitutes infringement of the rights of 
intellectual property owners that falls under the category 
of torts or delicts. The draft Hague Convention dealt with 
                                                 
446  See Gringras, Clive ‘The laws of the Internet’. Butterworth, London (1997), at 36-7. 
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jurisdiction over tort or delict cases under Article 10, 
whereby it provides for non-exclusive special jurisdiction 
for this category. Paragraph 1 of Article 10 provides that: 
                     A plaintiff may bring an action in tort or delict in the courts 
of the State: (a) in which the act or omission that caused 
injury occurred, or (b) in which the injury arose, unless the 
defendant establishes that the person claimed to be 
responsible could not reasonably have foreseen that the act 
or omission could result in an injury of the same nature in 
that State.  
   It has been commented that the results of the application of Article 
10 to disputes relating to infringement of rights via the Internet are not 
clear. The difficulty arises from the fact that traditional private 
international law rules have been premised on physical “points of 
attachment”. This fact is reflected in the terms used in this Article 
such as “the State in which the injury occurred” or “in which the 
injury arose”. This approach may not be easily reconciled with the 
virtual de-localized nature of the Internet. For example, the 
localization of the occurrence of a tortious act resulting from 
downloading from a foreign web site of an allegedly infringing copy 
of a copyrighted work may be debatable. Does it occur on the user’s 
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forum where the infringing copy has been stored in the memory of the 
user’s computer or other digital device? Or does it occur on the 
country in which the server hosting the downloaded material is 
located? If the hosting on the server of the copyrighted material in the 
above example is not authorized and that the tortious act is considered 
to be occurring in the country in which that server is located, the 
question which arises is: can the owner of the server be sued under 
Article 10 (1) (b) in the forum where the injury to the owner of the 
copyrighted work arose i.e., the user’s forum State, unless he 
establishes that he could not have reasonably foreseen this?447   
   Moreover, the territoriality of protection of intellectual property adds 
a further difficulty. For example, does the use of a trademark on a web 
site located in a country where that trademark enjoys no protection 
constitute infringement of the rights of an identical trademark owner 
in another country in which that trademark is protected merely on the 
basis that the said web site is accessible in that country? Some suggest 
that jurisdiction should lie in the courts of the country in which the 
trademark is protected and in which the resulting injury arose i.e., the 
country where the trademark is viewed on that web site according to 
Article 10 (1)(b) of the draft Hague Convention. However, in this case 
the foreseeability test may be in favor of the web site owner unless the 
                                                 
447  See WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
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trademark owner succeeds in showing that the web site owner knows 
or should have known that his acts will cause injury in the country or 
countries where it is viewed.448 
  In the period from 2 to 4 September 1999, The Hague Permanent 
Bureau organized in Geneva a Round Table on the issues of private 
international law raised by electronic commerce and the Internet. It 
has been reported that Commission II, which discussed the application 
of Article 10 of the draft Hague Convention to torts online had not 
come to consensus on this issue. Some felt that Article 10 could not be 
used for torts online, and suggested instead “making a forum at the 
place of the habitual residence of the plaintiff, who is usually the 
victim”. Others accepted the wording of Article 10 but proposed to be 
accompanied by two presumptions: “(1) the ‘place of the act or 
omission’ causative of the injury would be situated at the place of 
habitual residence of the defendant or author of the act; (2) the ‘place 
where the injury arose’ would be situated at the place of habitual 
residence of the plaintiff or victim, or at the place where the most 
significant injury occurred”.449  
  The Internet Law and Policy Forum (ILPF), which is a non-profit 
organization of twenty-five companies, most of them multinational 
                                                 
448  Ibid. 
449  See Kessedjian, Catherine, ‘Electronic Data Interchange, Internet and Electronic Commerce’ 
Available at: ftp://hccp.net/doc/gen_pd7e.doc at 22. 
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companies engaging in Internet-related businesses, submitted its views 
about the applicability of the draft Hague Convention to electronic 
commerce to the expert meeting organized by The Hague Conference 
in Ottawa in the period from February 28 to March 1, 2000 to examine 
the issues raised by electronic commerce in relation to the 
international jurisdiction of the courts. As concerns Article 10 of the 
Convention, the ILPF argues that the foreseeability condition for 
conferring jurisdiction on the court of the plaintiff forum under Article 
10 (1) (b) could not be avoided in the light of the global accessibility 
of web sites and as such the risks from the draft Convention 
jurisdictional rules for business interests that use the Internet outweigh 
any of the other associated benefits. Therefore, according to IPLF, 
Article 10 should either be deleted from the Convention or otherwise 
be narrowly applied e.g., “rules to allow claims and enforce judgments 
for physical harm to natural persons – can and should be explored”.450 
Yet, the Ottawa experts meeting discussed the applicability of Article 
10 of the draft Hague Convention and concluded that due to the 
difficulty of determining the location of the defendant, it would be 
necessary to have an alternative forum to the defendant’s forum. 
Therefore, Article 10 (1) (b) and (4) which conferred jurisdiction on 
                                                 
450  See Statement of the Internet Law and Policy Forum submitted to the Meeting of Experts on 
Electronic Commerce and International Jurisdiction, Ottawa, convened in the period from 26 February 
to 2 March 2000, at 4-5. Available at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/hague-stmt2.htm,   
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the plaintiff’s forum courts were found to be suitable for online 
torts.451  
          However, the study of the practices of US courts in this respect may 
be useful. Traditionally, “the Due process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution allows a court to require 
a non-resident defendant to stand trial only in the forum state where 
the court properly exercises personal jurisdiction over the defendant”. 
The Due Process Limitations require that specific jurisdiction on a 
non-resident defendant should be exercised only where the defendant 
has ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state to an extent that he 
foresees or should have foreseen that he may be haled into court in the 
forum state. Therefore, the minimum contacts test must comply with 
the Due Process and the traditional notions of ‘fair play and 
substantial justice’. To qualify for this, the minimum contacts test 
must satisfy three elements: first, the defendant must purposefully 
avail himself of benefits with the forum state. Secondly, the claim 
must arise of his activities with a forum state. Thirdly, the exercise of 
jurisdiction must be reasonable. “Factors in determining 
reasonableness include the burden placed on the defendant, the forum 
state’s interest in the outcome, the plaintiff’s interests in obtaining 
relief, the judicial system’s interest in a most efficient resolution, and 
                                                 
451  See Kessedjian, Catherine, ‘Electronic Commerce and International Jurisdiction, Ottawa 28 
February to 1 March 2000, at 8.. Available at: ftp://hccp.net/doc/jdgmpd12.doc, . 
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furthering social policies shared by the states”.452 As far as jurisdiction 
on a non-resident defendant for a tortious act is concerned, the effect 
of the tortious act must be felt in the plaintiff’s forum state, in addition 
to some type of activity in the forum state such as solicitation of 
business, persistent contact, reasonable expectation of the possibility 
of occurrence of an injury within the forum state or obtaining 
substantial revenue from interstate business.453 The ‘effect test’ 
developed by the American Supreme Court in the famous authority of 
Calder v. Jones454 has been followed in many subsequent precedents. 
In this case, a publisher in Florida published in its magazine an 
allegedly libelous article about an actress who lived in California. The 
Supreme Court found that the exercise of jurisdiction in California 
was proper, as the defendant knew that the plaintiff was in California 
and that he made telephone calls to collect data for the article from 
California and published the article in a magazine of a large 
circulation in California, intending to cause injury to the respondent in 
California.455     
          Generally, when extending the above general rules to jurisdiction 
over online activities the US courts differentiate between passive web 
                                                 
452  See Dearing, supra note 6, at 2. See also Burk, supra note 6, at 7. 
453  See Kuester, Jeffrey and Graves, Jennifer M., ‘Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet: Where is 
Cyberspace’, at 4. Available at http://www.tkhr.com . 
454 465 U.S. 783 (1984)  
455  Burk, supra note 6, at 7-8. 
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sites and interactive web sites. In cases of passive web site the courts 
often tend to refuse the exercise of jurisdiction when there is no 
interactivity between the web site and the Internet users. For example, 
in Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc.,456 the Arizona-based plaintiff, the 
owner of a registered trademark ‘Cybersell’ sued the defendant in 
Arizona for trademark infringement based on the use by the defendant 
at his web site of a trademark identical to the plaintiff’s trademark 
‘Cybersell’. The court found that the defendant did not encourage 
Internet users in Arizona to access his web site, there were no ‘hits’ by 
Arizona residents to the defendant web site (except by the plaintiff), 
there were no contacts, telephone calls, sales or messages exchanged 
or income derived from Arizona residents, therefore, the court 
concluded that the actions of the defendant lacked “purposeful 
availment” of the laws of Arizona and held that extension of specific 
jurisdiction merely on the basis of passive contact would be 
improper.457 In Bensusan Restaurant Corp v. King458, the plaintiff 
operated a jazz bar in New York City called ‘Blue Note’ and had a 
registered trademark for that name. The defendant operated a jazz bar 
carrying the same name in Missouri and had a web site advertising for 
the bar and including contact information for it in Missouri. The web 
                                                 
456  No. 96-17087 (C.A. 9th 1997). 
457  See Burk, supra note 6, at 7-8.  
458  No. 96-9344 (C.A. 2d. 1997) – September 10, 1997. 
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site contained no interactivity with Internet users and provided no 
means for purchasing ticket other than referring to the appropriate 
contact for those interested. The plaintiff sued the defendant in New 
York alleging trademark infringement, dilution and unfair 
competition. The defendant moved for dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction. The court held that personal jurisdiction did not exist. The 
court justified its decision by saying that “the mere fact that a person 
can gain information on the allegedly infringing products is not the 
equivalent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise 
making an effort to target its product in New York”. It went on to say 
that the defendant had not availed himself of the benefit of New York 
and that advertising products on a web site was like placing products 
into the stream of commerce, which might have been felt nationwide, 
but without more it would not be considered as purposely directed 
toward the forum state.459   
  On the other hand, in many cases the courts construed the 
interactivity between a web site and users from the state forum as 
indication of purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business. 
For example, in CompuServe Inc., v. Patterson460, Patterson and 
CompuServe contacted solely via the Internet, whereby Patterson 
made a contract with CompuServe so as to distribute software 
                                                 
459  See Dearing, supra note 6, at 6. 
460  89 F. 3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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belonging to him through CompuServe web site. The contract 
provided that Ohio law was applicable. Later Patterson discovered that 
CompuServe was distributing software of its own under a name 
similar to his product. He contacted Patterson accusing it of infringing 
his common law trademark and claimed for damages. CompuServe, 
the Ohio-based plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against 
Patterson, the Texas-based defendant, that it had not infringed 
Patterson’s trademark. Patterson pleaded lack of jurisdiction. The 
court ruled that it had jurisdiction to see the case. It justified this by 
saying that the defendant satisfied the requirement of purposeful 
availment of the privilege of doing business in Ohio, as he had been a 
party to a contract governed by Ohio law and exchanged multiple 
Internet communication with CompuServe.461 CompuServe has been 
criticized on the ground that the contract and the contacts made had no 
relation with the dispute before the court and should not have been 
taken into account. The mere relevant contact was the letter sent by 
Patterson to CompuServe accusing it of infringement of his trademark. 
If such letter would be considered enough for exercising jurisdiction, 
this would mean that a plaintiff would surrender jurisdiction any time 
he notified another party of a dispute.462 In Zippo Manufacturing Co. 
                                                 
461  Ibid. 
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v. Zippo Dot, Inc.,463 a Pennsylvania plaintiff sued in Pennsylvania a 
California defendant for trademark infringement and dilution. The 
court found that the defendant had entered into contracts with at least 
three thousand via the Internet with forum state residents and 
concluded seven agreements with service providers there. After 
reviewing the previous precedents the court concluded that it had 
jurisdiction to see the case because the defendant purposefully availed 
itself of benefits from association with Pennsylvania, thus permitting 
personal jurisdiction to that forum, as his acts were not mere 
advertisements but electronic commerce. 
          However; a recent case, Pavlovich v. Superior Court464, decided on 
August 7, 2001, disregarded the differentiation made by other 
American courts between passive and interactive web sites for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction on non-resident defendants. In this 
case the defendant published on his passive web site a computer 
program enabling decryption of DVD CCA’s encryption-based copy 
protection system used to protect copyrighted movies contained on 
digital versatile disc (DVDs). The interested party, DVD Copy 
Control Association, Inc., sued the defendant and others for 
misappropriation of its trade secrets in California state court. Although 
nothing was proved against the defendant other than the posting of the 
                                                 
463  952 F. Supp. 1119 (W. .D. Pa. 1997). 
464  (Cal. App. 2001) 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 91 Cal. App. 4th 623. 
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allegedly infringing software on his passive web site the court, 
following the ‘effect test’ applied in Calder case held that it had 
jurisdiction to see the case. It based its decision on the following: 
                Because that Pavlovich knew that California is commonly 
known as the center of the movie industry, and knew that 
Silicon Valley in California is one of the top three 
technology ‘hot spots’ in the country, he knew or should 
have known, that the DVD republishing and distribution 
activities he was illegally doing and allowing to be done 
through the use of his Web site, while benefiting him, were 
injuriously affecting the motion picture and computer 
industries in California. The question is whether Pavlovich’s 
lack of physical and personal presence in California 
incapacitates California courts from jurisdictionally 
reaching him through its long-arm statute. We hold it does 
not.465    
 
   (b) Disputes Involving Contracts between Businesses where there is no 
Choice of Forum: 
         In respect of contracts involving supply of goods or provision of 
services or both, Article 6 of the draft Hague Convention permits a 
                                                 
465  See Wildasin, Mark H. and Jones, Richard A., ‘Internet Jurisdiction: Is Pavlovich an Abberation or 
Can You be Sued Anywhere There’s a Modem’. Available at 
http://www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil_dec01_1.html, at 1-17. 
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plaintiff to bring an action in contract in the courts of the state where 
the goods are supplied wholly or in part in case of supply of goods, or 
where the services are provided in case of provision of services, or 
where the performance of the principal obligation took place in whole 
or in part if the contract involves both supply of goods and provision 
of services. Article 5 of the European Regulation provides that for 
matters relating to contracts, a person may be sued in the courts of a 
Member State of the place of “performance of the obligation in 
question”. The place of performance in relation to goods and service is 
defined as the place where the goods or services are delivered or 
provided or should have been delivered or provided respectively. 
However, with regard to goods or services delivered or provided 
offline, even if contracting for them takes place online, the existing 
rules of private international law remain relevant as it is easy to 
designate the place of performance in the physical world. But the 
difficulty arises where both the contracting for and delivery or 
provision of goods or services take place online. Where is the place of 
performance in such a case? Is it the place of the purchaser’s computer 
where the goods or services are received (e.g., in form of 
downloadable software) or in the seller’s system (e.g., the sale of 
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securities, which performed through computing processes take place 
in the seller’s system)? 466  
          In its study of the issues raised by electronic commerce, the Ottawa 
expert meeting noticed on its analysis of Article 6 of the draft Hague 
Convention that the traditional distinction between goods and services 
is not realistic for electronic transactions. Moreover, putting in mind 
the European Directive on Electronic Commerce, which treated the 
subject matter of electronic exchange as equivalent to services, all the 
participants agreed that such subject matter of electronic exchange is 
primarily information and that its classification as equivalent to 
services is not important, since the need for such qualification for the 
purpose of the Convention is not certain. Some experts expressed the 
opinion that “for purposes of jurisdiction, the actual nature of what is 
exchanged by the parties to the contract is unimportant, provided it is 
made clear that the present Article 6 does not apply to a contract 
performed online”. However, a majority of the experts were of 
opinion that a supplementary clause for Article 6 may be needed, 
though no consensus was reached as to the content of any future 
supplementary rule. Yet all the participants agreed that a special care 
is required when coordinating the existing Article 6 of the draft Hague 
Convention with any future supplementary clause for contracts 
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performed online. Moreover, it has been noticed that “all the proposals 
made were based on the idea that a rebuttable presumption would 
suffice for the place of performance or, more precisely, the place of 
delivery of the information”. In this regard it was recommended that 
the drafting of the supplementary clause could be premised on Article 
15 (4) of the 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law, which makes a 
presumption that, in the absence of agreement between the parties, a 
data message is dispatched at the place where the originator has its 
place of business and received where the addressee has its place of 
business.467   
          Furthermore, the experts meeting acknowledged the difficulty of 
identification and location of the parties to online contracts. Therefore, 
it is recommended that freedom of contracting should be respected 
and that each party should exert efforts to get enough information 
from the other party and verify that such information match with the 
reality. Each party will be bound by the information he supplies to the 
other party as concerns his identity and location. Moreover; the court 
may, according to Article 22, refrain from exercising jurisdiction 
under Article 6. It is recommended that this should extend to the case 
                                                 
467  See Kessedjian, ‘Electronic Commerce’, supra note 13, at 5. 
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where the co-contractor gave false information solely in order to 
confer jurisdiction on a particular court.468  
 
   (c) Contractual Choice of Forum:    
           Choice of forum raises no difficulties for electronic commerce and 
it is welcome and encouraged as it lifts many of the obstacles facing 
the parties to an electronic contract. Many international conventions 
respect the principle of party autonomy and allow freedom of 
contracting except in specific areas prescribed by law such as the 
case where the law confers exclusive jurisdiction on certain court or 
courts. For example, Article 4 (1) of the draft Hague Convention 
provides that: 
                 If the parties have agreed that a court or courts of a 
Contracting State shall have jurisdiction to settle any 
dispute which has arisen or may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall 
have jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction shall be exclusive 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Where an 
agreement having exclusive effect designates a court or 
courts of a non-Contracting State, courts in Contracting 
States shall decline jurisdiction or suspend proceedings 
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unless the court or courts chosen have themselves declined 
jurisdiction. 
          It has been commented that paragraph 2 of Article 4 adopts a liberal 
approach as concerns the formalities required for the validity of an 
agreement, conferring jurisdiction on a certain court. All that is 
required is a minimum degree of reliability of the document 
containing the agreement.469  
 
 
   (d) Consumer contracts 
      Typically, consumers are considered by legislators as the weak party 
and granted special status. For example, both the draft Hague 
Convention and the European Regulation stipulate that a consumer 
can sue the other party, in relation to trade or professional activities 
the other party has engaged in or directed to the consumer’s forum, 
particularly the cases of soliciting business by means of publicity, at 
the court of habitual residence or domicile of the consumer or the 
court of the domicile or habitual residence of the other party and that a 
consumer can be sued only at the court of his domicile or his habitual 
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residence. No departure from these provisions is allowed except an 
agreement made after the dispute has arisen.470 
          In an Internet environment, the place from which a consumer 
contacts an interactive web site may be difficult or impossible to 
determine and may not be relevant for connecting the consumer’s state 
with the contract he makes with that web site. Therefore, aware of the 
difficulties presented by electronic commerce, the European 
Regulation, unlike the draft Hague Convention, omits the requirement 
that a consumer takes the necessary steps to conclude the contract in 
his state. It has been stated that the focus should be made of the 
business that “pursues commercial or professional activities in the 
Member State” or directing, by any means, such activities to that 
Member State.471 
          The mandatory rules in the draft Hague Convention for the protection 
of consumers, which invalidate any contravening term in a contract 
with a consumer, has raised much controversy especially from the side 
of business. For example, the ILPF contends that the Convention 
should emphasize and strengthen the party autonomy, which is a 
fundamental principle of private international law and trade. 
Therefore, the ILPF recommends that the jurisdictional rules provided 
                                                 
470  See Article 7 of the draft Hague Convention, supra note 2. See also Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the 
European Regulation supra note 3. 
471  WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 8. 
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for under Article 7 of the Convention may be premature and they 
“must be allowed to evolve further under national law before being 
‘hardwired’ into an international convention that seeks widespread 
acceptance and certainty of interpretation”.472 The ILPF refused the 
concept of ‘jurisdictional avoidance’ proposed by some as a means by 
which business can avoid the provisions of the Convention in relation 
to transactions with consumers within a national boundary, such as 
disclaimers, non-targeting etc., because the consequences of applying 
such measures are not secured.473 Likewise, the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) argues that the aggressive assertion of jurisdiction 
could subject companies to the courts and laws of any country in the 
world in which their web sites can be accessed and this will result in 
legal uncertainty for business as concerns the basic legal paradigm of 
consumer shopping on the Internet. As a result, businesses may be 
forced to limit their markets and products. Thus consumers may be 
deprived of competitive goods or services merely because of their 
residence. Within the context of showing the difference between 
offline and online commerce the ICC puts, in bold type, this debatable 
question: “has the merchant created a virtual storefront in the buyer’s 
jurisdiction to make a sale, or has the purchaser virtually traveled to 
the seller’s jurisdiction to make a purchase?” To avoid the legal 
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uncertainty to businesses and the difficulty of execution of judgments 
both for businesses and consumers, the ICC recommends an approach 
for solution which consists of three steps: step one is represented in 
reasonable attempts for utilization of a company’s internal customer 
satisfaction mechanism; step two involves utilization of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), such as online settlement of disputes; step 
three is a legal action to be resorted to only if the dispute persists after 
applying the other two steps. If a legal action is needed, governments 
should “avoid expansive jurisdictional claims by applying principles 
of ‘country-of-origin’ and party autonomy”.474 In the light of these 
contentions both of Geneva expert meeting and Ottawa expert meeting 
recommended for the freedom of parties to a consumer contract if the 
consumer is habitually resident in a country recognizing the validity of 
such contracts. Thus, a clause should be added to Article 7 (3) of the 
draft Hague Convention providing that “if the contract is concluded by 
a consumer who is habitually resident in a State which has declared 
that these contracts are valid as against consumers”.475   
                                                 
474  See ICC Policy Statement concerning Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Electronic Commerce – 
Electronic Commerce Project (ECP)’s Ad hoc Task Force, 6 June 2001. Available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/2001/jurisdiction_and_applicable_law.asp, 
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       2. The Governing Law 
i) Choice of the Applicable Law 
  The parties to a contract may choose expressly or impliedly the law 
governing their contractual relationship. At common law the parties 
are free to choose the law to be applicable to their contracts. The 
leading case in this respect is the case of Vita Food Products Inc. v. 
Unus Shipping Co ltd.,476 which established that the parties were free 
to select any law to govern their contract, regardless of the connection 
of the chosen law with the contract, provided that such choice was 
bona fide, legal and not contrary to English public policy. This 
position has been confirmed by the Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980, which provides under 
Article 3(1) thereof that a contract shall be subject, wholly or in part, 
to the choice of its parties. This choice may be express or 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty from the terms of the contract 
or the circumstance of the case. Both at common law and under the 
Rome Convention, the law chosen by the parties need not be 
connected with their contract. However, if such a contract is wholly 
connected with a single country, the mandatory rules of that country 
cannot be derogated from under the Rome Convention even if the 
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parties choose another legal system to be applicable to their 
contract.477 
  The express choice happens when the parties insert a clause in their 
contract specifying the applicable law or do this in a separate 
agreement. In such a case the clause or the separate agreement must 
indicate a particular territorial legal system; otherwise this may result 
in confusion, which needs to be removed by other means. For 
example, a choice of a multi-systems forum such as British law or 
American law as such, may need further localization; especially in 
case of difference in the legal provisions within this multi-systems 
forum. Moreover, incorporation of certain provisions of a legal system 
into a contract will not be considered as choice of that legal system 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention. In such a 
case those provisions will be treated as additional contractual terms 
and the governing law has to be determined by reference to the 
provisions of the Convention. However, the incorporation of certain 
provisions from a legal system is viewed by some as an implied 
choice of that legal system.478  
  The implied choice of law occurs when the intention of the parties to 
a contract can be demonstrated with reasonable certainty from the 
conduct of the parties and from other surrounding circumstances. It 
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has been stated that there are certain cases from which a choice of law 
might be inferred. Examples of such cases include: first, the use of a 
particular standard form contract may give indication that the parties 
chose impliedly a particular legal system as was held in the case of 
Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Co,,479 
where the House of Lords construed the use of Lloyd’s marine 
insurance policy as implied choice of English law. Secondly, where 
there was an express choice of law in previous dealings between the 
parties, an implied choice of that law may be inferred in a subsequent 
contract between the same parties, especially if the subsequent 
contract was similar in character to the previous dealings. Thirdly, a 
choice of forum may imply the choice of the law of that forum. 
Fourthly, an express choice of law may imply a choice of that law in a 
related transaction. For example, “where a contract between A and B 
contains an express choice of English law, it may be possible to imply 
a choice of English law where C undertakes to guarantee the 
obligation of A”.480  
  The same above rules can be applied to a choice of law in a contract 
concluded via the Internet.481However, some provisions may need to 
be amended to cope with the peculiar nature of the Internet. For 
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example, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) of the US provides 
that “when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and 
also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either 
of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights 
and duties”. A reasonable relation has been found where the contract 
is made or a significant part of it is performed. This provision is 
considered as unsuitable for online contracts, as it may not be easy to 
determine the place of contracting or performance. Therefore, the 
proviso of ‘reasonable relation’ has been omitted in the UCITA which 
provides under s. 109(a) that other than in consumer contracts, the 
parties to a contract may choose the law applicable to their contractual 
relationship.482 However, the right of the parties to choose the 
governing law is not absolute but subject to some limitations. 
 
ii) Limitations on the Choice of the Applicable Law 
  Under Article 3(3) of the Rome Convention, where all the other 
elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are 
connected with a single country, the parties to a contract cannot 
derogate from the mandatory rules of that country by choice of a 
foreign law to govern their contract. For example, if the parties to a 
contract are nationals of a certain country and their contract should be 
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performed in that country and all other relevant contacts are with that 
country, the choice by the parties of a foreign law, whether or not 
accompanied by a choice of forum, will not exclude the mandatory 
rules of their country to which their contract is wholly connected. A 
mandatory rule is that which cannot be derogated from by contract. 
Examples of the mandatory rules are those relating to unfair 
contractual terms, where their enforcement will be contrary to the 
public policy of the concerned country such as contracts of adhesion, 
consumer contracts and employment contracts.483  
  As far as online contracts are concerned the mandatory rules are 
reflected mainly in the area of consumer contracts. In this respect the 
EU Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 1993 may give 
a good example.484 Under Article 3 (2) a term is unfair if “1) it has not 
been individually negotiated; and 2) it causes a significant imbalance 
in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer. The provisions of this Directive are 
applicable to online contracts. According to this Directive the court 
may remove the unfair terms and enforce the rest of the contract if it is 
enforceable without those terms, otherwise the entire contract is 
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voided.485 The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act 
(UCITA) 1999 of the US, provides for similar provisions under s. 111, 
but they may not be applied as under s. 104 the parties may choose not 
to subject their contract to UCITA.486 Another example is the EU 
Directive 97/7/EC on Distance Contracts487 This Directive sets 
mandatory rules aimed at the protection of consumers especially as 
regards pre-contract information given to a consumer about the 
identity of the seller or the supplier, the characteristics of the goods or 
services and their prices and the way of payment etc. Also there must 
be a written confirmation to be sent to the consumer not later than the 
time of delivery and in such a case the consumer has the option to 
withdraw within 7 working days. If no written confirmation about the 
information was given to the consumer, the option of the consumer to 
withdraw extends to 30 days.488 
 
iii) The Applicable Law where there is no Choice of Law 
   Under the common law rules where there was no choice by the 
parties to a contract of the governing law, the court should apply the 
system of law with which the contract was most closely connected. 
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The factors need to be considered for determining the most closely 
connected legal system include: the place of contracting, the place of 
performance, the language of the contract, the money of the account, 
the personal law of the parties and all other circumstances surrounding 
the contract. This position has been confirmed by the Rome 
Convention, which provides under paragraph 1 of Article 4 that in the 
absence of choice, the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country with which it is most closely connected. Under paragraphs 2, 
3 and 4 of Article 4 there are three rebuttable presumptions for 
determining the country, which is most connected with the contract: 
(1) it is the country in which the party who carries the characteristic 
performance has his habitual residence, its central administration, its 
principal place of business or a place other than the principal place of 
business if performance is to be effected through that other place. (2) 
Where the contract relates to a right in immovable property, it is the 
country in which that immovable property is situated. (3) Where the 
contract is for carriage of goods and the country in which the carrier 
has his principal place of business at the time of contracting is also the 
place of loading, discharge or the principal place of business of the 
consignor, that country is presumed to be the most connected country 
with the contract. However, paragraph 5 of the same Article provides 
that “ paragraph 2 shall not apply if the characteristic performance 
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cannot be determined, and the presumptions in paras 2,3 and 4 shall be 
disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country”.489 
  The Rome Convention has not defined the term ‘characteristic 
performance’. It has been stated that the doctrine of characteristic 
performance is “a novel and somewhat controversial aspect of the 
Rome Convention 1980 deriving from Swiss law”.490 The familiar 
concept at common law is that of the place of performance (lex loci 
solutionis). But the difficulty here is that in case of an ordinary 
bilateral contract for the sale of goods, for instance, there may be two 
places of performance; one place for the delivery of the goods and 
another for the payment. Some commentators identified the 
characteristic performance as the one “which usually constitutes the 
center of gravity and the socioeconomic purpose of the contractual 
transaction”. In such circumstances it is believed that in case of sale of 
goods or service, the characteristic performance is the work done 
rather than the payment for it. Therefore, the applicable law is that of 
the seller’s place of business. This difficulty has been compounded in 
case of online contracts because it may not be clear in an electronic 
contract in a digital form which party carries the characteristic 
performance. S. 109 (b) of UCITA sorts out three groups of 
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contracting and the applicable law for each group where there is no 
enforceable choice-of-law term. The first group involves access 
contracts or contracts for electronic delivery of copies. The applicable 
law to this group, in absence of choice, is the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the licensor is located at the time of contracting. The Official 
Comment on UCITA clarifies that the aim of this provision is to create 
certainty for online vendors, large or small, in the context of digital 
networks that makes access available to the entire world via the 
Internet. It is believed that in the absence of such provision an online 
vendor may need to know the laws of countries all over the world and 
comply with all of them, as it may not be clear or even knowable 
where a contract is formed or information sent. The second group 
includes consumer transactions that require delivery of a copy on a 
tangible medium e.g., CD-Rom. The governing law, in absence of 
choice, is the law of “the jurisdiction in which the copy is or should 
have been delivered to the consumer”. The justification here is that the 
vendor knows the physical place of delivery and has to comply with 
the mandatory laws of the consumer’s forum. The third group includes 
all other cases. The law that governs this group, in absence of choice, 
is “the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to 
the transaction”. It has been stated that by referring to the ‘most 
significant relationship’, UCITA codifies the traditional principles of 
 337
law to give the court “some flexibility in weighing the various factors 
that might be relevant in the online environment”.491   
   iv) The Applicable Law in infringements Cases  
  Generally, there are many theories as concerns the law applicable in 
respect of a foreign tort. One of these theories is the lex fori, where the 
court can apply the law of the forum. Another theory is lex loci delicti 
commissi, where the court can apply the law of the place in which the 
tort was committed. A third theory is the proper law theory where the 
court can apply the “law which, on policy grounds, seems to have the 
most significant connection with the chain of acts and circumstances 
in the particular situation”. The American courts have followed the 
proper law theory.492 Traditionally, the English common law since the 
decision in Phillips v. Eyre493 in 1870, adopted the so-called double 
actionability rule, which is a mixture of lex fori and lex loci delicti 
commissi, where an English court would not accept a suit for a wrong 
alleged to be committed abroad unless that wrong was actionable if 
committed in England and not justifiable by the law of the place 
where it was committed. Although since the decision in Boys v. 
Chaplin494 in 1971, the double actionability rule might be departed 
from in exceptional cases depending on the factual links of each case, 
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yet it remained effective until it was abolished by the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. This Act 
establishes a general rule in favour of the lex loci delicti, with room 
for the application of the proper law in exceptional cases.495 
  Different views have been advanced as concerns the law applicable 
in cases of tort committed via the Internet. For example, in the Geneva 
expert meeting the experts had been divided into groups. One group 
suggested the application of the lex fori, on the ground that “the 
conflict of jurisdiction ‘absorbs’ the conflict of laws”. A second group 
preferred that a victim should be given the option to choose the law of 
the country where the tortious act was committed or the law of the 
country where it was sustained. According to this group the injurious 
act is presumed to occur in the country in which the defendant has his 
habitual residence and the country where the injury is sustained 
provided that it is the country in which the victim has his habitual 
residence. However, observing the complexity of the system proposed, 
the latter group suggested that “the applicable law should be defined 
by a conflict rule based on the center of gravity or the test of the 
closest connection”.496 
  In case of alleged infringement of copyright, Article 5 (2) of the 
Berne Convention provides that “the extent of protection, as well as 
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the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall 
be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed”. The interpretation of this provision has raised controversy. 
Is it a choice-of-law rule, or a mere principle of nondiscrimination, or 
both? A further complexity is added by the ambiguity of the phrase 
“the country where protection is claimed”. It has been commented that 
although this may be construed to refer to the law of the forum where 
the infringement suit is commenced, the majority of commentators 
prefer a reading in which this phrase is to be construed as to mean the 
country in which protection is sought from an infringing act takes 
place there.497 However, if the latter view is to be adopted, in the light 
of the multiplicity of forums that may result from infringement via the 
Internet, the question which arises is whether the Berne Convention 
“requires strictly territorial approach, applying successfully the law of 
each country of receipt, or will it suffice to apply the law of the 
country of the initiation of the infringement”? If the answer is that the 
law of each country should be applied the person who seeks protection 
may either refer to the courts of each country where the infringing act 
takes place or commences a comprehensive suit in one forum where 
the court will need to assess the scope of rights, the alleged 
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infringement and the appropriate remedies country-by-country.498 
Bearing in mind the impracticality of applying a territorial approach as 
concerns the law applicable for infringements, some commentators 
point to the experience of the European Commission with satellite 
transmissions. Like the Internet, the satellite transmissions have the 
capability of instantaneous dissemination to multiple countries. The 
satellite Directive of the European Commission provides that “the 
copyright-triggering act of ‘communication to the public’ occurs in the 
country from which the satellite signal is up-linked”. Applying this to 
online copyright infringement, the country from which the alleged 
multi-country infringements are initiated will be the “country where 
protection is claimed’ within the meaning of Article 5 (2) of the Berne 
Convention. Although such approach will simplify choice of law in 
multi-jurisdiction infringement, there are fears that certain countries 
may turn to be havens for copyright infringement. In addition, there is 
the difficulty of locating the source of communication in certain cases 
e.g., where the source is anonymous or where a server is located in a 
place different from that of its owner. It has been acknowledged that 
“the choice of law issues raised by electronic commerce and digital 
communications will remain complex and difficult in relation to the 
protection and exploitation of intellectual property”. Therefore, it is 
                                                 
498  Ibid. 
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recommended that a further study and work are needed so as to trigger 
new international responses.499    
 
 
3. Enforcement of Rights 
 
 i) The Need for Effective Enforcement 
             Intellectual property rights are of no value without enforcement. The 
fact that intellectual property rights are traditionally territorially-based 
rights has complicated the international enforcement of these rights. 
The last two decades had witnessed international upsurge in 
counterfeit and pirated goods. Many factors have led to the growth 
and expansion of these illegal practices including: “the dramatic 
increase in international trade, the dismantling of certain borders 
controls, the difficulties experienced by national enforcement agencies 
in keeping up with the speed of development and volume of traffic, 
and the formidable expansion of technologies”.500  
            Moreover, a new challenge has been posed by the emergence of the 
Internet and electronic commerce. The capabilities of the Internet have 
rendered the uploading and downloading of intellectual property 
materials an easy task. Software, text, music and images are reduced 
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in digital form and transmitted immediately to any place in the world 
reached by the Internet. It is believed that piracy threatens all 
intellectual-property-based industries and creative individuals, and 
clouds the future of legitimate electronic commerce.501 However, even 
legitimate dealings via the Internet may result in disputes requiring 
effective response for their resolution, especially disputes involving 
consumers.  These new challenges require further efforts to combat 
infringements of rights and settle disputes in efficient, cost-effective 
and fast way. It is believed that the “traditional forms of international 
legal redress (recognition and enforcement of judgments) are too 
costly and cumbersome. Injunctive relief, electronic access to out of 
court settlements (arbitration) and the duty of service providers to 
identify themselves and their place of business are the truly relevant 
legal issues”.502 Different views have been advanced and various 
practical attempts have been made to achieve those objectives. Yet, 
there are many barriers impeding the achievement of these objectives 
such as the difficulty of detecting infringements, and identifying the 
wrongdoers in the light of privacy requirements. 
ii) Barriers to Effective Enforcement  
         (a) Difficulty of Detection of Infringements 
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  Detection of infringements on the Internet is not an easy task. The 
big number of Internet web sites and the different ways of duplication 
and manipulation of data in perfect, instant and infinite forms coupled 
with the difficulty of being detected or traced, have encouraged 
infringing activities all around the globe. “Given the reach of the 
Internet, content in digital form can be disseminated instantaneously 
worldwide, thereby vastly increasing the ease with which intellectual 
property can be infringed, either inadvertently or through piracy and 
counterfeiting”.503 Moreover, the international dimension of the 
Internet renders enforcement a difficult job of uncertain results. In 
addition, the transient nature of the digital data has compounded the 
difficulty of detection, whereby infringing material on the Internet 
may be removed from web sites or server after a short period of its 
posting, thus making the tracing of these infringing materials a 
daunting task. Sites closed here may reopen there under a different 
name or mirror across multiple jurisdictions thereby frustrating the 
effects of local enforcement proceedings. The difficulty of detecting 
and tracing infringing materials has stimulated specialized entities to 
assume the profession of policing the Internet searching or tracing 
infringing materials on behalf of their owners in consideration of a 
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certain charge. Once an infringement has been detected, the next step 
is to identify the wrongdoer.504   
 
   (b) Identification of Wrongdoers and Privacy Requirements 
          The peculiar features of the Internet make identification of Internet’s 
users very difficult if not impossible, especially if a user uses technical 
devices for hiding his identity. Tools for anonymous dealings, such as 
anonymous remailer programs and encryption technology, are 
available in the market. Despite the efforts of many service providers, 
such as domain name registrars, bulletin board operators and 
commercial web page hosts, to get personal data from their customers 
for future contact, they often discover that the information they got 
was false and as such they would not be able to take any action against 
non-complying customers.505 Different reasons lie behind anonymity. 
Some view it as a means of protecting personal privacy. Others find in 
it a means for free speech. Further others may want “to transact 
anonymously because they are involved in criminal activity and do not 
want to leave a trail of their dealings or because they want to evade 
tax”. Of course those using the Internet for criminal activities or civil 
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wrongs use anonymity so as not to be traced.506 Lately, the issue of 
anonymous communication has gained legal support in a recent 
judgment issued by a New Jersey court in November 2000, where the 
court held that “a software company is not entitled to learn the 
identities of two ‘John Doe’ defendants who anonymously posted 
critical comments on a Yahoo message board”.507 The right of privacy 
has raised great controversy due to the different international 
perception of this right. It has attracted more attention in the era of the 
Internet due to the commercial value of personal data. The collection 
and exploitation of personal data for commercial purposes have 
become a business in itself. The European Directive on Data 
Protection 1998 “prohibits the flow of personal information about 
E.U. citizens to countries outside the E.U. that are not in compliance 
with its stringent privacy protection rules”. This prohibition has result 
in tension with the US, which argues that it may result in future block 
of US e-commerce.508 Therefore, the two parties started negotiation 
and the problem seemed to be solved by the suggestion of US 
Commerce Department in March 2000 that “the E.U. grants the US 
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businesses receiving personal data from the E.U. ‘safe harbor’ status if 
they voluntarily accept a given set of principles addressing the 
safeguarding of personal information”.509 However, it is 
acknowledged that legitimate interest of the holders of intellectual 
property rights in identifying the source of infringing acts should be 
put into account in any regulation aiming at protecting privacy.510  
 
iii) Insufficiency of Traditional Legal Measures    
           Traditionally, intellectually property rights are territorial creatures 
depending on the protection afforded to them by national authorities. 
Each country determines the scope of the IPRs it grants, and the effect 
and protection of these rights are, in principle, confined in the territory 
of the concerned country. Even the international treaties concluded 
later on to regulate these rights, such the Berne Convention, the Paris 
Convention and TRIPS, have confirmed the territorial foundations of 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The national judicial 
and customs authorities are considered by these treaties as the main 
bodies responsible for the enforcement of these rights.511 It has been 
stated that although the “Paris Convention and the Berne Convention 
address certain enforcement aspects, these treaties are primarily aimed 
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at the codification of substantive norms”. However, the upsurge of 
piracy practices in the 1970s and 1980s had drawn the attention of 
those concerned for the need of international mechanism for the 
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights. This awareness to 
the danger threatening intellectual property rights has led to the 
conclusion of TRIPS Agreement, “which for the first time at the 
international level, created a comprehensive scheme for the 
enforcement of the intellectual property rights”. Yet when TRIPS was 
concluded the impact of the Internet had not been considered because 
the Internet at that time was at its infancy and no one thought it would 
bring the effects now it is bringing. Therefore, although TRIPS 
provided for comprehensive enforcement mechanism, it adhered to the 
territorial nature of intellectual property rights. However, these 
territorial rights are facing presently a non-territorial medium 
threatening their effective enforcement. It has been stated that the 
“effective enforcement presupposes an underlying legal framework 
that is conducive to the enforcement of the rights concerned on the 
medium where enforcement is sought”. The enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, at present, lacks a legal framework that 
takes into consideration the international dimensions of the Internet. 
Thus, the challenge confronting intellectual property is how to secure 
effective enforcement of the intellectual property rights via the 
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Internet by adopting measures less dependant on the notion of 
territoriality.512   
 
iv) Approaches to Effective Enforcement  
          The threat of the Internet for the traditional mechanism of 
management of intellectual property is more than the threat for the 
rights of the intellectual property owners. The international 
dimensions of the Internet necessitate the construction of a new 
method of creation, exploitation and enforcement of intellectual 
property that conforms to the peculiar characteristics of that medium. 
Although no single comprehensive mechanism of enforcement has 
been reached to date, different attempts have been made for creating 
effective enforcement means.  
    (a) Technological Measures of Enforcement 
          The difficulty of achieving effective enforcement of rights associated 
with the digital flow of data via the Internet through the traditional 
legal means has driven those concerned to think of alternative means. 
Technology has played a pivotal role in this respect. Various 
technological measures of protection are available on the market and 
have received legal recognition nationally and internationally. The 
WIPO Internet Treaties 1996 and the US Digital Millennium 
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Copyright Act 1998 are just examples of the legal instruments 
recognizing the technical measures of protection.513 There are many 
technical devices at present, such as encryption and watermarking, 
applied so as to create effective means that can help the right-holders 
to manage their rights on the digital networks. Encryption enables the 
transmission of data via the Internet in an illegible scrappy format, 
which can only be decrypted through a decryption key kept with the 
right-holder who can only release it at his own conditions, e.g., on 
payment. Watermarking is a device through which right-holders can 
embed identifying marks in legitimate copies of their works that 
connect the work with its author and prevent its modification.514   
 
     (b) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
          The term alternative dispute resolution refers to a set of procedures 
for the settlement of disputes by means other than the traditional 
litigation. Examples of the ADR include arbitration, mediation and 
conciliation. These forms of ADR have evolved throughout the 
twentieth century to meet the needs of litigating parties who were 
displeased with the traditional litigation. The attractive features of 
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these procedures are that they are expeditious and cost-effective.515 
The emergence of the Internet with its transnational dimensions and 
its expanding use in commercial transactions has necessitated the use 
of ADR as an effective means of settlement of disputes. The trend 
now in the countries where there is an extensive use of electronic 
commerce such as Europe and USA, is toward the enhancing of online 
cross border alternative disputes resolution, especially in relation to 
consumers’ transactions.516 “Online dispute-resolution procedure may 
serve to enhance access to dispute settlement mechanisms, while 
increasing the speed and efficiency with which the proceedings are 
conducted and reducing the corresponding costs”.517 However, the 
online dispute resolution mechanisms also have disadvantages such as 
lack of face-to-face contact and the potential for breach of 
confidentiality.518   
  There are many online dispute-resolution private entities to date, 
especially in the US, such as the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), CyberTribunal, On-line Ombuds, ClickNsettle, SettleOnline, 
Cybersettle etc., offering online mediation and arbitration services.519 
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However, the online dispute-resolution mechanism has raised legal 
questions that need to be answered. For example, whether the 
decisions through this mechanism are going to be recognized and 
enforced by national courts?. Likewise, questions need to be answered 
for purposes of statutes and treaties such as the New York Convention 
include: “where an on-line arbitration takes place, and where the 
award be considered to have been made? How can an online 
proceeding be classified? Is it ‘anational’, ‘delocalized’ or floating in 
regard to the application of a lex arbitri? How will an online 
arbitration meet the formalities required by national laws and by the 
New York Convention?” All these questions must be answered so as 
to give integrity and effectiveness to these emergent mechanisms.520 It 
is submitted that a legal framework is needed for the regulation of this 
process. In this respect “The existing arbitration rules can provide a 
foundation for any adaptations to the online environment that may be 
required”.521  
 
 
   (c) Direct Enforcement  
          According to this approach, effective enforcement may be achieved 
by the development of legislative frameworks or administrative 
systems providing for the direct enforcement of rights through the 
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entities having technical control in relation to content and access to the 
Internet such as domain names registrars and Internet service 
providers. Examples of legislative frameworks and administrative 
systems respectively are the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 
of the US, which adopts the so-called notice and take-down 
provisions, and the administrative domain name dispute-resolution 
system recommended in the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process 
and implemented by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN).522     
Conclusion 
  As explained in this chapter, the Internet has added a 
further dimension of complexity to the traditional rules of 
private international law, which have been premised on 
the presence of different physical territories. The Internet 
ignores the presence of these physical territories. 
Therefore, the challenge facing the traditional conflict of 
laws rules is how to adapt to this new environment. To 
date, no consensus has been reached as to the proper way 
for dealing with the legal issues posed by the Internet. The 
ongoing attempts of The Hague Conference to revise its 
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draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters 1999 to accommodate 
disputes relating to electronic commerce and the 
infringement of intellectual property rights should be 
supported and encouraged.  
          As explained, most of the problems in relation to jurisdiction and the 
governing law arise when there is no agreement between the parties as 
concerns the competent jurisdiction and the applicable law. The 
difficulty in this respect emanates from the fact that the traditional 
private international law based its rules, in absence of agreement, on 
physical points of attachments. The absence of these physical points of 
attachment in an Internet environment has resulted in confusion as 
regards the designation of the place of contracting or the place of 
performance, for example. Therefore, in order to solve this problem 
the parties must always include in their contract as much details as 
possible as concerns the jurisdiction and the applicable law. In 
absence of such agreement, whether in relation to contractual disputes 
or infringement of rights, there should be clear rules determining the 
competent court and the applicable law by designating a specific place 
instead of referring to that place by reference to other connecting 
factors, such as the place of performance or the place of contracting, 
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which are difficult to be determined in case of online dealings. Also 
there must be specific and clear rules as regards consumers’ contracts 
and privacy issues. 
          As concerns enforcement of rights the traditional rules must be 
adapted to accommodate the emergent challenges. The law should 
interfere in the regulation of the technical measures of enforcement so 
as to provide effective enforcement within the limits of the law. 
Likewise, the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including 
online settlement of dispute and direct enforcement should be 
recognized and regulated by law so as to reach their potential.                  
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Chapter 6 
The Impacts of Electronic Commerce on the Protection of 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights  
 
  Introduction 
  Traditionally, copyright and related rights protect the economic and 
moral rights of authors in their creative works. The economic rights 
of an author include rights of reproduction, translation, public 
recitation, public display, distribution and other forms of 
commercial utilization. The moral rights include the right of an 
author to claim authorship and object to any distortion, mutilation, 
modification of, or any other derogatory action in relation to the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
The subject matter of copyright and related rights protection 
extends to cover a wide array of human creativity. On one hand, 
copyright protection covers literary and artistic works. The term 
‘literary and artistic works’, in turn, includes a variety of creative 
works such as writing, both fiction and non-fiction, including 
scientific and technical texts and computer programs; databases 
that are original due to the selection or arrangement of their 
content; musical works; audiovisual works; works of fine art, 
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including drawings and paintings; and photographs. On the other 
hand, neighboring rights protection encompasses the works of 
those who add value to the creative works through the presentation 
of literary and artistic works to the public. It covers performing 
artists, such as actors, dancers, singers and musicians; the 
producers of phonograms, including CDs; and broadcasting 
organizations. However, the scope of the economic rights of 
authors is subject to certain exceptions and limitations in favor of 
public interest. The exceptions and limitations include the duration 
of the rights and the permission of free fair use of the protected 
works especially in relation to education, research and access to 
information. 
  This traditional system of copyright has faced a challenge represented in 
the susceptibility of most of the copyright materials for being 
transformed into digital form and transmitted over digital networks 
to any place in the world reached by these networks. Digitization 
blurs the boundaries between the different categories of copyright 
and neighboring rights. Images, words and sounds once digitized 
are transformed into a binary form of ones and zeroes. Digitized 
information can be manipulated in different ways. It can be stored, 
retrieved and transmitted electronically. Digitization makes 
possible the combining of different copyrighted works in a single 
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medium such as CD-ROM, creating what is known as multimedia 
works. Moreover, the emergence of digital networks has led to the 
convergence of the media of communication of copyright and 
related rights. The new digital networked environment, commonly 
known as information superhighway, permits the communication 
of data, text, audio, video and images at high speed and high 
fidelity. Information can be uploaded, downloaded and retrieved on 
demand.  
  It is believed that the global information infrastructure (GII), with its 
digital distribution systems and multimedia works, has blurred the 
distinctions between the rights of authors, producers and 
performers and thus undermined the basis for the separation of 
copyright and neighboring rights. This transformation is 
problematic for the traditional copyright system, which is built on 
different level of protection for the different categories of copyright 
and neighboring rights works. In addition to issues relating to the 
administration and enforcement of the protected rights, the said 
transformation has raised a lot of queries: how can the scope and 
limitations of exploitation rights is determined for works 
disseminated over digital networks? How do the various acts of 
network communication (digitization, transmission, uploading, 
downloading, browsing, viewing, etc.) fit into the current copyright 
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system? Is there any imminent need for redefinition or clarification 
of exploitation rights? What is the scope of copyright exemptions 
on digital networks? Whether the temporary copies made on 
computers and other devices when accessing works online 
constitute reproduction of those works and if so, whether this is 
permissible or not? Whether making a work available online for 
individuals to access at times and places chosen by them 
constitutes an act of communication to the public? Are the 
traditional exceptions and limitations suitable for being applied 
literally on digital environment? What is the effect of giving rights’ 
holders complete control over their works online through technical 
measures supported with legal provisions, on the traditional 
copyright exceptions and limitations such as duration, fair use and 
first sale doctrine? How can infringements be detected and 
prevented in order to safeguard effective protection for copyright 
and related rights materials? Who in the chain of dissemination of 
infringing material can be held responsible for infringement, which 
court is competent and which law is applicable? 
  Copyright and related rights materials are expected to form an 
important part of electronic commerce over digital networks. This 
chapter discusses the impacts of electronic commerce on the 
international protection of copyright and related rights and whether the 
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existing legal system can be adjusted to respond to this technological 
challenge effectively and efficiently, so as to safeguard the furtherance 
of the guiding principles of copyright and related rights. The chapter is 
divided into three main parts. Part 1 studies the scope of the rights of 
authors on digital networks. It is divided into two subtitles discussing 
the exclusive economic and moral rights of authors. Part 2 studies the 
protection of copyright and related rights works disseminated over 
digital networks. It is divided into four subtitles discussing the 
infringement of copyright and neighboring rights and the legal status 
of the Internet Service Providers, the private international law aspects 
for copyright and related rights, the protection of copyright and related 
rights through technical measures and the legal protection for those 
technical measures. Part 3 examines the future of the traditional 
copyright exceptions and limitations on digital networks. It is divided 
into two subtitles studying the scope of the traditional exceptions and 
limitations and the impacts of the electronic rights management 
systems on those exceptions and limitations.  
 
1. The Scope of Authors’ Rights in Works Disseminated on Digital 
Networks 
    
i) Exclusive Economic Rights   
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   Different approaches have been adopted as concerns the definition 
of exclusive exploitation rights of authors. Some countries adopt a 
detailed media-based list of exclusive rights. For example, the 
Sudanese Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996 
enumerates under s. 8 (b) detailed financial rights of authors. Other 
countries apply broader abstract notions of reproduction, distribution 
and communication to the public.523 Whatever methods adopted, the 
final aim is to enable copyright owners to exploit exclusively the 
financial returns of their works. But the question is whether the 
traditional paradigm of exploitation rights can be extended to 
copyright works on digital networks? It has been stated that “the 
digital networked environment of the information superhighway 
represents a radical change in the way copyrighted works are 
exploited. Mass distribution of copies or signals carrying identical 
information is replaced by transmission on individual demand of 
customized information”. Thus, the dissemination of works over 
digital networks may not necessarily fit the traditional exploitation 
rights.524 However, as far as digital networks are concerned, the focus 
is on two broad notions of exploitation namely, the right of 
reproduction and the right of communication to the public. 
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   (a) Right of Reproduction 
  Traditionally, reproduction right is considered as one of the core 
prerogative of copyright. Article 9 (1) of the Berne Convention 
provides that “authors of literary and artistic works protected by this 
Convention shall have right of authorizing the reproduction of these 
works, in any manner or form”. Within “the context of copyright and 
related right, ‘reproduction’ refers to copying, not to performance or 
some other acts which bring a work to perception other than in a 
tangible copy”.525 It has been stated that although the Berne 
Convention has not defined the term ‘reproduction’ and thus more or 
less member countries are left free to put their own interpretation, 
nevertheless “the mainstream interpretation stresses that reproduction 
requires some form of fixation in material form”.526  
  Historically, copyright laws focused on protection against 
exploitation that involved a certain scale of copying through writing or 
engraving. Later, the right of publishing extended to other new 
methods of fixation regardless of the number of copies. “Even hand 
made single copies, if made for profit, were held to infringe. This was 
especially relevant where single copies of paintings or musical scores 
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were involved, since such copies were often made by hand at that 
time”. Moreover, the scope of what was considered as infringing 
activities was widened to cover other areas such as translation and 
other forms of adaptations. All this, in turn, led to the adoption of an 
abstract and encompassing notion to the effect that any form of 
copying for profit was considered infringing.527 Furthermore, as 
technology brings new methods of exploitation of copyright materials, 
the right of reproduction has been extended to cover these new areas. 
For example, phonorecords were classified as reproduction even 
though they contained performance. Likewise, the scope of 
reproduction was extended to include works, which could only be 
perceived with the aid of a machine or device. However, the so-called 
ancillary copies were first considered as not amounting to an act of 
reproduction but later on they have been treated as reproduction. For 
instance, in “the German Gottfried Keller case,528 which was decided 
in 1923, a publisher had made printing plates and galley proofs in 
preparation for an edition which he intended to publish as soon as 
Gottfried Keller’s novels would fall in the public domain”. The court 
held that this was not an act of reproduction, as the plates in general 
could not be used to enjoy the work. But since the promulgation of the 
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German Copyright Act 1965, the situation has changed and ancillary 
copies have been treated as reproduction. The essential element is the 
embodiment of the work on a tangible medium; not its actual 
exploitation.529 National legal systems responded in different ways to 
the emergence and development of end-user accessible reproduction 
technology such as photocopying machines and audio and video home 
taping instruments. For example, while in 1955 the German Federal 
Supreme Court ruled in the case of Gema v. Grundig530 that the private 
audio copying by magnetophone threatened the interests of the 
copyright owners and could not benefit from the exception of personal 
use, the U.S. Supreme Court came to a different result in 1984 when it 
decided in the Betamax case531 that videotaping of TV programs for 
time-shifting purposes fell within the fair use exception and thus 
permissible. However, the decision of Gema v. Grundig has been 
overruled since the promulgation of the 1965 Copyright Act whereby 
home taping for private use is no longer an infringing act.532 
 Copying technologies have freed the end-user from the constraints of 
place and time and from the control of right holders. It has be 
argued that an author must have control over copies being made in 
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order to benefit from his work. This can be achieved by making 
reproduction right adaptable to any new technology enabling the 
reproduction of copyrightable works. However, the present status 
of reproduction right, as summarized by one writer, is as follows: 
           Today, the reproduction right may more or less cover any 
fixation, no matter how technically sophisticated and 
ephemeral, provided it is durable enough to enable some 
form of use or further communication of the work, so as to 
give the right owners as much control as possible over the 
exploitation and use of their works. Over and again, control 
is the key word, and any fixation, no matter how ephemeral, 
may be considered relevant if to label it ‘reproduction’ can 
help right owners to stay in command; especially if such 
copies enable the user to access the work.533  
  As concerns digital networks, virtually all Internet operations require 
continuous copying of documents from one computer to another. 
Copying may be permanent as in cases of uploading and downloading 
of data, and may be temporary or volatile as in cases of temporary 
storing of the transmitted documents on intermediate computers such 
as the access providers’ servers and RAM memories of end users’ 
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computers.534 The process of making an artistic or literary works 
available on-line usually requires two steps: first the work must be 
digitized; and secondly, it must be stored into the memory of a 
computer connected to the network. Both acts are considered as 
reproduction subject to the right holder authorization. For example, 
the European Commission’s Green Paper on Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights in the Information Society provides that “the 
digitization of works or other protected matter should generally fall 
under the reproduction right, as should such things as loading on to the 
central memory of a computer”.535 However, it has been observed that 
the decisions of the courts in the European Union, especially in 
France, so far have not distinguished between the two types of 
reproduction. “They ruled that digitization constitutes an act of 
reproduction but it seemed that they used the term ‘digitization’ to 
refer either to digitization proprio sensu or to be the subsequent 
installation of digitized work on a server”. For instance, the Paris 
Court of First Instance decided on May 5, 1997 in the first Queneau 
case536, where the defendant had digitized and installed on his web site 
a copyrighted work without the authorization of the copyright owner, 
that the act of the defendant constituted reproduction of the work 
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subject to the authorization of the copyright owner. This decision has 
been criticized on the ground that “the court sees the act of 
reproduction in the digitization itself; it should probably have seen it 
in the digitization and making available on-line; the judge could have 
used the phrase ‘transmission’ or ‘digital broadcasting on the Internet’ 
to refer to both actions as one”. It is conceded that the two acts are 
closely linked together particularly in the light of the fact that a work 
can only be stored on a server after it is being digitized. Yet, the 
distinction between the two types of reproduction should be 
maintained as long as the two acts may be carried by different persons 
on the one hand and on the other hand a work stored on a server may 
not have been digitized, at first, for that purpose.537 It is worthy to note 
that the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996, has not provided in its 
main text for the application of the right of reproduction on digital 
networks due to lack of consensus but the WIPO Performance and 
Phonogram Treaty 1996 provides under Article 7 that “performers 
shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the direct or indirect 
reproduction of their performances fixed in phonograms, in any 
manner or form”. Moreover, the Agreed Statements concerning 
Article 1 (4) of the WCT provides that:  
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            The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply 
in the digital environment, in particular to the use of works in 
digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected work 
in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction 
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.538  
  However, the legal value of the Agreed Statements is uncertain,but at 
least they serve as an element of interpretation of the WCT.539  
  Moreover, a controversial issue facing the right of reproduction is 
the transient or temporary storage on servers or end-users computers, 
especially RAM copies made during consultation. Is this kind of 
storage constitutes reproduction? If it is so, does it fall within the right 
of reproduction and subject to the authorization of the right holders? 
Many legislative provisions refer to temporary reproduction as a kind 
of reproduction that falls under the right of reproduction, e.g., Article 
4(a) of the European Software Directive 1991 and Article 5(a) and 7 
(2)(a) of the European Database Directive 1996. Likewise, s. 17(6) of 
the British Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides that 
“copying in relation to any description of work includes the making of 
copies which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the 
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work”.540 Under s. 101 of US Copyright Act 1976 “ a work is ‘fixed’ 
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration”. Legislatures as well as courts in US extend the definition of 
‘fixation’, which has been tailored by s. 101 for copyrightability 
requirements, to ‘fixation’ for the purpose of reproduction. For 
instance, in 1974 the Congress formed the National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study 
the complex issues raised by computers and copying machines. The 
CONTU’s report used the definition of s. 101 of ‘fixation’ in its 
analysis of reproduction. The Congress adopted the CONTU’s report 
without comment and the courts considered it as a form of legislative 
history.541 In MAI Systems, Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.542 the US 
Ninth Circuit “stated clearly that copies made from a permanent 
storage device into a computer’s RAM constitute reproduction”.543 
Likewise, the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights formed 
by the Information Infrastructure Task Force, published in 1995 the 
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‘White Paper’, which “purportedly relies on the Copyright Act, its 
legislative history, the CONTU report, and repeated court holdings for 
its assessment that loading a work into the RAM of a computer 
constitutes reproduction under the Copyright Act”.544 This attitude has 
been criticized on the ground that it failed to distinguish between 
copies of a digital work on computer hard drive or Read Only 
Memory (ROM), which are permanent or semi-permanent and are 
fixed under the Copyright Act, and those in its RAM, which is very 
transient and “necessitates special analysis under the reproduction 
provisions”. It is suggested that the purpose of reproduction should be 
put in mind when interpreting the fixation requirement of 
reproduction. In other words, “a copy should not be an infringing 
reproduction unless it harms the copyright holder, and thereby deter 
creation”.545 Moreover, some commentators contend that: “acts of 
short-lived copying as mere byproducts of a technical communication 
process, such as the ‘store-and-forward’ mechanisms used on the 
Internet and other digital networks, should not be qualified as acts of 
reproduction”.546 Others believe that although RAM copies meet 
current definitions of reproduction, they do not feel like copies. 
Likewise, although they seem harmless, leaving them outside the 
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scope of copyright may form a severe protection gap.547 Some writers 
even went far to consider denying characterization of temporary 
storage as reproduction to be contrary to Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention.548 However, the need for the existence of the right of 
reproduction on digital networks is questionable as every act of 
communication of a work to the public necessarily involves its 
reproduction. 
 
   (b) Right of Communication to the Public 
  Communication of copyrighted works over digital networked 
environment may involve one or more of acts such as digital 
reproduction or adaptation, temporary storage, providing on-line 
access, point-to-point transmission, broadcasting, dissemination in 
closed users groups, decoding and screen display or use.549 However, 
for a right of communication to apply; two conditions must be 
satisfied: first, there must be an act of communication and second, that 
communication is made to the public. The international conventions 
dealing with copyright and related rights have not defined the term 
‘communication’. Generally, “communication implies conveyance, 
and what is conveyed will be a tangible object (like a book or record) 
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or a representation of a work, performance or recording, in sound, 
light, electronic signals or some other energetic form”. Within the 
copyright context, “communication usually refers to the conveyance 
of representative signals series from one point to another” i.e., it 
involves the transmission and the actual or potential reception.550 
  In the light of the above definition of ‘communication’, does the 
installation of a material on a network which can be accessed and 
retrieved on demand by each individual for his personal use, 
constitute an act of communication? If it is so, does this constitute a 
public communication subjects to the authorization of right holders? 
The opponents of the application of copyright to materials 
disseminated on digital networks, on one hand, argue that the 
communication to the public subject to authorization requires a 
positive act of transmission i.e., the diffusion of a message towards a 
receiver. This is not the case on digital networks, as the uploading of a 
material on a web site does not involve a positive act of transmission 
towards the web site users who take the initiative to access the web 
site to download or view the material available on it. Moreover, they 
add that even if the act of uploading a material on a web site forms an 
act of communication, it is not a public communication within the 
meaning of copyright law since the users do not necessarily access 
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such material simultaneously or in the same place. The user accesses a 
web site, e.g., from his home or office, i.e., a private place. Thus it 
must be subject to the exception of private use. The supporters of the 
application of the right of communication to the public to copyrighted 
materials disseminated on digital networks, on the other hand, reply to 
these arguments by saying that what matters is that the work be 
communicated, irrespective of the means of communication. By 
making a material available through a telecommunication process, the 
web site owner performs an act of communication despite the absence 
of positive emission. The communication is initiated from the act of 
making the material available on a web site, not from the access of 
that web site by end-users. The access of the end-user is a mere 
manifestation of that communication. Moreover, whether the work is 
communicated to the public at a certain time and in a given place is 
irrelevant. What is important is that it is destined for public access. A 
potential public access is enough. “Therefore the fact that all 
receptions are not simultaneous cannot be used to argue that 
communications are private and fall within the scope of the exception 
for representation within the family circle”.551 
  It is worthy to mention that Article 8 of WCT and Articles 10 and 14 
of the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 1996 
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seem to settle this debate. Under Article 8 of WCT “… authors of 
literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire 
or wireless means, including the making available to the public of 
their works in such a way that members of the public may access 
these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them”. 
Likewise, Articles 10 and 14 of the WPPT provide for similar 
provisions as concerns the exclusive right of performers in their 
performances and the producers of phonograms in their phonograms 
respectively.552 Yet, as the dissemination of works on digital networks 
blurs the boundaries between the right of reproduction and the right of 
communication to the public, the co-existence of both rights online is 
questionable. It is argued that the application of either of them is 
enough for protecting authors’ rights on-line. Therefore, it is 
suggested that either of them may be maintained or that both rights be 
unified in one right, which may be called ‘right of digital 
transmission’ or ‘right of digital exploitation’. 
 
   (c) The Co-existence of the Right of Reproduction and the Right of 
Communication to the Public on Digital Networks  
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 The act of exploitation of a work on digital networks starts once it is 
digitized and stored on a server connected to a network, because such 
digitization and storage constitute reproduction. The same can be said 
as concerns the act of communication to the public, because the access 
by end-users is a manifestation of the act of public communication 
since the act of communication does not depend on the actual public 
access, a potential one is enough. As a consequence, if both rights 
have to be applied for authorizing the exploitation of protected works 
over digital networks, the operator may need to pay fees two times 
and may need to get authorization from two different entities if the 
holder of the reproduction right is different from the holder of the 
representation right. Therefore, a query arises as to whether it is 
justified to maintain the accumulation of authorizations. “Would it be 
possible, in order to facilitate the authorization procedure, to view the 
projected use of the work from the angle of only one of these two 
exclusive rights”?553  
Different approaches have been advanced in this respect. One 
approach is that only the right of reproduction needs to be applied for 
the protection of works disseminated on digital networks. This view is 
based on two arguments: first the whole process from the stage of 
uploading into the memory of a server to on-screen display should be 
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considered as an act of reproduction. The screen should be treated as a 
medium for material fixation within the meaning of copyright law or 
that the output on the end-user’s computer should be regarded as a 
secondary result of the initial uploading on a web site accessible by 
public. This argument is not new, as it had been suggested in relation 
to the inclusion of protected works into online databases. The 
criticism directed at this argument is that “a computer screen is more 
of a means of communication of a work than a medium for 
reproduction. To consider on-screen display in terms of reproduction 
would be to deny practically all value to the concept of 
representation”. Moreover, in the past the displaying of pictures on 
cinema or television screens had never been treated as reproduction. It 
has been suggested that if on-screen display were to be treated as 
reproduction, this should be based on the ground that the end-users 
call up works onto their screens, which falls within the scope of the 
exception of private copy; unless the owner of the server is considered 
responsible for providing the means of reproduction.554 The second 
argument is “based on considering on-screen display as an act of 
representation but more importantly as the consequence of the 
uploading of a work into the memory of the server”. According to this 
argument, the initial authorization for the reproduction of a work 
                                                 
554  Ibid., at 65-6. 
 376
through storage on a server is enough for authorizing the subsequent 
representation on end-users’ computer screens. This view has been 
rejected by some on the grounds that it would be contrary to the rule 
adopted by some national laws such as Article L. 122-7 of the French 
Code on Intellectual Property, which provides that “a transfer of the 
right of reproduction of a work does not constitute in itself an implicit 
transfer of the corresponding right of representation; whoever holds 
the rights must authorize each form of exploitation of the work”.555  
Another approach is based on the argument that the whole process of 
online digital transmission should only be treated as an act of 
representation. In other words, the initial uploading of a work on a 
server should be treated as a mere technical prerequisite to the 
communication of the work to the public. According to this view, the 
initial fixation will only make sense where the work can be 
communicated to the public. Therefore, no payment should be made 
for the initial reproduction other than the payment requested for the 
representation. This approach is also not new. It has been invoked in 
relation to audiovisual works “where the transfer of the authorization 
right, which allows the integration of a pre-existing work into a 
movie, does not make sense without the authorization of the fixation 
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of the work on film”.556 According to the supporters of this approach, 
the focus should be made on the right of communication to the public, 
which is “conceptually linked to the essence of the economic right”, 
“instead of focusing on merely technical (intermediate) acts of 
reproduction and transmission”.557 Once again this approach is 
contrary to the legislation of some countries such as Article L. 122-7 
of the French Code on Intellectual Property, which requires separate 
authorization for the act of representation as well as the act of 
reproduction.558  
  A third approach sees the solution not in the denial of either the right 
of reproduction or the right of communication to the public in favor of 
the other right but in the unification of those two rights in one 
comprehensive right that may be referred to as ‘the right of digital 
exploitation’ or the ‘right of digital transmission’.  It is believed that 
this helps in harmonizing the legislation with the technical process by 
maintaining the unity of online communication on one hand and, on 
the other hand, simplifying the procedures of use by confining the act 
of authorization in one step, without prejudicing authors. The 
criticism directed at this view is that practically, it is believed that 
there is no need for such unification in the presence of authors’ 
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societies such as SESAM, which introduced the so-called ‘one-stop 
shop’ thus facilitating the act of authorization. Theoretically, it is 
contended that the call for such unification tends towards giving a 
dominating role to the concept of economic rights in detriment for the 
personal rights of authors, which “will dissolve into an unspecified 
exploitation of their works, leading to global transfers of rights or 
even of legal licenses”. This may result in weakening copyright 
system and lead to its further dispersion. The protection of works 
depending on the way of their exploitation and not on the nature of the 
protected work, as in the case of software programs, has already been 
much criticized and it may not be reasonable to introduce another 
regime on the same basis, because this may affect negatively the unity 
of copyright and the efforts to make its enforcement and management 
more efficient. Moreover, the complications that may result from the 
creation of such new regime as concerns its relation with the 
traditional right of reproduction and right of representation and the 
exceptions and limitations relating to them have resulted at present in 
preferring the adoption or extension of the traditional copyright 
rules.559    
 
(ii) Moral Rights of Authors 
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  Under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention an author “shall have the 
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or any other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation”. It has been argued that the scope of the moral rights under 
Article 6bis have been formulated as such due to the pressure of 
common law jurisdictions to confine the scope of moral rights to a 
minimalist implementation of only the right of paternity and the right 
of integrity recognized by them. This attitude has been supported by 
TRIPS, which has not recognized moral rights.560 The scope of the 
moral rights of authors in civil law jurisdictions is wider than those 
provided for under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. For 
example, under French Law, besides the right of paternity and the 
right of integrity there are also the right of disclosure and the right of 
withdrawal and repentance.561  
  However, the persistence of the minimum standard of the moral 
rights under Article 6bis on digital networks is questionable. This is 
because the modification and adaptation of works have never been as 
easy as in digital environment. This will facilitate the infringement of 
moral rights. For instance, digitization makes it possible to copy parts 
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of a work and use them in creation of new material with virtually no 
effort or alter works of art to create an amusing web site graphics. 
Such acts violate the right of integrity, the right of paternity or both. 
Also it is possible to copy records of unreleased songs to a web site in 
violation of the right to decide on publication. Moreover, infringement 
may result not from deliberately outright malice practices but also it 
may result from common practices of the Internet users such as the 
common practice of ‘snipping’ done by newsgroups users. “Whilst 
this is a common practice, the fact that a message also contains the 
author’s identity means that careless (or, perhaps, deliberate) snipping 
can cause a loss of information that may result in violations of the 
rights of integrity, paternity or both”.562  
It has been stated that while civil law jurisdictions acknowledge the 
difficulty of maintaining the traditional moral rights effective on 
digital networks, the prevailing view at common law jurisdictions 
seek to keep moral rights theory and practice off the Internet 
altogether. Amongst the arguments put forward against the protection 
of moral rights on the Internet are the problems of collectivization and 
digitization. On the one hand, although collectivization, which refer to 
works produced by a group of persons working together, is not new or 
unique to the Internet, especially since the emergence of 
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cinematographic works, nevertheless, “the conceptual difficulties that 
it creates, and the consequent difficulties in designing a suitable legal 
framework for protection of creative interests, have become 
considerably more acute with the advent of digital technologies”. 
Take as an example a CD-ROM, which in addition to being a multi-
authorial work in nature, a matter that complicates the identification 
of right holders, it is also “a multi-faceted work and, as such, may not 
fit neatly into existing categories of works described by relevant 
legislation. On the other hand, digitization blurs the lines between the 
different categories of works. “The result of this blurring effect 
explains the proliferation of the multi-faceted works described above, 
a proliferation which is leaving the law in an ever more desperate state 
of ‘catch-up’”.563  
  It is submitted that the preservation of the traditional moral rights of 
authors is incompatible with the digital technology and may stifle its 
progress. Therefore, to maintain the co-existence of both; a flexible 
moral rights concept that can adapt to the nature of the digital 
networks should be sought. This can be achieved either by limiting the 
extent of moral rights or by allowing contractual adjustment to these 
moral rights.564 It is believed that the moral rights protection should be 
reshaped in a way acceptable to all countries, as the co-existence of 
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systems allowed by Berne Convention should no longer be maintained 
in an increasingly globalized culture.565 However, the protection of 
even adapted moral rights, as well as the economic rights of authors 
on digital networked environment has posed a challenge on those 
concerned with such protection. 
 
2. Protection of Copyright and Related Rights on Digital Networks 
 
i) Liability for Infringement of Copyright and Related Rights and 
the Legal Status of the Internet Service Providers 
  The infringement of copyright and related rights occurs when 
somebody exercises one or more of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner in violation of copyright law. This happens when the 
alleged infringer has no authorization from the copyright owner or 
permitted by law. All that is required from the copyright owner is to 
prove his ownership of the copyrighted work and that the alleged 
infringer uses that work. Proof of intention is not necessary. In order 
to defend himself the alleged infringer must prove either that he has 
authorization from the copyright owner or that the work is not 
copyrighted or no longer covered by copyright protection or that he 
benefits from one or more of the copyright exceptions and limitations. 
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“An infringement can be literal, using the author’s exact words, or it 
can be non-literal, where the author’s work is modified and claimed as 
a new creation”.566 Liability for infringement may be direct or 
indirect. Indirect liability, sometimes referred to as secondary 
infringement, is subdivided into contributory and vicarious copyright 
infringement. The practical difficulties of following up cases against 
individual end-users, such as the difficulty of locating them and the 
cost effectiveness of following up cases against them all over the 
world, have led copyright owners to seek redress from proportionately 
easily identifiable deep pocket defendants, commonly known as 
Internet Service Providers (ISP), who facilitate access and may 
provide content for the end-users. An ISP may run the risk of any of 
the types of liability for infringement.567 
 
   (a) Liability for Direct Infringement 
    Different approaches have been adopted for determining the direct 
liability for infringement. For instance, in civil law countries direct 
copyright infringement constitutes an unlawful act in itself. However, 
the general rules of liability require that a degree of fault must be 
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shown for determining liability. “For this purpose, courts generally 
find that direct copyright infringers are subject to a rather stringent 
duty of care, even to such an extent that they are almost strictly 
liable”. Likewise, in US copyright infringement is treated as specific 
tort. However, although a direct copyright infringer is strictly liable, a 
court may mitigate the damages against him if he proves that he was 
not aware or had reason to believe that his acts constituted 
infringement. In UK the law distinguishes between the so-called 
primary copyright infringement and secondary infringement. In case 
of primary infringement there is a presumption of strict liability. 
Alleged infringers may escape liability if they prove that “at the time 
of infringement they did not know, nor had reason to believe that 
copyright subsisted in the item”. On the other hand secondary 
infringers, such as mere distributors and organizers of performances, 
may not be held liable for copyright infringement unless it is proved 
that they knew or had reason to believe that they contributed to an 
infringement.568 
    Acting on the basis of these general rules; the courts in US, before 
the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 
(DMCA), adopted different approaches for determining the direct 
liability of ISP for copyright infringement. At first, a rather rigid trend 
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had been adopted. For example, in Playboy Enterprises v. 
Frena,569although the Bulletin Board Service operator (BBS) had not 
uploaded the work and was unaware of the infringement, the Court 
found him liable for direct copyright infringement because, according 
to the Court, intent or knowledge is not an element of direct copyright 
infringement. However, since the decision of Religious Technology 
Center v. Netcom Online Communication Services570, the US courts 
began to mitigate the strictness of the direct liability for copyright 
infringement for ISPs. The common features of the new approach are 
that “if an intermediary does not initiate the infringement nor create or 
control the content of its service, he cannot be considered to have 
caused the infringement and therefore not a direct infringer”.571 
However, since the promulgation of the DMCA the liability of ISPs is 
determined by reference to the provisions of the DMCA, provided that 
the activity in question falls under the provisions of DMCA.572 In 
Europe, to date, proportionately few cases dealt with ISPs’ liability for 
direct copyright infringement. For example, a Dutch court “found that 
a hosting service provider does not directly infringe copyright and 
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may only be held liable if he knows or has a reason to know of the 
actual wrongful act taking place over its installations”.573 
    It is worthy to note that the Agreed Statement concerning Article 8 of 
WCT provides that “it is understood that the mere provision of 
physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in 
itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or 
the Berne Convention”. This provision has been construed as to mean 
that, as long as the right of communication to the public is concerned, 
an intermediary cannot be held liable for direct infringement, but this 
does not extend to exempting him from direct liability for 
infringement of the right of reproduction nor the indirect liability for 
copyrights infringement in general.574 It has been noticed that the 
absence of a similar provision for the right of reproduction in WCT 
may be due to the fact that the Contracting Parties had not reached 
agreement as concerns the right of reproduction and thus it has not 
been included in the Treaty. The only mention for this right is made in 
the Agreed Statement concerning Article 1(4). This does not, 
however, clarify the status of the transient copies, which are by-
products of the ‘store and forward’ transmission. Yet, in countries like 
the EU countries and Australia, ISPs are exempted from direct 
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liability for copyright infringement resulting from transmission 
services.575 
 
    (b) Liability for Indirect Infringement 
     Liability for indirect copyright infringement arises when the acts or 
omissions of a person contribute to the occurrence of the 
infringement. Indirect infringement includes vicarious and 
contributory liability. “Vicarious liability concepts evolved out of the 
common law principle of respondeat superior, where an employer is 
liable for the unlawful actions of his employees”. However, the 
concept has been elaborated to cover cases where a person has a right 
and ability to control the infringing activity and has a direct financial 
interest in such activities. Contributory infringement, on the other 
hand, “originates in tort law and stems from the notion that one who 
directly contributes to another’s infringement should be liable”. A 
person is said to be contributorily liable for copyright infringement 
when he participated in the infringement by inducing, causing or 
materially contributing to the occurrence of an infringing activity 
although he knew or had reason to know it was an infringing activity. 
The difference between contributory and vicarious liability is that 
while contributory liability focuses on the knowledge and behavior of 
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a third party towards the alleged infringement, vicarious liability 
depends on the relationship between the direct infringer and the 
defendant. Lack of knowledge is not a defense in case of vicarious 
liability.576  
    Under US law, although the US Copyright Act 1976 has not 
expressly provided for liability for indirect copyright infringement, 
the US courts have settled the issue of the liability for indirect 
copyright infringement. The leading case in this respect is the decision 
of the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc.577, in 
which the court stated that: “the absence of such express language in 
the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for 
copyright infringement on certain parties who have not themselves 
engaged in the infringing activity”. However, since the promulgation 
of the DMCA, the contributory and vicarious liability of ISPs for 
copyright infringement is determined by reference to its provisions.578 
    Both the DMCA and the EU Directive on e-commerce have set rules 
regulating online intermediaries liability. Title II of the DMCA creates 
four limitations on the liability of ISP for copyright infringement. 
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These limitations are considered as safe harbor for ISP and cover 
areas relating to transitory communications, system caching, storage 
of information on systems or networks at direction of users and 
information location tools, provided that certain conditions are 
fulfilled. However, US courts seem to be reluctant to give the DMCA 
safe harbor protection for ISP. In this respect, it has been observed 
that after five years of the promulgation of the DMCA, only one 
service provider has been able to qualify in court for safe harbor 
protection from copyright infringement.579   
  The battle between copyright owners and new technologies, however, 
seems to last for ever. The recent digital file-sharing systems based on 
the so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies have once again waged 
the war between copyright owners and new technologies. In 1999, a 
college student named Shawn Fanning created a file-sharing program 
called Napster. The program facilitates the transfer of MP3 music files 
over the Internet. This software enabled Napster users to download 
and share an unprecedented amount of free MP3 files, most of which 
were copyright works. By December 1999, the recording industry 
brought a case against Napster. In February 2001, the court charged 
Napster with contributory as well as vicarious copyright infringement 
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liability and decided, at last, to shut it down.580 It has been commented 
that legal actions that seek to circumscribe these technologies are 
premature because, in addition to the fact that they have other 
substantial non-infringing uses, these technologies may help benefit 
copyright owners in the future.581 Moreover, the shut down of Napster 
may not solve the problem, as its users may find other alternatives. 
This is clear from the fact that once Napster was shut, the public 
found dozens of file-swapping services, such as KaZaA, Morpheus 
and Grokster, based on the proprietary ‘FastTrack’ technology. “A 
FastTrack network relies on a collection of ‘supernodes’ to provide 
listing and searching functions to users (like the old Napster central 
server). Unlike Napster, actual users run supernodes, and not a 
‘FastTrack’ company”. Once again, the recording, music publishing 
and motion picture industries filed suits against the companies 
responsible for KaZaA, Morpheus, Grokster and FastTrack in 2001.582 
Generally, the arguments of the defendants revolve around the 
allegations that they have no control over the supernodes and do not 
know what is going on between these supernodes, because the 
communication between them are encrypted. Moreover, the 
                                                 
580  See Napster case [in] Cheval, supra note 56, at 5. 
581  See Fessenden, supra note 57, at 408. 
 ’n of Freenet and the Future of Copyright on the InternetThe Digital Evolutio‘  See Roemer, Ryan 582
: Available at. 5. & Tech.L.UCLA J2002 
php._roemer021229_05/2002/articles/com.lawtechjournal.www://httpvisited in February Last . 6, at 
2003. 
 391
defendants added, even if they cease to operate or their servers 
became inoperative, the searching, indexing, transferring, 
downloading and other functions would continue unaffected. The 
arguments of the plaintiffs, on the other hand, concentrate on 
disproving these allegations and attempting to prove the contributory 
and vicarious liability of those companies for copyright 
infringement.583 
    It has been commented that the copyright owners may succeed in 
their litigation against the FastTrack companies, but this may not be 
an effective way for combating copyright piracy, as new generations 
of P2P technologies adapting to the legal and technological hurdles 
may appear. In this respect, mention is made to a developing 
technology known as ‘Freenet’. “Freenet is a P2P architecture 
designed to be secure, efficient and built to withstand virtually any 
legal or technological challenge”.584 Therefore, it has been 
recommended that, instead of seeking to circumscribe newly emergent 
technologies believed to be threatening copyright protection, it is 
better for copyright law to adapt to these technologies, as it did 
throughout its history.585 
 
                                                 
583  Ibid. at 6-7. 
584  Ibid. at 1. 
585  See Fessenden, supra note 57, at 408. See also Cheval, supra note 56, at 16. 
 392
 
ii) Private International Law Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights 
   
 (a) Historical Background 
    Generally, the main three treaties in the field of intellectual property 
viz., the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention and TRIPS focus on 
harmonization, both in terms of substance and procedure, and on 
principles such as national treatment for solving problems resulting 
from cross-border legal relationships. However, as far as private 
international law is concerned, although the said treaties have not 
excluded it altogether, they contain few provisions that can be 
characterized as rules of private international law. An example of a 
private international law rule is Article 5(2) of the Bern convention, 
which provides that “the extent of protection, as well as the means of 
redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed 
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed”. 
Likewise, the recent WIPO negotiations during the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances 
(December 7 to 20, 2002) relating to the international recognition of 
the transfer of rights of audiovisual performers referred to private 
international law to bridge the differing positions among the 
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delegations.586  However, while there is no comprehensive private 
international law regime for intellectual property at the international 
level, several general principles relating to jurisdiction and the 
applicable law can be found in national and regional systems, in 
addition to the provisions of the Draft Hague Convention.  
 
(b) Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments  
       Jurisdiction has two aspects: first, a court must determine whether it 
has jurisdiction over the defendant. This is known as ‘personal 
jurisdiction’.587 Second, the court must determine whether it has 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. This is referred to 
as ‘subject matter jurisdiction’.588 Traditionally, common law courts 
were reluctant to accept jurisdiction on disputes involving foreign 
intellectual property rights. This reluctance is due to the understanding 
that intellectual property rights are territorial creatures based on 
sovereignty and public policy and the interference by foreign courts 
may impinge upon the sovereignty of the states granting them.589 It is 
believed that the understanding of territoriality of intellectual property 
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rights in that way, which led to the exclusion of the application of 
foreign law, is wrong and contrary to Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention, which involves a conflict rule by providing for the 
application of the law of the country where protection is claimed.590 
However, the trend of the US and UK courts, at present, is towards 
accepting disputes involving foreign intellectual property law, 
particularly in disputes relating to allegation of infringement of 
foreign copyright.591 For example, the English Court of Appeal held in 
the case of Pearce v. Ove Arup592 that “there was no per se objection 
to the application of Dutch Copyright Laws by an English Court”. 
Likewise, the US Second Circuit in Boosey & Hawkes v. Disney593 
reversed the dismissal by the District Court of a claim requiring it to 
apply the copyright laws of 18 foreign countries on the ground of 
forum non convenious. The appellate court justified its decision on the 
basis that “disinclination to apply foreign law did not justify 
dismissing the case, especially when the forum was the only court 
before which all territorial infringement claims could be 
consolidated”. Since that decision, US lower courts have more often 
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recognized and assumed jurisdiction over claims involving violation 
of foreign copyright laws.594 
  The compliance with the legal requirements for assuming personal as 
well as subject matter jurisdiction is a precondition for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments. The compliance or non-
compliance with these requirements is to be determined by the court, 
which is required to recognize and enforce a judgment according to 
the law of the forum. That means assumption of jurisdiction in 
accordance with rules of the country rendering the judgment alone 
will not suffice.595  
 
    (c) Applicable Law 
 Determination of the law applicable to copyright disputes is often 
settled by reference to national systems of private international law, as 
convention law in this respect is somewhat lacking. Different 
approaches have been adopted depending on the issue in dispute. The 
emergence of the digital networks as a medium for dealing in 
copyrighted works has added a further complication. In this respect 
the possible applicable laws include lex contractus, personal law of 
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the author, lex fori, the law of the country of protection and the law of 
the country of origin. 
Lex contractus: the application of the lex contractus has raised 
considerable controversy. This is because, in addition to the fact that 
in case of material goods; lex contractus is subject to the mandatory 
rules of lex situs and lex fori, the very nature of intellectual property 
rights poses further limitations. Intellectual property rights are granted 
by national systems according to the public policy in each national 
system. Therefore, it is argued that matters such as the existence and 
validity of such rights should be determined by the legal system 
granting them, regardless of the presence of a contract between the 
parties. However, there is a great uncertainty in this respect. It is 
believed that imposing more restrictions on lex contractus would 
negatively affect the freedom of contracting and hinder the evolution 
of electronic commerce. So, it is recommended that this matter should 
not be left to fluctuating case law and divided doctrine and must be 
regulated “within a framework of an international convention dealing 
with the private aspects of copyright and related rights, to clarify the 
situation by setting out a number of guidelines”. This can be achieved 
by laying down a principle to the effect that all hypothesis where the 
nature and content of the right as copyrighted work were not 
concerned should be governed by the lex contractus, subject to “a 
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limitative list of exceptions in which recourse would be left to the law 
of the right, subject to those cases, also exceptional, in which the 
States would be free to apply the reservation of directly applicable 
regulations or that of international public policy”.596 
Personal law: this refers to the law of the nationality of the author or 
his place of residence or domicile. The resort to such law is 
recommended in case of unpublished works due to the impossibility 
of localizing on the basis of publication. However, the application of 
personal law to copyright and related rights has not found much 
support, especially from those who call for exclusive application of 
the law of the country of protection. Moreover, the application of the 
personal law may be difficult in case of participation of more than one 
writer from different legal systems, a phenomenon that has the 
potential to increase in the digital environment and that “it would have 
no justification with respect to related rights, particularly those of an 
economic nature, afforded to producers and broadcasting 
organizations”.597 
Lex fori: The traditional role of the law of the forum as concerns the 
procedural matters as well as provisional measures is undisputed.598 
But the question is whether it is the law referred to by Article 5(2) 
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when it designates that the law applicable for determining the extent 
of protection and means of redress afforded to the author is the “law 
of the country where protection is claimed”. In this respect although 
different opinions have been expressed, the dominant view is that the 
country of protection referred to in Article 5(2) is the country where 
the infringing act takes place.599 
Law of the country of protection: this refers to the law of the country 
where the infringement occurs. One commentator argues that: “no one 
denies that this law has a part to play. The controversy concerns the 
scope of that part, certain maintaining that the ownership, or even the 
existence of the right, must remain subject to the law of the country of 
origin, an attachment that we must now look into”. He went on to say 
that: “the concept of the application of the law of the country of 
protection to the whole of the right does not create an insecurity as 
great as has been claimed”. 600 
The law of the country of origin: it is often understood to be the law of 
the country of first publication. The supporters of the application of 
the law of the country of origin argue that at least that law should 
determine the existence and ownership of a right, as that right 
originates from it. Some even go further by contending that the 
application of the law of the country where protection is claimed, 
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provided for by Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, should be 
applied only to determine the sanction in case of infringement. In this 
respect they construe Article 14bis(2)(a) of the Berne Convention, 
which provides that “ownership of copyright in a cinematographic 
work shall be a matter for legislation in the country where protection 
is claimed”, as to stipulate in the negative that “in other hypotheses it 
should be a matter for the law of the country of origin to govern the 
issue of ownership of the right”.601 The opponents of this view argue 
that the expression ‘extent of protection’ under Article 5 (2) “cannot 
be read, without artifice, as referring solely to the consequences of 
infringement of the exclusive right, and even less with its spirit, since 
everything would indicate, despite unhappy drafting, that it is indeed a 
general rule of conflict that had been intended by the drafters”. 
Moreover, defining the country of origin as the country of first 
publication raises practical difficulties as concerns distribution of 
copyrighted works over digital networks, since the simple making of a 
work available on a website cannot constitute publication within the 
meaning of Article 3(3) of the Berne Convention, which defines 
publication as the “manufacture of a sufficient number of copies to 
satisfy the reasonable requirement of the public”.602 
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There is a general agreement between the legal writers that in case of 
infringement, “a choice of law rule that designated the law of a single 
country to govern the ensemble of the Internet copyright transactions 
would considerably simplify the legal landscape, and thus promote 
Internet commerce”. However, the problem is that in the light of the 
significant substantive differences between national copyright laws, “a 
choice of law rule that designates a single applicable law risks vesting 
legislative competence in laws that are either relatively 
underprotective or, for that matter, relatively overprotective 
(depending on the choice of forum and its choice of law rules) 
compared with the laws of other affected countries”.603In an attempt to 
overcome this obstacle, Professor Ginsburg recommends that in order 
to choose the law of a certain country to govern the full territorial 
extent of the claim, the domestic law of the country must be consistent 
with the Berne Convention, TRIPS and WCT. As far as online 
copyright infringement is concerned, the applicable law may be the 
law of the country where the operator of the website resides or has his 
principal place of business, or the law of the country where the server 
that hosts the alleged infringing material is located respectively, 
depending on the consistency of the chosen law with the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS and WCT. However, in case there is a third 
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country with more significant relationship with the alleged 
infringement, e.g., where there is targeting, then the applicable law 
should be the law of that third country, provided that its domestic law 
compatible with the Berne Convention, TRIPS and WCT. Otherwise, 
the applicable law should be the law of the forum, so long as the 
forum is a member of the Berne Convention or WTO or WCT.604 
  Furthermore, the difficulty facing the application of choice of law 
rules for copyright infringement on the Internet is the determination of 
the locality of the infringing act. For example, if an allegedly 
infringing content was made available on a website by a person in 
country A, on a server located in country B, and downloaded by 
persons all over the world, where can it be said that the infringing act 
took place? Is it in the country where the content was uploaded, or 
where it was hosted or in each country where it was downloaded?605 
These difficulties have forced some copyright owners to seek the 
protection and enforcement of their rights in the application of 
technical measures and have succeeded in getting recognition and 
legislative protection for those technical measures. 
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iii) Use of Technical Measures for the Protection of Copyright and 
Related Rights 
  Dissatisfied with protection afforded by law and contract, many right 
holders resort to technological measures, as supplementary 
mechanisms for the protection of their rights. The supporters of the 
use of technology argue that elimination of the threat posed by new 
technologies, such as the Internet, can be achieved by the use of 
technology itself. In this respect, reference is often made to the 
famous phrase of Charles Clark: “the answer to the machine is the 
machine”.606 Different technological devices have been used by 
content providers, some are specially designed for the protection of 
copyright and related rights works disseminated over digital networks 
and others are designed to protect content online, whether copyrighted 
or not. It is not easy to enumerate the technologies currently in use or 
being developed or to predict the future of these technologies. 
However, it may be possible to classify these technologies on the 
basis of their function or purpose. Within this context, four broad 
categories may be distinguished including those measures, which are 
efficiently used to protect copyright and related rights, systems used 
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to control access, watermarking and identification tools, and 
electronic rights management systems.607  
 
     (a) Technologies Protecting Copyright and Related Rights 
 These are devices used to control unauthorized exploitation of 
copyright and related rights on digital networks. In other words, these 
devices allow the initial access and view of the copyrighted works, but 
unauthorized uses, such as copying or modifying of a work, are 
disabled. Examples of these technologies are dongles, which are used 
mainly in software sector, and smart cards, which may be used for a 
variety of works available for the public. Likewise, there are other 
devices such as the Serial Copy Management System, which is used 
mainly in US for the protection of audio-digital recording.608 
  
     (b) Access Control Tools 
      These are technical measures that make the initial access to the online 
content conditional. In other words, access to the content is only 
allowed when certain conditions, such as payment of a fee, are 
fulfilled. The protected content may be a work or collective works and 
may be a service including, among other things, copyrighted works. 
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Technologies used for controlling access include cryptography, 
passwords, set-top boxes, black boxes, digital signature and digital 
envelope.609 
 
    (c) Watermarking and Tattooing Tools 
      Tattooing and watermarking technologies are used to identify and 
mark works. There are different applications for these technologies 
serving various purposes. One of their main uses is that they are used 
for inserting visible or invisible information about the work, such as 
the title of the work, the name of its creator, the copyright holder or 
the terms of use of the work. The inserted information may help in 
proofing counterfeit of a work or as means of authentication.610 
 
     (d) Digital Rights Management Systems 
      Digital rights management systems (DRMS), also known as 
electronic rights management systems (ERMS), are technologies 
enabling rights management on digital networks by making it possible 
to license and control the utilization of works online. They often 
consist of a combination of tools and technologies designed to 
perform several jobs. “Thus, a cryptography tool blocking access to 
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the work may be associated with an anti-copying system prohibiting 
the reproduction of the work”.611  
 
iv) Legal Protection of Technical Measures 
      Although technological measures used for the protection and 
management of copyright and related rights may be effective in 
relation to ordinary users, they may not stand against qualified users 
who, if they so like, may find a way to circumvent these technical 
measures. Thus, technological measures may be neutralized or 
‘hacked’ and a market for illicit devices facilitate decryption and other 
forms of circumvention of such measures, has the potential to grow.  
“No matter how ingenious the technology used to protect works 
against unauthorized use, equally ingenious ways may be developed 
to circumvent it”. Therefore, right holders seek legal protection for 
these technical measures against illegitimate use, impairment or 
destruction.612 In 1996 the WIPO Internet Treaties, namely WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performance and Phonogram 
Treaty (WPPT), set the framework for the national legislative 
endeavors that followed. In this respect Article 11 of WCT provides 
that: 
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           Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection 
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this treaty 
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of 
their works, which are not authorized by the authors 
concerned or permitted by law. 
     Likewise Article 12 of WCT provides for the imposition of effective 
remedies against those who remove or alter electronic rights 
management information or dispose of works by distribution, import 
for distribution, broadcasting or communication to the public, 
knowing that electronic rights management information has been 
altered or removed from them without authorization, whereby they 
know or has reasonable ground to know that any of these acts will 
induce, enable, facilitate or conceal infringement of any right covered 
by WCT or the Berne Convention.613 
     Many national and regional legal systems followed the WCT and 
WPPT by enacting laws that counter circumvention of technological 
measures used by right holders. In this respect, Title 1 of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 1998 of the United States provides for 
criminal and civil liability for the circumvention of digital rights 
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management devices. Section 1201 of this Act prohibits unauthorized 
access to copyrighted works through the circumvention of access 
control measures. Moreover, it prohibits the manufacture or making 
available technologies, products and services used to circumvent 
technological measures controlling access to copyright works, as well 
as prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of technologies that 
may defeat technical measures that protect the rights of a copyright 
owner as provided for under the US Copyright Act. Likewise, the 
E.U. Copyright Directive 2001 requires its Member States to provide 
adequate legal protection against circumvention of effective 
technological measures used by copyright owners and to prohibit the 
manufacture or distribution of devices, products or components or the 
provision of services specifically for the purpose of circumvention or 
has only limited commercial uses other than circumvention.614 
  It has been observed that the circumvention provisions of both the 
DMCA and the E.U. Copyright Directive have gone beyond what is 
required by WCT because, unlike WIPO Internet treaties, they “are 
not directed simply against the ‘circumvention of technological 
measures’, but cover any activity, including preparatory activities 
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such as the manufacture and distribution, as well as services, that 
facilitate or enable the circumvention of these devices”. Moreover, the 
protection afforded to the technical measures in US and EU laws, 
especially those controlling access to copyright works, threatens the 
existence of the exceptions and limitations and thus disrupt the 
copyright balance.615 
  
 
3. The Status of Exceptions and Limitations on Digital Networks 
 
i)  The Extension of the Traditional Copyright Exemptions to 
Digital Networks 
  Different ways have been followed by different national laws, as 
concerns the definition of the statutory exemptions to the authors’ 
exclusive rights. Some laws provide for lengthy and detailed list of 
copyright privileges, such as those provided for under the Sudanese 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Protection Act 1996. Others 
provide only for minimal exemptions, using general concepts such as 
‘fair use’ or ‘private use’.616 However, the issue of extending, 
adapting or excluding traditional copyright exceptions and limitations 
                                                 
615  Ibid. at 38. 
616  See s. 14 of the 1996 Act. See also Hugenholtz, supra note 1, at 93. See also Burk, L. Dan & 
15 . Vol. & Tech. L. J. Harv. ’Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems‘. Cohen, Julie E
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to copyrighted works disseminated over digital networks has 
generated intensive debate. Copyright interests argue that the mere 
uncontrolled access to copyrighted works would result in exploitations 
of creators’ rights in a way contrary to Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention. They add that the justifications underlying the exceptions 
and limitations such as fair use or private copying in the analog world 
viz., the market failure to provide end-users with their needs, the 
insignificant loss for authors’ earnings or the impossibility to control 
have been eliminated online. This is because it has become technically 
possible to control exploitation of works online and, moreover, 
feasible to meter every use of works disseminated online. 
Furthermore, the difficulty previously facing end-users in relation to 
contact with copyright owners is no longer existing in the digital age, 
where it has become possible for end-users to contact directly with 
copyright owners and get license to access their works online. 
Therefore, they claim that the traditional copyright exemptions should 
not be extended to digital networks and that rigorous forms of 
protections should be afforded for copyrighted works online through 
technical means, which are backed by law.617 
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The call for granting copyright owners exclusive control over the 
exploitation of their rights has been criticized by many writers on the 
grounds that it concentrates on the economical aspects at the account 
of social and cultural aspects of copyright law. It is considered as a 
manifestation for the current trend of using intellectual property as a 
mechanism for return on investment. This trend reflects a disturbing 
change in intellectual property rights, “which has gone from a system 
supposed to protect creative works to a system tending to protect 
investment”. Examples of this change are the sui generis right on 
databases, which protects basic information traditionally not covered 
by copyright, and the rights given to producers of phonograms and 
videographic recordings.618 It has been stated that: 
       Such a change in the idea of intellectual property ‘woven 
around the idea that it and the monopolies it thus grants are 
not trade-offs for enriching the collective cultural heritage, 
but a bonus that the law gives to companies that are able to 
make sizeable investments (which comes down to giving 
them a legal privilege as a reward for a de facto economic 
one)’ is particularly disturbing for developing countries and 
                                                 
618 See Dusollier, Severine & Poullet, Yves & Buydens, Mireille, supra note 85, at  6-8. 
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companies in those countries which very often cannot afford 
to make such investments.619 
  The campaign for enhancing copyright on digital networks has been 
accompanied by a decrease in the scope of exceptions to and 
limitations on copyrighted works disseminated over digital networks 
through the interference of different factors including legislation and a 
growing use of contracts and application of technological measures. 
Such conduct “runs the risk of causing an unprecedented break in the 
balance inherent in all systems of intellectual property. For copyright 
relies on balancing the interests of protecting created works and their 
creators and guaranteeing public interest and fundamental 
freedoms”.620 Therefore, Article 10(1) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
1996 tries to re-strike this balance when it allows the Contracting 
parties to provide in their national laws for limitations of and 
exceptions to authors’ literary and artistic rights provided that this is 
confined to certain cases, which do not conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice with the legitimate 
interests of the author. Under Paragraph 2 of the same Article, the 
Contracting Parties are required, when applying the Berne 
Convention, to “confine any limitations of or exceptions to rights 
provided for therein to certain special cases that do not conflict with a 
                                                 
619  Ibid., at 8. 
620  Ibid. at 5. 
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normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author”. According to the Agreed Statement 
concerning Article 10, this Article permits the Contracting Parties to 
extend into the digital networks the exceptions and limitations, which 
are considered acceptable under the Berne Convention and that it 
“neither reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the 
limitations and exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention”. Thus, 
a Contracting Party may create new exceptions or limitations deemed 
to be appropriate in the digital networks, on condition that the 
yardstick provided for under Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and 
Article 10 of the WIPO Treaty be properly observed; viz., that the 
exceptions and limitations be confined to specific cases, not 
conflicting with the normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the interests of the author.621    
  However, despite the provision of Article 10 of the WCT, the current 
trend seems to be supporting a reduction in both the scope and the 
number of exceptions and limitations on the digital networks. For 
example, in the case of American Geophysical Affairs v. Princeton 
University Press622 the court held that the existence of an entity like 
the Copyright Clearance System, which grants, on behalf of authors 
and publishers, “permission to make photocopies of articles taken 
                                                 
621  Ibid. at 10-11. 
622  60 F. 3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), [cited in] Dusollier, Poullet and Buydens, supra note 46, at 11  
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from books or newspapers, constituted a market for photocopies of 
scientific articles, so that photocopies made by a company for its 
research department could no longer be considered as falling within 
the area of fair use”.623 Moreover, the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) prohibits not only the circumvention of 
rights management systems, which control every use of copyrighted 
works online, but also the manufacture, distribution and importation 
of circumvention tools. Furthermore, the mentioned Statute provides 
clearly that copyright exemptions will not afford a defense for the 
circumvention of these rights management systems.624 Likewise, 
although the EU Copyright Directive 2001 enumerates some 
exceptions and limitations including private reproduction, criticism 
and parody, and news reporting that member countries may enact 
legislation ordering copyright owners to provide users with means to 
take advantage of, nevertheless, the exceptions and limitations 
enumerated in the Directive are described as discrete and relatively 
narrow.625  
  It has been stated that as maintaining of the exceptions to and 
limitations on copyright is essential for preserving the inherent 
copyright balance, the extension of the exceptions and limitations into 
                                                 
623  See Dusollier, Poullet and Buydens, supra note 85, at 11. 
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the digital networks is an inevitable matter. In this respect it is 
suggested that the issue of adaptation of copyright exemptions to the 
digital networks “can be solved only through a fresh analysis of the 
basis on which exemptions are granted”. Generally copyright 
exemptions are based on two kinds of considerations: “either the 
exception is required for practical or economic reasons, or it is 
justified by concerns of general interest or fundamental rights or 
freedoms”.626 According to Hugenholtz, there is merit in the 
arguments of both rights’ owners on the one hand and libraries, 
intermediaries and end-users on the other hand. Therefore, he believes 
that “exemptions having their origin in the market failure (i.e., the 
inability of copyright owners to transact directly with users) deserve 
critical review and, perhaps, should not survive in the new 
environment”. However, other exemptions, which aim at protecting 
human rights or basic societal needs and not merely justified by 
market failure “should, as much as possible, be preserved in the 
digital networked environment” so as to maintain the balance between 
property rights in information and public interest. Such exemptions 
include those protecting the basic academic freedoms or serve 
essential education purposes, in addition to other exemptions such as 
private copying, which protects the individual’s private sphere and the 
                                                 
626  See Dusollier, Poullet and Buydens, supra note 85, at 12-3.  
 415
library privileges, archival exemptions, rights of news reporting and 
quotation rights, which safeguard the cultural heritage of the society 
and foster the free flow of information.627 In other words, the decision 
on whether to recognize or deny a certain exemption should be made 
by reference to the justification underlying that exemption and not 
merely to the technological or economic possibility that an author has 
for granting his permission to use his work.628 It has been argued that 
if the authorial rights would be increased, e.g., if the digital 
exploitation right would apply, the scope of copyright exemption must 
be increased to the same extent so as to strike the copyright balance.629 
However, the application of technical measures by rights’ owners, 
which prevents all kinds of use unless authorized by them through 
contract or other kinds of license, threatens not only the uses 
authorized by copyright law in form of exceptions and limitations but 
also the use of works not covered by copyright protection or fall in the 
public domain. 
ii) The Impacts of Electronic Rights Management Systems on 
Copyright Exemptions      
  The easiness of copying and distribution all over the world of 
materials disseminated on digital networks at high quality level and 
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virtually at no cost has posed a great challenge on the protection of 
copyrighted works on digital networks. The response of right holders 
to this challenge is the application of technical measures enabling 
them to control the access to and use of their works. These technical 
measures, which are commonly referred to as electronic rights 
management systems (ERMS), include a combination of many tools 
ensuring rights management over digital networks by making it 
possible to license online utilization of works and to control such 
use.630 Moreover, these technical measures have been backed by 
national and international legal provisions, which prevent their 
circumvention. However, the protection provided by these technical 
measures exceeds the extent of protection required by copyright law 
as they “padlock and block access to works that are not, or are no 
longer, under copyright or to prevent the normal exercise of a legally 
recognized exception”. This implies that end-users could not exploit 
such protected works, even within the limits of the legally recognized 
exceptions and limitations, except through a contract with the right 
holders or by finding a way around the technological barrier.631  
As far as contracts are concerned, the owner of a copyrighted work 
may stipulate in his contracts with end-users that certain exemptions 
should be exercised, e.g., a backup copy for a software program or 
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quotation from a scientific article. The validity of such contracts 
depends on whether exceptions and limitations are matters of public 
policy and hence mandatory or default provisions that can be amended 
or excluded by the parties’ will. In this respect it has been pointed out 
that so far no national law has ruled definitely on the imperative 
nature of copyright exemptions except Belgian law, which recognizes 
all exceptions to copyright and neighboring rights as compulsory. 
However, “European directives on software and databases make 
certain exemptions compulsory, notably in the case of backup copies, 
decompilation and correction of program errors, normal use of a 
database and retrieval of non-substantial excerpts from the base 
content. Any contract which disallows this is therefore void”.632 
Moreover, some writers; following the distinction, referred to above, 
between different kinds of exceptions and limitations argue that 
exemptions that serve the preservation of fundamental rights and 
those based on public interest should be mandatory and thus cannot be 
circumvented by a contract, but exceptions based on the practical 
impossibility of enforcing copyright or due to the market failure to 
provide end-users with their needs and do not infringe any 
                                                 
632  Ibid. at 17. 
 418
fundamental freedom or public interest may be “granted auxiliary 
status by each state”.633  
 Different views have been expressed as regards the way of dealing 
with the adverse impacts of electronic rights management on 
exceptions and limitations in order to restore the copyright balance. 
One view is that the tackling of this issue should be left to the market 
factors. According to this view, the market elements will determine 
the relationship with the rights management systems in relation to “the 
economic benefits of these technologies, the new types of transactions 
likely to develop under a right-management regime, and the types of 
contents that are most likely to be protected by rights-management 
containers”.634  
 Another view sees the solution either in the resort to the common law 
principles such as the principle of abuse of right or in the systems of 
consumers’ protection. It is conceded that “the application of these 
institutions to copyright is still in its early stages, but nothing prevents 
it from falling within its purview”. However, for practical reasons this 
solution may not be perfect. For example, if the prevention of 
exercising an exemption serving the public interest is considered as 
abuse of right, it may not be acceptable to blame the rights’ holder for 
the failure of a technological measure to analyze and recognize the 
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often subjective terms that are imposed for the exercise of an 
exception.635  
  A third view suggests that the solution may be found in a contractual 
relationship between the right holders and end-users. This may be 
achieved by providing certain kinds of users, such as libraries, 
journalists, researchers and teachers, “with a copy of the work without 
any technological protection or a copy whose technological protection 
would take into account the kind of exemption to which that user was 
entitled”. Likewise, this solution may not be preferable, as it deprives 
individual users who would not be granted such an opportunity.636  
 A fourth view may be found in the alternatives proposed by Burk and 
Cohen. The first alternative is the programming of rights management 
systems so as to allow access to protected works within the limits of 
copyright exemptions. The difficulty facing this solution is that it may 
not be possible for the system designers to anticipate all uses 
authorized by copyright law, especially with regard to wide concepts 
of copyright exemptions such as ‘fair use’ concept adopted by US 
law.637 The second alternative is the designing of an infrastructure 
enabling an external decision-maker to regulate access to the 
protected work. At present, only human intelligence may be able to 
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determine whether a particular use falls within the copyright 
exemptions. Such escrow must be a trusted neutral third party, to be 
funded by governments, as users may not be able to do so. It has been 
stated that even if it is possible to find a trusted neutral entity that can 
monitor this process efficiently, case by case determination of the 
fairness of every use may be a complicated, lengthy and costly 
process which may deter some uses that otherwise would have been 
made. Moreover, this may be to the detriment of the privacy right, as 
“the application to a third party is likely to compromise the sort of 
anonymity that users presently enjoy”.638 The third alternative is a 
combination of the above two alternatives. This can be achieved by 
programming the rights management code to enable the commonly 
accepted non-commercial uses of protected works. The other uses, 
which need a human intelligence to decide on their fairness, may be 
referred to the trusted third party intermediary. This combination 
eliminates the drawbacks of the discrete application of either of the 
two alternatives. “Finally, to preserve the relative anonymity of the 
key escrow system, the records of applicants and keys issued would 
need to be guarded by stringent legal protections”.639  
The legislative response to the negative impacts of electronic rights 
management systems on exceptions and limitation, least to say, is not 
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commensurate with the threat posed by these technical measures on 
exceptions and limitations. This is because, although Article 11 of 
WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 18 of WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty “seem to limit the sanction to cases where a 
violation of copyright is performed after deactivating barrier (…), 
national laws are less clear on this point”.640 For example, in the 
United States when the DMCA was enacted in 1998, two fears have 
been expressed: that by affording copyright owners the power of 
authorizing access to creative works “the public domain will be 
inaccessible, and use of creative works will be subject to a pay-per-
view system”. Therefore, the Librarian of Congress was charged with 
the job of sorting out what classes of works, if any, should be 
exempted from circumvention of technical measures protecting 
copyrighted works. After extensive consultations two classes of works 
were declared as entitled to be exempted from the application of the 
provisions preventing circumvention. These are: “compilations 
consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software 
applications” and “literary works, including computer programs and 
databases, protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit 
access because of malfunction damage or obsoleteness”. As concerns 
the impact of pay-per-view system on access to protected works, the 
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Librarian stated that it had not been revealed “that ‘pay-per-view’ 
business models have, thus far, created the adverse impacts on the 
ability of users to make non-infringing uses of copyrighted works that 
would justify any exemptions from the prohibition on circumvention”. 
However, although a hint was made to the effect that “if such adverse 
impacts occur in the future, they can be addressed in a future 
rulemaking proceeding”, in US, so far, only limited exemptions are 
allowed as concerns the prohibition of circumvention of access 
control measures.641 Likewise, the European Union follows similar 
procedures as concerns prohibition of circumvention of technologies 
preventing access to protected works and the application of ‘pay-per-
view’ business model. This is because, although the Copyright 
Directive 2001 provides for a list of exceptions and limitations under 
Article 5, nevertheless, the exercise of these exceptions and 
limitations is subject to Article 6(4), which provides that: 
      Notwithstanding the legal protection provided for in 
paragraph 1, in the absence of voluntary measures taken 
by rightholders, including agreements between 
rightholders and other parties concerned, Member States 
shall take appropriate measure to ensure that rightholders 
make available to the beneficiary of an exception or 
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limitation provided for in national law in accordance with 
article 5.2a, 2c, 2d, 2e, 3a, 3b or 3e the means of 
benefiting from that exception or limitation, to the extent 
necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation, 
where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected 
work or other subject matter concerned.642  
  This means that the E.U. Copyright Directive differentiates between 
the use and access control. While circumvention of technologies 
preventing access to protected works is absolutely prohibited, the 
beneficiaries who have legal access to a work must be assisted to 
overcome controls preventing the exercise of an exception.643 
Moreover, the Directive recognizes the ‘pay-per-view’ system, as it is 
apparent from the provisions of Article 6(4) itself. Furthermore, 
Recital 60 of this Directive provides that the application of the 
Copyright Directive should be without prejudice to the other legal 
provisions of the Community including conditional access.644 The 
Conditional Access Control Directive, which has been promulgated as 
part of the EU electronic commerce framework, extends legal 
protection to access control technologies used in conjunction with 
many services including “services becoming more widespread in the 
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online environment, such as pay-per-view, video-on-demand, 
electronic publishing and music-on-demand. To gain protection under 
the Conditional Access Directive, any such service must be offered 
for remuneration”.645 Therefore, it has been recommended that in 
order to maintain the balance on which copyright law is premised, 
“any legal protection regime for technological measures must be 
carried out with due regard for access to information and to the public 
domain, and must permit the legitimate exercise of copyright 
exemptions”.646  
 
Conclusion 
  Electronic commerce offers opportunities to traditional copyright 
system, as well as posing challenges on it. The careful dealing with 
the phenomenon of the Internet is a precondition for getting its 
benefits and avoiding its adverse impacts. Things need to be put into 
consideration when dealing with such phenomenon include: first, 
Internet is an international medium that disregards altogether the 
traditional geographical borders. Second, it offers unprecedented 
opportunities of copying and distribution of copyright and related 
rights works all over the world at higher quality and speed. Third, this 
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medium can be exploited by pirates to deprive right holders of their 
economic as well as moral rights. Likewise, it can be exploited by 
right holders themselves to deprive the ordinary end-users of their 
legal rights under copyright law, a matter that will disrupt the balance 
on which copyright and related rights are premised. In order to strike 
the copyright balance, careful analysis of the problems and the 
proposed solutions must be done at the international level. 
 This requires that, on the one hand, the scope of the rights of 
copyright owners must be specifically determined. Likewise, the ways 
of enforcing these rights must be clearly stated. This necessitates first, 
solving issues relating to the responsibility of the Internet Service 
Providers for the infringement of copyright and related rights 
occurring on their websites. Second, agreeing on private international 
law aspects of copyright and related rights and the geographical 
locations of infringement occurring on digital networks. Third, 
specifying the extent of the legal protection to be afforded to the 
technical measures used by copyright and related rights holders for the 
protection of their rights on the digital networks. 
 On the other hand, the scope of copyright exceptions and limitation 
on digital networks must be determined at an international level, 
putting into consideration the rights of developing countries in the 
dissemination of knowledge and transfer of technology. Specifically, 
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exceptions and limitations that are based on public interest 
considerations must be preserved on digital networks. Likewise, the 
ways of enforcement of these exceptions and limitations online must 
be clearly stated. This requires that: first, right holders must be forced 
to allow the exercise of copyright exemptions online. Second, 
technical measures blocking the exercise of these exceptions and 
limitation should not be afforded legal protection. Third, contracts 
depriving end-users from their rights in copyright exemptions should 
be denied validity.  
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Chapter 7 
Protection of Trademarks on Digital Networks 
 
     Introduction 
  Traditionally, a trademark is defined as any visible sign used or 
proposed to be used upon, in connection with or in relation to goods or 
services of a certain person for the purposes of distinguishing them 
from those of others.647 As such, trademarks play a pivotal role in 
commerce because on one hand they enable consumers to differentiate 
between the competitive goods and services available in the market. 
On the other, the exclusive right granted to right holders, which may 
be for indefinite time, enable them to establish goodwill and 
reputation in their business so that it becomes difficult for their 
competitors to mislead consumers by making false associations with 
certain enterprises with which they have no connection. 
  This traditional role of trademarks in the off-line world may be needed to the same extent or even more in cyberspace. 
This is because in cyberspace, where face-to-face contact is lacking and where the opportunity for the inspection of goods 
or services is little, much dependence will be placed on trusted sources offering such goods or services. This fact may be 
extracted from the proportionately short experience of electronic commerce, which has shown the reluctance and hesitation 
of consumers in dealing with online enterprises, mainly for lack of trust. Therefore, online businesses are striving to build 
recognition and goodwill so as to inspire confidence in their business and brands on digital networks in order to remain 
competitive. 
  However, in addition to the traditional challenges that face trademarks protection 
in the real world, new challenges have emerged in the virtual world. The 
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challenges confronting trademarks online range from the difficulty of tailoring the 
conventional trademark law to fit the traditional forms of infringements that have 
been extended to cyberspace, to the difficulty of dealing with new practices that 
may not be easily conceptualized within the traditional forms of infringements, 
but affect trademark rights in a way or another. First of all, although there is a 
general international consensus that trademarks concepts such as the requirement 
of use, the likelihood of confusion and the definition of infringement should be 
extended to the Internet practices; the issue of determining what constitutes use, 
confusion and similarity online has proven to be problematic. Moreover, Internet 
users have developed new forms of practices that have been found detrimental to 
trademarks owners even though it may not always be easy to conceptualize the 
injury resulting from such practices under the rules of the traditional trademarks 
law. These practices include the registration of trademarks as domain names or in 
linking and framing. 
  The peculiarity of the Internet has rendered even the invisible use of trademarks 
harmful, e.g., the use of trademarks as meta tags and keywords or in the so-called 
pop-up advertisements or mouse-trapping. Furthermore, other peculiarities of the 
Internet, such as its borderless nature and the fact that a domain name, for 
example, can only be registered in the name of one person at a time in a certain 
general Top Level Domain (gTLD) or a country code Top Level Domain 
(ccTLD), have inflicted a further blow on the traditional trademarks law, which 
has been based on territoriality and co-existence of identical or confusingly 
similar trademarks for different categories of goods or services even in the same 
country and, the co-existence of identical or confusingly similar marks for similar 
goods or services in different territories. 
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  Many attempts have been made in order to find solutions for the 
problems generated as a result of the use of trademarks on digital 
networks. The fact that the traditional trademarks law may not 
properly fit for the current problems have led some to give more 
flexible or extended meanings to concepts such as ‘use in the 
course of trade’ or the concept of ‘confusion’ so as to satisfy the 
requirements of the traditional trademarks law and unfair 
competition rules. Even solutions contrary to the principle of 
territoriality, on which the traditional trademarks law is based, such 
as the grant of global injunction, are found acceptable in some 
cases in order to cure the injury suffered by trademarks owners as a 
result of the unfair use of their marks by others on the Internet. 
  This chapter discusses the current problems facing the protection of 
trademarks rights on digital networks. It is divided into three main 
parts. Part 1 studies the registration of trademarks as domain 
names. This part is sub-divided into six titles comprising the 
definition of domain names, the problems generated by the 
registration of trademarks as domain names, the role of the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the 
recent developments relating to domain names, the future of 
ICANN, and the settlement of disputes between domain names 
holders and trademarks owners. Part 2 discusses other forms of 
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practices on the Internet that proved to be detrimental to 
trademarks rights. This part is sub-divided into five titles dealing 
with use of trademarks as meta tags or keywords or in framing and 
linking, pop-up advertisements and mousetrapping. Part 3 clarifies 
the difficulty of adapting the traditional trademarks law to the 
Internet environment, particularly the clash between the principle 
of territoriality, upon which traditional trademarks law is based and 
the global nature of the Internet. It is divided into four subtitles 
discussing the requirement of ‘use’ for the acquisition and 
maintenance of trademarks rights on the Internet, the co-existence 
of trademarks on digital networks, jurisdiction over infringements 
online and the extent of remedies in infringement actions. 
 
1. Registration of Trademarks as Domain Names 
 
 i) What is a Domain Name? 
     An Internet Address is composed of a numeric address known as 
‘Internet Protocol’ (IP) and a corresponding alphanumeric address 
known as ‘domain name’. In other words, a domain name may be 
defined as “unique set of words, or a combination of words, generally 
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separated by periods, that identifies each entity on the Internet”.648 A 
domain name is divided into two levels. One is known as the ‘Top 
Level Domain’ (TLD), which may either be a ‘generic top level 
domain’ (gTLD) such as .com, .net, .org etc., or a geographic or 
‘country code top-level domain’ (ccTLD) such as .fr (for France), .za 
(for South Africa) etc. The other is known as the ‘Second Level 
Domain’ (SLD), which appears directly before the (TLD) suffixes. As 
the numeric addresses are too long and difficult to remember, users 
usually refer to the more user-friendly alphanumeric addresses.649  
 
ii) Problems Generated by the Registration of Domain Names 
   In addition to their function as Internet addresses, domain names 
play functions of identifiers of businesses and goods or services on the 
Internet. These additional characteristics give domain names an 
economic value, a fact that gives rise to “a great many ownership 
disputes with other signs that existed prior to the advent of the Internet 
and were protected by intellectual property rights, such as 
trademarks”.650 The disputes result mainly from the fact that the 
Domain Name System (DNS) was developed without concern for the 
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future trademarks ramifications. The system was essentially based on 
first come first served policy. It was created by a voluntary association 
of engineers (ISOC) in association with the American National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and Defense Advanced Research Project 
Agency (DARPA). “The NSF granted the ISOC the authority for 
domain naming, which in turn created the Internet Authorized Naming 
Authority (IANA)”. In 1992 NSF and IANA assigned the job of 
domain naming to a private company called Network Solutions, Inc. 
(NSI), which continued the first come first served policy applied by 
IANA. This policy resulted in the registration of famous trademarks as 
domain names by trademarks pirates commonly known as 
‘cybersquatters’. Trademarks owners turned to NSI, which adopted an 
ad hoc dispute policy in July 1995, which was subsequently revised 
many times. Likewise, trademarks owners resorted to courts and in 
many cases NSI was named as a defendant. The policy adopted by 
NSI had raised much controversy and criticized by domain name 
holders as well as trademarks owners. Proposals for reform had been 
submitted by different entities including IANA and the US 
Department of Commerce represented in the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). These 
efforts resulted finally in the formation of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in November 1998, a non-
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profit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of 
California in the United States of America.651  
 
iii) The Role of ICANN 
  According to a Memorandum of Understanding signed between 
ICANN and US Department of Commerce, ICANN was entrusted 
with the following functions: “(i) set policy for and direct allocation of 
IP number blocks to regional Internet number registries; (ii) oversee 
operation of the authoritative Internet root server system; (iii) oversee 
policy for determining the circumstances under which new TLDs are 
added to the root system; and (iv) coordinate the assignment of other 
Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal 
connectivity on the Internet”.652 
  Immediately after its incorporation ICANN started its efforts to 
ameliorate the DNS by, first; increasing the number of registrars and, 
second; adopting on August 24, 1999 the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Moreover, on November 16, 2001 
ICANN authorized the inclusion of seven new gTLD in the DNS. The 
new gTLD are: .biz (for business), .aero (for aeronautical industry), 
.coop (for accredited cooperatives), .info (for various activities), 
                                                 
Will the Current Legal : The Domain System and Trademark Law‘, . See Cheney, Stacy M651
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.museum (for museums), .name (for personal names) and .pro (for 
professional entities).653 The registrars for the new gTLDs have taken 
measures to protect intellectual property rights, either through 
preventive means by giving trademarks owners a sunrise period to 
register their marks as domain names or by adopting the UDRP and 
include its provisions in the agreements they make with the registrants 
or both. Different views have expressed as concerns the step taken by 
ICANN to increase the gTLD. The supporters argue that this step was 
made in response to overseas criticism that ICANN is blatantly U.S. 
centric. The critics of this step have been divided into two groups; one 
argues that the increase will not be a solution because it imposes a 
further burden on trademarks owners to register domain names in all 
the new gTLD or run the risk of registration of their trademarks as 
domain names by others. The other group believes that ICANN has 
been too slow to create new suffixes and that the seven new gTLDs 
are insufficient. ICANN responded to these criticisms by stating that 
the creation of new gTLDs has no precedent and that the seven new 
general top level domains will be evaluated as a ‘proof of concept’ 
before other new TLDs are made available.654  
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iv) Recent Developments Relating to DNS 
  Amongst the recent developments in the DNS is the issue of 
multilingual domain names. The trend at present is towards the 
registration as domain names of characters other than the current 
Roman script or ASCII characters, such as Arabic, Chinese, Japanese 
or Korean. In this respect the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
formed in January 2000 a Working Group on the Internationalization 
of Domain Names to “specify the requirements for internationalized 
access to domain names and to specify access and a standard track 
protocol based on the requirements”. Likewise, this issue is under 
discussion in various fora including ICANN, WIPO and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) so as to study the 
issues that may be raised as a result of the internationalization of 
domain names, whether it is technically possible, and its repercussions 
on intellectual property.655 Another issue relating to domain names is 
the use of keywords as identifiers instead of domain names, in an 
attempt to relieve the growing pressure on the DNS. However, it is 
feared that the increase in the use of keywords as identifiers may be 
“accompanied by a growing risk of intellectual property violations, 
                                                 
655  See WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 50 
 436
exacerbated by the internationalization of the DNS”.656 A third 
important development is the putting, by the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) in September 2000, of the Enum Protocol, which 
“makes it possible to convert telephone numbers into domain names 
and to relate them to communication services through what is known 
as Uniform Resources Identifiers (URIs)”.657 
 
  
v) The Future of ICANN  
  Historically, the structure of DNS has been built on a single central 
root. This central root is now under the control of ICANN. The 
importance of a single central root is that it permits reliable universal 
communications on the Internet. “ICANN has reaffirmed its 
commitment to a single, authoritative public root for the Internet 
Domain Name System (DNS) and to the management of that unique 
root in the public interest according to policies developed through 
community processes”. However, the authority of ICANN is now 
facing a serious challenge. Although there are many TLDs, known as 
‘alternate roots’, working outside the authority of ICANN for years 
and cannot be reached by ICANN’s root server, yet they are of 
marginal importance. The significant challenge to ICANN authority is 
                                                 
656  Ibid., at 52. 
657  For more details see WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 55. 
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coming from a newly emergent company called New.net. It offers 
twenty TLDs such as .shop, .kids, .law, .med, etc. Moreover, New.net 
has recently signed BulkRegister.com, the fourth largest domain name 
registrar and a major ICANN-accredited registrar, as a reseller of 
New.net domain names. It has been stated that “the signing of such a 
major registrar by New.net may open the floodgates and further 
undermines ICANN’s already murky authority”.658  
       ICANN has criticized New.net for daring to function outside its 
contractual structure. Moreover, some fear that such developments 
may undermine the universal character of domain names and, thus, 
jeopardize their stability and reliability. Likewise, it is feared that as 
these multiple roots “are outside the contractual system established by 
ICANN, there is nothing to insure that their operators will apply or 
even adopt the UDRP, and thereby protect intellectual property 
rights”. To dissipate these fears New.net has introduced a Model 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.659  
  It is worthy to note that some have commented that: “these 
challenges to ICANN’s authority reflect the criticism that ICANN 
exerts too much control over the Internet and it is too bureaucratic”. 
Moreover, it has been observed that, although the functions and 
authority of ICANN are of technical nature, the performance of these 
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functions by ICANN sometimes raises public policy issues, some of 
which relate to intellectual property. Thus, the question that has been 
raised is whether ICANN, as “a private sector organization subject to 
the laws of one particular country, can legitimately address those 
public policy issues without the additional involvement of public 
authorities, including intergovernmental organizations”. To address 
this question, ICANN recently has undergone a reform process. But 
still some are expressing their doubt as to the ability of ICANN to 
address this question satisfactorily and definitely.660  
 
vi) Settlement of Disputes between Domain Names Holders and 
Trademarks Owners 
 
    (a) National Endeavors 
       Disputes relating to domain names may be classified into two main 
categories. The first category involves disputes relating to the 
registrants who have legitimate interest in their domain names, which 
appear to be identical or similar to trademarks or personal names of 
others. The second category includes disputes involving registrants 
who, in bad faith, register domain names identical or similar to 
distinctive signs, especially trademarks owned by third parties, mainly 
                                                 
660  Ibid., at 54. See also Radcliffe, supra note 8, at 5. 
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for the purpose of selling or licensing these domains to the 
corresponding right holders or using those domains for commercial 
purposes.661  However, some commentators classify the disputes 
relating to domain names into three categories by dividing the second 
category into two sub-categories; one includes those who are 
commonly known as cybersquatters or cyberpirates, who register 
famous brands or trade names for the sole purpose of selling or 
licensing them to their corresponding holders, and the other includes 
registrants who abusively register the distinctive signs of others for the 
purpose of using them in their business (so-called ‘parasites’). The 
activities of the latter group take different forms. The most prevalent 
include: famous names registered by others, marks that are similar to 
each other and common mistyped versions of famous names or marks. 
The parties that are involved in parasites disputes may include: “direct 
competitors, competitors in similar lines of business and those who 
wish to ‘trade off’ of the name’s fame”.662  
  Many national courts have dealt with disputes relating to domain 
names and trademarks. They have often applied traditional trademarks 
laws, unfair competition and common law passing-off rules. 
Moreover, some countries have enacted new laws that cover the area 
of domain names and trademarks disputes. For example, the U.S. 
                                                 
661  See WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 48. 
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enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995(FTDA)663, and 
the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 1999 (ACPA)664. 
However, in their attempts to do justice and in the absence of specific 
legal provisions covering the forms of disputes facing them, the courts 
sometimes gave arbitrary interpretations for the legal provisions so as 
to satisfy the legal requirements for concepts such as confusion, 
dilution, commercial use, bad faith etc. In U.S., for example, in 
Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int’l,665 an Illinois federal court 
decided that: “the mere reservation of someone else’s famous 
trademark as a domain name constitutes trademark infringement and 
dilution”. However, other U.S. cases decided after this case have 
suggested limitations on this extreme view. In this respect, although 
there are many cases in which the courts found that the registration of 
another’s mark as a domain name constituted infringement of 
trademark rights, these cases often involved more than mere 
registration.666 For instance, in Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen667, the 
defendant registered the trademark of the plaintiff as domain name. 
The court found that the requirement of trademark infringement and 
unfair competition were not met, because as concerns the likelihood of 
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confusion the court found that “there was no similarity between the 
products and services; that there was no evidence of any relationship 
in the use, promotion, distribution or sales between the goods and 
services, there was no evidence of actual confusion; and that 
Toeppen’s intent was a question of fact”. The court concluded that 
there was no trademark infringement. However, it found Toeppen 
liable for the dilution of a famous mark. It construed the offer of 
Toeppen to sell the domain name to the plaintiff as constituting 
commercial use within the meaning of the new Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act. In another case against Toeppen668, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the judgment of the lower court against the defendant and 
concluded that the registration of domain names for the purpose of 
preventing the rightful trademark owners from doing business on the 
Internet under their trademark unless they pay for the registrant 
constitutes commercial use of the mark. In its interpretation of 15 
U.S.C. s 1127, which defined dilution as “the lessening of the capacity 
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and services”, the 
court emphasized that it need not depend on traditional notions of 
dilution such as ‘blurring’ or ‘tarnishment’. It went on to say that 
depriving a trademark owner of the power to use its mark as its 
domain name lessen its capacity to identify and distinguish its goods 
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and services by means of the Internet within the meaning of the 
Dilution Act, because potential customers commonly try to find a 
company’s web site by using its famous trademark followed by the 
ubiquitous .com.  
       Since the promulgation of the ACPA, the U.S. courts have considered a number of factors to prove the presence or lack 
of bad faith. On one hand the factors that may be considered to prove bad faith include: 
           (i) the person’s intent to divert customer’s from 
the mark owner’s online location – either for 
commercial gain or with the intent  to tarnish or 
disparage the mark; (ii) whether or not the 
person has offered to transfer, sell or otherwise 
assign the domain name to the mark owner; (iii) 
the person’s provision of material and 
misleading false contact information; or (iv) the 
person’s registration or acquisition of multiple 
domain names which the person knows are 
identical or confusingly similar to existing 
trademarks669. 
On the other hand, factors that may be considered to establish the lack of bad faith include:  
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(i) the person’s trademark or other intellectual property 
rights in the domain name; (ii) the extent to which the 
domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a 
name that is commonly used to identify that person; (iii) 
the person’s prior use of the domain name in connection 
with the bona fide offering of goods and services; (iv) the 
person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark; 
(v) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the 
person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive 
and famous within the meaning of the Lanham Act Section 
43(c)(1).670   
       The ACPA has been applied numerous times. For example, in 
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc.,671 Sportsman had 
been using the trademark ‘Sporty’s’ to sell products to pilots and 
aviation enthusiasts through a mail order catalogue since 1960 and 
obtained registration for it in 1998. Omega Engineering Inc., (Omega) 
sold scientific process measurement and control instruments through a 
mail order catalogue. The owner of Omega was a pilot who used to 
receive the Sportsmen’s catalogue. In 1994 or early 1995 the owners 
of Omega decided to enter the aviation catalogue business whereby 
they registered the domain name ‘sporty’s.com’ and formed a 
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671  202 F. 3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000), [cited in] Radcliffe, supra note 8, at 18. 
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subsidiary company to which they sold the domain name. The Second 
Circuit acknowledged that this case did not fit into any of the 
categories described in the ACPA, nevertheless it found that the mark 
‘sporty’s’ was distinctive and that Omega “intended to enter the 
market in direct competition with Sportsmen’s in the pilot and 
consumer aviation market. As recipients of the Sportsmen’s catalogue, 
the Omega owners were fully aware that sporty’s was a very strong 
mark for aviation products”. The court rejected all the defenses of 
Omega and upheld the decision of the lower court in favor of 
Sportsmen. 
      The United Kingdom courts have dealt with cases involving 
cybersquatters in ways similar to those of the U.S. courts. For 
instance, In Harrods Ltd v. Network Service Ltd672, the defendant 
registered the domain name harrods.com, but had not created a 
website linked to that domain name or offered it for sale, nevertheless 
the court held that the potential use of the domain name by the 
registrant constituted trademark infringement and passing off. This 
decision has been criticized by many commentators in England, as 
being at odd with the precedents dealing with passing off cases, as it 
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ignored one of the important elements of passing off viz., the 
misrepresentation must be made by a trader in the course of trade.673  
       The German courts seemed to adopt different approaches. For 
example, in one case674 the Mannheim court held that the assignment 
of the domain name Heidelberg.de to a private party infringed the City 
of Heidelberg’s superior rights, whereas in another case675 of similar 
facts, whereby a private party register the name of Kerpen city as a 
domain, the Koln court held that the registration of the domain name 
kerpen.de did not represent usage of the name of the city.  
  Whatever the experience of the national courts may be, it remains to be limited as those courts are national courts applying 
national law to problems, in most cases, bearing international dimensions. Although the courts in some countries such as 
the U.S and Germany sometimes assume jurisdiction beyond their territories, yet this still remains limited and 
controversial. Therefore, the Uniform Domain Names Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) adopted by ICANN has found 
wide international acceptance as a means for the settlement of domain names disputes. 
 
   (b) UDRP 
       The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy adopted by 
ICANN on August 24, 1999 to settle the disputes relating to the bad 
faith abusive registration of trademarks as domain names in the 
generic top-level domains (gTLDs). The UDRP applies mandatory 
administrative procedures similar to arbitration. All ICANN’s 
accredited registrars are required to insert in their contracts with 
                                                 
673  See Hutchinson, supra note 26, at 6. 
.24, at 19Abel, supra note ] in[, in 96/60-O-7, 1996, 8Landgericht Mannheim, March   See 674 
.24, at 19 Abel, supra note] in[, 96/477-O-3, 1996, 17Landgericht Koln, December   675 
 446
domain names registrants a clause providing for the acceptance of 
UDRP for the settlement of disputes. To succeed in his claim for the 
transfer or cancellation of a domain name; the complainant must prove 
that the domain name is identical or similar to his registered 
trademark, the registrant has no rights or legitimate interest in the 
domain name, and registered and used that domain name in bad faith. 
The registration of a domain name is deemed to be made in bad faith 
where the registrant is primarily registering it for the purpose of 
selling or licensing it to the owner of a similar trademark or otherwise 
preventing the owner from the use of his trademark as a domain name, 
or to disrupt the business of a competitor, or to attract Internet users to 
his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion. Either party may 
elect to litigate before, or appeal to, a court of competent jurisdiction 
before the commencing of the mandatory proceedings or after such 
proceedings have been concluded. In case the Panelist(s) decided to 
transfer or cancel a domain name, the UDRP provided for ten business 
day period in which the defendant may bring a lawsuit in an 
appropriate court to prevent the implementation of the decision.676  
       Following the adoption of the UDRP, ICANN has accredited a 
number of institutions to administer complaints filed under the Policy, 
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among which the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (WIPO 
Center) is today the leading provider. By December 2002, more than 
4,254 complaints have been brought before the WIPO Center 
involving parties from 105 countries.677However, the most difficult 
issue under the UDRP is the determination of the presence or lack of 
bad faith. For example, in a dispute involving the domain name 
americanvintage.com.,678 the complainant, American Vintage Wine 
Biscuits Inc. (AV), filed a complaint against the respondent Big 
Daddy’s Antiques (BDA) for the registration of its trademark as a 
domain name. The facts of this dispute may be summarized as 
follows: in 1991 AV registered its trademark AMERICAN 
VINTAGE, which was based on a first use date of October 1, 1989. 
When AV discovered that its trademark had been registered as a 
domain name by BDA in 1998, it filed a complaint before Network 
Solution Inc. (NSI) in early 1999. Upon learning of the complaint 
BDA asked AV if they would like to purchase the domain name. AV 
declined, stating that since they (AV) owned the trademark they would 
“prefer to see what NSI recommends or decides”. BDA replied: “well, 
you will probably have to sue me”. AV filed a complaint before the 
WIPO Center under the UDRP on January 4, 2000. BDA did not 
respond to AV’s complaint with the WIPO Center. The Panel decided 
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in favor of AV. It has been commented that the finding of bad faith by 
the panel is not convincing, because the record of the case included 
facts that work against this finding. For example, the representative of 
AV stated that he was not sure that the registration was primarily 
made in bad faith. Moreover, the Panel noted that “‘American 
Vintage’ is an apt descriptive or suggestive term for antiques, the 
apparent business of respondent…,” and that “it is not clear from the 
allegations regarding respondent’s offer to sell the domain name 
whether the domain name was registered or acquired primarily for the 
purpose of selling the domain name for valuable consideration in 
excess of the documented out-of-pocket costs”. The Panel justified its 
finding of bad faith on the ground of lack of contrary evidence, the 
offer of BDA to sell the domain name, its failure to use it and its 
failure to defend itself before the WIPO Center.   
  As has been noted before, the UDRP does not apply to TLDS not 
administered by ICANN such as the ccTLDS and New.net TLDS, 
unless expressly adopted by the administrators of those top levels 
domains. Likewise, it is applied only to domain name disputes 
involving trademarks. To fill the gap, WIPO has extended the services 
of the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center to include resolution of 
other disputes concerning the new gTLDs, ccTLDs, internationalized 
domain names and keywords. Moreover, in the Second WIPO Internet 
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Domain Name Process, WIPO has drawn the attention to disputes 
relating to bad faith, abusive, misleading or unfair registration as 
domain names of other identifiers such as (i) the International Non-
proprietary Names (INNs) for pharmaceutical substances; (ii) the 
names of intergovernmental organizations; (iii) personal names, (iv) 
trade names; and (v) geographical indications, geographical names 
and indication of source. Moreover, WIPO initiated in August 2000, a 
cooperation program for the benefit of the administrators of 
ccTLDs.679  
 
 
2. Other Internet Practices Relating to Trademarks 
 
i) Meta Tags and Keywords 
   (a) Meta Tags 
  Meta tags or meta data may be defined as a keyword or phrase 
embedded in the Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) code of a 
website, describing the contents of that web site so as to be identified 
and categorized by search engines.680 Although they can be made 
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visible together with the source code of the page, meta tags are usually 
not visible to normal users of the website itself. A search engine 
seeking particular keywords or phrases will find and list all web sites 
that contain these keywords or phrases as meta tags.681 Since 
trademarks used as meta tags are not visible to ordinary users, this 
means that their use as meta tags is not intended to perform the 
primary jobs of trademarks, i.e., to distinguish goods or services, but 
to divert customers looking for those trademarks to the websites of 
those who used these trademarks as meta tags. Although this particular 
fact has complicated a finding of trademark infringement against the 
defendant in meta tags cases, the courts in many jurisdictions have 
found these practices, especially when done by competitors, as unfair 
and applied different legal principles to invalidate them. For example, 
in the Indian case of Tata Sons ltd v. Bodacious Tata682, the court 
found that the use of a trademark as meta tag by a competitor 
constituted unfair competition. Anand commented on this and other 
similar cases by saying that: “it would, therefore, appear that the 
peculiarities of the Internet have made even the invisible use of 
another’s trade mark actionable”. The same result has been reached by 
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an Italian court in the case of Genertel SpA v. Crowe Italia Srl.683 
Moreover, in Brookfield Communication Inc. v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corp684, where the defendant, West Coast, used the 
plaintiff’s trademark ‘MovieBuff’ as meta tag to market a database 
containing entertainment industry related information similar to that of 
the plaintiff, the U.S. Ninth Circuit regarded the practice of meta 
tagging as potential trademark infringement. The court based its 
decision on the so-called ‘initial interest confusion doctrine’.  
The application of the doctrine of ‘initial interest confusion’ to meta 
tags has been criticized as inconsistent with the fundamental principles 
of trademarks law because there is no confusion on the part of a 
consumer at the moment of dealing with a competitor. The supporters 
of this doctrine argue that while this doctrine has attracted much 
attention within the Internet context, its applicability is fairly well 
settled law and has its roots in the brick and mortar world (real world). 
In this respect they point to the case law in the real world context.685 
According to them “a likelihood of initial interest confusion is 
analogous to a likelihood of confusion and necessitates a finding of 
trademark infringement”.686However, the important issue is to 
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determine the level at which the confusion occurs so as to result in a 
finding of trademark infringement. For example, within the Internet 
context: Should the doctrine of initial interest confusion apply even 
when the likelihood of confusion has dissipated at the level of the 
search engine results page? The supporters of the doctrine answer this 
question in the affirmative, saying that this is what was intended by 
Brookfield court and is supported by policy considerations as well.687 
  However, the application of the initial interest confusion doctrine 
within the Internet context is still perplexing. For example, in Playboy 
Enterprises Inc. v. Welles688, the court considered the use of the 
plaintiff’s trademark as meta tag by a former playmate of the year, in 
order to enable consumer to locate her web site, as fair use. The court 
rejected the application of the initial interest confusion noting that 
Brookfield “held that a finding of initial interest confusion can be a 
basis for a finding of likelihood of confusion, but the presence of 
initial interest confusion does not necessarily support a finding of 
likelihood of confusion”.689 Even the subsequent courts that followed 
Brookfield precedent in the application of the initial interest confusion 
doctrine, understood it to be applicable when the confusion of a user 
had not been dissipated at the level of search engine results page but 
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extended to the stage of opening the web site of a competitor. For 
instance, in a recent case690 the court noted that: “the brief descriptions 
of the retrieved web sites that many search engines include in their 
results lists, potentially dissipate initial interest confusion”. 
  Generally, the courts may allow the use of trademarks as meta tags 
where such use is not misleading or unfair. This result is apparent 
from the decisions of the courts in different jurisdictions. For instance, 
the Austrian Supreme Court held in one case691that “it was legitimate 
for the defendant to use the plaintiff’s trademark as a meta tag on its 
website, because such use enabled the public to be informed about 
products the plaintiff produced under patent, and because the average 
user would not be confused as to the ownership of the trademark”. 
Likewise, the Regional Trial court in the Philippines held that the 
“defendant’s use of meta tags on a parody site clearly used to criticize 
the plaintiff’s business schemes and raise public awareness of political 
issues, was not likely to confuse or mislead users and therefore did not 
amount to trademark infringement”.692  
 
 (b) Keywords 
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As explained above, meta tags may be made in form of keywords 
embedded in HTML code. Likewise, keywords may accompany the 
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) for the purpose of describing the 
contents of the web site. Users of the Internet are “increasingly 
resorting to search engines to locate information online, as an 
alternative to relying on domain names to navigate the web”. Users 
often request search engines to locate specific terms or keywords. 
Once receiving the order, a search engine applies a mixture of manual 
and automated methods in order to locate these keywords, whether 
they be in form of meta tags, URLs, keyword listing or based on a 
history of visits. Web sites’ owners, on the other hand, seek to attract 
visitors to their sites for different purposes. For example, for those 
who exercise the business of advertising, the higher the volume of 
visitors the higher the potential advertising revenue. Some retailers 
pay to ‘search engines’ so as to connect their banner advertisements 
with certain keywords referring to specific trademarked products in 
which they deal; so that once the concerned trademarks are entered in 
the search engine, an advertisement appears with any search result.693 
Within the real world context; practices similar to those exercised 
currently by retailers online, were described by some as ‘nominative 
fair use’. For example, in the case of New kids on the block v. News 
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America Publg. Inc.,694 the court concluded that: “where the defendant 
uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s products rather than its 
own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to nominative fair use 
defense”. Trademarks owners have challenged these practices of 
retailers on the ground that they divert customers from their own 
websites or from the websites of their preferred or authorized retailers. 
However, the legal treatment of these practices within the Internet 
context is still developing. In the case of Playboy Enterprises Inc., v. 
Netscape Communications Corporation,695 “the court denied 
preliminary relief stating that the ‘Playboy’ and ‘Playmate’ keywords 
sold by the defendant were used by searchers as common or generic 
words, not the marks”.    
   
ii) Linking and Framing 
(a) Linking 
  One of the easiest ways of navigating web sites may be through the 
use of the so-called ‘hyperlinks’. While viewing websites; the users 
often find hyperlinks, which may appear as an underlined or 
highlighted phrase or image. Once a user clicks a hyperlink, the web 
browser software automatically retrieves the corresponding web 
document and creates a copy thereof displayed on the user’s screen. 
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Through the use of linking technology, Internet users are able to 
retrieve information from files in the same or other websites. 
Generally, “linking can also raise concerns of trademark infringement 
if it explicitly or implicitly suggests an unwarranted association 
between the linking and the linked sites, and leads a user to believe 
that an unassociated web page is affiliated, approved or sponsored by 
the trademark owner”.696  
  There are two kinds of linking: hypertext linking and inline linking. 
In case of hypertext linking, on one hand, the linking site disappears 
once the web browser establishes a connection with the external site. 
This type of Hypertext linking may be less controversial if it connects 
the user to the home page of a web site owner. However, it is 
controversial when it bypasses the home page and takes the user 
directly to the required web document. The latter form of linking is 
called ‘deep link’. This type of linking has been challenged by 
trademarks’ owners, because it bypasses their home pages and their 
associated advertisements and thus depriving them of potential 
revenue and conflict with their contractual obligations towards other 
companies that had paid to link to their sites or advertise on their 
home pages. In the U.S. case of Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft 
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Corp.697, the plaintiff alleged that the deep link from the defendant’s 
site to events pages within its web site implied a false association that 
constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices and a dilution of its 
trademarks. However, the District Court had not discussed these issues 
as the case was settled out of court. In another case698, the “Court 
denied the claims for alleged unfair competition and trademark 
dilution as a result of linking, because the defendants had not used the 
plaintiff’s mark in commerce, nor in connection with the sale, or 
advertising for sale, of any goods or services”. 
  Inline linking, on the other hand, enables “a web site designer to 
inline or ‘pull in’ a graphical image from an external site and 
incorporate it as part of the local onscreen display”.  This form of 
linking is the most controversial one, especially when used in 
conjunction with framing.699   
 
 (b) Framing 
       Generally, framing is used by websites’ owners in order to divide the 
user’s screen in multiple windows that display different web pages 
containing different materials. For instance, the main frame may be 
utilized in submitting services to the viewers. Other frames may 
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contain the web site logo or trademark, advertising banners, 
hyperlinks etc. This form of framing is not unlawful, as it provides 
websites designers and viewers with an added advantage of 
functionality.700 However, framing becomes controversial when used 
as a means of linking. Some websites owners use the technology of 
inline linking so as to incorporate contents from other websites and 
surround them with frames from their own creation. In such a case the 
surrounding frames may displace the frames of the linked website 
together with its trademark and advertisements, and replace them with 
the content of the framing site. In contrast to hypertext linking, users 
viewing framed materials usually remain on the framing website and 
view content from both sites, possibly without being aware of this, as 
the displayed Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is the URL of the 
framing web site. This practice “raises concerns of trademark 
infringement because of its potential to mislead or confuse viewer as 
to the origin of the site and the goods and services it displays”.701 In 
the U.S. case of Washington Post v. Total News Inc.702, Total News 
framed content from various news sources, including Washington 
Post, Time-Warner, CNN, Times-Mirror, Dow Jones, and Reuters. 
The plaintiffs alleged that framing of their websites by the defendant 
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constituted misappropriation, trademark dilution and infringement, 
false and deceptive advertising, unfair trade practices, copyright 
infringement, and tortious interference with their advertising contracts. 
However, the case was settled out of court, whereby Total News was 
allowed to continue linking to the news sites provided that it would 
not frame the plaintiffs’ materials in association with any third party 
advertising or within its own URL. 
 
iii) Pop-Up Advertisements 
       The pop-up ad is one of the tools used by advertisers to attract the 
attention of customers. It is based on “software that is designed to 
track users’ online activity and then deliver targeted advertising based 
on their preferences”. It is a window that appears automatically on the 
viewer’s screen on top of a content page when a site is loaded. If a 
user clicks on the pop-up graphic, he will be “redirected to the 
advertiser’s website, otherwise, and unless closed by the user, the pop-
up window will close automatically after a short period of time”. In a 
U.S. case703, “the Court issued preliminary injunction that prohibited 
the defendant from enabling third-party advertising to appear on a 
user’s computer screen while the user was viewing websites owned or 
affiliated with the plaintiffs, who were 16 online news companies. The 
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Court found that the software violated the plaintiffs trademarks by 
causing pop-up advertising to appear in proximity to them”.704 
 
iv) Mousetrapping 
       The term ‘Mousetrapping’ refers to an aggressive form of marketing 
whereby Internet users who visit the sites that practe such technique 
are compelled to remain there by disabling their browser functions or 
flooding them with pop-up ads. The wrongdoers who practice such 
behaviour catch their victims by registering misspelling or versions of 
legitimate domain names, and whenever a user enters one of those 
sites and discovers that this is not the site he intends to visit, he would 
not be able to leave. This is made by disabling his ‘back’, ‘forward’ or 
‘close’ buttons, and instead of performing their ordinary functions, a 
user finds that once he clicks on one of those buttons, a new window 
is automatically opened that precludes the browser from leaving that 
site. If the user wants to exit, he has no choice than to end the task or 
reboot his computer.705 In a recent U.S. case706, the court “permanently 
barred the defendant from diverting or obstructing consumers on the 
Internet and from launching websites or web pages that belonged to 
unrelated third parties”. In that case the defendant was catching 
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consumers, who were looking for certain web sites, by registering as 
domain names misspelling or versions of the targeted websites and 
once a consumer entered into the ‘trap’ he could not exit.  
 
   3. Adaptation of the Traditional Trademarks Law to the Internet 
Environment 
 
i) Satisfaction of the Requirement of ‘Use’ for the Acquisition and Maintenance 
of Trademarks Rights on the Internet 
  There is a general consensus that the traditional requirements for the 
establishment and maintenance of trademarks rights should extend to 
the Internet environment. In other words, concepts such as the 
requirement of use should not be affected by the fact that the Internet 
is a new medium. However, the difficulty lies in determining what 
constitutes ‘use’. Traditionally, the proof of use of a trademark may be 
required in different situations. This includes: first, when a trademark 
owner wants to register a descriptive mark, in which case he is 
required to prove that his mark has acquired secondary meaning 
through continuous use and become distinctive. Second, in many 
countries the registration of a trademark may be cancelled if it is not 
used within a certain period of time. Third, in countries where the 
protection of trademarks depends on use, the owner of a trademark is 
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required to establish use or goodwill in order to succeed in a passing 
off action. Fourth, in an action against the infringement of a trademark 
right, the plaintiff is required to prove that the use by the defendant 
amounts to use in the course of trade.707   
 Within the Internet context the question, which arises is whether the 
display of a trademark on computer screens in a certain country 
satisfies the requirement of use? It has been stated that: “where a party 
asserts proprietary rights, there is a higher standard for use while 
relatively insignificant activity by the defendant might well be ‘use’ 
constituting infringement”. Therefore, on one hand, the requirement of 
‘use’ for the purpose of assertion of proprietary rights may not be 
satisfied by the mere display of a trademark on computer screens 
alone. The trademark owner must prove that its trademark was 
actually present in the Internet market by showing, for example, actual 
sales or other commercially motivated dealings with customers in the 
concerned country. This may be difficult where the whole transaction 
took place on the Internet or where the goods or services were 
delivered for free as in the case of search engines. On the other hand, 
in a passing off or infringement action, the mere display on computers 
screens for advertisement purposes may satisfy the requirement of 
‘use’. The case law supports this finding. For example, as concerns the 
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assertion of rights, the U.S. 9th Circuit concluded in the case of 
Brookfield v. West Coast708 that “the defendants’ registration of the 
domain name moviebuff.com and its use in their e-mail was not 
considered use in order to give the defendants a trademark right 
superior to the plaintiff”. In contrast, in relation to passing off and 
infringement actions minimum forms of use may be considered as 
enough. For instance, the Supreme Court of India held in the 
Whirlpool case709 that the requirement of use in a passing off action 
was satisfied, by mere advertising. Moreover, as explained above, U.S 
courts as well as UK courts have considered the registration of domain 
names by cyber-pirates for the sole purpose of selling them to their 
corresponding owners as satisfying the requirement of ‘use in the 
course of trade’. In the case of Marks & Spencer Plc., v. One in a 
Million710, although the UK High Court (whose decision was upheld 
by the Court of Appeal) conceded that the defendants were not using 
the domain names for websites or even for their e-mails, it concluded 
that as “they were professional domain name dealers and as they were 
registering the domain names to extract money from owners, this 
amounted to ‘use in the course of trade’”. It has been commented that: 
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“obviously, the court stretched the meaning of ‘use’ for reasons of 
public policy”.  
 
 
ii) Co-existence of Trademarks on the Internet 
  Traditional trademark rights are based on the principle of 
territoriality. Under this system, identical or confusingly similar 
trademarks may be owned by different persons in different countries. 
The international dimension of the Internet has made this traditional 
co-existence very difficult. This is because once a trademark is put on 
the World Wide Web it can be seen in every place reached by the 
Internet. Thus, a trademark owner may find himself involved in 
disputes in foreign jurisdictions where his rights are not recognized. 
Hence, “what had been co-existence of rights in the physical world 
becomes a conflict between rights on the Internet”. Such conflict, if 
left without solution, may result in stifling electronic commerce since 
each trademark owner may seek, with the help of his national courts, 
to block others who use marks that are identical or confusingly similar 
to his mark. The fact that each trademark owner depends on valid 
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reasons of ownership necessitates that this problem be addressed at its 
roots, i.e., in the trademark law711. 
One solution for this problem is that the traditional co-existence of 
trademarks in the real world should extend to the Internet under 
certain limitations. In court, “the fact that a defendant holds an 
exclusive right in the sign in another country could form a defense or a 
rebuttable presumption of legitimate use, the factual preconditions for 
which might have to be proved by the defendant”. Two limitations 
should be put on this co-existence so as to safeguard the interests of 
trademarks owners. The first limitation is that the risk of confusion 
should be reduced to a minimum possible level. The second limitation 
is that co-existence would not be appropriate if one of the users 
acquired the ownership of a trademark or use it in bad faith. As 
concerns the issue of confusion, on one hand, the WIPO Joint 
Recommendation provided that, once aware of conflict with other 
right holders, a user of a trademark should take reasonable steps to 
dissipate any confusion by putting a disclaimer statement, for 
example, explaining that his products are not available or sold in 
country A, B, and C or that he has no relationship with X, Y, and Z.   
However, if the user of a trademark is not aware of conflict, he is not 
required to undertake a worldwide search to see whether there are 
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other signs identical or confusingly similar to his trademark before 
starting the use of his trademark on the Internet, as this would be 
impossible and detrimental to the development of electronic 
commerce. Instead, a rights holder will continue to use his sign 
normally on the Internet until he is notified of a conflicting right. Once 
notified of the existence of a conflicting right, and in order to avoid 
any liability for the infringement of that conflicting right, the user of a 
trademark on the Internet should take reasonable steps to avoid 
causing any commercial effect in a particular country and dissipate 
any confusion with other right holders. These steps may be achieved 
by putting a clear disclaimer to that effect and refusing to deliver 
products to consumers in the concerned countries or to those who have 
indicated that they are based in those countries. “Users would, 
however, not be required to verify the statements made by their 
customers because this is almost impossible in cases where the whole 
transaction takes place over the Internet”. Instead, users may be 
required in case of transactions wholly taking place online to use 
technical devices, if possible, to bar access to customers from the 
countries where the conflicting interests exist.712  
  The bad faith registration or use of a trademark, on the other hand, 
may serve to rebut the presumption of legitimate use. The burden of 
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proving bad faith may be put on the plaintiff. Factors that may be 
taken into account for determining bad faith may include the case 
referred to in Article 4(5)(c) of the WIPO Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-known Marks, 
whereby previous knowledge or reason to know of the conflicting 
mark should be put into consideration. Moreover, the fact that one of 
the owners of the conflicting marks intends to profit from the goodwill 
of the other trademark should be considered as one of the factors 
indicating bad faith. However, “additional criteria would have to be 
determined in order to render the application of the bad faith exception 
predictable”.713        
 
iii) Jurisdiction over Infringements on the Internet 
  Since the mere display of a trademark on computer screens in a 
country is considered as satisfying the requirement of ‘use’ in an 
infringement action, a question arises as to the limits of the 
jurisdiction of national courts in the light of the global nature of the 
Internet? Generally, the courts may either adopt an extensive concept 
of infringement or a restrictive concept of infringement. Under an 
extensive concept of infringement a national court may assume 
jurisdiction simply because a trademark is visible on a computer 
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screen where the conflicting right exists. In such a case, the exclusive 
right of a trademark owner would almost have international effects. 
“[It] could be used to block use that was neither aimed at a country, 
nor had an effect in that country over and above the visibility of the 
sign on a computer screen”, whereas under a more restrictive notion, 
connecting factors more than the mere visibility of a mark on 
computer screens in a country where a conflicting right exists may be 
required.714   
  As part of its efforts to set harmonized criteria at the international 
level to deal with the tension resulting from the global nature of the 
Internet and the territorial rights of trademarks’ owners, so that 
businesses may be able to foresee in which countries their activities on 
the Internet might be legally relevant, WIPO has issued the WIPO 
Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other 
Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet (the ‘Joint 
Recommendation), which was adopted by the Assembly of the Paris 
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General 
Assembly of WIPO in September 2001.715  
  As concerns the issue of whether the use of a sign on the Internet has 
contributed to establishing, maintaining or infringing an industrial 
property right in that sign in a particular country, the Joint 
                                                 
714  Ibid. at 37. 
715  Ibid. at 40. 
 469
Recommendation has adopted the proposition that “not each and every 
use of a sign on the Internet should be treated as taking place in the 
Member State concerned, even though it might be accessible to 
Internet users based in that country”. According to the provisions of 
the Joint Recommendation, only use that has ‘commercial effect’ in a 
Member State is deemed to have taken place in that Member State. 
The provisions point to a detailed list of factors that are neither 
cumulative nor exhaustive, which can help in determining whether a 
particular use has commercial effect in the concerned country. These 
factors are as follows:716: 
- doing or planning to do business in a Member State; 
- character and level of commercial activity carried 
out in a Member State; 
- location of customers; 
- use of a "territorial disclaimer" stating that the goods or 
services offered are not available or only available in 
particular Member States; 
- actual delivery of goods or services to customers located 
in a Member State; 
- specific language use on the Internet site; 
- prices indicated in the currency of a Member State; 
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- address or contact information in a Member state; 
- interactivity of the website;  and 
- registration of the website under a country code top level 
domain.   
 
  As the above provisions are applicable to rights that are protected in a 
commercial context, Member States, which protect certain rights in 
signs, such as personality right, in a purely non-commercial context, 
may either continue to provide such protection on the Internet without 
giving regards to any commercial effect or apply the present 
provisions.717 Moreover, unauthorized ‘fair use’ exceptions should be 
taken into account when dealing with trademarks infringement on the 
Internet. Fair use exceptions may include the use of a sign in good faith 
in a purely descriptive or informative manner, non-commercial use, and 
use that may fall under one of the fundamental human rights such as the 
right of expression. Therefore, in the light of the global nature of the 
Internet, and as there are different approaches currently adopted by 
different countries, it will be helpful to set an international harmonized 
criteria in this respect. Further, as technology is developing, such 
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harmonized criteria should be in form of technologically neutral general 
standards for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable practices.718 
 
iv) Extent of Remedies against Infringements on the Internet 
  In the light of the territoriality of trademark rights and the 
consequential co-existence of trademarks on the Internet, a question 
arises as to the extent of remedies available for a plaintiff, where the 
court finds that the use of a sign on the Internet infringes his rights? 
Can the remedies extend to an injunction preventing the defendant 
from using the sign on the Internet? If so, such a remedy would have 
an effect that is as global as the Internet itself and would expand the 
exclusive right of a trademark owner to cover the worldwide expanse 
of this medium. This result would be against the principle of 
territoriality and co-existence of trademarks. Therefore, if traditional 
rules of trademarks law are to be applied in cyberspace, national 
courts should take into account the international nature of disputes 
relating to the use of trademarks on the Internet, and thus confine their 
remedies to the extent of ex-territorializing the use of the conflicting 
sign in the territory in which the plaintiff’s trademark is recognized, 
i.e., to the extent of excluding any commercial effect or confusion 
with the plaintiff’s trademark in the said territory, and it may award 
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damages but only for the commercial effect of the use in the 
concerned territory. In this respect, courts may need to introduce 
creative approaches so as to frame equitable relief that would oblige 
the defendant to avoid commercial contact with the territory in which 
the plaintiff holds exclusive right by using, for example, disclaimer or 
applying technical devices blocking the access of customers from that 
territory to his website. In such a case, although the sign of the 
defendant may be visible on computer screens in the country 
concerned, such use is not deemed to have taken place in that 
country.719  
 The above solution, however, may not be enough where the plaintiff’s 
mark, for example, is protected in more than one country and that the 
use of the defendant’s sign on the Internet entails an infringement of 
all these rights, in which case the plaintiff may have a genuine interest 
in obtaining, in one proceeding before a national court, an injunction 
preventing the use of that sign in all the concerned countries. 
Moreover, depending on the factual circumstances of each case, a 
plaintiff may have legitimate interest in obtaining a global injunction 
preventing the defendant from the use of the conflicting sign on the 
Internet, regardless of the specific country to which the message is 
addressed. Such global injunction is particularly relevant “in cases 
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where the use of a sign on the Internet has intentionally and in bad 
faith targeted a trademark right”.720 
   It has been commented that the issue of global injunction raises 
concerns for the traditional trademark law as well as the private 
international law. In the field of trademark law, the issue of global 
injunction is quite unprecedented and may raise a number of 
difficulties. This is true even if a national court settling a dispute 
relating to a trademark in other countries in which that trademark is 
registered or otherwise protected, complies with the jurisdictional 
rules and take account of the law and facts in all the countries to 
which the ruling shall extend. If a national court has to evaluate the 
legal situation in each country affected by its judgment, the grant of a 
worldwide injunction seems to be unrealistic. Further, even assuming 
that the trademarks laws of the world are harmonized to an extent that 
would enable the court to evaluate the legal situation in every 
concerned country, it is not expected that trademarks owners, or only 
extremely few of them, would have registrations for their trademarks 
in every country of the world. Therefore, the defendant may still argue 
that the global injunction “would unduly restrict his possibilities to use 
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the mark in those parts of the world where no prior registration 
exists”.721  
  It has been contended that: “if taken to such extremes, however, the 
argument that total prohibition to use a mark on the Internet might 
interfere with defendant’s rights become ridiculous”. There should be 
situations where it is possible to issue global injunction, especially 
where there is abusive bad faith practices from the part of the 
defendant. It has been argued that, although this solution forms 
deviation from the traditional principles of trademarks law, it does not 
necessarily cause severe harm, because “a judgment prohibiting 
trademark use on the Internet does not impose restrictions on other 
forms of use in domestic trade, including use in other media”. 
Moreover, as global injunction is typically sought to be applied 
against cyber-pirates, it is not expected that a cybersquatter will be in 
a position that enables him to obtain a valid right in a country where 
the conflicting mark is protected, “either because the mark is well-
known in that territory or because any registration taken out in 
positive knowledge of the existence of the mark would be regarded as 
invalid on the ground of bad faith”. Furthermore, the impact of such 
global injunction may be mitigated by the fact that practically, a court 
may not be able to evaluate the legal situation in all countries of the 
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world, and thus “it can regularly be deemed sufficient if the court 
primarily takes into account the legal situation in the country or 
counties where, according to the plaintiff, the core of the conflict lies”. 
Anyhow, the defendant shall be given the opportunity to establish that 
he has “a better right or a genuine and justified interest to use the 
mark, including use on the Internet, in another country or region”.722 It 
is worthy to mention that, although the WIPO Joint Recommendation 
has not precluded the imposition of Internet-wide prohibition, it 
specifically prohibits such injunction where a user has a right in the 
sign he uses and does not act in bad faith.723  
       However, the above “mode of procedure clashes with established 
principles of private international law and disrespects, to some extent, 
the constitutional confinements of judicial power”. Therefore, as the 
power to grant global injunction is contrary to the principle of 
territoriality governing the traditional trademarks law, and is only 
allowed to resort to in those exceptional cases necessitated by the 
peculiarities of the Internet, the competence for granting such global 
prohibition should be carefully examined. In principle, the 
competence to grant global injunction should be vested in courts 
having general jurisdiction, i.e., “competence to decide claims for a 
total prohibition of trademark use on the Internet rests primarily with 
                                                 
722  Ibid at 8-9. 
723  See WIPO Primer, supra note 4, at 44. 
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the courts in the country where the defendant is domiciled/ habitually 
resident/legally established”. Specifically, the competence of Courts 
having only specific jurisdiction based on the forum delicti commissi 
should not be allowed to extend to the grant of global injunction, as 
this may result in arbitrary choice of fora by the plaintiff. In the latter 
case, the competence of a national court should be confined to the 
extent of ex-territorializing the use of the sign in the country where 
there is a conflicting interest and, where applicable, ordering the 
defendant to pay damages for the plaintiff to the extent of the 
commercial effect of the use of that sign in the concerned country.724 
However, the competence of the court, where the harmful event occurs 
or where the victim (the plaintiff) resides, to grant global injunction 
should not be excluded altogether, as there may be cases where the 
defendant may choose as his place of resident a country which 
constitutes a ‘safe haven’ for infringers, without being actually doing 
any relevant business there. In other words, the competent court in the 
country where the harmful act occurs or the plaintiff has his habitual 
domicile should only be allowed to issue worldwide prohibition where 
there is abusive behavior by the defendant.725 
 
                                                 
724  Ibid. at 44. See also Kur, supra note 66, at 9. 
725  See Kur, supra note 66, at 9-10. 
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Conclusion 
     The role of trademarks in cyberspace is as important as their role in 
real space, if not more. The peculiarities of the Internet, on one hand, 
have generated new visible and even invisible uses of trademarks. As 
one commentator noticed, the peculiarities of the Internet have 
rendered even invisible use of trademarks actionable. The role of 
trademarks is no longer confined to their traditional function as 
identifiers of enterprises’ goods and services from those of their 
competitors. Trademarks are currently used as domain names, meta 
tags, keywords etc. Of course, these uses are built on the original 
function of trademarks, i.e., they depend on the fame and goodwill of 
trademarks as identifiers of goods and services. Even some of these 
uses, such as the use of trademarks as domain names are continuing, 
in most aspects, to play the role of identification. The registration of 
trademarks as domain names is one of the earliest problems that have 
faced trademarks owners. When trademarks owners became aware of 
the importance of the use of trademarks as domain names, they found 
that cyber-pirates had already discovered this fact and registered most 
of the well-known and distinctive marks as domain names, benefiting 
from the policy of first came first served, which was adopted by 
domain names’ registrars. Likewise, trademarks are embedded in 
HTML codes as meta tags and keywords, and used in linking and 
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framing, and in pop-up ads and mouse-trapping in order to mislead or 
divert customers looking for those trademarks. 
     There is almost general consensus that most of the above practices are 
unfair and harmful for trademarks owners. However, courts have 
found difficulty in classifying these practices under the traditional 
forms of trademarks infringement, because concepts such as the 
‘confusing use of a trademark within the course of trade’ are not easily 
satisfied. Therefore, courts have resorted to giving expanded meanings 
to the traditional concepts or to refer to unfair competition law so as to 
prevent these malpractices. Moreover, within the national context, 
some countries have enacted laws dealing with these practices in order 
to help their courts to combat such acts. Within the international 
context, WIPO has issued the WIPO Joint Recommendation 
Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property 
Rights in Signs on the Internet (the ‘Joint Recommendation), which 
was adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property and the General Assembly of WIPO in September 
2001, in order to guide national legislature when enacting legislation 
treating these new practices. 
     On the other hand, the traditional trademarks laws are built on the 
principle of territoriality, which allows the co-existence of identical or 
confusingly similar trademarks for similar goods or services in 
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different countries. This fact has clashed with the global nature of the 
Internet. The use of a trademark on the Internet is no longer confined 
to the territory in which it is registered or otherwise protected, as it 
can be seen worldwide in every place reached by the Internet. Under 
such circumstances a trademark owner may find himself involved in 
legal proceedings in jurisdictions where his trademark is not 
recognized or protected. As each trademark owner has acquired his 
rights in his trademark on legitimate basis, it would be unfair to prefer 
either right holder on the account of the other. Likewise, if left without 
solution, this problem would stifle the progress of electronic 
commerce, as each trademark owner would seek to block his 
competitors with the help of his national courts. Therefore, creative 
methods should be sought so as to solve this problem. In this respect 
the WIPO Joint Recommendation has provided for guidelines that can 
help national legal systems to reach fair results. There are different 
steps that should be followed to achieve these fair results. First, a 
trademark owner may use his trademark on the Internet in an ordinary 
way until he is notified of the existence of a conflicting right. When 
notified of a conflicting right, the trademark owner should take 
reasonable steps to avoid making any confusion or causing 
commercial effect in the territory in which the conflicting trademark is 
protected. Second, in order to be subject to litigation in a particular 
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territory, a conflicting trademark must be found to have been used in 
that territory. Third, a trademark is deemed to have been used in a 
particular territory if it has commercial effect in that territory. Fourth, 
the remedies to be granted by the court assuming jurisdiction should 
be confined to an injunction preventing the use of the conflicting mark 
in the concerned territory and awarding of damages to the extent of the 
commercial effect resulted from the use of that mark in the concerned 
territory. Fifth, Global injunction may be granted in exceptional cases 
where, for example, a user of a sign on the Internet has intentionally 
and in bad faith targeted a right holder in a particular territory. Sixth, 
in principle, only the court where the defendant is domiciled, resident 
or legally established is competent to grant global prohibition. 
Seventh, only where there is abusive behavior from the part of the 
defendant, a court where the plaintiff is domiciled or where the 
harmful act occurred may be competent to grant global injunction. 
     The emergence of the Internet has generated challenges and 
opportunities for businesses. The flowering of electronic commerce 
depends on the careful dealing with these challenges and 
opportunities. The complications brought by the Internet require 
careful analysis of the problems and the suggested solutions, putting 
into account the global nature of the Internet, the acquired trademarks 
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rights which are based on the principle of territoriality and the 
different forms of fair uses. 
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Chapter 8 
Protection of Patents on the Digital Networks 
 
    Introduction 
     Traditionally, the patents system is premised on the assumption 
that granting exclusive right to an inventor to exploit his invention 
and prevent others from making, using, or selling the patented 
invention for a limited period of time, in consideration of public 
disclosure of the information relating to that invention, will work 
as an incentive for further inventions and innovation and hence 
lead to technological and economic progress and public welfare. In 
other words, patents represent a form of bargain or trade-off 
balancing the expected benefits with the expected costs. 
Throughout its history the patents system, like other forms of 
intellectual property, is responsive to new technologies in form of 
adjustments that stir up arguments about the underlying rationale 
and specific policy objectives behind these adjustments. Evolving 
primarily around machines and chemical processes, patents law has 
been adjusted continuously to absorb new emergent technologies, 
such as electrical engineering, computer construction, atomic 
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energy, microbiological techniques, biotechnology and presently 
the Internet and electronic commerce. 
    The emergence of the Internet and the electronic commerce has 
brought with it new challenges for the patents system. One of the 
hottest issues at the international level currently is patenting 
electronic commerce-related inventions, including software 
generally and methods of doing business specifically. Preceded by 
a pro-patent era in the industrial countries generally and the United 
State in particular, the issue of patenting electronic commerce-
related inventions has strongly appeared on the surface. Since the 
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1998 in favor of patentability of methods of doing business, which 
have been followed by a flood of similar patents issued by the 
United States Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO), a great 
controversy relating to this issue has arisen inside U.S. as well as 
worldwide. The supporters of patenting electronic commerce-
related inventions view such patents as important for creating 
incentives and spurring investment in new digital technologies. On 
the other hand, the opponents of such a step believe that patenting 
electronic commerce-related inventions may stifle electronic 
commerce through the elimination of competition and may even 
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undermine the patents system, which has been based on exception 
of patenting abstract ideas and mathematical algorithms. 
     Different views have been expressed as to the ways of dealing with 
this phenomenon. Some are resisting the idea of patenting electronic 
commerce-related inventions altogether, others believe that these 
patents have acquired a de facto position needs to be adapted with. 
The latter group argues that the practical solution is to try to mitigate 
the negative impacts of these patents on electronic commerce as well 
as the patents system in general. This can be achieved, in their view, 
by strictly adhering to the satisfaction of the other requirements of 
patentability, especially the requirement of non-obviousness or 
inventive step. However, the satisfaction of these requirements is 
measured by reference to the state of the art or the prior art. What 
constitutes prior art in cyberspace has raised many questions, which 
have not found definite answers yet. For instance, whether information 
in electronic form can be considered as prior art, especially when 
disclosed on the Internet for only a limited time? Whether real world 
prior art can be applicable to Internet activities? How can the 
authenticity, veracity and integrity of information in electronic form 
be insured? Moreover, even if it becomes possible to reconcile the 
different views relating to the patentability of Internet patents, the 
territoriality of patents rights and the international nature of the 
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Internet and electronic commerce have raised serious problems as to 
the enforceability of these rights worldwide. 
    This Chapter discusses the protection of patent rights on the 
digital networks. It is divided into six parts. Part 1 discusses the 
patentability of electronic commerce-related inventions. It is 
divided into two subtitles studying the patentability of software and 
business methods. Part 2 discusses the different views in favor of 
and against patenting business methods and software. Part 3 studies 
some suggested views for dealing with electronic commerce-
related inventions. It is sub-divided into two titles discussing the 
various suggestions. Part 4 discusses the impact of the narrow 
application of the doctrine of equivalent on the scope of business 
methods patents. Part 5 examines the scope of prior art for 
electronic commerce-related inventions. Part 6 studies some 
private international law issues relating to patents law. It is divided 
into three subtitles discussing jurisdiction, applicable law, and 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. 
 
1. Patenting Electronic Commerce-related Inventions 
     
i) Patentability of Software 
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  Electronic commerce depends to a great extent on various computer 
and network technologies, both hardware and software. The 
patentability of electronic hardware of computing technology is not 
disputed, as it is considered a natural subject of patentable inventions. 
However, the patentability of software has raised great controversy 
that has not been settled yet. The term ‘software’ covers a wide 
spectrum of computer programs ranging from basic algorithms 
capable of application in an indefinite number of more specific uses to 
detailed instructions for the solution of particular problems.726In this 
study the term software refers to the instructions that tell computer 
hardware what to do. 
  Theoretically, different constructions have been given to the 
instructions of computer programs. “To some, even the most detailed 
operational programs remain nothing else than instructions for 
performing intellectual exercises; to others, the conversion of the 
operation into a technical process capable of constant repetition carries 
it over into the patentable sphere”.727 Practically, mathematical 
algorithms have been treated traditionally as exception to patentable 
subject matter. For instance, in the United States although the Patents 
Act has not excluded software from patentability, the earlier decisions 
of the U. S. Supreme Court considered software as essentially 
                                                 
.212, at )1999(, Sweet & Maxwell, London . edth 4’Intellectual Property‘. R. ee Cornish, W  S726 
727  Ibid., at 213. 
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mathematical formulae, holding that algorithms that were merely 
abstract ideas with no practical application were unpatentable subject 
matter.728 Article 52 of the European Patent Convention 1973 (EPC) 
expressly exclude computer programs as such from patentability.729  
  However, “the patent frontier has become increasingly significant, as 
the industry has discovered the limitations of copyright, contract and 
trade secret protection for programs and associated material”.730 As a 
result, the look to mathematical algorithm has begun to change both in 
U.S. and Europe since the 1980s. In 1981 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held in Diamond v. Diehr731 that “when a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a 
structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing 
a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., 
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then 
the claim satisfies the requirements of s. 101”. In response to this 
decision the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the 
predecessor of the current Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
                                                 
451 d 2.Ed.L57 , 2522. Ct.S98 , 584. S.U437 , Flook. Parker vSee also . 101. s. C.S.U35   See Title 728
Ron Laurie ] cited in)).[1972(273 d 2.Ed.L34 , 253. Ct.S93 , 63. S.U409 , Benson. Gottschalk v; )1978(
A Systematic Approach to : The Patentability of Intent Business Methods‘and Robert Beyers 
: atAvailable ) 2001(, JIL ’Evaluating Obviousness--News/C-GrayCary/gcc/com.gcwf.www://http
htm.doc_cvt._JIL0501/Journal/Arti.5-4, at  
:   The text of EPC is available at729html.index/epc/legal/org.ficeof-patent-european.www://http  
730  See Cornish, supra note 1, at 213. 
A ‘Snyder, . Kang and Kristin A. Peter H] cited in[, 10at ) 1981. (Q.P.S.U209 , 192. S.U   450 731
in the s Approach to Strategic Enforcement and Analysis of Business Methods Patents ’Practitioner
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(CAFC), developed a two-step test for determining the patentability of 
mathematical algorithm known as Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Step 
one in this test is to check whether a claim cites, directly or indirectly, 
a mathematical algorithm. If a mathematical algorithm is found, then 
step two is to analyze the claim as a whole so as to determine whether 
the algorithm is applied in any manner to physical elements or process 
steps. If the algorithm is so applied then the claim satisfies the 
requirements of s. 101 of the U.S Patents Act.  
  However, since 1994 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) appeared to abandon the physical transformation requirement 
articulated in past decisions, adopting a liberalized test for the 
patentability of claims incorporating a mathematical algorithm. This 
trend was reflected in its decision in In Re Alappat732, where it “found 
that data transformed by a machine through a series of mathematical 
calculations, to produce a smooth waveform display on a digital 
oscilloscope, was a practical application of a mathematical algorithm 
or formula because it produced ‘a useful, concrete and tangible 
result’”. In the opinion of the court the use of software program on 
general-purpose computer turns that general-purpose computer into 
special-purpose computer i.e., a new machine. It has been stated that 
the willingness of CAFC to abandon the Freeman-Walter-
                                                 
732  33 F. 3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), [cited in] Kang and Snyder, 
supra note 6, at 272. 
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Abele/mathematical algorithm analysis in the machine claims format 
paved the way for its approach to the second hardware-software 
combination format i.e., ‘software as an article of manufacture’ 
format. The article of manufacture approach defines the invention as a 
‘software program product’ consisting of a computer readable medium 
such as CD-ROMs, diskettes, DRAM or any comparable piece of 
hardware in the detailed description, which contains a software 
program designed to perform a particular task.733 This new trend has 
been reflected in the decision of CAFC in In Re Lowry734, in which 
the claim cited “a computer readable medium storing a data structure, 
which data structure is interrelated to the medium structurally and 
functionally”, commonly known as “Lowry-type claim”, and its 
decision in In Re Beauregard735, where the software-related invention 
was claimed as computer readable medium storing the software that 
performs the claimed functions, commonly known as “Beauregard-
type claim”.  
  Accordingly, the USPTO amended its Guidelines to reflect this new 
trend, especially the Beauregard-type claims. To avoid classifying 
non-functional data as patentable subject matter the USPTO identifies 
                                                 
Article of “Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an ‘  See Chiappetta, Vincent, 733
89 . L. Computer and Info. Marshal J. J17 . ’Software As Such As the Right Stuff: ”Manufacture
: Available at ).1998(html.vc/17/JCIL/edu.jmls.www://http.17, at  
734  32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1994), [cited in] WIPO Primer on Electronic 
: Available at. 88Issue III, at . ey of IssuesA Surv: Commerce and Intellectual Property
html.3/html/survey/int.wipo.ecommerce://http.  
735  53 F.3d 1583, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1995), [cited in] WIPO primer, supra note 9, at 88.  
 490
patentable functional categories as those consisting of “data structures 
and computer programs which impart functionality when encoded on a 
computer-readable medium”.736Moreover, in State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc.737, the Federal Circuit 
adopted a more expansive test for the patentability of claims 
incorporating mathematical algorithm when it held “that a 
mathematical algorithm that produces numbers as its only output 
would constitute patentable subject matter so long as it produces ‘a 
useful, concrete and tangible result”. However, the issue of 
patentability of computer programs as such has prompted discussion 
as to where to draw the line between copyright and patent law 
protection for computer programs. In the view of some writers, 
copyright and patents law play complementary roles in the protection 
of computer programs. Professor Karjala argues that the traditional 
division of labor necessitates that patent law protects the functional 
aspects of a computer program, whereas copyright protects the non-
functional aspects. According to him “copyright, with its low 
threshold of eligibility, vague infringement standard, and long 
protection period, should not be allowed to trench upon the traditional 
domain of patent to protect functional aspects of works absent a 
                                                 
736  See Chiappetta, supra note 8, at 24. 
737  149 F. 3d 1368, 1373-75, 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1596, 1601-02 (Fed. Cir. 1998) [cited in] Kang 
and Snyder, supra note 6, at 273. 
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clearly articulated social policy basis”. However, although program 
code is a patentable subject matter in his view, he believes that, as 
most programs are simply straightforward application of well-
understood computer science principles and techniques; they may not 
be patented for obviousness reasons.  Therefore, he argues that owing 
to the fact that these programs are often the result of the input of vast 
quantities of time and money and because they are vulnerable to easy 
and cheap copying, they should be protected by copyright for social 
policy balances.738  
  The proposal for double protection for computer programs has been 
criticized by some commentators on the grounds that “patents and 
copyrights are mutually exclusive with no overlap in ‘abstract 
expression’ subject matter”.739 In Europe, the European Patent Office 
(EPO) amended its Guidelines in 1985 to “allow claims involving use 
of a computer program if overall the invention made a contribution to 
an art that was technical”. This technical effect has been used by the 
EPO and the EPO Board of Appeal to differentiate patentable from 
unpatentable subject matter. For example, in Koch and Sterzel,740 a 
claim to X-ray apparatus controlled by a computer program so as to 
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secure optimal exposure without overloading the X-ray tube was held 
patentable by an EPO Board of Appeal. According to the Board, it 
was enough that the claim involved ‘technical means’ in addition to 
the mathematical method or algorithm, which was characterized as 
‘non-technical’. It is not necessary to show that the invention lay 
exclusively or largely in the technical means. The same test of 
technical effect was applied to reject a claim involving the use of a 
program that “could be used in an automated market for shares and 
similar securities. It analyzed customers’ orders to buy and sell against 
given criteria; those which met the criteria were then carried out”. The 
English Court of Appeal held this unpatentable under the 1977 Act. 
The justification for this decision was that “the program could be 
introduced into any suitable computer in any encoding language, 
causing data to be acted upon so as to carry out legal transactions, 
rather than technical production in any ordinary sense”.741 It has been 
argued that the rationale behind the distinction between the above 
examples is to differentiate between the securing of a technical effect 
and the mere production and manipulation of information. Cornish 
commented on the technical/non-technical test as follows: 
          As with any attempt to define the boundaries of intellectual 
property at all precisely, the technical/non-technical 
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dichotomy has its arbitrariness. It is being deployed to strike 
some compromise between a wide and a narrow 
interpretation of the exclusion of computer programs from 
patentability.742 
   However, the status of patentability of computer programs as such in      
Europe has not been settled yet. This is reflected in the fact that 
although the European Commission has been attempting since 2000 to 
amend the EPC so as to take computer programs off the list of 
exceptions from patentability, its efforts have not succeeded up to date 
owing to the resistance of interest groups mainly because of the fear 
that powerful U.S. companies such as IBM, which has already 
thousands of granted U.S. patents, may take the opportunity and file 
for the same in Europe, thus excluding European companies from the 
market.743 As far as other countries are concerned, although paragraph 
(1) of Article 27 TRIPS provides that “…patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application”, and that under paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of the same Article software has not been included in the list 
of exceptions from patentability, which support the argument that 
                                                 
742  See Cornish, supra note 1, at 215. 
: Available at ). JILT) (1(2003 , 'Software Patents and Innovation'  See Perchaud, S,743
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TRIPS provides a basis for patentability of software, actually few 
countries are willing to consider software as patentable subject 
matter.744 In U. S., as has been explained above, the patentability of 
software as such is no longer a controversial issue. What is 
controversial currently in U.S. is the ongoing wave of patenting 
software-implemented non-computing activities such as methods of 
doing business.745  
   
ii) Patentability of Methods of Doing Business   
       Despite the argument that the patentability of business methods may 
be based on Article 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement, there is no 
consistent international approach to business methods patents. In U.S., 
although they were not expressly excluded from patentability under 35 
U.S.C. (1952), traditionally, business methods were treated as 
unpatentable subject matter. Until 1996 the USPTO’s Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP) contained a provision stating that: 
“Though seemingly within the category of process or method, a method 
of doing business can be rejected as not being within the statutory 
classes”. In 1996 the USPTO responded to the criticism from both 
commentators and judiciary by deleting this provision from the MPEP, 
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ushering in a new era for business methods patents. Further, this trend 
has culminated in 1998 in the decision of the Federal Circuit in State 
Street case746, which put “the ill-conceived [business method] exception 
to rest”. In its decision, the Court noted that: “no invention has ever 
been deemed unpatentable under the business method exception by 
either the Federal Circuit or its predecessor, the CCPA”. Moreover, 
added the court, “the cases where the business method exception was 
applied, including Hotel Security, a finding of invalidity was based on 
other Title 35 grounds”. According to the court, “patentability does not 
turn on whether the claimed method does ‘business’ instead of 
something else, but on whether the method, viewed as a whole, meets 
the requirements of patentability as set forth in Sections 102, 103, and 
112 of the Patent Act”. Since then the USPTO has been flooded with 
patents applications covering a wide range of Internet-based business 
methods.747 Some of these patents raised public outcry as concerns their 
obviousness, and some even raised public derision with reference to the 
claimed subject matter. One commentator pointed to some of these 
patents and asked whether “patents of this sort protect the ‘useful arts’ 
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution”. Among the patents he 
pointed to are: U.S. Patent No. 6,329,919 (issued December 2001) 
claiming a method of providing reservations for restroom use, and U.S. 
                                                 
746  See State Street case, supra note 6, at 276. 
747  See Laurie and Beyers, supra note 3, at 1. 
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Patent No. 6,257,248 (issued July 2001) claiming a method of cutting 
hair using both hands.748 
     Business methods patents in U.S. have faced much criticism and the 
debate about whether they are patentable subject matter, the scope of 
business method patents, and whether they satisfy other requirements 
for patentability has not been settled yet. In response to this criticism, 
the USPTO issued a “White Paper on Automated Financial or 
Management Data Processing Methods (business methods)” and has 
taken other measures including giving special scrutiny to patent 
applications that classified as computer-implemented business 
methods. Moreover, the Congress enacted in 1999 a new “prior right” 
defense to patent infringements relating to “methods of doing or 
conducting business”. Also there is a bill under discussion before the 
Congress known as Business Methods Improvement Act 2001, which 
would require that “business methods inventions be published at 18 
months; institute special opposition procedures for business methods 
inventions; lower the burden of proof for invalidating business 
methods patents; make it easier to prove that a business method 
invention was obvious; and force patent applicants to disclose whether 
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they performed a prior art search if the invention was classified as a 
business method”.749  
     In Europe, business methods as such were expressly excluded from 
being patentable under Article 52(2) of EPC. However, if an invention 
has a ‘technical character’ or involves ‘technical teaching’ it may be 
eligible for patentability. It has been noticed by some critics that by 
insisting on ‘technical effect’ in the absence of any clarification of 
what is meant by the phrase, Europe seems to prefer “ambiguity to 
allow some business method patents to issue while having a political 
shield”.750 In Japan, where a business method is no more than a man-
made arrangement, or a method using only such an arrangement, 
business methods are not patentable subject matter.751 In an attempt to 
achieve some form of harmonization, USPTO, Japan Patent Office 
(JPO) and EPO conducted a trilateral comparative study on computer 
implemented business methods, so as to facilitate consistent search 
and examination practices among them. The trilateral report produced 
the following consensus summary: 
     - A technical aspect is necessary for a computer-implemented 
business method to be eligible for patenting. (In the United 
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States of America, the ‘in the technological arts’ feature 
may be implicitly recited in the claim. The EPO and JPO 
require that the technical aspect be expressed in the 
claim.) 
- To merely automate a known human transaction process 
using well known automation techniques is not 
patentable.752  
     However, the debate about the patentability of software generally as 
well as business methods has not been settled yet. Different arguments 
have been advanced in favor of and against patenting electronic 
commerce-related inventions. 
 
2. Arguments in Favor of, and, against Patenting Electronic 
Commerce-Related Inventions 
 
    i) Software 
   The supporters of patentability of software programs, on the one hand, 
argue that patent law is the traditional primary source of intellectual 
property protection of program technology, especially non-code 
technology, and that “copyright was not designed for, and is indeed 
                                                 
752 Ibid. 
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ill-suited to, the protection of technology”.753 On the other hand, the 
opponents of patentability of computer programs argue that “patenting 
symbolic expression breaches the intellectual property premise 
prohibiting property interests in mere abstract ideas, by avoiding both 
copyright merger and patent preemption doctrines”.754 According to 
Wagner, the shift to patent protection has not been based on normative 
requirement but came due to the fact that those depending on 
copyrighted expression discovered that the protection of copyright is 
inadequate because “computer science ingenuity lay in the logical 
model, not its expressed instruction” and that “copyright provides no 
interest over subsequent independent development”.755 
    Moreover, Wagner criticizes the proposal of USPTO to patent 
computer instructions fixed on computer readable media as an article 
of manufacture under the so-called ‘media claims’ or ‘Beauregard-
type claims’. He believes that this new shift in U.S. law has resulted 
from the pressure of computer hardware manufactures, which found 
that software companies started to market their software separate from 
computer hardware. As such, he contends, “media claims provide an 
unjust enrichment and competitive advantage to computer 
manufacturers over software companies by allowing (a) a second 
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compensation demand for an already licensed use (i.e., two payments 
for one invention embodiment), and (b) hardware dominance over 
independent software development”.756 It is worthy of note that even 
the supporters of patentability of software have criticized the ‘article 
of manufacture’ approach for the patentability of computer programs 
as such, but of course on different grounds. According to Professor 
Chiappetta: 
             The ability to properly determine when software inventions 
should be classified as useful arts technology depends on 
the ability to reconstruct a dividing line between software 
as a language (not technology) and software as computer 
implementation (technology) in the patent claims context. 
A proper test for patentability of software related 
inventions must clearly and consistently draw a line 
separating claims to software as the specific means for 
computer system implementation of the contained 
algorithms/processes (which are patentable subject 
matter) from those using a software context merely to 
express and communicate those algorithms/processes 
(which must be tested on their own merit independently of 
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the software context to determine if they involve patentable 
subject matter).757 
       After reviewing the USPTO Guidelines, Professor Chiappetta 
concludes that: “the computer readable medium test, however, fails to 
draw an appropriate line between software used as language and 
software claimed as implementation”. As a result, according to him, 
the Guidelines are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive from a 
policy perspective. They are over-inclusive in the sense that “an idea 
or process becomes classified as a statutory article of manufacture per 
se simply by using computer software language to describe it and 
putting that description on computer readable media”. They are under-
inclusive in the sense that they exclude software from patentability 
merely because it has not been put in a readable medium when 
claimed. He suggested, instead, a new approach based on the 
assumption that since it is generally accepted that the components of a 
patentable machine are patentable subject matter (articles of 
manufacture), the same rule may be applied to test the functionality of 
software, i.e., “claims which cover software functionality only when 
used as a component of a computer system implementing the task 
instructed by the software, are claims to machine components. 
Therefore, such software claims are claims to articles of manufacture 
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and are patentable subject matter as such”.758 The objection of the 
Europeans to the proposal of patenting computer programs seems to 
emanate from their fear of domination of the American companies in 
the field of software. As one commentator notices: “surely, there must 
be real grounds to fear that, if European companies lost out in the past 
because of inadequate software protection, they may now be about to 
lose out again, this time because of too much software protection”.759  
       It has been argued that the protection of software under patent law in 
U.S. has not achieved the expected result i.e., incentive to innovate; 
and that the “flaws of the American system has led to abuses 
(competition between software publishers is moving from the 
marketplace to the courts) threatening the freedom to innovate”. 
Moreover, although historically, software has been subject to 
comparatively weak form of intellectual property protection and has 
been a target for quick imitation in the market, nevertheless software 
sector is one of the most innovative of the whole economy.760The 
work of a programmer may be compared to the work of an architect. 
In case of an architect, although the bricks (algorithms in case of a 
programmer) are the constituent elements of the creation, the quality 
of the result depends much on the logic of the work as a whole than on 
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the bricks (algorithms). Software is a unique arrangement of 
algorithms. As in the case of bricks for architects, sharing and re-using 
of algorithms should be common so as to optimize the management of 
time in the creation of new software. In a study conducted by the 
Fraunhofer Institute in Germany in 2001, it was found that the re-use 
of code is an important element for the development of new software 
and that one third of new software contains more than fifty percent of 
existing code. This means that each new product of software builds on 
previous innovations and that no software was created ex nihilo. In the 
light of this result and the fact that big companies like IBM are filing 
more than five hundred software patents yearly, most of which are 
obvious and make no technical contribution to the state of the art, 
independent developers as well as medium-sized companies may not 
find a chance to innovate as every attempt may infringe existing 
patents.761 
 
  (ii) Methods of Doing Business 
      The main objection against patenting business methods is that 
patenting them may not achieve the economic goals on which patent 
law is based and as such the economic costs of their patenting will 
exceed their benefit for the society. The policy behind patents is to 
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increase market efficiency by replacing the “self-interest competitive 
motivations to innovate in a properly functioning market with the self-
interested inducements of legal control”. It does not “simply reward 
individual creativity without any concern for the effect the reward has 
on the aggregate”. A patent is a form of monopoly, which is generally 
undesirable and, therefore, “should be carefully limited to resolving 
only the identified market failure and the resulting distortion of 
incentives to desirable innovation which justifies its existence”.762 The 
invention motivation theory impliedly provides that if there are other 
factors, which can motivate invention, there is no need for the 
economic role of patent law, which is “no more than a grudging 
exception to the preferred competitive market model”.763 It has been 
argued that there are many other mechanisms such as the head start 
advantage, trade secrets and promotional value that may provide 
enough incentives for inventors to create new business methods. “The 
head start advantage refers to the financial return an inventor of a 
business method enjoys exclusively as a result of being the first to 
invent”. In other words an inventor may reap the benefits of his 
invention until the moment his competitors become aware of the 
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invention and succeed to develop a similar method that enable them to 
compete with the inventor. It is believed that the head start advantage 
coupled with a successful application of trade secrets techniques and 
promotional activities through the use of trademarks may render the 
patents incentive unnecessary for the invention of methods of doing 
business.764  
       Other arguments against patenting Internet business methods are that 
patenting business method will impose heavy burden on the majority 
of Internet businesses who are small-sized companies that lack 
financial capacities to obtain patents and protect them through 
litigation. As a result, trade will be stifled and the market efficiency 
will be inhibited.765 Commenting on the views objecting the grant of 
patents protection to business methods inventions, Smith states that: 
             In essence, this objection to business methods patents calls 
for recognition that science is different from business, and 
that innovation in science and innovation in business 
depend upon different incentive structures. Patent 
protection promotes invention in science because the time 
and resources required for scientific inventions are 
difficult to recover in the open marketplace without 
limiting the ability of competitors to appropriate and 
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market the new invention. Business innovations, however, 
provide a competitive advantage in the market, and thus by 
their very nature create economic incentives adequate to 
encourage creativity and development in business.766 
       On the other hand the supporters of business method patents argue 
that business methods patents have enhanced creativity and innovation 
in the marketplace generally, and particularly in the field of e-
commerce. This fact may be extracted from the big number of 
applications for business method patents in the recent years. 
Moreover, because of business method patents e-commerce Internet 
startup companies, such as Amazon.com, are able to develop their 
products and acquire a market position before being overwhelmed by 
larger, well-established competitors.767 The supporters of business 
method patents reply to the argument that business method patents 
limit the ability of competitors to participate in the marketplace, by 
saying that such an argument is built on a wrong assumption that 
business method patents “will not-cannot-inform and inspire other 
businesses to invent new business methods”. On the contrary, business 
methods patents encourage the market participants to be effective, 
efficient and creative so as to compete in the market. “Prohibiting any 
and all business method patents protects weak marketplace 
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competitors and discourages innovation, both because innovative 
competitors know they cannot protect their efforts, and because 
weaker competitors know they can free ride without penalty”.768   
 
3. Suggestions for Dealing with E-Commerce-Related Inventions 
 
  i) Some Form of Protection Short of Patent Protection 
 
     (a) Software 
       The opponents of patenting software concede that as the Internet 
speeds the move towards a global economy, the international 
harmonization of key aspects of trade law is inevitable. Therefore, it is 
desirable to remove the illogicalities and difficult concepts from the 
law and, thus there must be a form of world harmonization providing 
adequate protection for computer programs in both symbolic and 
functional mode. But providing such protection through the patents or 
copyright systems is disastrous because it will result in “severe, long-
term distortion and disruption of the balance between the rights of 
owners of existing property, and the interests of the population in 
general and of would-be creators in particular”.769 In the opinion of 
Widdison, an alternative solution may be found in a form of sui 
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generis regime. Such a regime, according to Widdison, might broadly 
be similar to the sui generis protection adopted by the EU for 
databases albeit with a few key differences. As a start of the debate he 
proposes that such sui generis regime should take the following points 
into account: 
• Existing owners of computer programs who could 
demonstrate that their software was substantially their own 
intellectual creation would be entitled to protection. No 
further account would be taken of such issues as novelty, 
inventiveness or industrial application. 
•  Protection would extend to every aspect of programs – from 
initial design algorithms, to code listings, and beyond to all 
functional characteristics.  
• The duration of legal protection would be appropriate to the 
useful life of a computer program - say a maximum of five 
years, renewable annually. A new version of a program that 
involved a substantial change might qualify for a new term 
of protection. 
• During the period of protection, other would-be creators 
could decompile a program for the limited purpose of 
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studying and understanding the concepts, processes and 
techniques used. 
• During the period of protection, would-be creators could 
demand a licence of right in respect of part or all of a 
protected program. The fee for such a licence would then be 
agreed by the parties or, in default, by a suitable 
independent body.770 
       Widdison argues that the proposed scheme would strike a fair 
balance between the interests of existing owners, would-be creators 
and the general public. However, he acknowledges that a sui generis 
regime for computer programs may not be a fashionable topic in the 
light of the presence of the TRIPS Agreement, nevertheless he 
believes that in time, the “growing distortions and disruptions in the 
global software market will force TRIPS signatory states to come 
together again in order to search for a software protection regime that 
is not only applicable world-wide, but also seen to be both even-
handed and workable on that same global scale”.771 
 
    (b) Business Methods 
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      The opponents of patenting methods of doing business acknowledge 
the importance of business methods for businesses not only in 
achieving efficiency in the delivery of goods and services, but also in 
optimizing the internal organization and operation of businesses. 
Moreover, they acknowledge the market failure in allowing owners of 
business methods to benefit from ‘first-to-move lead-time’ incentive 
and thus the need for some form of intellectual property protection. It 
is believed that addressing this market failure through either copyright 
or patent law may not be a proper solution, as the subject matter of 
business methods do not fit for either system unless extensive and 
risky modifications of either the existing patents or copyright laws are 
made. Professor Chiappetta argues that “a better solution lies in 
melding aspects of both systems to create an independent ‘competitive 
arts regime’ designed expressly, and exclusively, to supplement the 
reduced lead-time incentive while minimizing interference with 
desirable market forces”.772 The patent law’s aspects applicable to this 
new regime are those relating to novelty, claiming and independent 
examination requirements, which will help in limiting the reach of the 
regime. Likewise, infringements of rights under this regime should be 
examined according to the patent law’s constrained, claims-based 
literal and equivalent approach. However, the proper functioning of 
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this regime requires considerable adjustments to traditional 
implementation of these requirements. Among the adjustments he 
proposes are that the examiners must be specially trained for this kind 
of competitive arts and their search tools must be tailored to perform 
effective searches in such area. The applicant must be burdened with 
showing available prior art. The method should be published before 
issuance and the possibility for post-grant opposition must be 
permitted. Moreover, a higher standard of non-obviousness must be 
applied, so as to limit “the regime’s incentives to paradigm-shifting 
pioneering innovations and leaving the primary form of competitive 
arts advance (emulative adoption coupled with modest differentiation) 
to market forces”.773 
       Determining rights and remedies under this regime according to 
patent law, will provide “excessive incentive, leaving the related 
social costs of lost competition and foregone follow-on improvements 
unjustified”. Therefore, “copyright law’s great willingness to tailor 
rights and remedies to the particular need provides a much better 
approach” for determining rights and remedies under the said regime. 
Specifically, s. 115 of the US Copyright Act gives the innovator the 
advantage of being first to market, thus supplementing the impaired 
first-to-move lead-time advantage and provides appropriate remedial 
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framework. The compulsory licensing requirements provide access for 
other parties, including competitors, and at the same time secure 
suitable compensation for the innovator. Moreover, some additional 
refinements to the structure of the rights and remedies under this 
regime are required to strike some balance between the costs and 
benefits of this regime. Specifically, as the objective of this new 
regime is to supplement the first-to-lead advantage, the life of which is 
relatively short even in its maximum forms, and in order to avoid long 
term exclusion, the term of protection under this regime should be as 
short as possible and in any case should not exceed two or three years. 
Furthermore, independent creation should be recognized as complete 
defense.774  
       Alternatively, if the post-State Street Bank patenting status quo is to 
continue, administrative as well as judicial adjustments should be 
made immediately so as to mitigate the negative effects of over-
protection under traditional patent law. These adjustments should 
begin from PTO where special scrutiny should be applied in case of 
application for patenting competitive arts methods. Likewise, the 
courts should treat competitive arts patent cases different from other 
patent cases. For example, preliminary prohibitive injunction should 
not be given to the plaintiff and even where there is strong likelihood 
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of success, the court may impose on the defendant, instead of 
prohibitive injunction, an interim royalty-based cost. Moreover, the 
protection should only be confined to patent law and should not be 
extended to copyright for the protection of the non-expressive aspects 
of the innovation.775 
       The approach of Professor Chiapetta has been criticized on the 
ground that he adopts a narrow interpretation for the term 
‘technology’ so as to exclude competitive arts methods and thus be in 
compliance with TRIPS Agreement, which provides under article 
27(1) for the patentability of ‘all field of technology’. Professor 
Takenaka believes that this narrow interpretation may open the door 
for the developing countries to object traditional intellectual property 
protection for new types of technology that may be developed in the 
future. He adds that in the light of the borderless nature of the Internet 
and electronic commerce, introducing a sui generis protection scheme 
may require renegotiation of TRIPS and thus resulting in missing the 
chance of protecting new technologies under traditional intellectual 
property regime, especially patent law, which may be imposed by the 
                                                 
775  Ibid. at 38-47. 
 514
World Trade Organization on all member countries, thus securing 
international harmonization.776 
 
 
 
  ii) Limiting the Scope of Business Methods Patents through Strict 
Application of Non-obviousness Requirement 
       Some commentators believe that the debate about the patentability of 
business methods as a subject matter may not be viable in the light of 
the decision of CAFC in State Street777, and as such the efforts should 
focus on how to limit the scope of business methods patents so as to 
avoid their negative impacts. Different proposals have been advanced, 
among which is the strict application of the other requirements of 
patentability, such as novelty and non-obviousness. However, as the 
requirement of novelty may relatively be easily satisfied, it is believed 
that concentration should be made on non-obviousness.778  
       Traditionally, U.S. courts looked to patents as undesirable monopoly 
rights, which should not be granted unless their benefits to the society 
outweighed their costs. In the light of this look non-obviousness 
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requirement was used to differentiate between “inventions that would 
likely have been created, developed, and disclosed even in the absence 
of a patent and those that would not”. However, since its formation; 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has adopted a 
pro-patent attitude reflected in its tendency to replace the traditional 
‘patent-as-monopoly’ perspective by a simply-property perspective.779 
The simply-property perspective has been criticized on the ground 
that: 
           If patents are not monopolies and do not generate 
monopoly-like deadweight losses, they are not an 
“embarrassment” and there seems no longer any reason to 
restrict them to cases where the invention would not have 
occurred but for the expectation of a patent. As a result, 
the need for some means to “weed out” undeserving 
inventions seems largely to disappear, leaving an 
individual who creates something new and useful 
presumptively entitled to a property right reflecting her 
contribution. Viewed in this way, the simply-property 
perspective cuts non-obviousness from its traditional 
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mooring and leaves it adrift; the words in the statute 
remain, but they lack any clear direction.780  
       Traditionally, the inquiry about non-obviousness was based on the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.781 In 
this case the Supreme Court directed the lower courts to start their 
inquiry about the obviousness by applying a three-part factual inquiry 
to determine “(i) the scope and content of the prior art; (ii) the 
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention; and (iii) 
the level of ordinary skill in the art”. The Court then identified other 
factors such as the commercial success of the invention in the market, 
the fact that the invention has solved a long-felt but not solved need, 
failure of others, etc., as secondary factors that may be taken into 
consideration to determine the obviousness. It has been stated that 
before the advent of the Federal Circuit, U.S. courts used to start their 
inquiry by applying the three-part inquiry and resort to the secondary 
factors only where the three-part inquiry did not produce a firm 
conclusion; in order to “‘tip the scales’ in favor of non-
obviousness”.782 
      In line with its simply-property view of patents, the Federal Circuit 
has adopted some doctrinal changes that have contributed in reshaping 
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the role of obviousness in patent litigation. For example, it reversed 
the inquiry adopted in Graham case by elevating the secondary factors 
to a primary level and considered their satisfaction as enough for 
determining non-obviousness. It has been commented that considering 
secondary factors, such as commercial success, as essential factors for 
determining non-obviousness will render all litigated inventions non-
obvious, simply because patents that are not commercially successful 
would not have been brought to litigation. Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit rejected the so-called ‘synergism requirement’, which is 
applied in case of patents resulting from ‘combination of elements’. 
According to this requirement, where the elements of a combination 
are all available in the prior art, the combination is presumed to be 
obvious. “Only where some intervening consideration, such as 
unusual or surprising consequences from the combination, broke the 
logical chain would the court rule a combination patent non-
obvious”.783 The Federal Circuit, however, applied the presumption of 
obviousness in a different way. According to it, obviousness 
presumption should be applied only where the prior art “contain some 
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suggestion or reason to combine the elements in the manner set forth 
in the claim (the suggestion test)”.784  
       Professor Lunney argues that these doctrinal changes together with 
the continuing uncertainty in obviousness practice of the Federal 
Circuit are logical results of the simply-property perspective. In the 
light of the apparent adoption of this perspective by CAFC, the only 
way to influence CAFC’s directions on non-obviousness is to find out 
some sort of reconciliation between patent-as-monopoly perspective 
and patent as simply-property perspective. He believes that such 
reconciliation may be achieved by recalling that “the central purpose 
of any property regime, from an economic perspective, is to insure 
that scarce resources are allocated to their highest value use”. 
According to him, ‘creativity’ is the scarce resource within the patent 
context, and that for the patent system to make sense as a property 
regime it must allocate creativity to those uses which are most 
valuable to the society and which may not be created but for the patent 
incentive. “To do otherwise and grant a patent for every advance in 
the art, would almost certainly lead individuals to devote their 
creativity to less valuable uses and thereby frustrate the purpose of the 
patent system as property regime”. He argues that patents in a simply-
property perspective are awarded where the inventive costs associated 
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with a new product or process represent a substantial portion of the 
total costs of the invention as marketed, i.e., on investment basis. 
Therefore, he has developed a simple model that measures non-
obviousness standard by reference to investment in creativity. He 
believes that products involving more creativity investment are more 
attractive for copying and as such, should be protected by patent. 
According to his model the non-obviousness inquiry is “whether the 
inventive expenditure actually present constitutes a substantial fraction 
of the claimed invention’s market price”. He acknowledges that the 
proposed model may face some difficulties when practically applied, 
nevertheless he believes that it “should provide an objective, 
consistent, and sensible guide to the non-obviousness issue in the vast 
majority of cases”.785 
      The proposal of Professor Lunney has been criticized on the grounds 
that absent empirical proof “it is very difficult to determine the 
appropriateness of his assumption that products involving more 
creativity investment are easier to copy than products requiring less 
creativity”. For example, Internet patents are easy to copy regardless 
of the creativity involved in the invention. Moreover, it is not clear 
how to differentiate between creative and non-creative investments. It 
has been argued that Professor Lunney’s “non-obviousness standard, 
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measured by investment, is a challenge to the traditional notion of 
‘inventive step’ applied by countries out of the United States and has 
nothing to do with the investment made by the inventor”. 
Furthermore, Professor Lunney’s proposal may result in 
discrimination between the different fields of technology, thus leading 
to a violation of TRIPS. For example, “Internet patents seem to 
demand more creativity investment than traditional innovations such 
as chemical or pharmaceutical inventions which require substantial 
investment for testing and implementation”.786  
       Another approach to non-obviousness inquiry is said to be through 
broad application of the doctrine of analogous arts, i.e., when 
searching the prior art in order to examine the obviousness of an 
invention the search should extend to knowledge from those fields, 
which are reasonably pertinent to the particular problem. For example, 
in the Internet business methods context, the search of the prior art 
should not be confined to the Internet and e-commerce, but must 
extend to cover real world business methods, because in many cases 
those real world business methods are merely automated and claimed 
as new inventions.787 The proposal for adopting broad concept of 
analogous arts has been criticized on the basis that the doctrine of 
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analogous arts is difficult to apply because the “scope of applicability 
changes when the definition of the relevant problem changes”. 
According to Professor Takenaka, “defining an appropriate measure 
for assessing the non-obviousness of business model patents or 
Internet patents requires redefining the hypothetical person of ordinary 
skills in the relevant art- properly reflecting real life inventive 
activities”. He recommends that USPTO should follow the guidelines 
of EPO and JPO where examiners are allowed to assume a group of 
experts in assessing non-obviousness.788  
 
4. Limiting the Scope of Electronic Commerce-Related Patents 
through Narrow Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents  
 
       The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine 
applied by U.S. courts in order to do equity for the 
patentee where there is no literal infringement. “The 
doctrine of equivalents holds that a patentee can claim 
rights to inconsequential alterations to the thing patented, 
which are not literally covered by the original claims, but 
that could be achieved with little effort”. The doctrine is 
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based on the assumption that "if two devices do the same 
work in substantially the same way, and accomplish 
substantially the same result, they are the same, even 
though they differ in name, form or shape."789 As an 
equitable doctrine, there are limitations on the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents. Two of these 
limitations are of special concern for business model 
patents, viz., prosecution history estoppel and prior art 
obviousness. Prosecution history estoppel applies where 
the patentee relinquished or narrowed his claim during 
prosecution procedures. In a recent case the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that any amendment of claims 
during prosecution creates a rebuttable presumption of 
estoppel. In order to rebut the presumption the patentee 
must prove not only that he has not relinquished the 
particular equivalent in question but also he must show 
that the amendment was not made for patentability 
purposes and specifically "must show that at the time of 
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the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably 
be expected to have drafted a claim that would have 
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent."790 
       Some commentators have shown their fear that due to 
the fact that Internet-related business patents are 
relatively few because of real or perceived ‘business 
method exception’ to patentability and due to lack of 
printed publication in this respect, business methods and 
software prior art are unlikely to be cited by an examiner 
during prosecution. As a result, business methods patents 
are granted ‘pioneer’ patents status by default.791 Pioneer 
patents, which are considered as groundbreaking 
inventions that have not been performed before, are 
“generally given a more liberal interpretation under the 
doctrine of equivalents than would otherwise be 
accorded”. It has been argued that business methods 
patents should not be given ‘pioneer’ patents status 
because doing so would result in finding infringement 
                                                 
.1, at .Miller,ibid] cited in). [2002, 28May . Ct. S(1543 -00. No, .Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp  See 790 
791  See Bagley, supra note 62, at 280-2. 
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under the doctrine of equivalents unlimited by 
prosecution history estoppel, putting into consideration 
the fact that the relative sparseness of prior art does not 
actually result from the pioneering nature of business 
methods patents but because the USPTO is ill-equipped to 
search for or obtain relevant prior art to apply against the 
claimed inventions. Therefore, “it is incumbent on courts 
to take note of the examination defects inherent in 
Internet business model patent prosecution when 
applying what is, at its heart, an equitable doctrine”.792 
       However, where prosecution estoppel is not applicable 
due to lack of prior art in patent file wrapper, the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents may still be 
barred where the devices or processes are available in the 
prior art or would have been obvious to one who has 
ordinary skill in the art. This is because “the doctrine of 
equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent, not to 
give a patentee something which he could not lawfully 
                                                 
792  Ibid. at 282-3. 
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have obtained from the USPTO had he tried”. Therefore, 
it is recommended that where defendants are able to show 
relevant prior arts that are not before the examiner 
during prosecution, the prior art/obviousness limitations 
on the application of the doctrine of equivalents must be 
rigorously enforced so as to effectively limit the scope of 
business model patents.793  
 
5. Scope of Prior Art for Electronic Commerce-Related 
Inventions  
 
       Prior art or the state of the art plays a pivotal role in 
determining whether patentability requirements, such as 
novelty and inventive step or non-obviousness are 
satisfied, because such determination is made by 
reference to the existing state of the art. The scope of 
prior art with respect to electronic commerce-related 
inventions raises two broad questions, first; whether real 
                                                 
793  Ibid. at 284. 
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world prior art is applicable as prior art for electronic 
commerce-related inventions, and second, whether prior 
art in electronic form, which exists only in cyberspace 
(cyber art) satisfies the requirements as prior art, 
especially in relation to its authenticity, veracity and 
integrity. 
       As far as real world prior art is concerned, Professor 
Bagley noticed that in granting injunction against the 
defendant, the district court in the Amazon.com case794 
never explicitly mentioned the doctrine of analogous arts. 
Likewise, during prosecution procedures relating to 
Amazon.com patent itself before USPTO, none of the 
citations made reference to real world prior art. All are 
related to e-commerce and the Internet. He argues that: 
“the omission of real world prior art from the ‘1-click’ 
patent and the court discussion in Amazon.com is 
troubling because the problem facing the Amazon.com 
inventors was not a problem peculiar to the Internet”. He 
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adds: “if one approaches the issue broadly, it should be 
difficult to identify an art in the ‘bricks and mortar’ real 
world in which business methods are not used, or in 
which solutions to business problems are not generated”. 
Therefore, he believes that a narrow application of the 
doctrine of analogous arts in the field of business methods 
specifically is troubling because of the increased potential 
for improper expansion of patent claims.795 
       Determining whether information in electronic form 
available only in cyberspace constitutes reliable prior art 
is critical not only for inquiring novelty and obviousness, 
but also for determining the timing of disclosure and the 
accessibility of the cyber art to the public. Traditionally, a 
‘printed publication’ is chosen to represent the public 
source of knowledge because it is “recorded in a legible 
form, accessible to the public, locatable by the public, of a 
non-transitory nature, and in most circumstances actually 
                                                 
795  See Bagley, supra note 62, at 271-3. 
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distributed to the public”.796 Today, the role of the 
Internet as a source of information is increasingly 
widening in all fields of knowledge. Therefore, it is 
essential to determine whether information disseminated 
only in cyberspace may be counted as a printed 
publication. Pierotti tries to answer the question whether 
information posted on the Internet meets the 
characteristics of information contained in a printed 
publication and as such Internet information may be 
counted as a printed publication. He reviewed pre-
Internet case law and previous writings on the subject 
and concluded that: “a posting on the Internet appears to 
satisfy the requirements of a printed publication under 
the ‘print’ theory of a printed publication”. This is 
because, according to him, “information on public web 
pages can be easily copied or viewed by the relevant 
public. In addition, this information is embodied in a 
legible form because the letters are all of uniform size and 
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shape. The Internet by its very nature is designed to allow 
users to access information”.797   
       It is worthy to note that the WIPO International Bureau has prepared 
a Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (May 2003), which provides 
under Article 8(1) that ‘…the prior art with respect to a claimed 
invention shall consist of all information which has been made 
available to the public anywhere in the world in any form…”.798 The 
Guidelines under Article 8 explain that: “information that has been 
made available to the public through communication by electronic 
means, in particular, via an electronic database or the Internet, also 
forms part of the prior art”. Moreover, the Guidelines add that: 
          The availability of information disclosed via an electronic 
database or the Internet shall be considered in the same 
manner as other forms of disclosure, i.e., whether it was 
reasonably possible for the public to gain knowledge of the 
information concerned or not. Accordingly, where the 
information disclosed on the Internet was made available to 
a limited circle of people, it is considered being made 
available to the public, provided no obligation to maintain 
secrecy was imposed. In order to determine whether the 
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information disclosed on the Internet was made available on 
a particular date or not, the following factors, in particular, 
shall be taken into account: (i) public availability of the 
URL; (ii) possibility of search by a search engine; (iii) 
credibility of the web site.799  
 
6. Private International Law Issues Relating to Patents 
 
   i) Jurisdiction 
       The territorial nature of intellectual property generally and patents in particular 
clashes with the international dimensions of electronic commerce. Despite the 
globalization features reflected in the dramatic increase in the world trade, 
including electronic commerce, the calls for the abolition of the territorial nature 
of patents are facing strong resistance; even within regions that have already 
achieved a degree of harmonization in their substantive patent laws, such as the 
European Union. However, the support for territoriality in issues relating to the 
validity of patents is stronger than in infringement issues. Validity issues are 
viewed generally as involving considerations of public policy and as such should 
only be determined by the courts of the state granting these rights. There is almost 
international consensus in this respect. For example, Article 22(4) of the European 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels II), 
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following its predecessor Article 16(4) of the 1968 Brussels Convention, provides 
for the exclusive jurisdiction of the following courts, regardless of the domicile of 
the defendant: 
          4. in proceedings concerned with the registration or 
validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other 
similar rights required to be deposited or registered, 
the courts of the Member State in which the deposit 
or registration has been applied for, has taken place 
or is under the terms of a Community instrument or 
an international convention deemed to have taken 
place800. 
       As concerns jurisdiction over infringements of patents, although the 
Brussels II Convention has made no reference to intellectual property, 
the infringements of intellectual property are generally regarded as 
torts, and as such covered by provisions dealing with jurisdiction over 
tortious liability. In this respect, Article 16(4) of the Convention 
provides for general jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State 
where the defendant is domiciled, regardless of the nationality of the 
defendant or the forum where the damage occurred or suffered. Article 
5(3) and Article 6(1) provide for special jurisdiction. As far as patents 
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are concerned, Article 5(3) provides that “a person domiciled in a 
Member State may, in another Member State, be sued:…..in matters 
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where 
the harmful event occurred or may occur”. Under Article 6(1), a 
person domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued “where he is one 
of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of 
them is domiciled”. The European Court of Justice construed the term 
“place where the harmful event occurred” as to mean both the place 
where the event causing the damage took place and the place where 
the damage suffered.801 However, in a subsequent decision the 
European Court of Justice restricted the scope of jurisdiction under 
Article 5(3) to the extent that “the courts of the place where the 
damage was suffered only have power to award compensation for 
damages suffered by the plaintiff within their own countries”.802 
      Moreover, the jurisdiction over joint defendants under Article 6(1) 
has been criticized as encouraging ‘forum shopping’, since the 
plaintiff may choose any of the forums where one of the defendants is 
domiciled. In response to this criticism the Dutch Court of Appeal 
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recently ruled that in order to have jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants under Article 6(1) concerning infringement of foreign 
patents arising out of European bundle, it must be shown that those 
foreign defendants “belong to the same group of companies and the 
European headquarter of that group of companies is located on the 
territory of the court”.803  
       However, the much controversial area as regards jurisdiction over 
foreign defendants under the Brussels Convention is where, in 
infringement cases, defendants raise, as a defense, the invalidity of the 
foreign patent in dispute. European courts have divided into two 
groups; one group, represented in the Dutch courts, adopt a narrow 
interpretation for Article 16(4) relating to exclusive jurisdiction and 
assume jurisdiction even where a defendant raises the issue of the 
invalidity of a foreign patent; the other group, represented in the 
English courts, refuse to assume jurisdiction when a defendant raises 
validity issues of foreign patents. For example, in Coin Controls Ltd. 
v. Suzo International (U.K.) Ltd.804 although the court acknowledged a 
jurisdictional basis under the Brussels Convention, it ultimately 
refused to accept jurisdiction on the foreign patent issues on the 
ground that the defendants had raised invalidity issues of the foreign 
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patents, which should be settled by the courts of the states granting 
those patents according to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention. 
Moreover, the court concluded that in such cases, Article 19 of the 
Convention “requires the court to decline jurisdiction over all claims, 
not just the invalidity issues”.805   
       On the other hand, Dutch courts have refused the English courts’ 
interpretation of Article 16(4). For example, in Expandable Grafts 
Partnership v. Boston Scientific806 the defendants challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 16(4) and 19 of the Brussels 
Convention. The Court responded to this argument by explaining that 
Article 16(4) could be read in two different ways: 1) that the 
“infringement court- which in principle has jurisdiction- has to declare 
itself not to have jurisdiction as soon as the invalidity of the patent is 
claimed as a defense” (the English rule); or 2) the “infringement court 
is … competent to take…. the claim but…. that it cannot give a 
decision on it until after the invalidity court … has given its opinion 
on the validity of the patent”. The Dutch Court of Appeal justified its 
refusal of the English courts approach on basis of public policy, as 
“the English approach was likely to lead to attempts by defendants to 
eliminate jurisdiction by bringing invalidity proceedings 
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elsewhere”.807 It is worthy of note that European courts are currently 
following the interpretation of the English Patents Court in Coin 
Controls808 case for Article 16(4) to the extent that a court seeing a 
dispute relating to infringement of foreign patents should decline 
jurisdiction over all claims, including the infringement claim, when 
the invalidity of these patents is raised as a defense, on the ground that 
“issues of infringement and invalidity are closely related that they 
cannot be separated and each national court has jurisdiction as to 
validity limited to that part of the EP registered in its own country”. 
The Mannheim District Court applied this interpretation in a recent 
case.809  
       Jurisdiction under U.S. Law is assumed when a court has jurisdiction 
both over the person and subject matter of a particular dispute. Subject 
matter jurisdiction refers to the class of cases to which the subject 
matter in dispute belongs. Personal jurisdiction refers to the question 
whether a court has jurisdiction over a certain person, being legal or 
natural person. Personal jurisdiction is established by reference to the 
degree of contact between the defendant and the forum. Depending on 
the degree and level of contact, a U.S. court determines whether it has 
jurisdiction or not, and if it has jurisdiction whether that jurisdiction is 
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‘general’ meaning that the “court has jurisdiction over the defendant 
even for acts committed outside the forum, or merely; ‘specific’ 
meaning that the court only has jurisdiction over the defendant with 
respect to those acts committed by him inside the forum”. Within the 
Internet context, the personal jurisdiction issue is determined by 
reference to the question of whether the defendant’s website has 
sufficient connection with the forum for the court to exercise either 
general or specific jurisdiction.810 
       Worldwide, the various versions of Article 12 of the draft Hague 
Convention relating to exclusive jurisdiction, reflects the international 
divide in relation to this matter. There is almost international 
consensus that “in proceedings in which the relief sought is a 
judgment on the grant, revocation or infringement of a patent or a 
mark, the courts of the Contracting State of grant or registration shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction”. However, much controversy, which has 
not been settled yet, arises as to whether the courts of the Contracting 
State in the latter case should also have exclusive jurisdiction where 
the dispute relates only to infringement. Another controversial issue is 
how a court would deal with invalidity issues that may arise as 
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incidental questions in proceedings before courts other than those of 
the country of protection/registration.811  
 
  ii) Applicable Law  
       The territoriality of patents, as well as other industrial property 
rights, is reinforced by the “fact that these classes of rights, in most 
instances, are required to be registered in order to benefit from 
protection. As such, the acquisition of the rights concerned is to be 
determined on the basis of the law of the countries in which 
registration is sought”.   Likewise, the substantive law of the granting 
state governs all issues relating to the validity of a patent, as well as 
infringement actions. In other words, “the law of the state in which the 
patent is valid (the law of the patent territory) not only governs the 
grant of the patent but also the rights derived from the patent. It 
determines the term of the patent, the scope of protection, the 
remedies available in infringement actions and all other relevant issues 
of substantive law”.812 Within the Internet context, however, 
difficulties may arise with respect to the applicable law in 
infringement actions when a patented invention is composed of 
elements that are physically located in different countries. For 
instance, in the cases of process patents, the patented invention may 
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involve activities in several countries by several persons using 
computerized networks connections (e.g., the Internet). In such a case 
determining the applicable law as well as the competent court may be 
problematic.813  
 
  iii) Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
       Generally, as in case of jurisdiction and the applicable law, to date 
there is no international agreement regulating the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. In Europe, the Brussels Convention 
governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Article 26 of 
the Convention provides that a “judgment given in a Contracting State 
shall be recognized in the other Contracting States without any special 
procedure being required”. Under Article 31(1) if a judgment is 
enforceable in the originating State, it is enforceable in other 
Contracting States. However, under Article 27(1) the addressed court 
may refuse recognition “if such recognition is contrary to public 
policy in the State in which recognition is sought”.814 However, as 
judgments rendered by the courts of non-Contracting States are not 
covered by the Convention, each European country deals with such 
judgments according to its national law. Generally, provisions relating 
to recognition and enforcement of judgment in national laws may 
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either be considered part of the private international law or of the civil 
proceedings of the concerned country. Recognition and enforcement 
of judgments are generally based on comity and reciprocity. The 
addressed court may refuse recognition on public policy 
considerations. For example, the European countries as well as Japan 
refuse recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments awarding non-
compensatory damages on the ground that they are contrary to public 
policy. Public policy arguments are also made in relation to procedural 
law issues as well. In the United States, as there is no international 
agreement regarding the mutual recognition and enforcement of 
judgments to which the United States is a party, foreign judgments are 
recognized under the principle of comity. In addition to the fact that a 
judgment must not be contrary to public policy, the conditions for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in US “include the 
opportunity for a fair trial abroad, a trial before a court of competent 
jurisdiction and a trial conducted upon regular proceedings”.815  
      As far as intellectual property is concerned, a U.S. court would refuse 
to recognize a judgment involving U.S. intellectual property rights 
“either because the foreign court is deemed not to have subject matter 
jurisdiction or because the public policy defense would be successful”. 
However, a foreign judgment relating to foreign intellectual property 
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rights may be recognized and enforced in U.S., provided that the 
conditions mentioned above are met.816 As concerns the draft Hague 
Convention, it has been commented that although the Convention is 
intended to be applicable worldwide, the jurisdiction as well as 
recognition provisions are drafted in an attempt to mitigate 
incompatibilities between U.S. and European law. For example, the 
conflict relating to the recognition of the U.S. judgments for non-
compensatory damages, which are usually refused by the European 
courts on public policy grounds, is settled under Article 33(1) of the 
Convention, whereby “in so far as a judgment awards non-
compensatory, including exemplary or punitive, damages it shall be 
recognized at least to the extent that similar or comparable damages 
could have been awarded in the State addressed”.817   
 
Conclusion 
       As stated before, throughout its history the patents system, like 
other forms of intellectual property, is responsive to new 
technologies in form of adjustments that stir up arguments about 
the underlying rationale and specific policy objectives behind these 
adjustments. The response of the patents system worldwide to 
electronic commerce-related inventions is still at its first stages. It 
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ranges from complete denial of patentability of electronic 
commerce-related inventions, to almost full recognition. 
Proportionately, patentability of software as such is less 
controversial than patentability of methods of doing business. At 
least in a country like the United States of America, software 
patentability has found almost full official recognition represented 
in the decisions of US courts and the practice of USPTO. Although 
patentability of business methods is strongly leading its way to full 
recognition in US, they are still debatable. Few other countries are 
recognizing the patentability of electronic commerce-related 
inventions. 
       The extreme arguments against the patentability of software 
generally and methods of doing business in particular are premised 
on fear of preempting the whole algorithms on which these 
inventions are based. It is believed that owing to the incremental 
nature of innovation in software, access to existing programs is 
essential for innovation and competition. Patenting computer 
programs may seriously restrict access to ideas and concepts 
underlying these programs. Moreover, patenting business methods 
may entail costly litigation that may result in stifling trade and 
force local firms out of market. Other commentators are crying the 
lack of novelty and inventive step in business methods inventions. 
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It has been argued that most of business methods inventions are no 
more than the automation of business methods available in the real 
world. 
       Different suggestions have been advanced for dealing with electronic 
commerce-related inventions. Even those who object patenting of 
these inventions, acknowledge the need for some sort of protection for 
the efforts of innovators in this field. It is conceded that the easy and 
fast copying of these inventions, facilitated by digitization of data and 
computer networks, has serious threats on the ability of those 
innovators to benefit from the lead-time first to invent advantage. 
Therefore, some form of sui generis protection taking into account the 
needs of the society for free access to knowledge on one hand and the 
rights of innovators for fair form of protection, on the other hand, may 
provide a better alternative. For those criticizing the permissive nature 
of examination relating to other requirements of patentability, the 
solution lies in the strict adherence to other patentability requirements, 
especially non-obviousness requirement. It is believed that 
examination of non-obviousness should be extended to cover not only 
electronic commerce prior art but also real world prior art, through 
broad application of the doctrine of analogous arts. Other approaches 
for limiting the scope of business methods patents is through narrow 
application of the doctrine of equivalents. However, the application of 
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the other requirements of patentability, such as novelty and inventive 
step, is made by reference to prior art. Thus determining the proper 
scope of prior art for electronic commerce-related inventions is a very 
important issue.  
       Moreover, the international dimensions of the Internet 
and electronic commerce have posed serious challenges 
for the protection of intellectual property rights generally 
and patents in particular, which have been previously 
provided on territorial basis. The international divide as 
concerns the competent court in disputes relating to 
intellectual property is reflected in the ongoing discussion 
of draft Hague Convention, which has been continuing 
since 1992 and up to date. Even if jurisdictional issues 
were solved, the recognition and enforcement of the 
resulting judgments would face considerable difficulties 
due to the differences in substantive national intellectual 
property laws. As has been shown above, few countries 
recognize the patentability of electronic commerce-related 
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inventions. Therefore, judgments relating to these patents 
may not be recognized on public policy considerations.   
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Chapter 9 
Internationally Harmonized Intellectual Property Rights: 
Safeguards for Developing Countries 
 
   Introduction 
 Apart from the earliest stages of evolution of intellectual 
property, by the middle of the nineteenth century the 
industrialized countries in Europe and America had adopted, 
more or less, similar intellectual property legislation. In each 
country, the intellectual property laws were conceived of and 
formulated to work within the boundaries of that country and, 
in most cases, for the protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) of its citizens. Few countries afforded foreigners 
protection similar to their own nationals and, in most cases on 
reciprocal basis. However, as a result of the increase in 
transborder trade in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the exporting countries sought to protect the IPRs of their 
nationals abroad. The efforts in this respect culminated in the 
conclusion of the main two intellectual property treaties, viz., 
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the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
in 1883 and the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works in 1886.818 
  The Paris and Berne Conventions were basically built on the notion 
that Signatory Countries should afford foreigners’ IPRs protection 
similar to the protection they afforded their own nationals (national 
treatment) and that such protection should not be less than a certain 
substantive minimum standard (substantive minima). Basically, under 
the system set by the Paris and Berne conventions the sovereignty of 
the Contracting Countries was maintained to a large extent. There 
were many factors behind this, among which was the fact that the 
substantive minima determined by the two conventions was in most 
cases codifying states practice and reflecting a consensus position. 
Moreover, concepts such as who is an author of a copyrighted work or 
the patentability of certain technological inventions were left to be 
determined by each Member State according to its own national 
policies and values. This position was practically affirmed by the lack 
of enforcing mechanism. Moreover, regardless of these multilateral 
arrangements, the traditional intellectual property system remained 
territorial in scope and limits, i.e., protection of IPRs of foreigners had 
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to be sought only in the countries where they were granted. The 
territoriality of IPRs was a fundamental principle on which the 
traditional intellectual property system was built. There is no such 
thing as international copyright or international patent or international 
trademarks. National courts had very little role to play in the 
construction of international intellectual property law as a result of: 
first, the strict adherence to the principle of territoriality; second, the 
fact that the provisions of the international treaties were codified in the 
national laws of the Contracting Countries, hence national courts were 
interpreting and applying their own national laws; and third, the fact 
that disputes brought before courts were largely relating to rights 
within the national boundaries.819   
  The call for the internationalization of IPRs is not new. It was 
reported that during the debate preceding the adoption of the Berne 
Convention some delegations called for the adoption of universal 
copyright law, yet these attempts were aborted in favor of greater 
national control over the course of copyright law. Similar views, 
though in a less degree, were expressed during the debate leading to 
the conclusion of the Paris Convention. However, the transformation 
of the economies of developed countries, especially the United States 
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and Europe, from economies depending on traditional industries and 
means of production to information-based economies has brought the 
internationalization issue once again to the surface. The last quarter of 
the twentieth century witnessed dramatic advances in many fields 
including pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, telecommunications, 
information and digital technologies, electronics, and the Internet. The 
new information technologies have facilitated the high quality copying 
and transmission of intellectual property materials all over the world.  
 Trading in pirated and counterfeit goods, which had flourished in the 
eighties and nineties of the last century led the US to amend in 1988 
its Trade Act of 1974 to make access to its markets dependant on the 
adoption or implementation by its trading partners of stronger 
intellectual property protection than they already had. It has been 
stated that the US had exploited the allegations of piracy to curtail 
legitimate measures in intellectual property adopted by developing 
countries such as “the denial of protection for certain categories of 
inventions like pharmaceutical and chemical substances, strict 
standards of patentability, a shorter period of protection, the issuance 
of compulsory license and licenses of right over unworked 
inventions”. However, the major step in the move towards 
internationalization of IPRs was the adoption of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which 
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reduced intellectual property issues to trade issues subject to measures 
of enforcement ordinarily conceived to resolve trade distortions.820     
  It has been argued that the emergence of new technologies such as 
the Internet has rendered TRIPS outdated. The emergence of 
electronic commerce has triggered the move towards further 
harmonization of IPRs. The move towards internationally harmonized 
IPRs is taking place at different forums. In addition to TRIPS, 
developed countries are pressing through bilateral treaties with 
developing countries to raise the minimum IPRs Standards above the 
levels of TRIPS (so-called TRIPS plus). From its side WIPO has 
succeeded in fostering a number of new multilateral intellectual 
property treaties since TRIPS entered into force, such as WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT) in 1996 (WIPO Internet treaties), the Patent Law 
Treaty in 2000 and the latest draft of the Substantive Patent Law 
Treaty, which is currently (2004) under discussion.821 Moreover, 
WIPO has formed standing committees to respond quickly to new 
developments and make proposals for WIPO Assemblies for adoption 
as non-binding recommendations. Likewise, there are many other 
forums working on formulating harmonized public and private 
international intellectual property rules. It has been commented that: 
                                                 
  For the text of TRIPS see 820org.wto.www://http.83-79, at 1See also Endeshaw, supra note .  
:   See 821index/ip/treaties./org.wipo://http., html 
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“the quest for harmonization in intellectual property rights has resulted 
in a ‘race to the top’ directed by the efforts and self interest of the 
countries which have had the strongest property rights”.822   
  The ubiquitous capabilities of electronic commerce offer important opportunities for developing countries to improve their 
social and economic growth. However, there are many challenges facing developing countries, which have impeded their 
access to the Internet and electronic commerce. In addition to the infrastructure obstacles, the ongoing international upward 
harmonization of IPRs carries significant implications for developing countries because the access to content on the Internet 
is as important as the access to the Internet itself. As such, efforts of developing countries should not only concentrate on 
technical infrastructure, but also extend to the regulation of the legal environment. In this respect, the ongoing moves 
towards more harmonization of IPRs should be carefully studied and analyzed by the representatives of developing 
countries so as to acquire a comprehensive understanding of their various implications, including their impact on the access 
to content on the Internet, and the necessary safeguards for the protection of the interests of their countries. 
  This chapter discusses the potential of electronic commerce for 
developing countries and the ongoing move towards internationally 
harmonized intellectual property rights, their implications for 
developing countries and the strategic policies that should be 
adopted by developing countries to face any accompanying 
challenges. The chapter is divided into four main parts. Part 1 
reviews the potential of electronic commerce for developing 
countries. It is divided into two subtitles discussing the 
opportunities and challenges in this respect. Part 2 reviews the 
arguments of the supporters and opponents of internationally 
harmonized intellectual property rights. It includes two subtitles 
                                                 
Lessons from American : Intellectual Property and Economic Development‘Zorina, .   See Khan, B822
: Available at). 2002(, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights ’and European History
.org.iprcommission.www://httpICTSD Capacity Building Project on IPRs -See also UNCTAD. 56, at 
: Available at. ’The Global Intellectual Property Rights System‘, 2, Part )2002(
http:://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/pp/pp_3ch_02.pdf , at 43-52.  
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discussing the arguments of the supporters and opponents of 
internationalization. Part 3 studies the implications of strengthened 
IPRs for developing countries. It is divided into two subtitles 
discussing the costs and benefits of strong IPRs in relation to 
development generally and access to the Internet and electronic 
commerce in particular. Part 4 discusses strategic policy issues for 
developing countries. It is divided into four subtitles examining the 
technical and capacity gaps in developing countries and the 
necessary safeguards for developing countries in order to fill these 
gaps. The chapter is closed by a conclusion summarizing all the 
previous issues. 
 
 
1. The Potential of Electronic Commerce for Developing Countries 
 
  i) Opportunities        
  The range of opportunities and activities offered by the 
information technologies seem to be unlimited. The recent report 
of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) pointed 
out that the applications of the information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) are potentially important in "government 
operations and services, health care and health information, 
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education and training, employment, job creation, business, 
agriculture, transport, protection of environment and management 
of natural resources, disaster prevention, and culture, and to 
promote eradication of poverty and other agreed development 
goals". In the field of economic activities, broadly, ICTs have been 
applied to "enhance four major categories of activities: governance, 
growth and supply/distribution of goods and services, adding value 
to existing services and the creation of new products and services”. 
As far as developing countries are concerned, information 
technology may assist in overcoming obstacles that impede their 
access to international markets such as “high transaction costs, 
inefficiencies in production, distribution and supply, while adding 
value to existing products and services and also creating new 
ones”.823 The Internet has reduced transactions costs to minimal 
limits. It can be used as a cheap means of communication to 
facilitate marketing and online conclusion of transactions, payment 
for tangible goods, and payment as well as delivery for intangible 
goods and services.824 
                                                 
823 See Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/9(Rev.1)-E, 18 February 2004, at 8. Available at: 
Issues in the : Development in the Information Age‘. See also Okediji, Ruth L. org.itu.www://http
Available . ’erty Rights, Computer Software and Electronic CommerceRegulation of Intellectual Prop
: at2003.Dec. pdf.Okediji_ecommerce/docs/ictsd/unctad/org.iprsonline.www://http.35, at  
824  Ibid. at 35-6. For more details see Chapter 4 infra. 
 553
  Another aspect of great importance for developing countries is the 
informational and educational capabilities of the Internet. In 
addition to the huge volumes of informational and educational 
materials and resources, the Internet provides linkage to 
educational institutions worldwide. The educational opportunities 
of the Internet extend beyond formal education. “Specialized 
learning and ongoing informal education can take place through 
chat-rooms, listservs and other interactive forums enabled by the 
Internet”. The Internet has facilitated access to the latest 
information about any number of subjects. It is believed that while 
distance learning cannot and should not replace structured 
educational systems, developing and least developed countries can 
benefit from the Internet in updating and improving the quality of 
their current educational systems and materials.825 
  The participation of developing countries in general and Africa in 
particular in the access to the Internet is very poor. It was reported 
that by 2002 the participation of African users was: “1 user for 
every 250-400 persons in Africa compared to a world average of 1 
user for every 15 persons, and in the United States and EU 1 user 
per 2 persons”. However, the participation of African countries is 
growing exponentially. For example, the growth of the Internet 
                                                 
825  See Okediji, supra note 6, at 36. 
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users in the Sudan between 2000-2003 increased by 180.0%. The 
Internet users in Sudan by 2003 were reported to be 84,000 
representing about 0.2% of the population. Yet to reach levels near 
to those in developed countries, developing countries generally and 
African countries in particular need to overcome different 
challenges.826 
 
  ii) Challenges 
   Some commentators have described the disproportionate level of 
access to the Internet between developed and developing countries 
as ‘digital divide’. There are many reasons for this digital divide 
represented mainly in the acute shortage in developing countries of 
the foundational infrastructure of the Internet such as computers 
and telecommunications, and the high barriers to access to content 
on the Internet. Tackling the problems of the foundational 
infrastructure may be easier than overcoming the barriers to access 
to content on the Internet.827  
   As far as information technologies are concerned, there are many 
indications ushering in progress in this respect. It is expected that 
developing countries are going to benefit from the decreasing 
prices of information technology products and other related 
                                                 
826  Ibid. at 17, 52. 
827  Ibid. 12. 
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complementary goods. There is evidence that high-income 
developing countries are achieving some progress in this respect. 
However, for the growth of acquiring information technology 
products to continue, there should be “innovative organizational 
models, in addition to strategies to increase overall income so that 
the vast majority of citizens are empowered to purchase the 
necessary hardware and software”. In this regard, improvement of 
the educational capabilities of the citizens in the field of 
information technology and access to the Internet is an important 
factor. Likewise, innovative ways that facilitate access to the 
Internet, such as the so-called ‘Internet Café’ is helpful.828   
   The other component of the foundational infrastructure is the 
telecommunications substructure of the Internet. A combination of 
services is needed for access to Internet. “In most countries, the 
complex relationship between telephone service providers, cable 
service providers and the rise of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
has given rise to a variety of pricing models to sustain differences 
in the market structure”. Despite the emergence of new 
technologies for access to the Internet, such as satellites and mobile 
telephones, still most individuals use the traditional telephone 
networks to access the Internet. Interestingly, it has been reported 
                                                 
828  Ibid. at 12. 
 556
that in Africa the use of mobile telephone surpassed the use of 
traditional fixed line for communications. The increased trend of 
using mobile phone coupled with the continuing evolution of 
mobile technology is expected to help developing countries in 
overcoming many obstacles impeding their access to the Internet. 
Moreover, the nature of the Internet has enabled firms in 
developing countries to benefit from access to international ISPs 
(host computers) in some applications such as the construction of 
websites. However, the price of services is an important factor in 
facilitating access to the Internet. It is worthy to mention that to 
date Internet services are monopolized by certain big businesses in 
developed countries, particularly the US. For example, in 2001 the 
top ten ISPs in the United States monopolized 66% of the market 
and the top four of those ten companies accounted for more than 
half the market. Evolution of access technologies has facilitated 
access to the Internet through a variety of means including mobile, 
cable, telephone, satellite and wireless. For developing and least 
developed countries to benefit from these access technologies, 
sound competition policies must be adopted for the regulation of 
competition between these services so as to ensure pricing options 
that are within the capabilities of consumers in these countries.829 
                                                 
829  Ibid. at 12-18 
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   The third factor affecting access to the Internet are the barriers 
impeding access to content. To prevent unauthorized access to their 
materials online, the owners of digital content apply legal as well 
as technical measures. The legal measures revolve around 
intellectual property law, especially copyright, in addition to other 
laws such as contracts, tort, and criminal law. The technical 
measures range from technologies aim at facing the digital threat to 
copyrighted works to technologies which indiscriminately prevent 
any kind of access to digital content whether protected by 
copyright or not.830 Developed countries are seeking to apply 
expansive intellectual property laws and other forms of sui generis 
protection to close the vast content placed on the Internet. 
Endeavors in this respect include the pressure through the WTO to 
obtain international recognition of the neutral technology language 
of TRIPS in order to extend TRIPS protection to digital content, in 
addition to efforts to prompt implementation of WCT and WPPT 
through their incorporation in TRIPS. New forms of protection 
such as sui generis protection for database, patent protection for 
business methods, and copyright protection for audiovisual 
performances are on their way to international recognition under 
                                                 
Copyright and Access to Information ‘  See Severine Dusollier, Yves Poullet and Mireille Buydens, 830
.  29-6at ) 2000 (4. XXXIV No. Vol. Copyright bulletin. ’te Digital Environmenin th 
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the name of internationally harmonized intellectual property 
rights.831 
   The WSIS report emphasized that bridging the digital gap 
requires international cooperation to: “improve access to 
information and communication infrastructure and technologies as 
well as to information and knowledge; build capacity; increase 
confidence and security in the use of ICTs; create an enabling 
environment at all levels; develop and widen ICT applications; 
foster and respect cultural diversity; recognize the role of the 
media; address the ethical dimensions of the Information Society; 
and encourage international and regional cooperation". To 
overcome these challenges, developing countries must set 
“simultaneous, multi-faceted and strategic policies aimed at 
addressing the rules that create and sustain the access problem”.832 
 
 
2. Arguments for, and, against International Harmonization of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
i) Arguments of the Supporters 
                                                 
commerce and Intellectual Property -Issue on the Relationship between E‘  See Eugui, David Vivas, 831
: ailable atAv.. 15-4at ) 2001. (’Implications for Developing Countries: Rights in the WTO
htm.pubindex/publications/org.southcentre.www://http  
832  See WSIS report, supra note 6, at 4. See also, Okediji, supra note 6, at 13. 
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  Regardless of the post-TRIPS dramatic changes in the international 
intellectual property system, the basic principle on which intellectual 
property law has been premised, i.e., the principle of territoriality, has 
largely been preserved. Intellectual property rights are protected in the 
country where they have been granted. The main two concepts 
underlying the traditional international intellectual property system, 
viz., national treatment and substantive minima, define the obligations 
of each Contracting State. The supporters of internationalization argue 
that the digitization of data and the convergence of information and 
communications technologies, resulting in the emergence of the 
Internet, have caused great transformations in the social and economic 
environment worldwide. The quantities of intellectual property 
products and the speed with which they move through the 
international commerce and international communities could never be 
imagined before. These facts, coupled with the fact that IPRs have 
become a major source of wealth in developed countries have 
"prompted the demands for intellectual property laws that are more 
global in reach, and the sometimes inconsistent demand for 
intellectual property laws that respond more quickly to new problems 
and new technologies".833  
                                                 
833 See Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 999.  
 560
  It is believed that within this climate of globalization of IPRs "the 
principles of territoriality and national autonomy over precise rules of 
domestic intellectual property law have come under pressure". It has 
been argued that the multinational nature of disputes involving IPRs 
requires national courts to issue decisions that may have substantial 
effects in many different countries. The only way for this process to 
reach its potential to enable national courts to develop multinational 
solutions through private litigation and contribute to the development 
of international intellectual property law is through deployment of 
measures that effect virtual territorialization.834 In the view of one 
commentator, "digital media have unleashed deep-running changes in 
the international regime of intellectual property. The patchwork of 
nation-states can no longer respond, with its purely territorial laws, to 
network imperatives of interconnectivity". Thus, the solution lies in a 
universal code that "would impose sufficiently uniform law worldwide 
that courts would not have to choose between conflicting laws on 
critical issues that typically arise in this field of law".835 Justice Jacob 
believes that: 
           As time goes on… the world will realize that at least for 
intellectual property the days of the nation-state are over 
                                                 
834  Ibid. at 1006-7and 1010. 
835 Strategies for International Intellectual : 'From Patchwork to Network See Geller, Paul Edward, 
: Available at. 90-70, at )1998(69 . & Int'l L. of Comp. Duke J9 . 'Property in Flux
htm.69p9djcil/articles/djcil/journals/edu.duke.law.www://http  
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and truly international courts will be created. This is not 
without growing precedent – the tribunals of the World 
Trade Organization and the increasing number of war-
crimes tribunals are but a part of globalization from which 
intellectual property will not be able to stand apart.836   
 
ii) Arguments of the Opponents  
  The opponents of international harmonization of IPRs argue that 
historically the calls for harmonization often result in strengthening of 
IPRs. Typically, it is upward harmonization modeled on the laws of 
the developed countries, especially the United States and Europe. In 
other words, the calls for harmonization aim at providing international 
protection for IPRs more than what is currently prevalent under the 
multilateral agreements including the controversial TRIPS Agreement. 
Moreover, it has been contended that the calls for harmonization are 
no more than attempts to internationalize new standards that are 
controversial even within the developed countries themselves. For 
example, the European database protection right has not yet found 
wide acceptance in other developed countries. It is believed that the 
sui generis protection of databases “could subvert the classical 
                                                 
836 . Case W. 'International Intellectual property Litigation in the Next Millennium' See Justice Jacob, 
Res. J. Int'l L., Vol. 32:507 (2000) at 516. Available at: http:// lawwww.cwru.edu/academic/jil/32-
3/jacobarticle.pdf  
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intellectual property tradition built around patents and copyrights, with 
unintended consequences that could elevate the costs of research and 
development across the entire knowledge economy”.837 
  In the United States the operation of even the most established 
intellectual property systems, viz., copyright and patents, has never 
been as controversial as presently. The recent holdings of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the field of patents, in 
which it expanded patent protection of computer programs to cover 
software per se and business methods, and narrowed the doctrine of 
equivalents in patent infringement, has faced wide criticism inside and 
outside the United States. As a result, the patent system is widely 
perceived to have broken down in the United States. “New proposals 
to reform the patent system appear frequently, and commissions to 
study or propose reform are operating on numerous fronts”. Professor 
Reichman asks: “how, under such circumstances, could it be timely to 
harmonize and elevate international standards of patent protection – 
even if that were demonstrably beneficial – when there is so little 
agreement in the U.S. itself on how to rectify a dysfunctional 
apparatus that often seems out of control?” It has been recommended 
that, “at least from the perspective of developing countries, it is not 
                                                 
. ’Managing the Challenge of a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime‘, .H.  See Reichman, J837
ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue, 2nd Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectual Property, 18-21 Sept. 
: Available at. 10-9, at )0320(pdf.Reichman/docs/bellagio/unctadictsd/org.iprsonline.www://http   
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advisable to promote further international harmonization of a system 
that has gone far beyond its essential function: to foster and reward 
genuine inventiveness”. Likewise, the enactment of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) in U.S., which is 
considered to be an example of national implementation of WIPO 
Internet treaties, has also been controversial. It has been argued that 
the DMCA has adopted a much more restrictive approach to copyright 
protection on digital networks than what is required by WIPO Internet 
treaties.838  
  Other opponents of internationalization argue that: "there are 
growing recognition that the regulation of patents and other IPRs 
cannot be reasonably made with a unique, universal standard. 
Different socio-economic conditions and levels of development 
require different intellectual property systems".839 Even though a 
unified international intellectual property legal system may bring more 
international uniformity and predictability in the light of the 
uncertainty created by digital networks, “nations are not willing yet to 
surrender their sovereignty completely on the issues of jurisdiction or 
                                                 
zation of the Patent Internationali‘, .See also Correa, Carlos M. 25, at 6 See Okediji, supra note 838
, 7-25March . WIPO Conference on the International Patent System. ’System and New Technologies
: Available at. 21-1, at 2002/en/agenda/patent/int.wipo.www://http .   
839 The Risks for Developing : The WIPO Patent Agenda‘& Musungu, Sisule, . Carlos M See Correa, 
: Available at. 22, at )2002(, ’Countrieshtm.pubindex/publications/org.southcentre.www://http. 
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enforcement, nor to allow other countries’ substantive law to be 
legitimized when it is contrary to the home country’s law”.840  
   Some commentators, however, try to take a flexible position by 
acknowledging the efficiency gains expected from standardized 
supranational intellectual property laws, particularly in the field of 
copyright, but at the same time argue that this should not extend to 
deprive nations from the ability to forge intellectual property laws that 
suit their own circumstances. Professor Austin argues that while 
international intellectual property law seems by now to be a reality 
above all, "a reality that may in many instances serve interests and 
agenda pursued purely within domestic contexts", nevertheless the 
territoriality principle derives its viability from concerns about the 
importance of domestic self-determination in intellectual property 
laws. According to him: 
          The concept of self-determination is meant to capture the 
ability of individual nations to develop and test new 
intellectual property policies; it might also include the 
ability to calibrate the level and types of protection afforded 
to intellectual property proprietors in light of a nation's 
specific circumstances, to craft new defenses and 
                                                 
International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of ‘, .& Morris, Roberta A. lin, Jonathan A  See Frank840
Irrelevance of, Goals for and Comments on Current : Judgments in the Era of Global Networks
: Available at. 43-1242at ) 2002(1213 : 77. Vol. R.Kent L-Chicago. ’Proposals
pdf.Final/:377/articles/edu.kentlaw.lawreview://http 
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exemptions and expand existing ones, and to use intellectual 
property laws as vehicles for molding cultural and technical 
policies to suit domestic circumstances.841  
 
3. Implications of Strengthened IPRs for Developing Countries 
 
   i) Costs 
   The negative implications of the emergent protective measures for 
developing countries in relation to development generally and access 
to content on the Internet in particular, are believed to be tremendous. 
For example, the criticism directed to the sui generis right on database 
is that the only justification for protection is to enable the owners to 
obtain a return on their investment, not on the basis of the originality 
of the works. Moreover, as the sui generis right covers not only the 
non-original form of collection of data but also the whole collection of 
data, it actually grants monopoly over simple collection of information 
and threats public access to information. As such, it jeopardizes not 
only “access to information by developing countries, but also prevents 
the non-commercial sector from taking advantage of the free flow of 
information. The educational and scientific communities whose work 
                                                 
841 in International Intellectual ” Determination-Domestic Self“Valuing ‘, .Austin, Graeme WSee 
: Available at. 61-1159at ) 2002(77 . Vol. R. Kent L-Chicago. ’Property Jurisprudence
pdf.Final.Austin/:377/articles/edu.kentlaw.lawreview://http  
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is inconceivable without the permanent use of available information, 
is particularly affected by this right”.842 As concerns the Internet and 
electronic commerce, it has been argued that “such protection will 
lead to even greater industry concentration and increase the costs of e-
commerce by simultaneously lowering the utility and increasing the 
cost of search engines”. The consequences would be “reduced 
competition on the Internet due to heightened barriers of entry to e-
markets and inhibiting second generation improvements to existing 
databases”.843  
   Likewise, the extension of patents protection to business methods 
has raised great controversy even in the United States itself, where 
such protection has found the largest support. The EU and other 
countries such as Japan and Australia have dealt with notable caution 
in their respective policies about granting business method patents. 
The increasing number of business methods has raised concerns about 
their possible inhibiting role on the development of e-commerce and 
innovation in the online environment. As concerns developing 
countries, “empirical evidence does not establish that business 
methods patents have a singularly positive effect on innovation”. On 
the contrary, such patents “could facilitate the increase of 
anticompetitive practices by using patents as a way of limiting further 
                                                 
842  See Dusollier, Poullet and Buydens, supra note 13, at 8. 
843  See Okediji, ‘Development in the Information Age ‘,supra note 6, at 31. 
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innovation. These types of actions could limit access to new 
technologies”. Moreover, recognition of such patents by developing 
countries would add further financial burden on them in terms of 
administration costs and royalties.844  
  It has been argued that the protection under WCT and WPPT of 
technical measures used to prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted 
works on the Internet would have negative effects on developing 
countries. This is because, first, there are no express requirements, 
even permissions, for exceptions or limitations on the control of these 
technical measures. Second, unlike the purely copyright protection, 
proper technical measures would form a direct barrier to the access 
and use of the protected subject matter.845 The first implementation of 
WCT and WPPT has been the DMCA of the United States. The 
DMCA has been "heavily criticized as over protective and lacking in 
any limitations to protect legitimate uses of content protected by 
technological means”. Regardless of this criticism, the United States 
negotiated a series of bilateral agreements containing DMCA like 
provisions, and thus “made these inordinately high standards a de 
                                                 
844 Ibid. at 26-30. See also Eugui, supra note 14, at 18. 
Digital Millennium or Digital Dominion? The Effect of IPRs in Software on ‘  See Lea, Gary, 845
Global Intellectual Property ‘.] eds[ahos and Ruth Mayne Peter Dr] in[, )2002(, ’Developing countries
, at )2002(PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, New York . ’ Knowledge, Access and Development-Rights
154, at 155. 
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facto model for global implementation of the WCT”. According to 
professor Okediji: 
        The combined effect of private law mechanisms such as tort 
and contract law, and public law regulation through 
copyright and other specialized regimes like the DMCA, 
will lead inevitably to increased difficulty in access to 
content. In a situation where access to hardware is already 
an important hindrance to developing countries, adding 
another layer of impediments, and inevitably raising costs, 
is problematic for the interests of developing countries in 
utilizing information technology.846 
  The attempts of developed countries to obtain international 
recognition of the neutral technology language of TRIPS so as to 
extend TRIPS protection to digital content online and their attempts to 
incorporate by reference the provisions of WCT and WPPT in TRIPS 
are adding a further difficulty to the position of developing countries. 
On the one hand, although there is no formal definition for the term 
‘technological neutrality’ either within WIPO or WTO, “in informal 
terms, technological neutrality tends to mean that TRIPS rules and 
obligations will be applied whatever technology is used. It also 
applies to the rules on enforcement, including any violation of IPRs 
                                                 
846 See Okediji, ‘Development in the Information Age’, supra note 6, at 32. 
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on the Internet or as a consequence of a digital technology”. The 
concept of neutral technology has been used as a justification not only 
for the revision of existing rules in order to be adaptable to the digital 
environment but also to expand intellectual property protection to new 
subject matter such as business methods and non-original database. 
Developing countries are afraid that this concept might be used to 
expand their obligations under TRIPS. Moreover, practically the use 
of the concept of technological neutrality in the field of enforcement 
would add a further burden on developing countries which are already 
experiencing shortage of essential infrastructure in this aspect.847 On 
the other hand, the incorporation of WCT and WPPT in TRIPS will 
make the expansionist copyright model an enforceable global regime. 
For developing countries, such integration will, at least, raise the costs 
of access indirectly by constraining policy spaces for them to promote 
domestic policies that are consistent with their national interests more 
than what is currently allowed under TRIPS Agreement.848  
  The opponents of strengthened IPRs refuse the move towards 
international harmonization on the ground that its ultimate purpose is 
to strengthen the current IPRs and introduce new ones in favor of right 
holders, who are almost nationals of developed countries, at the 
expense of developing countries. Generally, strengthening IPRs has 
                                                 
847  Eugui, supra note 14, at 4-6. 
848  See Okediji, ‘Development in the Information Age’, supra note 6, at 34. 
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many other costs for developing countries in addition to the 
previously mentioned costs of the newly emergent IPRs. Regardless 
of the costs of administration and enforcement of IPRs, which are in 
most cases foreigners’ rights, internationally strengthened IPRs will 
weaken a sovereign power control over its domestic innovation 
policies as a result of a shrinking public domain, high costs of 
technological input, and restriction on reverse engineering and other 
methods of imitative innovation. Moreover, “the growing thickets of 
rights will make the transfer of technology harder for those operating 
outside patent and intellectual property pools”. Higher standards of 
patent protection are unlikely to have a positive effect on local 
innovation in developing countries. This is because, for strengthened 
patent system to promote innovation, a certain level of technological 
development and financial capabilities must be reached so as to 
finance research and development (R&D). Strengthening IPRs will 
strengthen the monopoly of right holders and may result in higher 
prices for consumers because it will “improve the negotiating position 
of right-holders to determine the royalties to be paid and other 
conditions for the transfer of needed technologies, in case they agree 
to part with them at all”.849 
                                                 
849  See Reichman, ‘Managing the Challenge ‘, supra note 20, at 9. See also Correa & Musungu, WIPO 
pment and New Treaty Develo‘, .See Okediji, Ruth L. 5-25, at 22Patent Agenda, supra note 
UNCTAD Dialogue, the Rockefeller -ICTSD. ’Harmonization of Intellectual Property Law
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ii) Benefits 
  The supporters of international harmonization of IPRs, particularly 
patents, argue that in addition to benefits for right holders in terms of 
lower costs for acquiring and maintaining multinational IPRs, 
internationally harmonized patent system helps governments to avoid 
wasting financial and human resources in searching and examining 
applications already searched and examined by other patent offices. 
Moreover, as far as development is concerned, it has been observed 
that “the importance of IP systems in general, and patent systems in 
particular, to the development of countries and their economies, has 
grown exponentially in the last twenty years as the world’s economy 
has increasingly become a knowledge-based economy”.850 
 A strong patent system will promote innovation because it guarantees 
exclusive rights for patentees, and as such encourages inventors to 
invest their time and energy in creating new products and services and 
enables them to obtain the needed funds from financing institutions. 
Likewise, the disclosure requirement stipulated by patent systems 
saves time as well as human and financial resources that might 
                                                                                                                                            
: Available at.. 2-1, at 02. Nov 2 -Oct30 s Bellagio Conference Center, ’Foundation
pdf.R_Okediji/docs/bellagio/unctadictsd/org.iprsonline.www://http 
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otherwise be dissipated in research and development (R&D) of the 
same invention and enables competitors to leapfrog ahead and create 
advances beyond the inventor’s contribution because they will start 
from where the inventor ends. “These advances continue a cycle, 
creating additional new products, services, jobs and further raising the 
economic well-being of society”. Moreover, a strong patent system 
provides a favorable climate for foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
transfer of technology. Sherwood, depending on previous as well as 
his own empirical studies concluded that these studies indicated that 
the protection of intellectual property contributes to development in 
different ways including technical change, knowledge diffusion, 
human resources expansion, technology financing, business growth 
and economic development. Likewise Lesser assures that the previous 
empirical studies as well as his own study proved, at least, the positive 
relationship between strong intellectual property protection and the 
increase in imports and FDI.851 
 The opponents of international harmonization, on the other hand, 
refuse the arguments of the supporters on the grounds that ‘one size 
does not fit all’. They argue that the economic history of the 
                                                 
. ’Intellectual Property and Economic Development‘, .See also Sherwood, Robert M. 2at .   Ibid851
The Effects ‘, .See also Lesser, W. 95-191at ) 1990(Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford . Westview Press
. ’Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on Economic Activities in Developing Countries-f TRIPSo
: Available at. 21-1, at 2002, 7-25March . WIPO Conference on the International Patent System
/en/agenda/patent/int.owip.www://httpReforming ‘Kanaan, . Alami and Maya Z. See also Tarik H . 
ECSSR Abu . ’Implications and Policies: Intellectual Property Rights Regimes in Developing Countries
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developed countries, especially the United States and Europe support 
the view that “appropriate policies towards intellectual property are 
not independent of the level of development, nor of the overall 
institutional environment”.852They add that their argument is 
supported by a recent report of the World Bank (2001), which assures 
that while the patent system may entail considerable short-term costs 
for developing countries in terms of administration costs and high 
prices for medicines and technological input, the long-term benefits 
seem uncertain. The said report concludes that ‘one size does not fit 
all’ and that developing countries should not be treated on the same 
footing as developed countries, and that each country should be left 
the flexibility to adapt the levels of intellectual property protection as 
its economy grows.853  
  In the view of one commentator the reality lies somewhere in 
between. According to professor Maskus “the question of how 
intellectual property rights (IPRS) affect the process of development 
and growth is complex and based on multiple variables. The 
effectiveness of IPRS in this regard depends considerably on 
particular circumstances in each country”. He concedes that the 
empirical studies showed that countries tend to adopt more protective 
                                                 
852  See Khan, supra note 5, at 58. 
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measures when their economies grow to higher levels and the opposite 
is true. He acknowledges that mere strengthening of IPRs will not lead 
to growth and development, first, because there are many other factors 
affecting growth such as “macroeconomic stability, market openness, 
policies for improving the economy’s technological infrastructure, and 
the acquisition of human capital”, and second, IPRs may have positive 
or negative impacts on growth. He concludes that: “the policy 
approach most conducive to expanding development is to implement 
an integrated system of both IPRS and corollary policies that strike a 
balance of incentives in favor of rigorous but fair dynamic 
competition”.854 
 
4. Strategic Policy Issues for Developing Countries 
  Developing countries generally and least developed countries in 
particular are experiencing serious technical and capacity gaps in 
relation to intellectual property. One commentator classified gap areas 
into four categories. First; developing and least developed countries 
are in need to fill gaps in relation to understanding the concepts, 
issues, benefits and risks of intellectual property protection. Second, 
they have to deal carefully with the issues of implementation and 
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compliance with existing commitments. Third, they must fill gaps 
relating to their capabilities to manage and influence on-going 
negotiations on further commitments. Fourth, they have to adopt 
proper policies that enable them to develop strategies and set the 
agenda for the future. It is conceded that the magnitude of these gaps 
differ from country to country and change over time, yet developing 
and least developed countries are in need to identify their individual 
as well as collective interests in the field of intellectual property and 
work to “translate these interests into policies, negotiating goals and 
positions; situate these policies, negotiating objectives and positions 
into their overall development framework; and allocate resources, 
both human and financial, to execute these policies, negotiating 
objectives and positions.855 
 
i) Understanding the Concepts, Issues, Benefits and Risks of 
IPRs 
   The importance of understanding the concepts, issues, benefits and 
risks of IPRs lies in the fact that it is essential for the success in the 
other areas i.e., understanding the concepts, issues, benefits and risks 
of IPRs is essential for the success in implementation and compliance 
                                                 
Oriented Intellectual Property Technical -Designing Development‘.   See Musungu, Sisule F855
 Bellagio Series on Development and nd2UNCTAD Dialogue, -ICTSD. ’Assistance Programmes
: Available at.. 4-3t , a)2003. (Sept21 -18Intellectual Property, 
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with existing commitments, managing and influencing on-going 
negotiations on further commitments, and making and developing 
strategies and setting the agenda for the future. It has been argued that 
the economic success of a country largely depends on the creation and 
maintenance of efficiently defined property rights. In the field of 
IPRs, efficiency is “generally thought to involve a balance between 
rules of appropriation and rules of diffusion”. It is believed that a 
democratic bargaining environment, locally and internationally, helps 
in striking balance in ways that produce efficiency. Among the 
requirements of a democratic bargaining are that all concerned parties 
are well represented and well informed. Internationally, being well 
informed is an indispensable prerequisite for understanding the 
concepts, issues, benefits and risks of entering in international 
obligations in the field of IPRs. It has been argued that when TRIPS 
was concluded most countries were in ignorance about its likely 
effects in information markets. “Multinationals had better information 
about the strategic use of intellectual property portfolios in various 
markets around the world than did most governments”.856   
                                                 
. ’alogueBetween Coercion and Di: Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights‘  See Drahos, Peter, 856
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  The recent report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(CIPR) identified some of the issues that developing and least 
developed countries need to understand. These issues are as follows: 
− The consequences of full implementation of TRIPS on the 
developing world, including the provisions relating to 
enforcement. 
− The implications of the movement towards harmonisation 
and integration of patent systems at the international level. 
− Impacts of patents and other IPRs in new or rapidly 
advancing fields of technology, such as biotechnology and 
software.  
− The impact on access to information crucial for development 
on the Internet, including technological protection by 
publishers and other content providers, and of anti-
circumvention legislation. In addition, there will be issues of 
how to respond when nations attempt to take legal 
jurisdiction over foreign servers in order to affect the way 
these servers distribute information over the Internet. 
− Alternative models of IPR protection suitable for developing 
countries. 
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− How best to build capacity for IP policymaking, 
administration and enforcement in developing countries – 
and how donors can provide support more effectively.857 
  To achieve these and other related developmental goals, developing 
and least developed countries are in need to build institutional 
infrastructure for evaluating and reconciling international intellectual 
property standards with national and regional systems of innovation. 
Professor Reichman suggested the establishment of a high level 
permanent Advisory Council on Trade-Related Innovation Policies 
(ACTRIPS), in each country “which could become the focal point for 
interagency policy making with respect to the integration into 
domestic law of existing and evolving international legal standards 
affecting innovation”. Unlike other intellectual property offices, this 
Advisory Council “would ideally play a supervisory and policy 
making role that requires inputs from intellectual property offices but 
that locates policy making decisions of importance to the state as a 
whole in a suitable oversight agency concerned with national 
development strategy”. Likewise, a regional or sub-regional group of 
developing countries should consider the feasibility of a regional 
ACTIPS to coordinate regional positions on matters of common 
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concerns, develop regional standards concerning IPRs and enable 
consensus building for future IPRs negotiations. The regional 
ACTRIPS could benefit from the pooling of resources and expertise 
among its members to avoid duplicating the same inputs in all 
countries. He believes that the concerned developing countries may 
use such regional Advisory Councils, in the short and medium term, 
as “institutionalized focal points for future bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations bearing on national innovation policies, in order to ensure 
that governments and regional bodies, wherever possible, coordinated 
their positions on the relevant issues”. He adds that these ACTRIPS 
“would serve to institutionalize a broad-based lobbying coalition that 
could focus on both existing and new issues, monitor developments in 
different forums (WIPO, WTO, WHO), and become a vehicle for 
rapidly responding to pressures from developed countries in an on-
going and systematic fashion”.858  
     However, one of the acute and chronic problems facing developing 
countries generally and least developed countries in particular is the 
shortage of qualified cadres capable of dealing with complex trade 
and intellectual property issues.  The status in Africa may well be 
exemplified by the speech of the Ghanaian Minister of Justice, Nana 
Akufo Addo who acknowledged that: “granted that we lacked the 
                                                 
858  See Reichman, ‘Managing the Challenge’, supra note 20, at 5. 
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capacity to send competent experts to represent government at both 
the WTO and other multilateral negotiations, we cannot escape the 
necessity of having to evolve principles to improve our performance 
at such fora”. He added that: “we first need to build up a nucleus of 
trained negotiators, not necessarily drawn from government 
employment”. It has also been reported that the Ghanaian Minister of 
Trade “told a story of how the Ghanaian delegation to the recent Doha 
WTO Ministerial Meeting went attending cocktail parties at the 
invitation of powerful Asian and European delegations because they 
were under resourced”. He added that “whereas other countries sent 
big delegations, including experts, Ghana only managed a skeletal 
team, making it difficult for them to deliberate at other meetings”. 
Moreover, it has been observed that the delegates were typically 
drawn from the public service, and due to per diem usually 
accompanying such trips Directors and Chief Directors jostle for 
selection regardless of their qualifications. It has been observed that 
because of “the correlation between trade and accelerated economic 
growth even the developed countries see trade negotiations as a matter 
of life and death and would press their views at the cost of 
anything”.859  
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     Therefore, training of cadres capable of dealing with complex trade 
and intellectual property issues is an indispensable priority. It has 
been recommended that training should be provided both at the local 
level and through qualified foreign institutions. “Affiliation should be 
sought with leading foreign institutions, with a view to developing 
systematic inputs and distance-learning materials”. According to 
Professor Reichman, the best and most effective form of training may 
be obtained through training of the most qualified personnel at foreign 
institutions under degree granting programs such as JD and LLM. He 
is aware, however, of “the risk of brain drain either by defection to 
foreign countries or by recruitment to serve foreign interests at home”. 
Therefore, he recommends that: “these risks can and must be 
alleviated by suitable contractual agreements that mandate fixed 
periods of public service for the beneficiaries of the fellowship 
programs”. Moreover, he recommends that developing and least 
developed countries should strive to finance their initiatives in the 
field of intellectual property from their resources because the foreign 
aid often accompanied by high-protectionist propaganda paid for by 
the very coalition of interests that developing countries are seeking to 
resist.860  
 
                                                 
860  See Reichman, ‘Managing the Challenge’, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
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 ii) Implementing and Complying with Binding International IPRs 
Commitments 
   In order to achieve their strategic development goals, developing 
and least developed countries should “review their own capabilities 
and needs, and in the light of their findings, they should strive to 
tailor-make intellectual property rights and other legal and regulatory 
regimes to produce pro-competitive results consistent with both their 
own technical capacities and international legal obligations”.861 In 
particular, they should “exploit the flexibility inherent in TRIPS 
Agreement to promote their own systems of innovation, to tilt existing 
intellectual property standards to promote their own investment needs, 
and to experiment with new forms of intellectual property protection 
that may stimulate local innovation at lower social costs than models 
familiar from current European and American practice”.862 As 
concerns compliance with existing international commitments, 
especially TRIPS, and as least developed countries, including the 
Sudan, are starting procedures to amend their intellectual property 
laws so as to comply with TRIPS, attention should be drawn to the 
fact that although the minimum standards under TRIPS may result in 
some degree of harmonization, they have not imposed uniform law. 
TRIPS Agreement leaves certain flexibility for WTO member 
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countries to adopt different legislative policies in some respects. Least 
developed countries may use such flexibility to encourage 
competition, technology transfer, the diffusion of existing 
technologies and innovation.863  
  In the field of patents, developing and least developed countries 
should be aware of the fact that TRIPS has not defined what an 
invention is; it has only specified the requirements for patentability. 
This will enable member countries to determine what can be 
considered an invention and hence a patentable subject matter. Thus, 
member countries may exclude from patentability any substance, 
which exists in nature, if claimed as such without modification. 
Particularly, “DNA molecules may be regarded as building blocks of 
nature, which should be free for use by the scientific community and 
for any research or productive application. Similarly, patenting of 
software and business methods is not an obligation under the TRIPS 
Agreement”. It has been recommended that, in order to preserve and 
enhance competition, developing and least developed countries should 
apply strict standards for patentability requirements, particularly 
novelty and inventive step, without violating their international 
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obligations.864 Moreover, particular concern should be given to the 
following issues: 
  Parallel imports: generally countries refer to parallel imports to 
encourage competition when the prices of the protected goods in the 
place of protection are higher than elsewhere. This practice is based 
on the doctrine of exhaustion of rights (in the US it is known as the 
doctrine of first sale). According to this doctrine the rights holder has 
no right to prevent the further marketing of his products once placed 
on the market by him or his licensee. It has been applied with respect 
to industrial property titles (patents and trademarks) as well as 
copyright. Although originally the doctrine of exhaustion of rights 
was limited to the domestic market, it has become increasingly 
applicable on international basis. The application of this principle at 
the international level has been recognized under Article 6 of TRIPS. 
Developing and least developed countries should be aware of this 
flexibility and leave room for it in their intellectual property laws, 
especially the patents. It is worthy to mention here that when South 
Africa included similar provision in its Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Amendment Act 1997, it faced enormous pressure 
from the US government and the international pharmaceutical 
industry. However, eventually South Africa succeeded in resisting this 
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pressure with the help of a number of international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), especially those concerned with the dramatic 
rise of HIV-related infection in South Africa.865    
  Exceptions to patent right: Article 30 of TRIPS provides in general form for 
exceptions that member countries may allow. Based on comparative law, the 
exceptions that may be allowed within the scope of Article 30 may include the 
following: 
- acts done privately and on a non-commercial scale, or for a 
non-commercial purpose; 
- use of the invention for research; 
- use of the invention for teaching purposes; 
- experimentation on the invention to test or improve on it; 
- preparation of medicines under individual prescriptions; 
- experiments made for the purposes of seeking regulatory 
approval for marketing of a product after the expiration of a 
patent; and 
- use of the invention by a third party that had used it bona 
fide before the date of application of the patent.866 
  Compulsory licensing: A compulsory license is an "authorization 
given by the government for the use by a third party, without the 
consent of the right-owner of a patent or intellectual property right”.  
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TRIPS recognizes under Article 31 the right of each country to grant 
compulsory licenses under certain conditions. However, TRIPS has 
not specified the grounds under which compulsory licenses can be 
granted, but generally national laws may provide for granting 
compulsory license in cases of national emergencies and non-
commercial governmental use, even without informing or getting the 
consent of the titleholder in advance. In other cases compulsory 
licenses may be granted whenever the titleholder refuses to grant 
voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms. Reference is often 
made to a non-exhaustive list, which includes “national emergency or 
extreme urgency, dependency of patents, licenses for governmental 
non-commercial use, and licenses to remedy anti-competitive 
practices”.867 
   ‘Bolar’ exception: Under this exception the competitors of the 
patentee of a pharmaceutical product are allowed to conduct tests in 
relation to the invention and obtain the approval from the health 
authorities before the expiration of the patent, for the purpose of 
commercialization of a generic version, just after the expiration of the 
patent. In exchange of this permission the period of the patent may be 
extended for some time. The purpose of this exception is to help the 
producers of generic drugs to place their products on the market as 
                                                 
867  Ibid. at 48-9. 
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soon as possible after the expiration of the patent. ‘Bolar’ exception is 
receiving growing recognition in many developed countries including 
the US, where the patentee may be given up to five years more for the 
life of its patent in consideration of the exercise of this exception, but 
it is still unusual in developing countries. According to a decision of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, this exception is not against 
TRIPS. Moreover, “to be consistent with TRIPS requirements, this 
exception does not need to be linked to the extension of the life of the 
respective patents”.868    
  Protection of data submitted for registration: usually, national 
authorities require information about the efficacy and toxicity of 
pharmaceutical products as a condition for the registration of these 
products. Whether the originators of this information are entitled to 
exclusive rights over such information has been a controversial issue. 
In the US the originator of the information is given additional five 
years for the exclusive use of the data. In EU the originator is given 
additional 10 years for the exclusive use of the data. It has been 
argued that this is beyond the standards prescribed by TRIPS, which 
gives member countries under Article 39.3 the options to decide how 
they wish to regulate the protection of undisclosed information 
submitted for registration of pharmaceutical products. It is 
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recommended that when choosing between granting exclusive rights 
or merely preventing unfair commercial use of such information, 
“policy makers will have to weigh the protection of the interests of 
originator companies against the importance of creating an 
environment that fosters competition and increases access to 
drugs”.869The measures that should be applied by developing 
countries in the field of patents are summarized in CIPR Report as 
follows: 
- exclude totally from patentability diagnostic, therapeutic 
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and 
animals. 
- Exclude from patentability plants and animals and adopt a 
restrictive definition of microorganisms. 
- Exclude from patentability computer programs and business 
methods. 
- Avoid patenting of new uses of known products. 
- Avoid using the patent system to protect plant varieties and 
where possible, genetic material. 
- Provide for international exhaustion of patents rights. 
- Provide an effective compulsory licensing system and 
adequate government use provisions. 
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- Provide broadest possible exceptions to patent rights 
including adequate research exemption exception and 
explicit 'Bolar exception'. 
- Apply strict standards of novelty, inventive step and 
industrial application or utility (consider higher standards 
than currently applied in developed countries). 
- Make use of strict patentability and disclosure requirements 
to prevent unduly broad claims in patent applications. 
- Provide a relatively low cost opposition or re-examination 
procedure. 
- Provide means to prevent the granting or enforcement of 
patents comprising biological material or associated 
traditional knowledge obtained in contravention of access 
legislation or the provisions of the CBD. 
- Consider providing alternative forms of protection to 
encourage sub-patentable type local innovation.870 
  It has been recommended that developing countries should benefit 
from the freedom left for member countries in areas of IPRs not 
covered by TRIPS as well as from the scope of different 
interpretations of existing obligations in ways that serve their 
developmental purposes. In this respect, it has been recommended that 
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developing and least developed countries must extend not only 
traditional copyright exemptions to content on digital networks, 
especially those relating to fundamental freedoms and public interest, 
but also introduce new exceptions to facilitate access to information, 
research and transmission of knowledge and culture871.  
  According to Professor Reichman, developing and least developed 
countries should depend on self-help to experiment with new forms of 
intellectual property protection that may stimulate local innovation at 
lower social costs. He argues that the hybrid forms of exclusive 
intellectual property rights such as utility model laws, design 
protection laws, plant variety protection laws and the like, which have 
been designed by some of the developed countries to stimulate small-
scale innovation, are not suitable for developing and least developed 
countries because of their high social costs and numerous technical 
disadvantages. Instead, he argues that a growing number of legal and 
economic studies show that a new type of intellectual property rights 
known as ‘liability rules’ are better for developing countries than 
antiquated exclusive rights regimes such as utility model laws and the 
like. Unlike the hybrid exclusive property rights, the liability rules do 
not require second comers to get licenses from the originators but, 
instead, enable them to borrow technology for further improvement 
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and follow-on applications in return of a relatively set table of 
royalties. The characteristic features of this regime are that it protects 
innovators from wholesale duplication, allow them to get reasonable 
compensation for follow-on applications, and give them the right to 
borrow back the improver’s own improvements for further innovation 
for similar compensation. He believes that “such regimes should 
stimulate investments in small-scale innovation without obstructing 
follow-on applications, without creating barriers to entry, and without 
impoverishing the research commons or the public domain, as occurs 
under hybrid exclusive property rights in developed countries”. To 
meet their international obligations, developing countries may grant 
foreigners the international minimum standards available for similar 
IPRs. Likewise, their nationals are entitled to get abroad the same 
international minimum standards for similar IPRs.872 Moreover, in 
relation to software, developing and least developed countries need to 
find alternatives to proprietary regimes. It is believed that the most 
important alternative available currently is the Open Source model, 
which is beneficial for these countries not only in “improving access 
to software, but also for the opportunities it offers to facilitate the 
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training of domestic software engineers, and the relatively low cost of 
complementary technologies”.873  
  Furthermore, developing and least developed countries should 
incorporate treaty norms into their domestic laws in ways that are 
sensitive to development concerns and avoid as far as possible 
verbatim incorporation of treaty language into their domestic laws 
because treaty language often reflects specific understanding that may 
not be supporting for their developmental purposes. Likewise, 
developing and least developed countries should carefully study the 
legal relationship between different intellectual property treaties and 
how to comply with their obligations in consistent and complementary 
way.874 However, the legislative efforts need to be supported by 
competent enforcement institutions that interpret and apply the 
legislative rules in ways that strike a balance between public and 
private interests. It has been observed that one of the reasons of the 
success of the United Sٍtates in its earlier stages of development was 
that its judges and legal practitioners adopted an instrumentalist 
approach that interpreted the law in ways conducive to economic 
development.875 In this respect CIPR Report recommends that: 
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            Developing countries should ensure that their IP 
legislation and procedures emphasise, to the maximum 
possible extent, enforcement of IPRs through 
administrative action and through the civil rather than 
criminal justice system. Enforcement procedures should be 
fair and equitable to both parties and ensure that 
injunctions and other measures, are not used unduly by IP 
rightsholders to block legitimate competition.  Public funds 
and donor programmes should mainly be used to improve 
IP enforcement as part of broader strengthening of the 
legal and judicial systems.876   
 
iii) Managing and Influencing On-going International 
Negotiations on Further IPRs Harmonization 
   Generally, it has been recommended that developing countries 
should participate in the on-going standard-setting exercises; 
otherwise their interests are unlikely to be accommodated. They 
should adopt a clear strategy and an articulated position to any 
negotiation. They should first identify common grounds of interest 
and/or concern among themselves and then at the broader negotiation 
forum. “Earlier introduction of issues of concern for development 
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objectives should be an integral part of the discussions”. They should 
be aware of the fact that their interests tend to coincide with the 
interests of second comers, improvers, and value adders worldwide; 
therefore, they should build alliance with the members of the civil 
society and other interest groups in developed countries. Issues that 
may constitute framework/agenda for the negotiations, among others, 
may include the need to identify: how the major treaties under each 
category interact with development goals; the development losses due 
to multiple membership in overlapping, conflicting and superfluous 
agreements; and the relationship between various treaties affecting 
IPRs. As concerns the Internet and electronic commerce, it has been 
observed that developing countries did not play a significant role in 
the technical architecture of the Internet; however, they should not 
miss to “play a role in determining how access to the Internet, in all its 
various permutations, will enhance their capacity and opportunity for 
effective improvement of the quality of life for their citizens”. In 
particular they should work to influence the current multilateral 
negotiations to establish regulatory norms that result in principles 
encouraging competition in the Internet through balanced IPRs and 
how to translate the economies of scale that are made possible by 
information technology in the intellectual property context to assist in 
“(1) gains for developing countries with regard to access issues; and 
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(2) reducing costs of participation in negotiation, drafting and 
coordination between the various regional and international 
intellectual property offices”.877  
  Moreover, in order to strengthen their bargaining position, they 
should link the results of any negotiations in the WTO on intellectual 
property and electronic commerce to results in areas such as 
biodiversity, farmers rights, traditional knowledge, geographical 
indications and other areas of interest for developing countries.878 In 
order to manage effective negotiations, developing and least 
developed countries are in need to have "permanent representation in 
Geneva; appropriately staffed expert delegations able to attend 
meetings and negotiations; adequate technical support for policy 
analysis; and functional mechanisms for policy co-ordination and 
discussion in capitals".879 
 
iv) Developing Strategies and Setting the Agenda for the 
Future 
     While the development needs differ from country to country, 
developing and least developed countries are in need to identify their 
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individual as well as collective interests and work collectively to 
translate these interests in policies, negotiating goals and positions to 
support their overall development framework; and allocate resources, 
both human and financial, to execute them. Strategies should focus 
heavily on areas of common interest for all developing and least 
developed countries so as to develop common position for any future 
negotiations. “There should also be some consideration given for 
creating alliances with some developed countries in areas where those 
countries might share similar concerns. This was a strategy that 
worked very well during the TRIPS negotiations as well as during the 
WCT/WPPT negotiations”.880  
  It has been recommended that developing countries should insist on the 
preservation of the balance, on which intellectual property has been premised, i.e., 
the balance between the interests of right holders and the interests of society in 
general. Some commentators summarize the requirements for achieving this 
purpose, particularly in relation to copyright, in the following propositions: 
- That it is important that the domain of protection of 
intellectual property rights be confined to ‘creations’ and 
‘technological innovations’ but exclude the investments 
made and the technological measures introduced for their 
protection. Any other solution would be prejudicial to 
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developing countries and the non-commercial sector, 
particularly to libraries and institutions of learning. 
- That it is useful to reassert the principles underlying 
exceptions to intellectual property rights, to reconsider the 
current list using these principles as a yardstick, or even to 
add new exceptions, and finally to safeguard their 
compulsory character. It is particularly important for 
UNESCO that exceptions for scientific, educational and 
journalistic purposes be maintained. 
- That it is indispensable to safeguard the universal right to 
access to the ‘informational public domain’ which brings 
together the information essential for the citizen of a modern 
democratic society (statistical, regulatory, environmental 
and safety-related information) and which each State must 
control without risk of confiscation of that control by private 
companies. 
- Finally, that, considering the development of technological 
measures of protection, it is urgent to recall that the 
intellectual property right is not designed to legitimize 
measures of control over access that, if these must be 
protected by common law, proper protection must be found, 
independent of copyright, in the regulation of product 
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distribution, i.e., the service of providing conditional access 
to those products, which will thus no longer be able to 
jeopardize the desired balance between the interests of 
copyright holders and societal or public interests- a balance 
that is at the very heart of intellectual property rights.881  
     It has been observed that developing countries are often caught 
unaware or unprepared when developed countries submit new issues 
for negotiation. “As a strategic matter, it is important for developing 
countries to think ahead about issues that developed countries 
priorities/interests may later suggest as the appropriate subject of 
multilateral negotiations”. To circumvent such future possibilities, the 
representative of developing and least developed countries in both 
WTO and WIPO “should appreciate intellectual property as a tool for 
development policy, and not merely as a contentious area to be 
designed and redesigned in response to developed countries’ demands 
or political pressures”. It is conceded that it may take some time to 
significantly influence the course of such complex processes such as 
the WIPO Patent Agenda, yet, as a starting point developing and least 
developed countries should immediately begin a debate within WIPO 
about the impact of upward international harmonization of IPRs on 
their development prospects. “The key to such constructive influence 
                                                 
881  See Dusollier, Poullet and Buydens, supra note 13, at 29-30. 
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in WIPO clearly lies in higher levels of engagement and coordination 
than currently exists”.882  
Conclusion 
  The Internet has brought great social, economic and even political 
transformations worldwide. In addition to facilitating different ways of cheap 
communications, the convergence of information and communication 
technologies has made possible the digitalization and transfer of data in different 
fields of knowledge and in volumes unimaginable before. The emergence of 
electronic commerce has opened new horizons for commerce throughout the 
world. However, as far as developing and least developed countries are concerned, 
there are different obstacles impeding their access to the Internet and electronic 
commerce. Besides infrastructure barriers, represented in the shortage in 
computers (hardware and software) and telecommunications, the legal and 
technical measures applied by the owners of content on-line to prevent 
unauthorized access, has added a further layer of complications for developing 
and least developed countries.  
  Moreover, one of the negative ramifications of electronic commerce is the move 
towards further strengthening and internationalization of intellectual property 
rights under the name of harmonization. Different forums are participating in the 
lawmaking process of international intellectual property law. Harmonization, 
which is often modeled on the intellectual property laws of developed countries, 
results in strengthening IPRs in developing countries. It has been argued that 
while the short-term costs of strong IPRs, in terms of high prices and stifling of 
                                                 
882  See Okediji, ‘New Treaty Development, supra note 32, at 6. See also, Correa & Musungu, supra 
note 22 at 28. 
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competition and innovation are definite, the long-term benefits, such as transfer of 
technology and FDI, are uncertain. Developing and least developed countries are 
in need of intellectual property systems that respond positively to their 
developmental objectives. In particular, they need intellectual property systems 
that encourage competition and innovation. In order to achieve this objective they 
have to participate effectively in the international intellectual property lawmaking 
processes. 
  However, developing and least developed countries are facing 
technical and capacity gaps in four areas. These four areas are as 
follows: understanding the concepts, issues, benefits and risks of 
intellectual property protection; implementing and complying with 
existing commitments; managing and influencing on-going 
negotiations on further commitments; and making and developing 
strategies and setting the agenda for the future. Developing and least 
developed countries are in need to identify their individual as well as 
collective interests in the field of intellectual property and work 
together to fill the above gaps by tailoring locally intellectual property 
systems that meet their developmental goals and unify their efforts 
internationally for the same purpose.  
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Chapter 10 
 
 
Conclusion and Proposals for Reform 
 
  The roots of intellectual property are believed to refer to prehistory ages. 
Prehistory forms of intellectual property, however, were mainly 
identity related symbols or marks and secrets. The protection of 
these rights was probably depending on customs and the self-
imposed rules that governed each sector of commerce. Although 
the interference of the ruler or sovereign in the protection of IPRs 
could be traced back to the Roman era, the commercial value of 
IPRs had become clear only in the Middle Ages. Different 
incentives were offered to inventors to encourage them to exert 
more efforts. This includes gifts, prizes and patent privileges. The 
protection was confined mainly to the nationals of each country. 
Foreigners were only awarded protection if there was need for their 
works in the receiving country. Copyright protection was affected 
by the discovery of the printer, which facilitated making of copies 
and paved the way for fraudulent re-print. Privileges of printing 
were given to publishers. Authors were given only the amount of 
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reward they agreed upon with the publishers. In the 1850s or 
thereabout the modern intellectual property law emerged as a 
discrete body of law. 
   The expansion of trade between states necessitated the protection of 
foreigners’ IPRs. This was first secured by bilateral treaties and 
later on evolved into multilateral system of protection. The main 
multilateral conventions in this respect were the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883 and the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works in 
1886. However, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed 
tremendous transformations in the field of IPRs. The massive 
increase in exchange of goods and services worldwide has resulted 
in the so-called globalization of trade. The last quarter of the 
twentieth century, in particular, witnessed dramatic advances in 
fields such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, information and 
digital technologies, telecommunications, electronics, and 
electronic commerce. As a result, the economies of the developed 
countries, especially the United States, Europe and Japan, have 
transformed from economies depending on traditional industries 
and means of production to information-based economies. The new 
information technologies have facilitated the high quality copying 
and transmission of intellectual property materials all over the 
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world. Trading in pirated and counterfeit goods had flourished in 
the eighties and nineties of the last century to the extent that the US 
amended in 1988 its Trade Act of 1974 to make access to its 
markets dependant on the adoption or implementation by its 
trading partners of stronger intellectual property protection than 
they already had. The traditional multilateral system, which was 
based on territoriality and substantive minimum standards, was 
found to be insufficient for the international protection of IPRs.  
   The first practical step towards internationalization of IPRs was the 
adoption of TRIPS in 1994. TRIPS has caused formidable 
transformation in the notion of intellectual property protection by 
reducing intellectual property issues into trade issues subject to 
measures of enforcement ordinarily conceived to resolve trade 
distortions. However, the emergence of new technologies such as 
the Internet and electronic commerce has rendered TRIPS outdated 
and triggered the move towards further strengthening of 
international IPRs under the name of international harmonization 
of IPRs. The international intellectual property lawmaking process 
is increasingly becoming more complicated. Different forums are 
participating in this process including a diversity of multilateral 
agreements, international organizations, bilateral and regional 
arrangements and even private entities,. Almost all these 
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institutions overlap in driving towards globally harmonized and 
strengthened IPRs. In addition to bilateral treaties between 
developed and developing countries, which aim to raise the 
minimum IPRs Standards above the levels of TRIPS (so-called 
TRIPS plus), the international intellectual property system has 
witnessed many developments. In the field of copyright two 
agreements were concluded in 1996, viz., WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 
Likewise, in the field of patents, the Patent Law Treaty was 
concluded in 2000 and another treaty under the title ‘Substantive 
Patent Law Treaty’ is currently (2004) under negotiations.  
  The protection of IPRs nationally and internationally always requires 
the definition of the rights to be protected, their nature, purpose and 
scope. There is no specific definition for the term ‘intellectual 
property’. Generally, it refers to the legal rights that result from an 
activity of the mind in the fields of industry, science, literary and 
artistic works. Article 2(viii) of the Convention Establishing the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 1967 provides that 
intellectual property shall include rights relating to literary, artistic and 
scientific works; performances of performing artists, phonograms, and 
broadcasts; inventions in all fields of human endeavor; scientific 
discoveries; industrial designs; trademarks, service marks, and 
 605
commercial names and designations; and protection against unfair 
competition. The intellectual property law is growing and developing 
continuously so as to accommodate new technologies and other forms 
of innovations and human creativity. The creation of new intellectual 
property rights can be achieved either by way of accretion or 
emulation. Accretion involves re-defining an existing right so as to 
accommodate the new subject matter, whereas emulation requires the 
creation of a new and distinct right based on eclectic analogy from the 
existing rights. Different factors affect the choice between accretion 
and emulation, such as the suitability of the existing rights for the 
emerging material and the acceptability of a sui generis form of right. 
  The purpose of intellectual property law is to safeguard the rights of 
creators and other producers of intellectual goods and services, by 
granting them the right to control the use made of their products, 
subject to certain exceptions and limitations determining their scope 
and duration and restricted by the supervening public interest. 
Different approaches have been adopted as concerns the justifications 
for granting property rights in intellectual goods. While the Anglo-
American systems adopted a utilitarian approach based on the notion 
of incentives, the Civil Law systems based their justifications on the 
theory of natural rights. It has been argued that the history of 
intellectual property does not support either approach and that modern 
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IPRs is no more than a legal arm of the economic-technical structure 
in the industrial countries.  
  Throughout their history intellectual property rights have 
often been affected by new technologies in a way or another. 
The latest technology that has brought tremendous 
transformations in the field of IPRs is the Internet. The 
invention of the Internet by all means is a revolution in the 
field of communications in the twentieth century. Its vast 
abilities in performing different kinds of communication 
activities including real-time communications, one-to-one 
messaging and retrieval of information efficiently and 
effectively at low costs have revolutionized the interactions 
of humans all over the world and truly rendered the world a 
small village. The exponential growth of the users of the 
Internet proves that it is a popular medium. Its various 
applications facilitate almost all aspects of life. It surpassed 
all previous communications means in facilitating the 
communications and dissemination of information. As a 
result, it has generated transformative social practices, which 
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need legal response.  However, as a tool, the Internet can be 
exploited for good and for evil. Some are using the Internet 
for illegal practices including criminal activities, civil wrongs 
and infringement of rights. The transborder nature of the 
Internet has added further complications for the problems 
resulting from its use. Actions taking place on the Internet are 
taking place instantaneously everywhere, if anywhere. Efforts 
have been exerted within individual sovereign countries as 
well as at the international level to find solutions for these 
legal controversies.  
  Different approaches have been advanced for the 
governance of the Internet. One approach calls for separate 
virtual space to be governed by independent rules. The 
supporters of this view argue that the Internet Service 
Providers and users have formed separate virtual 
communities capable of creating their own normative rules. 
Individual countries cannot and should not control 
cyberspace, because actions on the Internet take place 
everywhere instantaneously, not in any place in particular. 
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This approach has been criticized as illogical and unrealistic, 
simply because it ignores salient facts such as the presence of 
the participants in Internet activities in the physical world and 
the direct positive and/or negative impacts of the Internet on 
various aspects of life in real space. Another approach calls 
for the application of the existing legal system. The 
supporters of this view contend that most of the problems 
generated by the Internet are not new and that the traditional 
rules of the existing laws are flexible enough and can be 
adapted to accommodate even those problems, which may be 
considered as new. The criticism directed at this approach is 
that it ignores the peculiarities of the Internet. A third 
approach adopts what is known as ‘code solution’. The 
exponents of this viewpoint argue that the resolution of the 
Internet controversies lies in interplay of law and technology. 
They believe that the governance of cyberspace can be 
achieved through modifications in the architecture of the 
Internet infrastructure supported by the power of law, i.e., the 
law can enforce its values through imposing the designing or 
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modification of the architecture of the Internet infrastructure 
in ways that serve its values. The criticism directed at this 
approach is that code solution may not be perfect and it may 
be circumvented. Moreover, even if it is perfect, it may 
transcend other activities not intended and bring negative 
results. The fourth approach suggests a hybrid form of 
regulation taking into account the Internet peculiarities as 
well as the direct concerns of the real world with its activities. 
The hybrid form of regulation approach may offer a good 
solution if it considers not only the peculiarities of the 
Internet, but also its connections with the physical world and, 
moreover, within the physical world it must take account of 
the economic, social and political peculiarities of each 
sovereign country, especially the developing countries.  
  As has been stated above, the Internet has revolutionized the 
social and economic activities all over the world. One of the 
economic activities that have been revolutionized is trading 
via the Internet, namely electronic commerce. The 
application of the World Wide Web has facilitated the 
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interaction between businesses as well as businesses and 
consumers. Moreover, international trade is no longer 
confined exclusively to big businesses. The international 
nature of the Internet and the easy and low cost of access to it 
have enabled small and medium sized enterprises to 
participate in the international trade. The genius of the 
Internet lies, not in facilitating transactions for tangible 
goods, regardless of the progress it brought in this area, but in 
revolutionizing commerce in the field of intangible goods and 
services. In addition to promoting electronic contracting for 
intangible goods and services, the Internet has enabled online 
delivery of these goods and services. As a result, the Internet 
is expected to be the main medium for contracting and 
delivery of goods and services such as computer software, 
entertainment products, information services, technical 
information, products licenses, financial services and 
professional services.  
It has been stated that the emergence of the electronic 
commerce has fueled dramatic developments for the digital 
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economy reflected in financial markets and trade flows, 
innovative models for business and new opportunities for 
consumers. The size of these developments is so big that 
electronic commerce has become a subject of economic, 
policy and social importance. However, the growth and 
expansion of electronic commerce are facing impediments of 
different kinds: financial, legal and in relation to market 
access. In the legal field electronic commerce is confronting 
lack of predictable legal environment due to legal uncertainty 
in relation to the formation of electronic contracts and their 
validity in the light of the formalities required by law or the 
parties to a contract in paper-based environment such as 
writing, originality and signature, in addition to issues 
relating to the authentication of electronic documents and 
their admissibility and evidential weight. Other forms of legal 
uncertainty are found in the area of the applicable law and 
enforcement, in addition to other related legal issues such as 
the protection of consumers, intellectual property and 
privacy. Moreover, there are fears from intensive government 
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intervention such as imposing extensive regulation on the 
Internet and electronic commerce, especially in fields such as 
taxes, customs duties, restriction on types of information to 
be transmitted, licensing requirements and the extent of 
responsibility of service providers.  
 Different approaches have been advanced for the regulation 
of electronic commerce including calls for an international 
uniform law via treaties, model laws, law merchant (lex 
mercatoria) and a hybrid form of regulation. To date there are 
many legislative attempts nationally and at the international 
level addressing issues pertaining to the regulation of 
electronic commerce. The aim of these legislative endeavors 
is to secure trustworthy digital transactions based on legal 
principles and technical capabilities so as to promote reliable 
digital authentication and limit the rights and obligations of 
the parties involved. Amongst these attempts are the works of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), including UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce 1996 and UNCITRAL Model Law on 
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Electronic Signature 2001, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) Guidec I (1997) and Guidec II (2001) on 
General Usage of International Digitally Ensured Commerce, 
the European Union Directive on Electronic Signature 1999, 
the works of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), in addition to national legislation such 
as the US Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act 
(UCITA). 
 However, still there are many controversial areas. For 
example, as regards the formation of electronic contracts, 
issues concerning communication of offer, acceptance and 
related notices have not been settled yet. Rules determining 
the effective time of communication need be clearly 
articulated. Also, terms such as dispatch, delivery and receipt 
have to be clearly defined. Moreover, the controversy about 
contracting by means of programmed software (electronic 
agents), especially the allocation of responsibility of the 
related parties in case of alleged error or mistake resulting 
from a defect in the programmed software, should be 
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definitely specified. As concern formalities, the functional 
equivalent approach applied for lifting formality impediments 
is still debatable and needs much analysis. Likewise the 
issues relating to authentication of electronic documents and 
their admissibility and evidential value are far from being 
settled, especially in the light of lack of judicial precedents 
supporting any of the legislative endeavors made to this 
moment.  
  The growth and flourishing of electronic commerce need 
more collective efforts. These efforts should be of 
international nature so as to cope with the international 
dimensions of electronic commerce. These efforts should not 
be selective or targeting the interests of a particular group at 
the account of others. Moreover, for such efforts to succeed 
due regard is to be given to the social, cultural and political 
divergences. Scholars from all related specializations should 
participate in these efforts without ignoring the roles of 
policy-makers and the public opinion at large. Any hasty 
endeavors may result in negative consequences. 
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       Besides its opportunities, the Internet has posed many 
challenges for the international community. Among these 
challenges are the further complexities it adds to the 
traditional rules of private international law. The Internet 
has ignored the presence of the geographical territories on 
which private international law has been premised. 
Traditionally jurisdiction is defined by reference to 
geographical territories and although the traditional 
private international law rules witnessed along their 
evolution important transformations relating to the 
stringent physicality requirements embodied in the rules 
lex locus contractu and lex locus delicti, in favour of a 
more flexible system based on what is described as 
“interest analysis”, nevertheless; the essential 
requirement of some nexus between the concerned 
jurisdiction and the persons or transactions intended to 
be subject to it, has not been abandoned.  
       The difficulty facing the traditional conflict of laws in 
this respect is that the Internet has not only weakened the 
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significance of physical locations, but destroyed them all 
together in three senses: first, the Internet ignores the 
existence of physical borders to an extent that events 
happening on the Internet may be described as happening 
simultaneously in every place reached by the Internet. 
Secondly, there are many events and transactions that 
may be described as having no physical locality in 
particular but taking place only on the network, which by 
its very nature is not a “localizable phenomenon”. For 
example, Usenet discussion groups, which consist of 
continuing changing collection of messages that are 
routed from one network to another across the global net, 
with no centralized location at all, may be considered as 
occurring everywhere, nowhere in particular. Thirdly, 
locations on the Internet can be conceived of only in a 
virtual sense by reference to the addresses of machines 
between which information and messages are routed. 
These addresses are independent of the physical locations 
in which those machines are located, i.e., it is impossible 
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to designate the physical location of users or resources 
merely by reference to the Internet’s addresses. This 
geographic indeterminacy is simply part of the network 
normal operation, without recourse to technological 
devices such cryptography or anonymous re-mailers. 
Moreover, users of the Internet may not always be aware 
of the physical jurisdictions they visited while navigating 
the World Wide Web through hyperlinks. So, owing to 
the differences in the substantive laws of different 
countries, those users may be oblivious to the fact that 
they may violate laws of different jurisdictions while 
navigating the Internet.  
       However, even if the above difficulties have been 
surmounted, the application of the traditional private 
international law rules to the Internet transactions and 
infringement of rights via the Internet is controversial, 
especially with regard to transactions or infringements 
that take place completely online. For example, where 
there is no clause for choice of forum or the applicable 
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law in case of transactions completely performed online, 
the place of performance is controversial. Likewise, in 
case of online infringement of rights such as downloading 
of an allegedly infringing copy of a copyrighted work 
from a foreign web site, a question arises as to where the 
alleged tort took place. Is it in the place where the user’s 
computer is located or in the place where the server 
hosting the downloaded material is situated? Similar 
difficult questions arise in case of infringement of other 
intellectual property rights. Even where there is a 
contractual choice of forum and applicable law, the 
application of the traditional mandatory rules relating to 
consumer protection to the Internet transactions has 
raised much controversy. Similar difficulties are found in 
relation to performance of transactions and enforcement 
of obligations, especially for small sized transactions.  
        To date, no consensus has been reached as to the proper 
way for dealing with the legal issues posed by the 
Internet. The draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
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and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
1999 has not reached consensus on its rules, particularly 
in relation to electronic commerce and infringement of 
intellectual property rights. The difficulty in this respect 
emanates from the fact that the traditional private 
international law based its rules, in absence of agreement, 
on physical points of attachment. The absence of these 
physical points of attachment in an Internet environment 
has resulted in confusion as regards the designation of the 
place of contracting or the place of performance, for 
example. Therefore, in order to solve this problem the 
parties must always include in their contract as much 
details as possible with regard to jurisdiction and the 
applicable law. In the absence of such agreement, whether 
in relation to contractual disputes or infringement of 
rights, there should be clear rules determining the 
competent court and the applicable law by designating a 
specific place instead of referring to such place by 
reference to other connecting factors, such as the place of 
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performance or the place of contracting, which are 
difficult to be determined in case of online dealings. Also 
there must be specific and clear rules as regards 
consumers’ contracts and privacy issues. As concerns 
enforcement of rights the traditional rules must be 
adapted to accommodate the emergent challenges. The 
technical devices of enforcement should be regulated by 
law so as to provide effective enforcement within the 
limits of the law. The alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, including online settlement of dispute and 
direct enforcement should be recognized and regulated by 
law so as to reach their potential.                  
  In addition to the conflict of laws complications, the Internet and 
electronic commerce have posed many challenges as well as 
opportunities for IPRs, particularly copyright. It is believed that the 
global information infrastructure (GII), with its digital distribution 
systems and multimedia works, has blurred the distinctions between 
the rights of authors, producers and performers and thus undermined 
the basis for the separation of copyright and neighboring rights. This 
transformation is problematic for the traditional copyright system, 
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which is built on different level of protection for the different 
categories of copyright and neighboring rights works. It has raised a 
lot of queries such as: how can the scope and limitations of 
exploitation rights be determined for works disseminated over digital 
networks? How do the various acts of network communication, 
including digitization, transmission, uploading, downloading, 
browsing, and viewing fit into the current copyright system? Is there 
any imminent need for redefinition or clarification of exploitation 
rights? What is the scope of the copyright exemptions on digital 
networks? In addition to issues relating to the administration and 
enforcement of the protected rights.  
Controversial issues need to be settled, for example, whether the 
temporary copies made on computers and other devices when 
accessing works online constitute reproduction of those works and 
whether this is permissible or not? Whether making a work available 
online for individuals to access at times and places chosen by them 
constitutes an act of communication to the public? Are the traditional 
exceptions and limitations suitable for being applied literary on digital 
environment? What is the effect of giving rights’ holders complete 
control over their works online through technical measures supported 
by legal provisions for the prevention of the circumvention of those 
technical measures, for instance, on the traditional copyright 
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exceptions and limitations such as duration, fair use and first sale 
doctrine? How can infringements be detected and prevented in order 
to safeguard effective protection for copyright and related rights 
materials? Who in the chain of dissemination of infringing material 
can be held responsible for infringement and what is the competent 
court and which law is applicable?  
 The careful dealing with the phenomenon of the Internet is a 
precondition for getting its benefits and avoiding its adverse 
impacts. Things need to be put into consideration when dealing 
with such phenomenon include: first, the Internet is an 
international medium that disregards altogether the traditional 
geographical borders. Second, it offers unprecedented 
opportunities of copying and distribution of copyright and related 
rights works all over the world at higher quality and speed. Third, 
this medium can be exploited by pirates to deprive rights’ holders 
of their economic as well as moral rights. Fourth, the right holders 
themselves may use technical as well as legal measures to deprive 
the ordinary end-users from their legal rights under copyright law, 
a matter that will disrupt the balance on which copyright and 
related rights are premised. In order to strike the copyright balance, 
careful analysis of the problems and the proposed solutions must 
be done at the international level. This requires that, on the one 
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hand, the scope of the rights of copyright owners must be 
specifically determined.  
  Moreover, the ways of enforcing these rights must be clearly stated. 
This necessitates first, solving issues relating to the responsibility of 
the Internet Service Providers for the infringement of copyright and 
related rights occurring on their websites. Second, agreeing on private 
international law aspects of copyright and related rights and the 
geographical locations of infringement occurring on digital networks. 
Third, specifying the extent of the legal protection to be afforded to 
the technical measures used by copyright and related rights holders for 
the protection of their rights on the digital networks. On the other 
hand, the scope of copyright exceptions and limitation on digital 
networks must be determined at an international level, putting into 
consideration the rights of developing countries in the dissemination 
of knowledge and transfer of technology. Specifically, exceptions and 
limitations that are based on public interest considerations must be 
preserved on digital networks. Also, the ways of enforcement of these 
exceptions and limitations online must be clearly stated. This requires 
that: first, right holders must be forced to allow the exercise of 
copyright exemptions online. Second, technical measures blocking the 
exercise of these exceptions and limitation should not be afforded 
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legal protection. Third, contracts depriving end-users of their rights in 
copyright exemptions should be denied validity.  
  Likewise, the Internet and electronic commerce have brought challenges to the traditional trademarks law. The role of 
trademarks in cyberspace is not less than their role in real space, if not more. To play this role effectively, trademarks law 
needs to address these challenges properly. The challenges facing trademarks range from the difficulty of tailoring the 
conventional trademarks law to fit the traditional forms of infringements that have been extended to cyberspace, to the 
difficulty of dealing with new practices harmful to trademark rights and at the same time may not be easily conceptualized 
within the traditional forms of infringements. First of all, although there is a general international consensus that trademarks 
concepts such as the requirement of use, the likelihood of confusion and the definition of infringement should be extended 
to the Internet practices, determining what constitutes use, confusion and similarity on digital networks has been found to 
be problematic.  
Moreover, Internet users have developed new forms of practices that have proven to be detrimental to trademarks owners 
even though it may not be always easy to conceptualize the injury resulting from such practices under the rules of the 
traditional trademarks law. The peculiarities of the Internet have generated new visible and even invisible uses of 
trademarks. These peculiarities have rendered even invisible use of trademarks harmful and thus actionable. The role of 
trademarks is no longer confined to their traditional function as identifiers of enterprises’ goods and services from those of 
their competitors. Trademarks are currently used as domain names, meta tags, keywords etc. Of course, these uses are built 
on the original function of trademarks, i.e., they depend on the fame and goodwill of trademarks as identifiers of goods and 
services. Even some of these uses, such as the use of trademarks as domain names are continuing, in most aspects, to play 
the role of identification. The registration of trademarks as domain names is one of the earliest problems that have faced 
trademarks owners. When trademarks’ owners became aware of the importance of the use of trademarks as domain names, 
they found that cyber-pirates had already discovered this fact and registered most of the well-known and distinctive marks 
as domain names so as to re-sell them to their owners or competitors, benefiting from the policy of first came first served, 
which was adopted by domain names’ registrars. Likewise, trademarks are embedded in HTML codes as meta tags and 
keywords, and used in linking and framing, and in pop-up ads and mouse-trapping in order to mislead or divert customers 
looking for those trademarks.  
  There is almost general consensus that most of the above practices are unfair and harmful for trademarks’ owners. 
However, courts have found difficulty in classifying these practices under the traditional forms of trademarks infringement, 
because concepts such as the ‘confusing use of a trademark within the course of trade’ are not easily satisfied. Therefore, 
courts have resorted to giving expanded meanings to the traditional concepts or to refer to unfair competition law so as to 
prevent these mal practices. Moreover, within the national context, some countries have enacted laws dealing with these 
practices in order to help their courts to combat such acts, whereas within the international context, WIPO issued the WIPO 
Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on the Internet 
(the ‘Joint Recommendation), which was adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the General Assembly of WIPO in September 2001, in order to guide national legislature when enacting 
legislation treating these new practices.  
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  Furthermore, other peculiarities of the Internet, such as its borderless nature and the fact that a domain name, for example, 
can only be registered in the name of one person at a time in a certain general Top Level Domain (gTLD) or a country code 
Top Level Domain (ccTLD), have inflicted a further blow on the traditional trademarks law, which has been based on 
territoriality and co-existence of identical or confusingly similar trademarks for different categories of goods or services 
even in the same country and, the co-existence of identical or confusingly similar marks for similar goods or services in 
different territories. The use of a trademark on the Internet is no longer confined to the territory in which it is registered or 
otherwise protected, as it can be seen worldwide in every place reached by the Internet. Under such circumstances a 
trademark owner may find himself involved in legal proceedings in jurisdictions where his trademark is not recognized or 
protected. As each trademark owner has acquired his rights in his trademark on legitimate basis, it would be unfair to prefer 
either right holder at the account of the other. Likewise, if left without solution, this problem would stifle the progress of 
electronic commerce, as each trademark owner would seek to block his competitors with the help of his national courts. 
 Therefore, creative methods should be sought so as to solve the problem of co-existence of trademarks on the Internet. In 
this respect the WIPO Joint Recommendation has provided for guidelines that can help national legal systems to reach fair 
results. There are different steps that should be followed to achieve these fair results. First, a trademark owner may use his 
trademark on the Internet in an ordinary way until he is notified of the existence of a conflicting right. When notified of a 
conflicting right, the trademark owner should take reasonable steps to avoid making any confusion or causing commercial 
effect in the territory in which the conflicting trademark is protected. Second, in order to be subject to litigation in a 
particular territory, a conflicting trademark must be found to have been used in that territory. Third, a trademark is deemed 
to have been used in a particular territory if it has commercial effect in that territory. Fourth, the remedies to be granted by 
the court assuming jurisdiction should be confined to an injunction preventing the use of the conflicting mark in the 
concerned territory and awarding of damages to the extent of the commercial effect which resulted from the use of that 
mark in the concerned territory. Fifth, Global injunction may be granted in exceptional cases where, for example, a user of 
a sign on the Internet has intentionally and in bad faith targeted a right holder in a particular territory. Sixth, in principle, 
only the court where the defendant is domiciled, resident or legally established is competent to grant global prohibition. 
Seventh, only where there is abusive behavior from the part of the defendant, a court where the plaintiff is domiciled or 
where the harmful act occurred may be competent to grant global injunction.  
  As in the cases of copyright and trademarks the Internet 
and electronic commerce have posed challenges on the 
patent system. The response of the patent system to 
electronic commerce-related inventions is still at its first 
stages. It ranges from complete denial of patentability of 
electronic commerce-related inventions, to almost full 
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recognition. Proportionately, patentability of software as 
such is less controversial than patentability of methods of 
doing business. At least in the United States of America, 
software patentability has found almost full official 
recognition represented in the decisions of US courts and 
the practice of USPTO. However, although patentability 
of business methods is strongly leading its way for full 
recognition in US, it is still debatable. Few other countries 
are recognizing the patentability of electronic commerce-
related inventions. The extreme arguments against the 
patentability of software generally and methods of doing 
business in particular are premised on fear of preempting 
the whole algorithms on which these inventions are based. 
It is believed that owing to the incremental nature of 
innovation in software, access to existing programs is 
essential for innovation and competition. Patenting 
computer programs may seriously restrict access to ideas 
and concepts underlying these programs. Moreover, 
patenting business methods may entail costly litigation 
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that may result in stifling trade and force local firms out 
of market.  
 Other commentators focus on the lack of novelty and 
inventive step in business methods inventions. It has been 
argued that most of business methods inventions are no 
more than the automation of business methods available 
in the real world.     Different suggestions have been 
advanced for dealing with electronic commerce-related 
inventions. Even those who object to patenting of these 
inventions, acknowledge the need for some sort of 
protection for the efforts of innovators in this field. It is 
conceded that the easy and fast copying of these 
inventions, facilitated by digitization of data and 
computer networks, has serious threats on the ability of 
those innovators to benefit from the lead-time first to 
invent advantage. Therefore, some form of sui generis 
protection taking into account the needs of the society for 
free access to knowledge on one hand and the rights of 
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innovators in a fair form of protection, on the other, may 
provide a better alternative.  
For those criticizing the permissive nature of examination 
relating to other requirements of patentability, the 
solution lies in the strict adherence to other patentability 
requirements, especially non-obviousness requirement. It 
is believed that examination of non-obviousness should be 
extended to cover not only electronic commerce prior art 
but also real world prior art, through broad application 
of the doctrine of analogous arts. Other approaches for 
limiting the scope of business methods patents is through 
narrow application of the doctrine of equivalents. 
However, the application of the other requirements of 
patentability, such as novelty and inventive step, is made 
by reference to prior art. Thus determining the proper 
scope of prior art for electronic commerce-related 
inventions is a very important issue.  
Moreover, the international dimensions of the Internet 
and electronic commerce have posed serious challenges 
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for the protection of intellectual property rights, which 
have been previously provided on territorial basis. The 
international divide as concerns the competent court in 
disputes relating to intellectual property generally and 
patents in particular is reflected in the ongoing discussion 
of draft Hague Convention, which has been continuing 
since 1992 and up to date. Even if jurisdictional issues 
were solved, the recognition and enforcement of the 
resulting judgments would face considerable difficulties 
owing to the differences in substantive national 
intellectual property laws. For instance, as few countries 
recognize the patentability of electronic commerce-related 
inventions, judgments relating to these patents may not be 
recognized in other countries on public policy 
considerations.  
  As far as developing and least developed countries are concerned, the 
ubiquitous capabilities of electronic commerce offer important 
opportunities for developing countries to improve their social and 
economic growth. However, there are many challenges facing 
developing countries in this respect impeding their access to the 
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Internet and electronic commerce. Besides infrastructure barriers, 
represented in the shortage in computers (hardware and software) and 
telecommunications, the legal and technical measures applied by the 
owners of content on-line to prevent unauthorized access, has added a 
further layer of complications for developing and least developed 
countries. The fact that the Internet and electronic commerce have 
rendered intellectual property rights vulnerable to worldwide 
infringement has prompted the calls for strengthening and 
internationalization of IPRs under the name of international 
harmonization.  
  Different forums are participating in the lawmaking process of 
international intellectual property law. Harmonization, which is often 
modeled on the intellectual property laws of developed countries, 
results in strengthening IPRs in developing countries. It has been 
argued that while the short-term costs of strong IPRs, in terms of high 
prices and stifling of competition and innovation are definite, the long-
term benefits, such as transfer of technology and FDI, are uncertain. 
Developing and least developed countries are in need of intellectual 
property systems that respond positively to their developmental 
objectives. In particular, they need intellectual property systems that 
encourage competition and innovation. For developing and least 
developed countries to achieve their objective, they have to participate 
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effectively in the international intellectual property lawmaking 
process. Therefore, efforts of developing countries should not 
concentrate only on technical infrastructure, but also extend to the 
regulation of the legal environment. In this respect, the ongoing moves 
towards more harmonization of IPRs should be carefully studied and 
analyzed by the representatives of developing countries so as to 
acquire a comprehensive understanding of their various implications, 
including their impact on the access to content on the Internet, and the 
necessary safeguards for the protection of the interests of their 
countries.  
  However, developing and least developed countries would not be 
able to participate effectively in the international intellectual property 
lawmaking process and hence achieve their purposes unless they fill 
the technical and capacity gaps facing them in this respect. 
Particularly, there are four areas in which developing and least 
developed countries are facing technical and capacity gaps: 
understanding the concepts, issues, benefits and risks of intellectual 
property protection; implementing and complying with existing 
commitments; managing and influencing on-going negotiations on 
further commitments; and making and developing strategies and 
setting the agenda for the future. Developing and least developed 
countries need to identify their individual as well as collective 
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interests in the field of intellectual property and work to fill the 
mentioned gaps so as to tailor locally intellectual property systems 
that meet their developmental goals and unify their efforts 
internationally for the same purpose. 
  Finally, the Internet offers innumerable opportunities for the 
international community. One of the greatest economic opportunities 
facilitated by the Internet is electronic commerce. Electronic 
commerce offers many opportunities as well as challenges for 
intellectual property rights. The international protection of IPRs in the 
light of the expansion of electronic commerce has become a must. 
Principally, the clash between the Internet and the IPRs refers to the 
universality of the first and the territoriality of the latter. The 
ownership of IPRs is not even all over the world. While developed 
countries are classified as exporters of IPRs and other products of 
intellectual property content, developing countries generally and least 
developed countries in particular are classified as importers. The 
benefits of the exportersfrom a strong international protection of IPRs 
in terms of returns from the sale of products of intellectual property 
contents or royalties from licensing of IPRs, on one hand, are definite.  
  On the other hand, while the short-term costs for importers from a 
strong international protection of IPRs in terms of high prices and 
stifling of competition and innovation, in addition to the 
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administration and enforcement costs are undisputed, the theoretical 
long-term benefits, such as transfer of technology and FDI are 
uncertain. The conflict of interests between the different countries 
generally and the developed and developing countries in particular has 
resulted in differences in the substantive domestic intellectual property 
laws. Throughout the history of IPRs, no single country has tried to 
run the risk of the short-term costs of a strong intellectual property 
protection in hope of receiving the long-term benefits. On the 
opposite, all the developed countries of today applied intellectual 
property systems suitable to their developmental stages. Of course the 
circumstances of the past were not as those of today. Concepts such as 
‘sovereignty’ are no longer bearing the meaning they borne in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
  The current information and communication technologies have 
turned the world into a small village. Within the integrated world of 
today, it may no longer be permissible or acceptable for individual 
countries to determine their internal affairs that have international 
dimensions, such as the intellectual property rights in isolation of the 
other members of the international community. At the same time a 
compulsory international system of intellectual property rights that 
works against the interests of some of the members of the international 
community will not find its way for enforcement. Thus, while it is 
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unfair to leave IPRs vulnerable to different forms of infringements 
worldwide, it is unfair to the same extent to impose on developing 
countries intellectual property systems incommensurate with their 
developmental goals. A successful international intellectual property 
system is that one, which takes into consideration the developmental 
concerns of developing and least developed countries as well.  
 Therefore, it is recommended that the international community should 
take into account the following proposals so as to reform the 
international intellectual property system in a way that serves the 
interests of all stakeholders:  
 
1-    In order to solve the procedural problems posed by the 
emergence of the Internet and electronic commerce, which 
are threatening the effective international protection of the 
IPRs, the international community is in need of an 
international agreement regulating all the private 
international law issues relating to the Internet and 
electronic commerce generally and IPRs in particular. 
2-    As far as intellectual property is concerned, a successful 
private international law agreement requires an agreement 
on the international regulation of the Internet and on a 
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balanced comprehensive substantive international IPRs 
treaty. 
3-    The international regulation of the Internet needs collective 
governance of the Internet under the auspices of the United 
Nations.   
4- A prerequisite for a successful comprehensive substantive 
international IPRs treaty is the removal or at least 
mitigation of the territorial conflict of interests between the 
exporters and importers of IPRs. This requires the increase 
of the rate of development of the developing and least 
developed countries through different means including 
direct financial assistance, transfer of technology, 
encouragement of FDI and adoption of intellectual 
property systems promoting innovation and competition. 
5- Developed countries should put into consideration that a 
compulsory international regime of IPRs will not succeed 
even if it is included in international treaties signed by 
developing countries and incorporated in their domestic 
laws, because no political system in the developing 
countries will be willing to run the risk of enforcing an 
intellectual property regime that would add a further 
economic difficulty to the country and may result in 
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political instability. Therefore, developed countries should 
work together with developing countries for a voluntary 
international IPRs system based on conviction of its 
benefits for all the concerned parties. 
6- The current on-going race-to-the-top move towards 
internationally harmonized international IPRs should stop 
immediately and be replaced by an open international 
discussion, under the auspices of WIPO, for the 
formulation of this comprehensive and balanced 
substantive international IPRs regime.  
7- All the concerned stakeholders, including developing and 
least developed countries should participate effectively in 
this open discussion.  
8-    To participate effectively, developing and least developed 
countries are in need of immediate technical and financial 
assistance so as to fill the technical and capacity gaps in 
this respect. 
9- The technical and financial assistance should be regulated 
in a transparent way under the auspices of one of the 
specialized UN organizations such as UNCTAD, so as to 
be allocated efficiently. 
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10-   The proposed substantive international IPRs regime 
should provide an acceptable form of protection for the 
international IPRs without prejudicing developing and least 
developed countries in relation to their essential needs for 
food, medicine, access to knowledge and other 
developmental goals. This may be achieved by providing 
for fair exceptions and limitations. 
11- Developing and least developed countries should be assisted and 
encouraged to benefit from the Internet and electronic commerce. 
This can be achieved by providing them with the necessary 
infrastructure and adopting the proposed international intellectual 
property system in order to facilitate access to content online. 
12- Meanwhile, developing and least developed countries should be 
allowed to benefit from the flexibility of TRIPS to forge 
intellectual property laws that respond positively to their essential 
needs as well as their developmental goals.    
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